TO THE READER

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CHARTER FOR BRITAIN

TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

HUGH WALKER-TAYLOR

CHARTER FOR BRITAIN

by

P. N. WALKER-TAYLOR

The British Empire is no mean thing, but something to be proud of and worth serving and dying for. . . . In my person as a South African and a Boer, the British system of to-day stands vindicated before history.

FIELD-MARSHAL J. C. SMUTS,
in a broadcast, 6th Dec., 1942.

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AUTHORITIES

W. E. Woodward's A NEW AMERICAN HISTORY (Faber & Faber, London, and Farrar & Rinehart, New York); Sir Bernard Pares' RUSSIA (Penguin Books); H. A. L. Fisher's HISTORY OF EUROPE (Eyre & Spottiswoode); G. M. Trevelyan's HISTORY OF ENGLAND (Longmans Green & Co.); Gregor Ziemer's EDUCATION FOR DEATH (Constable & Co.); G. W. Johnson's ROOSEVELT (Hamish Hamilton); Louis Kronenberger's KINGS AND DESPERATE MEN (Victor Gollancz); H. K. Smith's LAST TRAIN FROM BERLIN (The Cresset Press); C. F. Strong's THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (Hodder & Stoughton); Philip Jordan's RUSSIAN GLORY (The Cresset Press); Quentin Reynolds' ONLY THE STARS ARE NEUTRAL (Cassell & Co.); Rosenberg and Thurston Hopkins' THE ROMANCE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND (Eyre & Spottiswoode).

For permission to quote from these works, I wish to acknowledge my thanks to the authors and publishers, to the publishers and executors of the late H. A. L. Fisher for the passages from his *History of Europe*, and to the publishers and H.M. Stationery Office for the passages from *Roosevelt*; and particularly I am indebted to Professor Woodward and Sir Bernard Pares, for I have quoted extensively from their books, so useful to English readers for a proper understanding of the respective histories of the United States and Russia.

WHY I AM WRITING THIS

A DAY or two after England declared war on Germany a young relation wrote asking what I thought of the world situation; among other things, did I think that the removal of Hitler would be sufficient for that particular problem? There was a rumour going round at the time that he would in effect offer that—retirement as Fuehrer, after having quickly taken what he wanted from Poland. To that part of the letter I replied something like this. Hitler is, if you like, the main source of the present Nazi infection, but, make no mistake about it, there must be by this time a considerable number of the German people also individually infected, and they are now lively sources of contagion too. The soil was in any case pretty well prepared, has been so for a couple of generations, and don't forget the present intensive sowing has been going on for six years. The contagion in this case is a conviction, or set of convictions, and convictions are mulish things. Most people, I mean most people in places I know like England and Australia and America and South Africa—and you tell me if it isn't true—don't have any real inflexible convictions about anything. A book, or a man, or a speech, or a slogan impresses them, perhaps gives them over momentarily to the beginnings of a crusading idealism; but the next day, in these free countries, they hear or read or reflect something which mitigates the diamond contours of that first impression, and the fire becomes just a warming glow of extra knowledge and understanding and sympathy. It is thus people get tolerance and wisdom. So we grow up. But consider the situation in regimented Germany. There a set of ideas is presented, and only one set of ideas. Further, not only is there no other set of ideas presented to live against it, no other set of ideas is permitted at all. And not only is this particular set presented again and again in endless repetition, dinned in by radio, public speeches, films, books, newspapers, etc., the hearing and assimilating of it is made compulsory. What must inevitably happen? Particularly think of the young people in the last six years who have never had any other ideas to live against them in leisured reflection. This happens: these ideas become convictions, a very part of themselves. We must face that. For the acceptance of this ideology is not in itself a proof of German bestiality. It is a natural event in the section affected, people being limited by humanity, and knowledge being limited by availability.

Thus I wrote; and, as it seems, I rather belaboured the word con-

viction. I do it again, for this is the point: convictions which are very personal things can also be shared, and they form (just examine yourself for an instant) the most compulsive stimulus for individual selective behaviour. And not only individual behaviour but mass behaviour. That is important. It is of tremendous importance. It is indeed, in my opinion, the most important cardinal fact for humans in the world; and that is why, surely, it is at the very least sensible, if nothing stronger, that before embracing any convictions with their dangerous dynamism we should make as certain as possible that the convictions we are to embrace are right ones and not just silly fallacies.

It is for this reason that I am writing this book. Because I have reached convictions from which I think I have clear-headedly banished most of the fallacies of ignorance and wishful thinking. After—I admit it—many searching changes of mind and hot intolerances, I have arrived at certain thoughtful and, I flatter myself, scientific conclusions about the British way of life, that sum of compromises and contradictions represented by our national philosophy and form of government.

Strangely it might seem, I have come round in almost a complete circle. As a child I started off, like most children born in the British Empire, unquestioningly, therefore unintelligently, loyal to all that England was and recommended. I have ended up more loyal, but now not stupidly, not hypnotically. I hold these convictions now because I have been driven to them by hard, inescapable, practical fact. I hope to show you.

I make no apology for the first person singular in this, because my conclusions form a subject that I and no one else am competent to deal with. It is not a hypothetical person thinking, in the same way that the subject (the fashion of viewing the world we live in) is not a hypothetical subject but a living, real, vital one, and one about which each individual must make up his individual mind. I present my experience not because I am an extraordinary person in any way, but expressly because I am, I consider, completely ordinary. The value of the book will be in that fact.

Since I know that I am average in the way of birth, education, and experience of life, I in consequence feel myself entitled to conjecture with a reasonable amount of certainty that my experience of thinking has been average too. I reckon that many other people in growing up and feeling their minds must, exactly like myself and perhaps at similar stages, have been struck with certain inconsistencies and unfairnesses and dishonesties in the British 'way' and must have reacted hotly and impulsively as I have done. Actually I know this without

conjecture, because friends and acquaintances and strangers are every day testifying to it in argument or conversation.

If there is one mental aspect in which I am not altogether average, because we all differ, it is that, by an inherited quality or something, I am intellectually not so easily satisfied as some. I want to know the reason why about things. I want to apply the acid of common sense and, where possible, scientifically proved knowledge. For, although I talk about my intelligence not being extraordinary, in fairness to the readers of this book I want to give you some assurance that I am not infra-ordinary: I am not asking you to read the pious beliefs of a feeble-minded Sunday-school teacher. I am not, I think, gullible. I am a medical graduate with several what are called higher qualifications. For two years I was engaged in research work, and that is an experience which, believe me, more than any other succeeds in giving one a cautious, not to say a suspicious, mind. In such work, to arrive at any scientific result, fact, truth only, counts, not guesses or wishes; there one soon wryly learns to distrust, or at least suspiciously examine, every written or spoken statement—even that of other scientists. On a certain point you consult the work carried out by another man, and his conclusions. They are plausible. You consult another. His conclusions and his ' facts,' the experiments on which they are based, flatly contradict. One of them you know is either lying or self-deceived. You must prove it yourself, or you must take both their conclusions, with them place as many others as you can muster, and from them extract your own. Truth is often found to lie in a mean, in a compromise; sometimes there is no exact truth at all. Prove them, or examine with an open, an unbiased, mind. And that rule should sensibly be ours in the important matter of life and how we look at it. No, I am not over-credulous. . . . Apart from these exercises, I have written some books and I have looked at the world from many countries in it.

When I first wrote this Preface I made it quite an extensive autobiography. It was a history of my social thinking from infancy. I do not now think that is necessary, and I omit or abridge it because I think the daydreams of childhood—which are childish convictions—and subsequently the ardent, unquestioning, *i.e.* ignorant, loyalties of a youth during the last war—which are youthful convictions—are quite normal, and were probably no different in my case from similar convictions, at similar stages, of most children born and brought up in the British Empire. I was in Australia. I described how this attitude, and the belief in the rightness of things as they were, persisted through the period of my university and medical training, because I was fully occupied with work and sport and sex, and had not really, except in

the technical aspect of disease, been confronted with any of life's problems. I remember my year beforehand in a subject called 'philosophy.' How it stimulated us to discussions of systems of metaphysics, the existence of the soul, evolution, the processes of thought. I recall the phase pretty well, and I can assure you that none of our high-flown conclusions, or practically none, ever by any chance directly related to the real, concrete, humdrum facts of everyday existence like food and wages. At the end of my medical course, though I had broadened in technical directions, in my apprehension of the world I lived in, in my understanding of the people that comprised it and the problems that confronted them, in my understanding of myself I had progressed hardly appreciably. Questions of the rights of man; questions like, What is the human race doing?, Where is it going, if anywhere?, What is my country doing in the matter?, Is it right?, Is it necessary for there to be brutality in the world, and inequality, and starvation?, Have I personally any duty or responsibility in all this? . . . questions like these had never been answered by me because—solely, I think, because—they had never been put.

If instead of being a medical student I had been, for instance, a student of political economy, or if I had been out in the world as a working man or working youth, I would at that time no doubt have been stocked with information about wages, in addition possibly to Marxism and class distinction; but as it happened I was none of these and my state was as I have expressed it. I was ignorant. Like hundreds, thousands, millions of my fellows, ignorant. And not only ignorant but abysmally ignorant. However, though I was ignorant, don't run away with the idea that I thought so. Oh dear, no. Have I given the impression that I would not discuss politics? That is wrong. At the time I would, even world politics and world economy. I glanced at statements in the newspapers; some I kindly approved, others I laughed at. I may have been ignorant, but at least I was definite.

All this youthful cocksureness—I was then twenty-four—sounds very risible and pathetic. It is. Perhaps it also sounds harmless. That it is not. Wilful, self-satisfied blindness is more than silly, it is more than merely wrong; it is dangerous. Other people have problems, and it is our duty to understand those problems unless we want to be unexpectedly slammed on the head, or be under the necessity of slamming.

I was both smug and ignorant, and I was not alone. At least I am no longer smug.

At that time, in addition, my complacency was supported by a

theory I had that I think was shared by a goodly number of people in the world at that time—this was about ten years after the last war and just prior to the great economic depression—and I imagine is still held by some. I held the theory that everything, everything in the world, but particularly humans, both physically and mentally and in their inter-relations—that everything was progressing. That like some grand poem it was sweeping on slowly and surely and harmonically, in spite of our wilful acts, on and ever upwards. It was the irresistible cadence of evolution. Surely advances in science and the League of Nations, to take only two instances, proved it.

However, complacency, except for dolts, is born only to wither. Facts stepped in. In the medical histories of my patients I came inevitably on the fabric of their lives, ordinary, strenuous, shiftless, competitive, vicious, brave, or sordid. Again, there were great human movements starting in separate places now beginning gravely to disturb the world and compel people to think who had never thought before. The knowledge was forced on me that all the affairs of the world were not so beautifully simple or well-arranged as I had heretofore blissfully imagined. From that time I became personally aware that the facts of life were often ill-matched, inharmonious, and ugly; and somewhat slowly but progressively came my awakening to the realities of existence: the sociological realities, the biological and scientific, the reality of my ignorance and complacence and emotional instability, and that of all other human beings; the reality of the force of an idea, but of the greater force of force itself; the reality that necessity recognises no law ; that life is strife ; the reality of my social responsibility to myself and my neighbours; the reality that most of the things I had looked upon as natural human laws are but cloaked workable compromises; the reality that abstractions like unselfishness and goodness and Christianity are but normative abstractions made from impalpable thought that must be grafted but do not grow spontaneously; the reality that if I did not find a formula for all this chaotic dinning jumble I should lose hope or my self-respect.

Primarily, in the medical sphere, I had become a realist. If a patient had cancer, I said to myself: "This is cancer; unless it is removed it will proliferate and kill the patient," or sometimes: " It is hopeless; this patient will soon be dead." No amount of friendship for the patient, or wishing it were otherwise, could alter the reality that was there. I knew that this form of realism, with the labour it entailed of arriving at a correct diagnosis, was a duty not only to myself but a duty to my patient, because only then could I give the right treatment. I had to be a blunt realist to myself, though often, for humane

reasons, I prevaricated to my patients and did not tell them the cruel truth.

It was evident that the only method of arriving at a solution, a private solution, of the social enigma which surrounded me was to be an unbiased realist about these facts as well. Then I might be able to find a formula for the assuagement of this dizzying problem, a private formula to satisfy my self-respect even though it was obvious I should never be able to administer it. A formula I was questing for these inequalities and cruelties and unsettlements and fears in human society. Perhaps there was no such formula; then at least I would have discovered that hard fact. In short, it appeared that I had entered politics and I was looking for the best form of government for a human community.

Suggestions for this political nostrum were not lacking.

"Russia has the answer," enthusiastically some were saying.

"Fascism, efficient Fascism as being exemplified in Germany, has it," said others.

"No; America, hard-boiled, democratic, capitalistic America really has it," said others. "That would be the best system for England."

"You are all wrong," said other compelling talkers or writers. "No system at present in existence is really any good. They should all be scrapped. Here is the only sane, intelligent system." And they proceeded, scores of them, to present systems out of their own heads. Along with the ideal Communists and British Fascists were Socialists, diehard Imperialists, Roman Catholics, Buchmanites, Atheists, Pacifists, H. G. Wellsites, League-of-Nationsists, Irish Nationalists, even Scottish Nationalists, and other adherents, cool or rabid, to all sorts of religions, philosophies, ideologies, and systems which divide and influence not only thoughts but actions in considerable sections of humanity.

The only thing they all agreed about was in criticising the British system.

What is the truth ?

In the last ten years or so I have investigated. I have been mostly in England but frequently in other countries. I have read, discussed, and thought. I have heard the arguments of each, I have read the books. And I do not deny that I have been impressed—not by some of them, *but by all of them.* Yes, all of them. Each and every one of them, by a judicious selection of arguments (and omissions), is able to make out a case that is not only, on immediate impact, impressive, but, temporarily, even convincing. Yet, though each has many

adherents who will argue till they are black in the face, they cannot all be right, for many of them are mutually contradictory.

What is the answer, then? This: most of them, if not all, must contain fallacies. I conceive it is our duty, if we would be honourable in our attitude and our actions to other people, and if we would instruct our children rightly, to search out these fallacies and to hold them up in the clear light of day. Only thus can we tell ourselves that if we do decide on a certain political philosophy it is one that we can follow with stoutness, loyalty, and conviction.

INTRODUCTION

WE look around, we ordinary people, and we see the world full of strife, and cruel passions, and inequalities and envy and greed and grievances and waste and persecutions and war, and we look at one another rather helplessly and say: " How silly it all is ! If only people would be sensible ! Wars, for instance, never solve anything: look at the last one. If only they would *see* it ! " Then we go off into a daydream and picture a sensible world peopled with intelligent and generous people, all educated so that they are convinced of the reason for this way of living, all happy, all busy, no one greedily wanting more than anyone else, all working unselfishly for the common good.

Most of us look up after a moment or two with a little smile, give ourselves a regretful shake, and plunge once again, practically, into our everyday affairs.

But with others the dream becomes prolonged, involved, and exciting. " Why not ? " they say. Why not a world in which every-one has work according to his inclination and his ability, and each one works joyfully because he realises it is for the common good; in which spacious leisure is occupied in intellectual pastimes; in which with organised production and distribution of the world's commodities there is plenty of food and clothing for all and no waste; in which each child that is born is a model of mental and bodily fitness because of careful eugenics, pre- and post-natal supervision, and so on ?

So from Plato to the latest Cambridge undergraduate they pro-pound their Utopias. Their perfect worlds. It could be done, they asseverate. The world possesses the knowledge and the means. It only requires unselfish co-operation.

Only, forsooth ! Only universal unselfishness ! They might just as well have said universal unnaturalness, because unfortunately human nature *is* selfish. " It is mine ! " says the child. " It is mine ! " says the grown-up, clinging to his property, small or great, tenaciously. " It is mine ! " signifies the infant incapable of speech no less definitely. It is true that in special instances certain external persuasions like blunt force or religious superstitions or ethical education can be brought to bear which will smother or suppress this instinct of self-interest, but the fact remains that the primal ' natural ' impulse of each human being is to take such action in the face of circumstances as will accord with his well-being—and not the reverse. It must be. The

animal man with his highly imaginative and memory-retaining brain is born an individual, not a leaf of a tree. Also he is still an animal, and his biological function is to conserve his individual life and well-being, to propagate, and to preserve the life and the well-being of his offspring. If this does not demonstrate selfishness as a biological essential then the whole world is nonsense.

It comes to this, then, that in contemplating philosophies by which communities of human beings may live an orderly life together, the whole multi-coloured picture of human nature must be deliberately taken into account; all the qualities, many mutually conflicting, that from time to time, as a result of adequate stimulus, rise to the ascendant. Not only the qualities that on the face of them appear to be conducive to community life, like the gregarious (herd) instinct, mental educability and suggestibility, the instinct for following leadership, the maternal and family instinct; but the others that on the face of them seem unconducive, like the instinct of selfishness and individualism, the instinct of curiosity, the instinct of display, the instinct of pursuit and inflicting pain (brutality), the instinct of resenting constraint (liberty). The instinct to preserve life (self-preservation) is probably the strongest, but we must recognise that any instinct, if the stimulus is adequate, can for the time being rise to the top and dominate not only educated thought but all other instincts. Nor must we class some as good and some as evil: for instance, the instinct of brutality can be good when applied in self-defence or defence of the family or herd, or in the necessary punishment of enemies of the herd (criminals). In short, we must not throw the spotlight on this and try not to recognise or deplore the other; we must face all simply and deliberately as facts.

From the earliest of recorded history we have seen human beings hang together in communities, because of the two great urges of human nature: the gregarious instinct, and the instinct for preserving their life, or self-defence. We have seen them sowing and reaping, breeding animals, making tools and weapons, clothes and ornaments, buying and selling, trading, making love, engaging in rivalry and display, fighting. We have seen communities making war on others; we have seen communities defending themselves against attack. We see that always each community has had some set of customs or rules which are accepted and obeyed by the community, and which not only gives some degree of orderliness to each community but in addition a certain distinctiveness as compared with another community which has a different set of customs or rules.

In the early days before writing—that is before experiences could

be permanently recorded—each generation found all phenomena just as unexpected and unexplainable as the last, and in consequence they were very superstitious; and the stronger characters of the communities who affected to explain or even control occurrences had in the community high power and authority. They imposed the customs or rules of the community, sometimes passing on the old rules of the tribe, sometimes adding to them or making new ones, all of which were consequently, at that time, religious or superstitious rules, or taboos. The fact that many of these had economic (as to methods of sowing and reaping and storing food, and hunting) and social (as to chastity and entitlement to property) and military (as to obligations to train and fight at the behest of the priest-king) application did not make them any the less religious rules. We note that when one community at the behest and under the organisation of its authority made war on another community, either for loot which the other community possessed, or for the sound reason of preservation of life because they lacked food which the other community possessed, or perhaps simply for rivalry and display, if they conquered the other community they overthrew its community religious system or system of government and imposed their own. We saw some communities ruled by a priest-king, such as Egypt, Sumeria, Maya, become great nations of power and wealth. We saw that as the art of writing was discovered, thereby permitting summation of evidence, and as this knowledge of the phenomena of the world increased, the influence of superstition in the government of most communities waned; but by keeping this knowledge from the mass of the community, that is by keeping the community ignorant, some of these governments—*i.e.* the clique who wielded government (consider the one in Egypt which plainly increasingly possessed considerable scientific knowledge)—were enabled to rule these communities by superstitious fear for some centuries longer (*n.b.* Tsarist Russia is an analogous case, and modern Japan).

At last, in the sixth century B.C., we find men who are not priests seeking and recording knowledge and enquiring into the mysteries of life and being. These, such as Thales and Anaximander of Miletus, and Heraclitus of Ephesus, were Greek enquirers living on the fringe of the Cretan and Babylonian priest-king governments and hence having a certain freedom from supervisory suppression.

For the first time we find people questioning everything. And finding answers, without being bound (not being amongst the hierarchy of a knowledge- and therefore power-jealous government) to keep their secret. It is not surprising that among other things they questioned the ' divine right ' of kings and were not convinced of its scientific logic.

For the first time the mind of man, at least of some men, was free. Free to do what we are doing; to think fearlessly about the whole subject of the art and science of government—*i.e.* Politics. Free, that is, in the way of being unconstrained by superstition, which is the force of ignorance or false knowledge. From that time we see amongst the freer and more enlightened communities something new in methods of government.

Note this well. The physical actions of man can be constrained from without by physical force. That is a matter of observation, it is axiomatic, it needs no proof. But the mind of man cannot be constrained by physical force; it can only be constrained by that type of force which alone can reach the mind, the force of ideas—interpretation of experiences, information, instruction, *education*. In other words, by the presentment of ' knowledge,' whether true or false.

We also, therefore, in our enquiry into the science or art of government, to arrive at true conclusions must be sure that we divest our minds as far as possible of superstition or false knowledge. Incidentally, with an additional two thousand years of recorded experience, we should be able to do this more successfully than the Greeks.

Let us make a pledge, therefore, here at the beginning, that in our enquiry we will as far as possible do this. We will be what is now called scientific, basing any conclusions we may come to only on true, that is proven or demonstrable, facts. The enquiry concerns government of human beings. The relevant facts for use are therefore:

1. The factual nature of human beings. This does not require recorded evidence; it is demonstrable.

2. The true record of past experiences of governed communities. The facts of history.

3. The facts we wrench out ourselves by the scientific analysis of present forms of government.

That is the general nature of our enquiry; but what is its aim? Because an enquiry is liable to be a waste of time unless it has an explicit aim and arrives somewhere. Our aim will be, having looked them all over, to try to find the best form of government.

Now, I know that looks suspiciously ingenuous, put down like that. And it is. We have pledged ourselves to honesty, and, being human, I am compelled to admit the selfish truth: I am not looking for the best form of government for the Swahili or the Icelanders—their problems are bound to be different from ours, anyway—I am looking for the best form of government *for ourselves*. In England. I hope you are with me. Of course if we find the best form of government for ourselves, it ought to prove fairly suitable for other com-

munities who have individual (*e.g.* cultural, etc.) and community considerations fairly similar.

It behoves us therefore first of all to think out clearly what important benefits—or shall we say satisfactions?—we would like to have assured to us, and then we shall be able to define our aims with a certain amount of particularity. Of course we must be reasonable and also sensible. It is no use asking for the moon. For instance, it would be childish to say we want luxuries for everyone, no compulsion, a four-hour day, and peace for ever. We do want adequate means of life, though, and a certain amount of happiness with it, that is, contentment. And we would like peace. Those two are basic. But we sensibly recognise that peace cannot be assured by any method of government if another country is determined on, and in fact does, attack. It could still be assured, of course, if we were prepared to forfeit all self-respect, and pass into slavery—actual slavery without any form of freedom or claim to justice—by determining never to fight in self-defence. But not many people, no matter what their cultural ideas, would agree to that, for self-respect is another basic. And not only in that connection. We would not wish to live under a régime that compelled us continually to acts that we, with whatever ideas of culture we happened to have, were ashamed of. No, life would be intolerable unless we could keep our self-respect, which is an indivisible part of contentment. Better any other form of government; none could be worse. Getting back to the question of peace: we cannot expect utter peace, but we reckon that a worth-while method of government ought to be able to assure us a fair amount of it, so let us call it security.

That implies that the method of government will include means to protect us from unexpected attack at least; also that if an attack cannot be avoided, or alternatively it becomes essential to us for our safety to take preventive disciplinary steps, that it will have means to make our action effective. The method of government therefore shall have means to prevent raids and piracy, and that sort of *external* disturbance; but very definitely there is another aspect: security involves that we will not be perpetually subjected to *internal* riots and insurrections all over the place, that is to say general lawlessness and unsettlement within the country. In short, it involves stability. And another thing: we don't want experiments, drastic changes in the whole method of government every little while. We want to know where we stand. We don't expect perfection, but we do count on the form of government we will support lasting us for our lifetime—otherwise we want to find one that will. In fact we consider that it should be possible

to find one that will last not only our own lifetime but our children's too, who will be growing up in the community, and theirs after them. And that's the one we want. Something reliable. Something that fits in with human nature, and is provenly practicable and satisfactory. Something we can *bank* on, in the proved knowledge that it's practicable and sound, is going to afford stability to the life of the country, and is going to last. Such a one if we could find it would obviously be worth having. Such a form would be worth going to trouble to procure. If we once procured this thing, whose value we have scientifically proved, it would be worth resisting ill-informed efforts to change it. In fact it would be worth fighting for.

Here is our defined aim:

> We are looking for a political formula under which a broad community such as ourselves can live in self-respect and security for succeeding lifetimes. We want a proposition that is practicable (*i.e.* workable), stable, and durable.

So now we are ready to commence our investigation. We are pledged to go to it with completely open minds, honestly facing all facts, whether of history, past or present, or human nature, justly giving them their appropriate importance, and without bias drawing from them their logical conclusions. It may be we shall conclude that the ancient method of an authoritative priest-king exacting obedience by superstitious fear is still the type of government which is most likely to prove workable, stable, and also durable in a modern country; it may be another.

Concerning the facts of history it is of course impossible in a book of this scope, or indeed in any book, to set down the relevant facts, for all are really relevant. There is plainly only one course to pursue: it is taken for granted that you, who are engaging with me in this investigation, know the salient facts. If not, it is your duty to study them. Where it is necessary to refer to certain facts as a means of illustration, they will be referred to. Secondly, concerning the facts of human nature, to know this: learned books may be consulted on psychology and human behaviour; but why, unless it is necessary as in the case of history, study our facts at second-hand when we can study them direct? It is ourselves we must examine and our acquaintances, for human nature does not vary much throughout the ages and, after all, it is a community *such as ourselves* that is the explicit subject of our investigation. We want the truth, and not a coloured version, but the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so in our self-discernment it behoves us to be honest and not squeamish.

The Greeks, to whom we referred above, living about two thousand five hundred years ago, were, we saw, the first in our world to bring to that momentously important subject politics, human government, the clarifying force of unfettered enquiring minds. They put politics under the microscope. They had not yet developed the mechanical technicalities whereby to probe all nature's secrets, like electricity, and to control them—nor have we yet learnt all—but they were able, just as well as ourselves, without any special devices except their responsible minds, to examine human behaviour. They observed the general tendency to congregate in communities and to obey constituted authority. They observed the general partiality for orderliness in the community, but they did not fail, nor could they have failed, to observe the ready tendency, both individually and collectively, to resort to force in order to protect their property or their rights. In short, they saw plainly the necessity for some form of government in a community. Then their minds took wing and engaged in flight. What forms of government could there conceivably be ?, they asked.

They conceived of many. And, what is more, they tried them out. The country of Greece is by nature divided into a number of moderately large fertile valley regions, each surmounted by high mountains, so that, as if nature itself was lending a hand to the experiment, the population of that little world was divided into a number of almost segregated communities. These communities of vivid, active-minded people tried them out. There is no point in questioning that they were vivid and active-minded, in spite of their superficial preoccupation with gods and goddesses (are we so emancipated ?); their literature and philosophies and artistic achievements have never yet been surpassed. Yes, they tried them out. Aristotle, who lived in 300 B.C., wrote an account and analysis of all these conceivable forms of government that had been tried out in the Greek States: there were over three hundred of them. But they did not try them out as formulas or detached experiments. No group of men, I imagine, are so unnatural as to conduct formulas and detached experiments with their own lives, because that is what experiment in form of government involves: the life of the community—inevitably when communities conducting them are liable at all times to attack in war, as, I can assure you, the Greek States were, regularly. No, these communities carried out their experiments for serious, the most serious of all, motives: survival. They tried out each new form because that particular generation of the community that elaborated it seriously thought it was the best form attainable.

Naturally they tried out the one they had seen functioning, the

priest-king type which exacted absolute obedience to one central head by the power of superstitious fear, with righteous force used against the impious; but since the clean wind of enquiry had blown away the power of most superstitions, while retaining the form of absolute government by one head, they implemented it by sheer force or reasoning acquiescence. They called this form an *Autocracy*. It is obvious that ignorance or superstition of subjects is an advantage to this form. Sometimes they made this arbitrary rule hereditary in a family, giving the despot the title of king. This was *Monarchy*—in this case, absolute monarchy. Often the absolute ruler was forcibly overthrown by another, who in turn became the *Tyrant*. Sometimes these tyrants, whether royal-titled or not, were elected in succession at the death of the holder; sometimes they were elected for a course of a few years, *or annually*. In different states at different periods of this few hundred years of history there were scores of variations in the degree of despotism imposed by autocrats or agreed to by subjects. Then there was the form of government called *Oligarchy*, which is rule by a few, so that instead of a single ruler there is a Supreme Council. It is seen that this can, as it did, have a number of versions. Finally there was the most revolutionary conception, that an intelligent people should make their own laws and rule themselves. That is government by the people or, as they called it, *Democracy*, and a State governed by democracy is a republic. It is evident that this type permits of the greatest variety of interpretations. For instance, there are the two broad choices: Shall the government by the people be direct, that is by agreement amongst a great concourse, or indirect, that is by representatives chosen by the people? Obviously there can be a multitude of compromises between the two, some questions being decided by direct and some by indirect government. If the idea is solely direct, then common sense immediately shows practical difficulties. Indeed, the picture which it conjures up, and which it presented where communities were anything except very small, with everyone having his own and equal opinion, is little different from *anarchy*, which is no government at all. For completeness it may be said that this thing, anarchy, has also been held by certain preposterous people as an actual theory of politics. But this theory, whose presumption is that people are really by nature so uncontentious that laws are unnecessary, is plainly so silly that it deserves no further scrutiny, and it will get none from us—at least none from me.

Thus there were the three types of government—autocracy, oligarchy, and democracy—with combinations and compromises of all three. But surely it is evident that an oligarchy where it is not at the

one end a kind of multiple autocracy is at the other indistinguishable from one pole of representative democracy; so we will omit it from our major divisions of the art of government, politics, which leaves only two: Autocracy and Democracy. All the numerous systems of government which the Greeks tried out are analysable into either one or the other, or—and this, of course, was a large section—a Mixture.

The vast political experiment in Greece illuminated the world. With the meagre communications of the ancient world its influence did not soon spread to Asia or the other continents, but the effect of it can be studied in Europe. After Greece, which became a great power after defeating the Persians and subsequently becoming imperialised by Alexander, the next great power in Europe was Rome. The founders of great Rome were perhaps Greek colonisers, but at any rate they modelled their state on Greece. It was a republic, and as a republic it grew to dominant power in the Mediterranean; then, assuming empire, it had sway over all the known world. As an empire it had a different form from a republic, but it retained many of the political instruments of the republic. Surrounding the Empire were other States with different forms of government, mostly simple barbaric autocracies. As we know, these eventually overcame Rome and destroyed its government. Christianity, which Rome had adopted, remained as a kind of enlightened authority, but otherwise what was referred to as the Dark Ages descended over most of Europe until at the Renaissance the rediscovery of Greek learning again cast its illumination, which has not since been lost.

Throughout all this time there have been many, many forms of government in the various states of Europe; but in none was there ever functioning one that on analysis can be shown to be anything other than a version of either an autocracy, a democracy, or a mixture of them. The same applies to the present day.

We agree, I think, that the only scientific proof is test. Therefore to assess the efficiency, so as to judge between them, of these three possible forms of government for a community such as our own, we must examine practical examples concerning which we can produce the cold facts. This we can obviously most justly do by examples in existence at the present day. We do not intend to examine many. Nor need we, because we are confined by the words 'such as ourselves' to the consideration of only such communities as are comparable to the British community in size and outlook; and these are not vastly many. Indeed, the way the world is now arranged, and excluding the Asiatics, there are, practically speaking, only four. One, the

community referred to, the British Empire; two, America; three, Germany; four, Russia. And these are the ones we select.

As it happens, each one is nominally a distinct form of government. Germany—an autocracy; Russia—Communism, nominally an extreme form of democracy; America—a constitutional democracy; Britain—a constitutional monarchy.

Nor is that the only felicity of the choice, as it turns out. For just as the past world, since the time of the Greeks, never seems to have been able to make up its mind which was the best all-round form of government, neither can the present. Autocracy or democracy! Democracy or mixture! Mixture or autocracy! it has always been and still is. And these four national forms are the examples commonly cited. Even quite intelligent people do not seem able to decide.

Let us see if we can.

THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM

WE begin with the system in force in Russia, a country which has a population of about a hundred and eighty millions.

To compare things rationally it is obviously necessary to delineate them as far as possible in the same terms. In other words, in examining the functioning of these various political systems we should try to keep to a planned scheme of description. This will be our scheme.

Firstly, careful analysis of the system.

Then detailed assessment of the system now clearly visualised. Assessment of a political system will come under several headings which we will discuss later.

Analysis of the Russian System

The Russian State is officially defined as the Union of Soviet (*i.e.* democratic) Socialist Republics. And the political doctrine of the U.S.S.R. is officially Communism.

What is Communism ?

Communism is the name given to a political theory elaborated by a German philosopher (Karl Marx) who lived in England at the middle of the last century, and actually did most of his writing in the British Museum. According to Marx it is a philosophy which is the result of a logical (dialectic) and utterly materialistic outlook on life and circumstances—Dialectic Materialism. In form the theory is an extreme of democracy. As the name implies it conceives a community in which no one possesses personal property but all property is owned by the community or State; so that there are no rich or poor and society is quite classless. It visualises the community functioning, in an economic sense, by each member working according to his capacity, and receiving according to his wants—in the words of Marx, " from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

The ratiocinations of his philosophy are set out in his book *Das Kapital* (Capital). He presents the economic and sociological facts of the age as he saw them in England. Now this age in England was the disturbed beginning of the tremendous world-upsetting Industrial Revolution, which, as we know, began in England. The great social and economic adjustments that necessarily had to be made for it—and gradually were made—had not yet been clearly visualised. Detachment is difficult in a whirlpool. England, in fact, was, as we now

recognise, blundering in a metamorphosis. From his observations on these conditions he developed a theory, into which he fitted all the preceding history of the world. Reasoning by logical processes in his theory, he demonstrated an inevitable tendency in the whole economic and sociological picture presented, and an inevitable, unthinkably lamentable finale—unless drastic action were taken, to wit, a forcible revolution of the proletariat (working people), and thereupon the institution of his ideal democracy, Communism.

This work, *Kapital*, may be called the Communist bible. Another document, the Communist Manifesto, of about thirty-five pages, published in 1848, also written by Marx in conjunction with Engels, is the Communist Call-to-Arms. The Manifesto is an historical document. Of it Engels says this is the fundamental proposition:

"That in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which alone can be explained the political and intellectual history of that epoch ; that consequently the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiters and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, nowadays, a stage has been reached (*i.e.* in 1848) in which the exploited and oppressed classes (the proletariat) cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class (the bourgeoisie) without, at the same time, emancipating society at large from all *exploitation*, *oppression*, *class distinction*, *and class struggles*."

In other words he maintains firstly, as an axiom which all good materialists are expected to accept, that the form of any society (its politics, art, religion, etc.) is the direct result of the form of its economic structure. Secondly, because in all history since the golden age of primitive society (why golden ? and in any case what evidence is there that primitive society was communistic in personal property ?) there has always been some element in the community that owned property, he divides society into two classes, the owners on the one hand and on the other an exploited and oppressed class, the proletariat; and these two classes, he states, have always been bitterly at war, hating one another. Thirdly and finally, he asserts that if the proletariat manages to emancipate itself from this oppression—by a bloody revolution if necessary—it will in so doing bring once again the golden age on earth, perfect for everyone.

Let us first look at this England of the nineteenth century that he

is basing his criticisms on before examining his processes. "In the meantime [this is the beginning of the century] the Industrial Revolution was taking place in England. Almost imperceptibly, while the countries of Europe were fighting for their lives, the most radical metamorphosis in the economic history of England was being brought about. Over a period of two generations, England, from being an agricultural country, was changed into an industrial manufacturing country, with an unrivalled commercial ascendancy. The change, beneficial from the point of view of wealth, brought with it serious abuses of the working classes, and the great problem of the relationship between Capital and Labour had its origin in the new grouping of the industrial community into employers and employed. Intertwined in the history of the nineteenth century are these predominating factors, the wealth of the country, the commercial development, and the grievances of the working classes, or as Carlyle puts it: 'The Condition of the People' question." (From *The Romance of the Bank of England*, by Rosenberg and Thurston Hopkins, 1933.)

Now for Marx's interpretation. He examines the facts of wealth production. He analyses the common terms of value, profit, interest, commodities, prices, labour power, purchase, sale, etc., and by a masterful exposition and a brilliant reduction of complicated concepts to simple elementary principles he demonstrates that all wealth can be expressed in terms of labour. In fact, he says, wealth is labour power. And capitalists, he therefore says—that is to say anyone who employs labour power for the purpose of increasing his wealth—is trafficking in no less than human lives.

He traces the gradual change and development of the technique of wealth production and by this, largely, explains the social changes of history. He demonstrates how the development of the machine was the turning-point of history from the point of view of wealth production. Previously articles were made by tools directly wielded by hand; and this, demonstrable by examples in many trades, had been so for centuries—stationary. Production therefore was limited, and the number of workers that could be employed by one man was also limited, because a skilled worker if dissatisfied could always make the goods individually or along with several others. Then, a workman had individualism, because of his learnt skill, and a freedom of choice. With the coming of machinery, however, where the single tool is no longer guided by hand but, along with ten, or a hundred, or a thousand other similar tools (like a needle, or a hammer, or a wheel), is driven automatically and regularly by an unerring co-ordinating machine, then the balance of centuries was upset and smashed.

The manufacturing age has become the industrial age. Now production is unlimited, and skill is gone because any workman can watch a machine, feeding it the raw materials and stacking away the finished article, now and again losing a hand or a leg. There is now no longer any limit either to the number of workers one man can employ, and no limit to the wealth that man can accrue. In short, the Capitalist has arisen. Now, in the new capitalist age, he says, not any worker who is dissatisfied can depart with a proud independence and become a capitalist himself, because he needs capital to buy the machines and to employ workers. Furthermore, large employers by enormous output are able to sell articles cheaper than the small employers; the small employers, thus swamped out of competition, in consequence themselves become workers, and the large employers, amalgamating at times, become by the very inescapable nature of the process larger and larger and richer and richer. Where is the process leading? "Where else," in effect says Marx, carried away by the driving force of his argument, "than there where it lies straight before our nose—where it *must* lead"? All industry and capital will be cornered by a handful of bloated pashas of enormous wealth, who will have the power of lavishing on themselves inconceivable luxury, while the rest of mankind, haggard toilers, labour on starvation wages, or as often as not die because there is not sufficient labour to employ them.

This condition of absolute capitalism was approaching undeviatingly in England, says Marx, with quickening pace, and would soon inevitably be upon them—unless, and only unless, the process were surgically stopped by a dramatic revolution. But that unstable and horrid condition of absolute capitalism would actually never be given time to arrive, because that, goes on Marx the materialist, the pride of the mass of the human race will not tolerate. And therefore revolution is exclusively inevitable.

It is noted that there seems to be in the argument somewhat of a superfluity of inevitables, but now one of them has been made supreme, you might say inevitably inevitable, by excluding the others; but not content with this, Marx then goes on to give a definite plan how it might be brought about.

I think we might here be permitted to remark on two outstanding fallacies of Marx's reasoning outlined above before passing on to the examination of his plan; because that is our main preoccupation, the plan, Communism.

1. The 'inevitable' and imminent Revolution in England confidently prophesied by Marx has, a hundred years later, not yet come to pass.

2. He says that in the new capitalist age a workman cannot become a capitalist and employer himself because he lacks the preliminary essential capital. This is a palpable fallacy. Successful self-made men are described so for that very reason. It is tedious to read their biographies—there are so many in this industrial, or, as Marx calls it, capitalist age.

3. Regarding his description of the ' inevitable ' peak of capitalism, with the small special class of immensely wealthy capitalists and the large contrasted class of starvation-waged or workless proletariat: in his diamond-hard materialistic logic he leaves entirely out of account (except in his final surprising, unmaterialistic, and entirely inconsequential intervention about human revolt, which he requires of course for the next chapter of his thesis) the nature of the material with which he is dealing, that is to say, human nature. Quite apart from the incredible inhumanity of the entire small class so cursorily depicted, will the overwhelming mass of human beings allow themselves to be progressively deprived of the adequacies of existence to anything like the degree depicted? We know that they will demand redress and adjustment long before; we know in our own history (about which incidentally he is explicitly prophesying) they did demand it, and obtain it, long before. But apart from examples our common sense, which quality we must never despise in any consideration of politics, instinctively pointed fallacy.

It is interesting in this connection to record that Marx was what he himself styled bourgeois, born comfortable, always comfortable. The condition of many of the people was bad, deplorable, at that time of experimental industrial adjustment, but Marx knew nothing of it at first hand; all his knowledge was from books and Parliamentary reports and reports of Royal and other Commissions (which were, even as he observed them, attempting and effecting adjustment), and then it was only economic facts he knew; the people themselves this intellectual recluse never knew, their family life and loves, their humours. He did not know their hearts. But he forged a seductive sword for others to wield and to influence them with.

THE PLAN—COMMUNISM

After the Revolution—quite inevitable, but, if not, induced—there should come into force his logical and materialistic form of government, Communism. The instruments of the system are set forth in the Manifesto. These extracts are the gist:

1. " All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interests of minorities. The proletarian movement is

the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air."

2. " Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie."

3. " In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into *open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.*"

4. " The bourgeoisie is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slaves within its slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie; in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society."

5. " The theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: abolition of private property."

6. " Abolition of the family ! . . . The bourgeois claptrap about the family and education, about the hallowed correlation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour."

7. " The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationalities. The working men have no countries. We cannot take from them what they don't possess.

" National differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

" The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.

" In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to."

8. " The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and generally from an ideological standpoint are not deserving of serious examination.

" *The basis of Communism is materialism pure and simple.*"

9. "The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of *the State, i.e. of the proletariat organised as a ruling class*; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible."

Then follow some of the measures by which the revolution might as a tentative alternative be brought about more or less constitutionally.

But note—these represent a pale alternative, a half-way house, a stage of Socialism and NOT COMMUNISM.

i. Abolition of property in land.
ii. Heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
iii. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
iv. Confiscation of property of all emigrants and rebels.
v. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State.
vi. Centralisation of the means of communication, etc.
vii. Extension of factories owned by the State, etc.
viii. Equal liability of all to labour.
ix. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.
x. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Etc., etc.

The Manifesto goes on:

"If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it *makes itself the ruling class*, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonism, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

"In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonism, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

Regard the second half of that last paragraph well. Note the words 'free development.' It is the crux and the hope of theoretical Communism.

It is more than that, however. It is not so exclusive. *It is the aim and hope of all plans of socialism under whatever name.* And it is the

aim that no one, no one, I repeat, who is a reflective human and who has witnessed the cruelty of poverty, can dispute is a noble aim. But—and here is the question to which we are pledged to find the answer—can Communism realise that aim ?

Communism is therefore a system of government in which the whole community, having been levelled by the dispossession of all property, is permitted absolutely free development. There is to be no distinction of class or privilege. It is by definition the very opposite of autocracy: It is an extreme democracy, carried on by Soviets, *i.e.* elected councils, the members of which have no extra privileges but merely special duties and responsibilities during their terms of office.

It is to be a régime based on stark materialism, with no hanky-panky about sentiment. Its guiding principle is the slogan, " From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Its salient executive principles can be summarised :

1. Abolition of private property. (Needless to say, including abolition of all rights of inheritance, because, of course, in *real* Communism there is no property to inherit.)
2. Abolition of the family.
3. Abolition of religion.
4. Abolition of countries and nationalities.
5. A classless society, that is, no class having any privileges over any other.
6. Free development of all individuals, which includes unrestricted development of their minds in discussion and sources of information.
7. Free election of their representatives in government.

It is a remarkably ambitiously-aimed scheme no one can dispute—if only people can be persuaded to give up all silly sentiment and become as detachedly materialistic as its author.

Without more ado we pass to its assessment.

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNISM

In assessing the value of anything it is necessary to have criteria. For a political doctrine, or a religious for that matter, whose object is to influence the minds or conduct of men, the criteria are special but on the whole I think rather obvious ones.

First of all, it must have a certain primary emotional appeal such as the betterment of the lot of the community (this is the commonest political advertisement); in other words, its general impression must not be—like the political system of the bees with one sexual monarch served by the royal harem, the rest being all sexless workers—one that is at variance with all human instinct. Next, since all men have some

powers of reason, and in consequence are not influenced to acceptance of a proposition that is patently idiotic, it must at least look plausible.

Any political formula that has these two qualities, *emotional appeal* and *plausibility*, can be floated; but the sands of history are littered with many smashed, flimsy carcases. We, intelligent people, want something more definite, I hope, something more satisfying to our cautious and critical minds before we put a political theory, which involves the happiness, not to say the very existence, of a community, into actual practice. We apply analysis. We apply a deeper penetrating logic. We apply the test of *practicability*. Can this doctrine stand, we say, away from all the clap-trap? Not only is it soundly constructed and integrated in itself, like an aeroplane new-finished on a factory floor, but is it adapted or adaptable to the storms and strains of the world we know outside? Will it support as passengers the fallible people we know and cherish—ourselves!—without crashing? Is it foolproof? And will it not only make one short flight, but can it make a long journey through any weather that comes?

If our analytical minds are fully satisfied—satisfied, at any rate, that it contains no fundamental flaws, then splendid! let us try it out forthwith in *actual practice*. Then we can see factually, firstly, if it does really work; and, secondly, how well. The final criterion is, for how long?—the *test of Time*.

These, then, are our criteria in assessing political formulas:

1. Test of Emotional Appeal.
2. Test of Plausibility.
3. Test of Practicability. Under three headings: does it give promise of being (*a*) Workable?
   (*b*) Stable?
   (*c*) Durable?
4. Test of Actual Practice.
   By which we note (*a*) Does it in fact work?
   (*b*) Is it in fact stable?
5. Test of Time.
   By which we ask: Has it in fact proved durable?

By these standards we proceed to assess Communism.

1. *Test of Emotional Appeal*

The first reaction to any political formula is obviously produced by the chief features that first strike the mind. Most people have a hazy idea of Communism. To them—I don't think I am wrong—the chief features of the doctrine are:

(*a*) Dispossession and deflation of the rich minority, with subse-

quent equalitarianism, which means, without working for it a social and creature betterment of themselves, the majority remainder.

(*b*) There is an ideal in it, an ideal of unselfishness and world brotherhood.

Both of these features have definite appeal. The first is to instinctive cupidity, the second is to righteousness. To a simple mind it might be said that it favours robbing of the rich to pay the poor, and gives it a moral sanction.

It passes this test of Emotional Appeal.

2. *Test of Plausibility*

Marx's Communism is one version of the Utopia that every imaginative socially-minded man has daydreamed of since the world was young—documented. Documented mathematically ! (*Das Kapital* is full of facts and figures.) That history is bent in this document, that economics are misinterpreted, that some of the most important irreversible instincts of human nature are not taken into account, these facts to the wishful-thinker already half swept away by his egalitarian dream have no weight. This document, to the discontented mind that swallows everything, is plausible enough; and a glance at the Manifesto and a hot Capitalist-grinding-the-faces-of-the-poor speech confirms it.

Yes, for shallow minds, Communism passes the test of Plausibility without effort.

3. *The Test of Practicability*

Logic. Will it work ?

" From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." All, unselfishly, for the State; and the State—comprised we must conceive of bodiless, just, unimpassioned, godlike beings, without possessions or the desire for them, without family, without any human foibles, frailties, or fallacies—the State for all.

Is it human nature that it can work like that ?, we ask. We must shake our heads.

We know that a condition like Communism, where all property owners are dispossessed, where God is uprooted and materialism put brutally in His place, can only happen through a bloody revolution; and from such a maelstrom of killings and force we, in our ordinary common sense, cannot see an immediate unselfish idealism suddenly burgeoning in general throughout the land. The hysteria of this type of revolution, unless the community is to annihilate itself, will only terminate when it is terminated by a strong hand of authority—*and*

Autocracy is not Communism, though it calls itself by that name a thousand times.

The question is now put: does Communism stand the test of Practicability?

Is there a logical likelihood that this idealistic State can come into being in the manner indicated?

We answer: Firstly, it does not seem to us likely that the equable idealistic State described, recognising the hard facts of human behaviour and of history, an unimpassioned logical State of ant-like industry and beautiful unselfishness, could ever be the immediate sequel to a bloody revolution. Secondly, knowing human nature, it does not seem to us likely that such a scheme of behaviour and economics, which demands perfect unselfish idealism from everyone, could function for more than two minutes in our faulty world—even supposing it should, by the waving of a wand, miraculously come into being somewhere.

In short, by the third criterion, Practicability, under the acid of our common sense, Communism fails.

The Test of Actual Practice

A State where every individual, impersonal as a number, toils to the maximum of ability, takes sustenance just sufficient for his needs from the common store, with no personal possessions at all and no desire for them, without home, without a family, without patriotism, without any hint of sentiment, without religion, without any tinge of partisanship springing from the proximity of friends, without *humanity*, like cogs in a machine, like ANTS—such a State has not existed yet on earth. It certainly has not existed in Russia, as the true facts will now show.

When the twentieth century opened Russia was by far the most backward country in Europe.

(Many of the references are to *Russia*, by the careful Russian historian Bernard Pares: 1941. Pages are indicated in text.)

It was an autocracy under the unrestricted rule of an hereditary Tsar. In the early years of this Romanov dynasty a new Code of Laws, in 1649, the year in which Charles I lost his head in England, fixed the complete stabilisation of serfdom (p. 43). The serf was not only bound to the soil but became the property of his master, could be sold by auction, exchanged for horses or greyhounds, etc.

Peter the Great had forced all the gentry into the State service, but in 1762 a half-imbecile Tsar, Peter III, gave them exemption from State service. Catharine, a little later, gave them freedom from taxation, made colossal grants of crown peasants to them, thus flinging

more free men into serfdom and extended the serf system to Ukraine, where it had not existed. Peter had imposed on the country a standing army and a huge and cumbrous administrative machine which rested on the basis of serf-labour and serf-taxation (p. 45). It was a similar automatically-recruited serf army which was the resisting cushion against Napoleon.

About this time—the American Revolution and subsequently the French Revolution—the question of 'freedom' had been in the air. That is to say, it had reached the thoughts of the nobility in Russia, because they were the only ones educated; it had necessarily not reached the thoughts of the peasants. But the human nature of a proportion of even these nobles proved itself humane. A thought of freedom in Russia could only point at the condition of serfdom of the vast majority of the community. Even Catharine II was influenced, but when she saw the outcome of the French Revoluton (1789) she changed her mind. Others, however, of the nobles, the Russian Liberals, mostly young men, gave expression to their feelings after the Russian peasantry had withstood and beaten Napoleon. At this Alexander, the new Tsar, himself previously influenced, became profoundly reactionary and suspicious. In 1825 he mysteriously disappeared in the distant Crimea, and in the confusion which followed, in the month of December, the young Liberals, who had been conspiring, demanded a constitution.

The new Tsar, Nicholas I, had them shot down. Some were hanged and the rest sent to Siberia. These were the Decembrists. This was the last revolution that had nobles as its leaders. This Nicholas became the most despotic of all the Tsars. His motto was 'Submit and obey.' He permitted expression of opinion, of whatever colour, from no one. "Thought was driven underground" (p. 50). There were almost more censorships than there were books; even textbooks of arithmetic or notes of music were suspected of being ciphers. He tried, however, without emancipating the serfs, to improve their lot, and gave the serf right of appeal to the law courts. We know enough of human nature, I think, and also of history, to be sure that it is difficult entirely to suppress ideas, and it is no surprise to learn that, in spite of all censorship, the views concerning the 'ideal society' of the great German thinkers of the time, Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel and lastly Karl Marx, were not unheard in Russia. Meanwhile the tremendous economic or Industrial Revolution which was so upsetting first England and subsequently the rest of Europe, involving inherently as it did the movement of workers away from their home soil, could not help beginning to affect Russia. Just a very slight

beginning. These two forces were brought to a head by the national defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, and the Acts of *Emancipation of Serfs* were pronounced in 1861 by which the peasants not only got freedom but the concomitant essential, land. (In England the emancipation of the villeins took place four hundred years earlier.) The State bought half the land of the squires, which the peasants could work and buy on a long-instalment plan. It was a revolution from the Throne.

The results were not foreseen. "It set going a tremendous economic revolution which brought Russia into the first stages of Capitalism. It sent out great masses of labour into new areas which were only waiting for workers; and in the south, toward which the centre of population now gravitated, it created a new industrial Russia. It broke down the whole social structure of the community by a rough deal, which left all future issues undetermined, and it opened the door to every kind of Utopia. It ruined the squires, who, already spoilt by the easy conditions of serf labour, now found themselves without half their land and *all their labour*, and it also left the peasant cultivating only half as much land as before, unless he could afford the high rents which the ruined landlord now demanded of him. *In summary it made revolution inevitable.* The squire, deprived of his old powers, was now an alien on his own estate; across it was drawn an imaginary line, leaving on one side him and his family, and on the other the mass of the peasants. It was certain that wherever the artificial prop of police protection was withdrawn, the peasant mass would cross the line and secure the rest. They nearly did it in 1904–7, and they finally did it after the fall of Tsardom in 1917" (p. 52).

Now note these facts of Russian history (p. 16): "Agriculture is far and away the most important industry in Russia. From *unknown antiquity up to* 1906, northern Russia was farmed on the primitive principle of *communal land tenure*, which till the eighteenth century prevailed all over Europe, but was abandoned because it was a hopeless obstacle to initiative and improvement." G. M. Trevelyan says of the same mediæval system in England which had ceased years before: "Agricultural improvements and private enterprise were severely handicapped by such a system" (p. 41). "The Government (*i.e.* early Romanoffs) did all it could to stop the immigration from the centre, and it found a useful instrument not only in the official squires but also in a peasant institution which had existed as far back as history can trace. This was the village commune: common farming of the land of the village. An elder was elected, who summoned all heads of houses whenever a common problem had to be faced—when to start

ploughing, sowing, or reaping; an interesting anticipation of the present collective farming under Communism."

Now (p. 52) " One other defect. [This refers to the Emancipation of the Serfs which finally took place in 1861.] The Crown did not wish to leave the peasantry at the mercy of the disgruntled squires. It therefore took them under its own special protection *It never equalised them in civic rights with the rest of the population*, and it left them with certain State obligations. It therefore preserved the old village commune, which was a bar to all individual initiative, and its elected officials now became a lower rung of the Ministry of the Interior. Even peasant justice was a separate compartment of the State system." It was evident, as Pares points out, that the Emancipation of 1861 itself raised a whole number of new questions, and reforms were plainly required. They were slow in coming. (p. 53) " But the young folk were always crying for more. They demanded an entirely new world in which all that belonged to the past would disappear—for instance, throne, altar, and country. In the 70's great numbers of young men and girls (they were called the Navodniks) went down to the peasantry in an impulsive attempt to blend with them and stir them up to a social revolution which would give all the land to the peasants. The peasants couldn't understand them, and sometimes handed them over to the police. The most desperate returned to the slums of the big towns and therein conducted a guerrilla war on the administration. They picked off the most odious of the officials one after another, and in the end settled down to an organised hunt after the life of the Emperor. They met with several failures; but in the end he was destroyed by a bomb on the very day when he had issued a tentative summons to representatives of the public to take part in a work of legislature. *His murder stopped all reform for twenty-three years* (1881–1904)."

That is why I said at the opening of this section that at beginning of the twentieth century Russia was by far the most backward country in Europe. It cannot be disputed. It is known. All the facts mentioned above can be substantiated, but I have stated most of them in the words of a well-recognised historian, a man who is favourable to Russia and to the Communist experiment.

Pares goes on (p. 75): " The twenty-three years that followed the senseless murder of Alexander II were engaged in an attempt to stop the clock from ticking—at first tentative, but soon deliberate." The power of the period " took pleasure, so to speak, in thrusting everything modern back on itself." The ideal set by the Government was " the public calm," which very soon came to mean the public silence.

While the public had to keep silence, the Government vaunted every sign of backwardness in Russia with enthusiasm.

This is all said to show that, if ignorance is to be defined as lack of knowledge, then by the beginning of this century the mind of the great mass of the Russian people was, by official design, still kept extremely ignorant. In other words, it was virgin soil for whatever type of knowledge should now be impressed.

Now, while most of the great reforms of Alexander II were held in abeyance, one in particular was permitted because it was practically useful in government in a vast country like Russia, and it was not new. This was the functioning of the Zemstva, or county councils and town councils, elected by and responsible to the population. Their most active members were naturally strongly imbued with liberalism. The reactionary Government feared that this successful "experiment in popular control was bound to lead to a demand for a national legislative assembly, as indeed it did. For this very reason the Government sometimes interfered with some of the most obviously useful innovations of the Zemstva." . . . Nevertheless "the Zemstva produced a whole generation of social workers who could later show their value much better when, instead of the hindrances of the Tsar's Government, they had the active support of the Soviets."

Meanwhile the universal Industrial Revolution, later to start in Russia than elsewhere but nevertheless started, was making itself felt. As Pares says: "Russia was really in full economic revolution, and the pace of development, which from the emancipation had been sensational, under Witte (1892–1903) became hectic."

Another lost war, this time the Japanese (1904), again brought matters to a head, and in November of that year a meeting of Zemstva chairmen "put out a national programme of which the whole keynote was liberty—of person (habeas corpus), conscience, speech, press, meeting, association—crowned by the claim for a representative national assembly." Meetings of the leading professions supported the idea. "Organisers also got busy amongst the working population, and on January 22nd, 1905, a priest named Gapon led a huge demonstration to the Winter Palace. . . . They were met with rifle fire." This time, however, organisation was better, for it was organisation amongst the city industrial workers, a quite new class, and there was an epidemic of strikes. There was also an assassination of the uncle and brother-in-law of the Emperor. Nicholas II gave in. He promised general assembly. At first he planned it to be of extremely limited franchise and to be, really, no more than consultative. At this, now they had him on the move, the disorders continued, till in October 1906

they culminated in a general strike all over the country. "The franchise practically became universal: the Duma (the new Parliament) became legislative; for the first time, a Cabinet was set up under Witte as responsible Prime Minister."

Note this: Witte was a former Tsarist Minister, and also all the other Ministers, selected by Nicholas, were reactionaries. Consequently, faced with a liberal Duma (elected representatives of the people whose scheme of government was on the Western, English, model) and not being responsible to the Duma but to the Tsar only, there was a deadlock. Nicholas dissolved this Duma and called another, making the premier Stolypin. "His double task—of fighting revolution and taking the lead in reform—might well be thought superhuman, and so it was to prove." Most of the first Duma had been disqualified for re-election to the second for making a joint appeal to the country against the dissolution, an appeal which had fallen entirely flat. (Note, from this, the strong personal prestige of the Tsar over the child-people of Russia.) Consequently "this time they sent more revolutionaries, as men who were accustomed to stand up to the Government and take the consequences." They elected several who were in prison without trial, as revolutionaries. This Duma let itself be trapped by the Government in a debate on the morality of political terrorism, and it, too, was dissolved. Now universal suffrage was abolished and the franchise was in the main concentrated on the long-since dying class of country gentry, with the sharpest limitations on the peasantry. "Its efforts were lamentably evident ten years later, when there was no fully representative authority to take the place of the Tsar."

The third Duma ran from 1907 to 1912. Now reforms did take place. It was evident to all, Tsar and landed class, that they were inevitable. "Both the leader of the House, Gutchkov, and the leader of the Opposition Milyukov, took their models from British Parliamentary experience. This Duma, by committees, had the right to question Ministers."

The reforms were great. By 1914 there was a new population of yeomanry. The results were visible everywhere: prosperous farms on remote positions; new wells, better-kept cattle; *and soon co-operative farming on business-like lines, which is completely in the genius of the Russian peasantry.* Agriculture, fostered in every way by government help, went forward by leaps and bounds. The vast State forests and the railway system now for the first time gave a real profit.

"The general prosperity enabled the Government to launch out into productive legislation. . . . Free education was established and

plans were prepared for making it compulsory. . . . The Duma was throughout favourable to religious toleration. The censorship became for once reasonable; studies of first value, *e.g.* history, now appeared in print. . . . Russian industry organised itself on free lines similar to those of our own Associated Chamber of Commerce; and the whole trend of this movement was for less restriction and greater freedom of initiative."

In September 1911 Stolypin was assassinated, not by a police agent as he had always expected, but by a revolutionary. The Duma, however, completed its legal term of five years; and most of the leading members were re-elected to the fourth Duma, which was due to last out its full term and continue till the March revolution of 1917.

This, then, was the condition of Russia when the 1914 War came. I don't think anything in the short following summary can be disputed.

The great child-nation of Europe was beginning to think and act for itself. In eight years, from an absolute autocracy ruling over a population of mediæval ignorance—with only a fringe education, in defiance of authority, by outside ideas—it had become a constitutional monarchy whose laws were made by a Parliament elected by the population, and whose executive ministers were in some degree responsible to this Parliament. The franchise was restricted, but it had for a time been practically universal and there was every reason to expect that soon again it would become universal. Russia, by copying England, had found in eight years, like a gift, a constitution and an outlook to acquire which had taken pioneering England many hundreds of years. The Constitution was one of justice, freedom, and increasing Socialism. Russia was beginning to think for herself, but still only beginning ; a nation of a hundred and eighty millions cannot in eight years change its vast majority to liberal education from a peasant ignorance of almost nothing, but education was now encouraged, and free education, which is the only form which can reach the poor, had actually been just established. In European Russia before the Revolution the proportion of illiterates was over 75 per cent. and in Siberia 85 per cent. The major portion of the Russian mind was still to all intents and purposes virgin soil.

Although everything appeared to be set for advance, however, you must not run away with the idea that, granting the great tasks that confronted it—of which the greatest was the unaltered ignorance of the great mass of the Russian people—all was otherwise merry as a marriage bell. Far from it. Like all great advances in human history that have proved persistent, this one had proceeded thus far by compromise. There were still advanced elements on either side. On the one side the advanced revolutionaries, and on the other

the diehard reactionaries. The Tsar was malleable, and, being given drastic concessions, the firebrand revolutionaries were kept in check by the great body of moderate opinion now in power. The Tsar's wife, however, a strong-minded German woman, never ceased reminding the Tsar of his autocratic 'duties and oaths'; and towards the end of the period, under the influence of the extraordinary man Rasputin, she urged him to such reactionary indiscretions that the revolutionary talk, never actually silenced, was temporarily given more fuel. Then came the war.

As usual in any nation, the first mood of the Russian people was enthusiastic co-operation in the prosecution of the war. Catastrophes soon came, however. First the great defeat of Tannenberg, then the revelation as early as November 1914 that munitions were disastrously short. At this crisis the Emperor got foolishly sentimental. He decided he should be at the front to lead and be with his armies. Obviously from the front he could not take his correct part in the government of the country, which went therefore to the Empress, thus indirectly to Rasputin. This was the real turning-point in the fate of the Monarchy. Ministers, Duma, Army, and people were indignant. Growing privations and soaring prices came inevitably—no fault of the Emperor—and defeatism began and grew. The Empress was blamed. The disgraceful public excesses of Rasputin outraged every opinion. At length, at the end of 1916, he was assassinated by members of the Imperial family itself. But things had gone too far, the whole administrative machine was out of action, Nicholas remained at the front, and it was no longer a question of if, but when, the storm was going to burst. There were disorders in Petrograd. Nicholas at the front signed an order to stop all disorders next day as "inadmissible in time of war." The Volynsky Regiment were ordered to fire on the crowd, did so, then going back to barracks killed one of their own officers and next morning came out on the side of the people. All the soldiers in the capital, 175,000 of them, also immediately went over.

This was the Revolution.

Kerensky, a young labour leader, directed the mutineers to claim the control of the Duma, which he now fashioned into a Provisional Government. Instead, however, an irregularly elected Soviet representing the Army set itself up in the same building, the Duma; and in this Soviet were most of the leading revolutionaries. The Cabinet disappeared. Nicholas abdicated, March 16th, 1917.

This is what Pares says:

"*No one made the Russian Revolution, unless it was the autocracy*

itself; certainly no one on the other side, if one excepts the last-minute change-round of the Volynsky Regiment. Till then there was no organised opposition to the police and troops, and, indeed, that very evening, at a meeting of revolutionary leaders in Kerensky's quarters, it was precisely the Bolsheviks present who said that the moment had not yet come and that success was not to be hoped for." Lenin and all the principal Bolshevik leaders were not in Russia. Their influence on Russia at this time was only now beginning to be of serious significance, and their pledged supporters probably did not number more than fifteen thousand.

The change at the outset was wholly destructive. The police were abolished because they had fired on the people. The Army broke up because its allegiance, and soon its discipline, was gone. Gutchkov, at the time, said " the power would go after the Revolution to those who took it."

In fact it all depended on who could curb the mob.

The Provisional Government of the Duma tried, but its three tasks, particularly the last, were too big, and it failed. The tasks were (1) to restore administration, (2) at the same time recognise the fundamental revolutionary change, (3) to keep Russia in the war.

There were now two extremes, Reaction or Conservatism, and outright Bolshevism of which the ordinary man in Russia understood only one principle, *common ownership of land.* Kerensky tried to run in the mean course, but soldiers away from the front deserted *en masse*, Reaction had no power, and Bolshevism won. Throughout the whole of that summer the soldiers streamed to the farms, evicted the owners, and took possession themselves.

Lenin, who had reached Russia in April, had all along preached this; by the end of the year the process—with no police or any other authority to intervene—was practically complete, the Provisional Government failed, and Lenin became the new prophet.

Note Pares's comment: " In England most people have their heads above water; in Russia most people have not. That was why a movement for liberty could so easily take the character of a slaves' revolt."

Is it necessary for ourselves to make any comment? I think not, but nevertheless I do it, to underline it. All this history we have studied proves the statement. *This was not a revolution inevitably produced on an industrial population by the inherent momentum of industrialism, as Marx prophesied; it was a revolution in which a people, too long oppressed, and kept in poverty and ignorance, beginning to realise their human rights, demanded them: reasonable rights of livelihood, of some disposal of their own freedom, of some possessions.*

It was a revolution as elementary as that of the French, a hundred and thirty years before, before the time of Industrialism.

It was instrumentalised not by an inexorably progressive political class-consciousness, but by a simple instinct, cupidity, by an unexpected removal of restraint—abdication of authority and abolition of police—suddenly given rein. Its aim and driving force was not renunciation of property, but possession of property.

Now for a slight history of Russian Marxism, with an explanation of the term Bolshevik. " In 1903, in Brussels, and later in London, was held a meeting of the exiled leaders of Russian Marxism, and there the Bolshevik was a member of the majority (*bolshinstvo*) whose view prevailed at that meeting." In the Russian language, Pares points out, it means an " all-outer," or " whole-hogger," *i.e.* Maximalist.

There were previously two socialist parties in Russia. You remember the Navodniks, the young people who went down to the peasants in the 70's. These split into two groups. One group believed in political terrorism, and were responsible for the assassination of Alexander II; these came to be called the Social Revolutionaries or S.R.s. These were non-Marxists. The other group did not believe in political terrorism, they later became Marxists, and were called the Social Democrats or S.D.s.

Now, these S.D.s in Russia, being Marxists, were really only a Russian branch of a large party of European Marxists. It was this group which had the meeting in 1903, and there the question was: " Was the goal to be reached by persuasion and a democratic victory, or by compulsion and violence? The second method needed a closely-knit party discipline, and implied totalitarianism of the State after the victory." It was the second division that Lenin inspired at the meeting and who were the first Bolsheviks. The other division were the Mensheviks, or minority.

These two parties, remember, were Marxist, that is they were international parties. Inside Russia they had no organisation. Many, of course, were not Russian at all and a considerable number were internationally-minded Jews. Lenin, however, the leader of the Bolsheviks, was a Russian. He was of the minor Russian provincial gentry. He therefore was educated and took a law degree. His brother was a revolutionary and was executed for his part in a conspiracy to assassinate Alexander III, and Lenin was easily influenced to become a revolutionary. He was exiled in Siberia for five years and after 1900 lived abroad. Like Marx, he was a constant reader at the British Museum. He dreamed and planned the future. He decided on two main lines for effecting and then making use of a revolution:

" On the one hand the widest agitation in factories to draw the working class more and more into the political arena, and on the other the organisation of a compact body of professional politicians to give the lead, and over this nucleus he established an imperative authority."

Remember Lenin was not a Russian patriot. Never be misled into thinking that. He despised nationalism. Listen to him in 1913:

" The teaching of Marx is all-powerful because it is true. It is complete and symmetrical, offering an integrated view of the world, irreconcilable with any superstition, with any reactionism, or with any defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate inheritor of the best that humanity created in the nineteenth century in the form of German philosophy, English political economy, French Socialism." We can't ask for any clearer statement of creed. As Pares says: " Russia was for him an objective factor " only, merely a step on the road to his conceived world-communism. Of all Europe, however, as we have seen by our history, Russia was the likeliest at that time for revolution, though not as a result of industrial causes; therefore Russia, just as any other country, would serve him and his colleagues' purpose. He stressed this at meetings at various parts of the Continent. When the war came, he worked for the defeat of Imperialist Russia. He had no success, but Rasputin and others, as we have seen, did his work for him. There was no actual leadership of the Revolution itself, and, as Pares says, " the triumph was that of the mob, that is, of disorder."

We saw the Provisional Government and the Soldiers' Soviet both set up on the same day. From the first there was constant rivalry and friction. " Lenin, by agreement with the German Government, which recognised his distinctive value, was brought through Germany in a sealed van and reached Petrograd April 16th, 1917. (Trotsky, a former Menshevik, who only now perspicaciously became a Bolshevik, arrived from America a little later.) Lenin immediately boldly preached fraternisation with the enemy at the front and seizure of the estates in the rear." Though a small party, indeed very small, the Bolsheviks were the only party who had organisation and a definite plan. In May they made an attempt to seize Petrograd, but they were too small and failed; in July again they failed. Then they had luck. In August the reactionary commander-in-chief Kornilov with a ' loyal ' army advanced against the revolutionary Soviet army in Petrograd. It was a fiasco: troops on both sides fraternised. Both Kornilov and Kerensky, with his Provisional Government, were discredited, and in November, having in the meantime by assiduous organisation got control of opinion at scattered meetings, the Bolsheviks marched in

with practically no opposition. There was still the Soldiers' Soviet in the Duma, but these, being comprised of a variety of revolutionary elements, had no strong unanimity of opinion as to action, and the organised Bolsheviks had them at a discount.

Now at last, November 1917, we have arrived at a moment of history where a confirmed Marxist, of great organising and executive ability, Lenin, is in a position and has the power to impose his theoretical system on a large ignorant community.

At first the Bolsheviks collaborated in the Government with some of the other, S.R., revolutionary leaders, but they soon dominated them. Next there was a Constituent Assembly, newly elected by universal franchise and representing the entire country, just gathered. The Bolsheviks dispersed it by force. Now they were in sole control. They were the Government.

Remember, the prime interest of Communism was world revolution. This, with their eyes filled with the Russian foreground, they thought was on the point of bursting out everywhere. Russia was a beginning only and they were impatient. They were not really interested in the effect of their legislation on Russians: they simply proceeded with their laid-down Marxian programme without regard to the question whether the existing conditions allowed it to be workable. The administration of factories was handed over to workers' assemblies. House property was seized. Banks were abolished. All private trade was declared illegal. There was no other means of distribution of food and commodities yet set up, mark you; so what was the result?—ruin and starvation passed all bounds. This mainly affected the cities. What of the country? They had immediately confirmed the peasant confiscation of land, but the simple peasants had grabbed the land for themselves, not for any communistic State-ownership. Thus three-quarters of Russia had taken a step which was anti-communistic. What is more, they showed deep primitive feelings about it. What did the Communists do? Act ruthlessly according to Communist plan? No; they gave in to the unarguable vast human interest. *Before Communism began it had surrendered one of its most vital planks —ownership of land.*

Thus the peasants were temporarily pacified by a vital surrender of principle, but there were other matters. There was the general scarcity of food resulting from the breakdown of the whole system of production and distribution, and obedience to the Government could be gained only by the starkest methods of all-round repression—the detested Cheka, and later the O.G.P.U.

They immediately treated with Germany for an armistice, and a

humiliating one was accepted by Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. An unpopular peace by a government that imposes great hardships can only have one result: there was civil war. The Bolsheviks, however, won the civil war because amongst the opposition there was wide division of political opinion and hence no co-ordination. With our Armistice in November 1918 allied intervention on the side of the opposition ceased and the Bolsheviks had won. It was merely a matter of clearing up.

Now for the condition of Russia. Listen to Pares. "Marxism was an industrial theory, and Russia was predominatingly agricultural; and it was only because agriculture for a time evaded the application of the theory that Russia survived at all.

"The factories were ruined by the application of the theory that pay was independent of work, by levelling of skilled and unskilled labour, and most of all by administration by public assembly and entirely inexpert managers. According to Rykov, Commissary for Industry, factory output had fallen by 85 per cent., and what was produced was looted by the workers and the plant to boot: he reckoned that the number of factory workers left in employment was not more than a million—*and this was the boasted proletariat, who were to profit most by the change.*"

Thus (1) At the first try-out, Communism, applied to the industrial section, *for which it was designed*, failed.

(2) It was not applied to the far vaster agricultural section.

Someone will point out that nevertheless the Government remained, as it did, in existence. Yes; but that is a comment on the efficacy of State autocracy, not on Communism.

It is evident to us, and to history, that the Government remained in existence *because* they did not apply Communism to agriculture. This, however, the Government of the time, intoxicated with power and the success not of Communism but of autocracy, did not see: they now attempted to apply Communism to agriculture. They said in effect, and they determined to enforce it by autocratic force: The peasant was now a Communist citizen; they would not take away his land yet, but they would allow him to take from its products only a fraction to represent his wages, the rest was to go to the State. What happened? What, obviously, would simple human nature do? The peasantry decided to grow only what he required for himself, and no more. The Government had to act at this. They had to get food for the towns. They sent out punitive expeditions to take the peasant's food, even his seed grain reserved for the next crop. The result was a colossal famine. There followed terrible epidemics.

Millions died. Nature, in fact, itself had called a halt to the programme of Communism.

What did Lenin do? He did the only possible thing. In the words of Pares, he decided to make the halt official. He promulgated a New Economic Policy, the NEP, which was nothing more or less than a partial restoration of the old. Look at these provisions and see it if is Communism.

1. A free market was allowed to peasants.
2. Private shops were allowed to open again.
3. Money was restored as currency in place of the idealistic, and impractical, barter.
4. " Attempts were made to reopen communications with Capitalistic countries to get loans to carry on."

In short, COMMUNISM WAS DEAD !

As we shall see, in Russia it was never revived.

It never had been really alive: there were exceptions from the very start. By the NEP it was officially decapitated: it has never come alive since. Every step since has been to take the political system in Russia farther from Communism.

Many social changes took place or remained—changes which the socialistic Duma had been itself gradually attaining—but socialist changes are not Communism. Communism is a precise extreme form of Socialism, whose terms were clearly defined by Marx and repeated by Lenin—and *Communism was dead.*

It may be true that Lenin only intended this to be a temporary halt, and that his altruistic purpose—internationalism, abolition of private property, abolition of the family, of religion, etc.—was in his own mind unchanged, and for this reason he still called the régime Communism. But by the NEP precise Communism was dead; and if plain facts like these cannot be squarely admitted, it is no use proceeding with the investigation.

Listen to Pares. " What a situation for a fanatic ! Fanaticism at half-cock ! When shops opened again and trams ran again for payment, there were actually young people in Moscow who committed suicide at the thought of it. What ? We were told that we were so right and they so wrong, that killing was no murder. And now you tell us to put back what we have swept away. It was only the enormous prestige of Lenin that could have forced the retreat of the party, and it was his last great achievement." *Communism was not being practised!*

Lenin was shot, but not immediately fatally, by a woman called Dora Kaplan in 1921; he developed sclerosis of the brain and had a

stroke in May 1922, another in December which half paralysed him, and a third fatal one in March 1923.

This was the position of the Communist Party. Under Lenin it was an autocracy, ruling Russia by direct force with party police. With Lenin gone, the remaining leaders were an oligarchy ruling Russia by the same means. Stalin finally gained chief authority over them and it was again an autocracy. Always it has been totalitarian, with the Communist Party having complete monopoly of political power, complete monopoly of the Press, complete monopoly of foreign trade, and *complete monopoly of education*. In the early days, as we saw, Lenin and his associate leaders were Bolsheviks, *i.e.* confirmed Communists—they ousted all the others. They found that Nature herself—human nature—forbade them putting Communism into anything like precise practice in Russia, but they still hoped for the future. They hoped to use education to change this obstinate human nature. With the 75 per cent. illiterates what a " glorious chance to teach the alphabet simultaneously with the principles of the new world to be."

Then the Bolsheviks, true to the tenets of Communism, began through their organised educationists to teach the children disrespect of religion, the family tie, and parental control, and all the rest of it. Alas, all of this sharp communist tendency had the reverse effect to what was intended, each part of it was resulting in its own contribution to novel kinds of social chaos, and all had to be blunted. You must read the history of this period, 1921–28, in the chapter that Pares calls 'Compromise and Irony,' dealing with many aspects—religion, agriculture, private enterprise. Note this, for instance: At the Congress of the party in 1924 Kamenev announced that 10 per cent. of home trade was in private hands, and 80 per cent. of retail. He sums up: " One can imagine the effect of all this compromise on such ardent doctrinaires (the Communist Party). What a position for a Government—to hold power on condition that you let the greater part of the population *do the opposite* to what you wished." Here was the effect: " The party itself, and therefore the Government, was soon split endwise." There were two main divisions led respectively by Stalin and Trotsky.

Stalin's group, realists, said: Continue governing the country by making concessions to human nature, and giving the country what it evidently wants.

Trotsky's group, ideal Communists, said: What the country wants and has is not Communism, and everyone knows it. Practise what you preach. You call it Communism, therefore let it be Communism,

with world revolution the open and avowed goal, and to hell with the sentiments of the people of Russia !

The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky went on for four years. We see now their purposes clearly, distinct and incompatible: Stalin's —practical government of Russia, with the outside world a secondary consideration; Trotsky's—world revolution, and it's just too bad for Russia. (Marx had regarded England as the crucial test of his theory, Communism. There in the General Strike of 1926, inspired and fermented by Russia in the person of the Russian trade-union delegate, Tomsky, the challenge of world revolution came to a head—and fizzled out. At a football match between strikers and police the chief constable's wife kicked off and the strikers won.) From vehement arguments at meetings it came to action. Stalin won. Trotsky was banished, and to the end of his life shrilly called Stalin a traitor to Communism (see his book *The Revolution Betrayed*)—which, of course, he was, but not necessarily to Russia. It is not unimportant that Stalin was a Russian and Trotsky not.

Stalin having won, and now being in dominant control of the party, continued his purpose according to his lights with unshrinking resolution. Though forced to become an autocrat, he still wished to confer on Russia as many of his early socialistic principles as possible ; but his purpose was practical and disregarded trivial principles: he would govern Russia and make the necessary laws to do so, no matter if each individual one outrageously flouted Communism. Trotsky the main stumbling-block was gone, and now he systematically got rid of all opposition by purges, by assassinations, by public trials with forced confessions followed by imprisonment or executions. Soon of the original ' old Bolsheviks ' (the original *Politburo*) none was left.

Stalin was in the saddle, and his policy was not Communism. The basic principle of Communism, Equality, Stalin contemptuously denounces as a shibboleth. The principle of recompense ' according to his needs ' has gone into limbo: piece-work has come in, and competition. Stalin rewards the record-breakers—or ' Stakhanovites,' after the Donetz miner Stakhanov—and the extra output is not paid at the same rate but progressively higher. The Five-Year Plans commenced, the first 1928–33 and the second 1933–38, whose aims were to make Russia self-supporting, and at no disadvantage industrially compared with the rest of the world. There is no need to go into these, they can be read about; and I only allow myself one personal comment. I see no reason why any other intelligent and enthusiastic form of government, say a democratic or parliamentary one, should not, in the twentieth century, have done just as much. And surely

the present one would have been farther advanced and in a better position to meet a great nation's attack in 1939 (or 1941 as they made it by a time-buying treaty) *if they had not wasted eleven valuable years from* 1917 *to* 1928 *in wrangling, and bludgeoning and starving and maltreating a variegated community of sensitive humanity by trying to compress it into the rigid materialistic framework of impracticable Communism.*

Meanwhile, making concessions here and there to the individualism and sentimentalism of human nature, the community was governed by its various local Soviet councils, mounting to the Supreme Soviet, a kind of national assembly with its Ministers of State, *i.e.* Government. All this sounds very democratic. As a matter of fact it is not, because the Party—never forget the Party—appoints the candidates and does not give any choice. Never forget the Party. It is a hand-picked party of professional political directors with an iron discipline, just as the Party is in any other totalitarian country like Germany or Italy, with its army of party police. In Russia membership of the Party is confined to about two million, and the Party rules Russia. Not only does it appoint the candidates for the various Soviets, it dictates the policy and actions of the Soviets when elected. And the Party itself—as well, therefore, as the State—is governed by a Political Bureau (*Politburo*) of nine persons. This today is omnipotent. At the head of it is the autocrat, Stalin. As we know, until Russia came into the war Stalin had no official title in the government of Russia; he was not part of the Government, although he was the Autocrat of Russia. As Pares says (p. 138): "Stalin did obtain absolute power, such as Lenin never claimed, and has retained it ever since." He was 'merely' the Secretary of the Politburo. But when Russia came into the war it seemed appropriate to Stalin to assume official title, and he created himself Premier.

As I say, meanwhile the government of the community went on, *not according to the principles of Communism but according to the principles that Stalin conceived were good for Russia.* But no one had seen these principles in black and white. Of course they did not exist in black and white, and furthermore, as we have seen, they were constantly changing. Now if there is one thing people like in their politics, which when boiled down means their daily lives and the rules thereof, they like to know where they stand. Consequently it was with great general relief that it was learnt in 1936 that 'Stalin's Constitution' was being prepared. It was published on June 12th, 1936.

As Pares says: "Its first appearance made a striking and even astonishing effect." "*It looked almost amazingly like the liberal*

programme of the Zemstva (which led up to the Parliament (Duma) of 1905, which broadly copied the British parliamentary system), *which came to be adopted by practically the whole nation. Even the actual wording was sometimes the same.*"

If you who have been reading this short account are not struck by the remarkableness of this above fact, you have little insight.

Thirty years of experiment and back—in intention—where they started !

Can anyone say that the experiment had been worth while ? Yes, perhaps—*as a warning to others.* After thirty years, human nature —for the words " adopted by practically the whole nation " must denote an event in tune with human nature—human nature at last receives, as it must always receive in any political system that hopes to have any stability or permanence, its recognition.

But digest this fact: *each recognition, or each concession made to human nature, has taken it farther and farther from the dream Communism.*

As we shall see, the promises laid down in this Stalin Constitution—freedom of speech, press, thought, etc.—have not yet been implemented, but there does remain the political fact of their stated intention.

Contemporary Picture of Russia

Here is a contemporary picture of Russia given by two trained observers, from whom I quote: Philip Jordan and Quentin Reynolds. These two were present in Russia during the war, but to show that the same conditions obtained before Russia's war with Germany, compare the Russian section of Virginia Cowles' book, *Looking for Trouble* (1941), on precisely the same topics. Jordan's book is called *Russian Glory*. In his introduction he says: " What facts I have stated are facts; the rest is a world that I have lived in "; and on page 1: " Ever since the Spanish War my life has been in some way mixed up with Communism and the men of the extreme left." Again, page 1: " That was indeed the dominant fear in my heart "—when he was going to Russia for the first time—" that all I had written and preached for five years would dissolve suddenly in my hand "; and on page 128: " Until we can oust the British Conservative Party from its place of power, Europe will not trust us again." He is therefore, for Russia, a non-antagonistic observer.

He says: " Since Lenin first propounded the doctrines that were henceforward to guide the lives of all who came within the Bolshevik orbit, there has been retrogression. Equality of education no longer

exists. . . . Having bred an élite from those who showed themselves in the early days to be the true founders of the Socialist State, Stalin has attempted to breed from them a still higher aristocracy of intellect and efficiency by instituting school fees for all members of the community, and grading them so that, taken by and large, only the sons and daughters of the élite can be afforded the higher education. His two other profoundly abhorrent regulations are the introduction of internal passports, and the tying of a man to his job " (p. 141).

This last, it is to be noted, is not a passing wartime measure, when autocratic measures are to be expected, for look at page 68: " It is now some years since the Russian workman lost his right to sell his labour in the open market: one of the most criticised of Stalin's decrees was that which bound a man to the job on which he found himself, on pain of never being employed again."

What of the principles of ' equality,' of ' from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs ' ? and, incidentally, what about the abolition of private property ?

This is what Jordan says on page 81: " It is true that the so-called Intellectuals earn a good deal more money than the workers. . . . Everybody in Russia has a basic ration of foodstuffs in wartime. But anyone who has the money to do so can buy, at greatly enhanced prices, commodities above that ration in any quantity he is able to pay for." Further, on page 101: " Materially, the people whom we saw (at Ryazan) were infinitely worse off than anyone at home, even those who have lived for years on the rotting pittance of the dole; but material prosperity, however much they may desire and work for it, is not as important to the Russian as it is to us " (!)

A democracy encourages freedom; a dictatorship or autocracy prefers to regiment opinion and action as if for war. On page 82 Jordan speaks of " The brains of a propaganda organisation that makes that of Goebbels look like an amateur advertising agency. . . . This perpetual campaign of explanation is by now innate belief of the Russian citizen. . . . He has been told for years that he must suffer and sacrifice so that Russia can possess an army great enough to protect him and to beat the enemy; and he has been told for well-nigh a quarter of a century that one day his country would be attacked by either one of a group of western capitalistic powers."

Later he refers to " *the profoundly militaristic atmosphere in which a whole generation has been reared* "; and then, on the same page, 141, he goes on: " More than forty per cent. of the present population of the Soviet Union were born after the Revolution took place; more than a further twenty per cent. were no more than five years old when it

happened, which means that something like sixty per cent. have no notion how the rest of the human race lives. *They are completely ignorant of the contemporary world.* . . . It is useless to tell a young Soviet citizen that the material condition of the workers in Britain or in the United States is better than his own, because he simply will not believe you. . . . This refusal to face facts is exasperating, and it is so widely spread that one can only admire *the efficiency with which the minds of highly intelligent men and women have been conditioned.*" (My italics.)

Quentin Reynolds (*Only The Stars Are Neutral*) says of his life in Moscow in 1941 (p. 126): " You were, of course, cut off from contact with all Russian citizens. The authorities still forbade Soviet citizens from fraternising with foreigners, and the only Russians we ever met were Government officials."

How, one may ask, has this extraordinary general ignorance been ' conditioned ' in this great country of two hundred million ? The answer has been given above. It has been done by the propaganda machine of a rigid dictatorship. By isolating the minds of the masses of the country entirely from the rest of the world and by feeding those minds exclusively on the prescribed propaganda diet. By repression of individualists, by the famous ' purges ' of which we have heard so much, by the secret police of the Cheka and the O.G.P.U.

Jordan says: " Most revolutions have led to a resurgence of the human spirit in these particular departments of human endeavour "— he is referring to the arts. Not so in Russia. " It points to the fact that regimentation is on too wide a scale; and the fear of outside contamination so great that, at all costs, something universal in the human mind had to be stamped out " (p. 88). And again (p. 87): " With the possible exception of Sholokov, who wrote *And Quiet Flows the Don*, there are no writers of integrity in the Soviet Union. Literature has become so politicised that all inventive genius, all channels for the real expression of the human spirit, have been dammed. . . . There is no way of escape from the political currents of the day, with the result that novelists and writers have ceased to think for themselves and write only to please the ruling order. They are mobilised for war now, as they should be; but initiative was killed in them long before it began."

I spoke of purges.

Jordan says (p. 143): "The shadow of the purge had not yet entirely departed, and its substance will not be forgotten for some time to come." Reynolds (*Only The Stars Are Neutral*), who was present at an official dinner at the Kremlin, says: " Vyshinsky stood chatting with

Harriman in French, and it was hard to believe that this was the man who prosecuted and sent either to death or imprisonment at least one hundred thousand Russian citizens in the 1938 purge."

What of the autocrat of this great concern ?

We know that originally they officially tried to suppress Christianity; have they tried to replace it with anything else ?—for humans like to have a sentimental or spiritual focus. We see many signs that the State-directed propaganda organisation does provide such a focus—in the Master of the State. The Master who, incidentally, rules the organisation, and who cannot be publicly or privately criticised on pain of death or punishment. As Jordan says (p. 107): " No criticism of Stalin or of the Government was allowed." Reynolds says (p. 100): " In Russia, anyone who criticises the government is an enemy of the State."

These are some of the signs: Photographs and effigies of first Lenin and then Stalin are displayed everywhere, obligatorily. Lenin's tomb is accorded not only great state importance but exclusive reverence. All ameliorative occurrences that affect the general life are ascribed to the benignance and foresight of this one man; and, by means of his propaganda organisation, his influence, the heroic incidents of his life, are never absent from the people's attention. Constantly, through this machine, he appears before them in a strong, a wise, a benevolent light. Indeed more than benevolent. Describing a club of an artillery company, Jordan says, " And on to the panelled walls were pinned all the political apparatus that is such a feature of Soviet life: photographs of Lenin, now become a remote and mystical figure *with some of the attributes of a God*; of Stalin, taken when his hair was still black " (p. 27). (My italics.)

Is there any freedom in this ? one may ask.

Jordan enunciates this opinion (p. 78) when talking of the way even all history books in Russia subserve politics and propaganda: " For there is no such thing as an a-political history. To be a-political in itself is to commit a political act."—" That would not suit me. But it suits the Russians: it is their war for their freedom, and if freedom does not mean the same thing in the Soviet Union as it does in Great Britain or the United States, that does not invalidate its real meaning for them."

Looking at the picture outlined above, all I can say is that it is by no means my definition of freedom. Nor is it any definition if words have ordinary meaning.

In conclusion Jordan says: " On my return to this country I found that the British people as a whole seemed to be sentimentally in love

with Russia, to have lost all judgment, and to suppose that Russia had produced an impossibility—the perfect human society. If the British people are so in love, then I can only be sorry for them; for although Russia contains within itself all the seeds of *future* happiness for men, they have as yet hardly begun to throw out roots."

Is this Communism?

Look once again at the salient principles of Marxian Communism which Lenin and the original Bolsheviks, according to his written word, intended to impose on Russia:

1. Abolition of private property.

1A. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.

2. Abolition of the family.

3. Abolition of religion.

4. Abolition of countries and nationalities.

5. A classless society, no privileges.

6. Free development of all individuals—*i.e.* unrestricted speech, press, etc.

7. Free election of representatives in government.

Now compare the interpretation of these principles in present Russia.

1. *Abolition of private property.*

" By a decree of February 18th, 1935, . . . their [peasants] houses and kitchen gardens, as in the time of the Tsars, together with all household articles, *were declared to be individual property*; but besides they were given allotments on which they could labour for their own profit " (Pares in *Russia*). Since then in countless directions private ownership has gone on apace—and is official.

In fact private property is *not* abolished in Russia.

1A. *Abolition of all rights of inheritance.*

" Earnings could be invested in the National Savings Banks, which were soon very full, *and could also be bequeathed* " (Pares).

In fact rights of inheritance are *not* abolished.

2. *Abolition of the family.*

" The peasants in particular were greatly pleased at the respect now accorded to family ties—heartened, it is said, by a rather demonstrative

visit of Stalin to his mother. Now in every school hung the legend that they were expected to show respect for their parents " (Pares).

In fact the family is *not* abolished.

3. *Abolition of religion.*

Religion is still permitted in Russia, though at the moment not officially recognised. " Yaroslavsky, in his report of the Union of the Godless in April 1937, reckoned up the results of all its attacks; one-third of the townspeople and two-thirds of the countrypeople were still religious, which means more than half of the whole." Official criticism reproved " those who idealise pre-Christian paganism and do not understand the simple fact that the introduction of Christianity was progress, in comparison with pagan barbarism." (This official view witnessed by Pares.) We know this also by frequent newspaper reports at the beginning of the Russian war and since.

In fact religion is *not* abolished.

4. *Abolition of countries and nationalities.*

Nationalism and love of their country, Russia, is, as we know, Stalin's and the Government's loudest theme in this war. In February 1939 the Army discarded its oath to the world proletariat, and, for the first time, bound its allegiance to the Soviet Fatherland.

Philip Jordan in *Russian Glory* simply says (p. 73): " Russia is intensely Nationalistic." There is no need to expand this by quoting Stalin's speeches, for instance, during the war.

In fact countries and nationalities are *not* abolished; the exact opposite, they are stressed.

[NOTE: As this book goes to press, news comes from Russia of the official disbandment of the Communist International (the Comintern). The decision of the Præsidium—the governing body—was announced May 22nd, 1943. Thus henceforward not only are " all sections of the Communist International "—including the Communist Parties of Great Britain and other countries—" freed from their rules and regulations and from the decisions of the congress of the Communist International " (according to the wording of the Moscow statement), but from this date the Marxian sacred precept of ' internationalism,' one of the most prominent limbs of the Communist doctrine, is publicly and officially amputated from the Russian system.

We had already extracted the fact that, while to have organised groups in many foreign countries obedient to Moscow was an advantage not to be sneezed at, this precept had not for some time figured

very prominently in Stalin's practical government of the Russian people.]

5. *A classless society, no privileges.*

No one is nowadays deluded that Russia has a classless society, that no one has more privilege than another. Pares, on page 192, talks of " quarrels in the *ruling set*." Virginia Cowles states: " The important Soviet police official or bureaucrat had none of this inconvenience. He was rewarded not only by a far larger salary than the ordinary worker, but to have a car and chauffeur at his disposal, etc." And again: " Although Soviet Russia claimed to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, under the label ' Intelligentsia ' you found a class of privilege and power. . . . Officially defined in 1938, [the Intelligentsia] included technicians, police officials, and bureaucrats—in fact the white-collar class of the Soviet Union." Jordan bluntly says (p. 82): "The privileged class is the Communist Party."

In fact there is *not* a classless society, with no privileges.

6. *Free development of all individuals—i.e. unrestricted speech, press, etc.*

No sane person can be found in the world to say that there has been, or is now, free development of individuals in the Soviet Union. We see education, press, radio, literature, all strictly state-controlled, *i.e.* Party-controlled. Most strictly controlled, by secret police and ' purges.' This is not, nor ever can be, called ' freedom ' in our simple concept. Not only is there no freedom of mental development, with the rigid regimentation of education, etc., and punishment of free speech, through twenty-five years of peace; there is not even simple physical freedom, when, in peace, a man is " bound to his job on pain of never being employed again," like a slave.

In fact there is *not* free development of all individuals.

7. *Free election of representatives in government.*

Russia is ruled by Stalin and the Communist Party—and by no one else. They are not and they were not elected.

There does exist the fiction of universal suffrage. Let us examine it. " His [Stalin's] intention became clear when it was announced that there should be only one candidate, and that candidate nominated by the Party " (Pares).

That is clear enough, even to a child.

In fact there is *not* free election of representatives in government.

. . . . . .

In short, every Communist principle is contradicted.

IT IS REVEALED THAT THIS SYSTEM IS NOT COMMUNISM—OTHERWISE WORDS HAVE NO MEANING.

THE ACTUAL SYSTEM IN RUSSIA

If the political system at present governing Russia, and for the last twenty-five years, is not Communism—although it is still called by that name for the sufficient reason that the rulers sitting securely in the seat of power are not such fools as to admit a complete and fundamental error—what, then, is the system ?

This review of the Russian scene during the last twenty-five years has been necessarily brief, but the facts it depicts are clear. We see a numerous people that formerly was largely illiterate, under an autocratic monarchy, now receiving education—but not a liberal education: a truncated, specialised, regimented one. We see some betterment in the physical lot of the masses, but not yet equal to the general lot of peoples in other countries such as Great Britain and America (though whether that betterment would in any case have been achieved, or perhaps surpassed, by some other system that did not so frequently modify itself and change its direction, and that did not impose such crippling early hardships, is suggestively open to question). We have not had time to examine at length certain important aspects of the scene, such as the socialisation of most, but not all, industries, nor the functioning of the excellent—for they are excellent—social services. Many books are available for reading about these. We did not have time to deal with these aspects, but we take them into account; and the account we take of them does not vitiate the import of any of the statements we have set down.

We see a community that after twenty-five years is intellectually isolated from the rest of the world. A community that does not have freedom as we understand it. A community that throughout all the vicissitudes and changes of that time—the early grim period of attempted strict Communism, to which Jordan refers on p. 92 of his book in these words: " The memory of the black famine years and of the bloody imposition of collectivisation still stark and vivid in his [the Russian peasant's] mind "; the retrogressive, startling NEP of Lenin; the sudden and successive organic adjustments necessitated by Stalin's step-by-step, less-and-less communistic decrees—a community that *during all this time has been under an unchanged governing power.* A community over which first Lenin took control and exacted obedience for six years, and in succession Stalin, uninterruptedly, for twenty, appointing all officials in the State from the highest to the lowest

without argument, never submitting this choice to the arbitrament of a free election—most certainly never submitting himself to that arbitrament.

What is such a system ?

Words to us have definite meaning. When we say a pure Autocracy we mean a state system that has permanent state officials, totally, from the apex (autocrat) down, all being appointed from the apex; a pure Democracy has temporary state officials, totally, up to and including the apex (president), all being appointed from below by recurring vote; a Mixture has some permanent (*e.g.* army) and some temporary, and according to the proportion of permanent or temporary so the system approximates towards the autocratic or democratic forms.

The actual Russian system is unquestionably an autocracy.

And if a definition is required as to the particular classification of autocracy it is—for all forms of government vary slightly within their class—IT CAN ONLY BE DEFINED AS AN AUTOCRACY WHICH, SO FAR, HAS SET ITS FACE AGAINST GROSS CAPITALISM.

No more will the facts allow us to say of it.

It includes in its autocracy provisions for general social services, such as medical attention, etc., that other countries, in particular England, had long before. It has some measures, state-ownership of certain industries, that so far go beyond other countries. But that proves nothing. Many other countries have state-owned industries, such as railways, etc., and have had for years. England, for instance, has now state-ownership of coal, and there is no limit to what England might do in this direction by her own constitutional means—and England has a distinctly different political system.

CONCLUSION ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF 'COMMUNISM'

Now we may return to our plan of analysis.

We commenced with considering the political system of ' Communism ' as defined by Marx and Lenin. Let us finish with it.

Scientifically we applied our tests. We found that, for shallow thinkers, it passed the tests of Emotional Appeal and Plausibility. We considered that under the test of Theoretical Practicability—where, more critically, we took indigestible human nature into account—it failed. Then came the most important test, the only real test, the test of Actual Practice.

We frankly considered the actual application of this political system to the great community Russia. Without bias, and having regard, I believe, only to actuality, carefully we culled and marshalled the facts.

We are now in a position to give our verdict on this section, remembering always that the subject is that clear thing defined by Marx and Lenin, the thing with which we started: explicit Communism.

The question is: How well does 'Communism' work in ACTUAL PRACTICE?

There is only one answer we can, on the evidence, truthfully give: There *is* no explicit 'Communism' in actual practice. *Under the crucial test of Actual Practice, in Russia 'Communism' failed to function.*

. . . . . .

As a matter of fact, history shows that the idealistic doctrine of 'Communism' always has failed in actual practice; for this, in Russia, is not the first time that an attempt has been made to impose it on a community. Apart from the well-known experiment of the early Christians—when Ananias proved the fallibility of the human element—the abortive Commune of Paris in the last century, and the more recent failure in Hungary, there have been many others. In the first half of last century a great number of these communist-minded communities were organised by idealists in the beckoning continent of North America. It was like an epidemic. But they did not last. "In the course of the next thirty years sixty-odd groups or communities similar to Owen's New Harmony Settlement were organised in various parts of the country," says the historian Woodward, in *A New American History* (p. 348), who then goes on: "The main reason for the failure of these associated groups appears to have been the equality of pay and social status. After the first enthusiasm wore off, the efficient workers resented the fact that they were on the same basis of reward as the idlers and fools."

There is a more famous one still. The Brownists or Separatists, a sect of Puritans, to escape from disfavour in England fled to Leyden in Holland. "They wanted to establish churches of their own; they believed in holding property in common, in sharing the proceeds of labour. . . . If the Separatists were here today we should call them Communists" (Woodward). They were unhappy in Holland and decided to go to the New World. "One hundred and two Separatists, now become the Pilgrim Fathers of history, set sail in the *Mayflower* in September 1620. In 1623 (only three years) the objections to the communal manner of living became so pronounced that Governor Bradford abolished it and gave every man a piece of land for his own use." (Compare Lenin's first concession to the peasants.) Bradford exclaimed with a sigh: "The vanity of that concept of Plato and other ancients . . . that the taking away of property and bringing in com-

munity into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing, as if they were wiser than God ! "

That may well serve as ' Communism's ' epitaph.

Reflect well on this wise observation of the historian Gibbon in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*: " *Augustus was sensible that mankind is governed by names ; nor was he deceived in his expectation that the senate and people would submit to slavery, provided they were respectfully assured that they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.*"

Similarly we have observed that the people of Russia is not governed by ' Communism,' though it is still called by that *name.*

History indeed would seem to state that explicit Communism, beyond failing in the one annotated instance of Russia, is not ever a practicable political proposition.

Conclusion on the 'Actual' System in Russia

Our last step in the examination of the Russian system has now been reached.

We know the system for a strict autocracy that keeps its people controlled and generally contented (except for the ' purgees '), by rigid supervision, by intellectually isolating them from the rest of the world, by regaling them from a centrally-controlled propaganda machine which keeps them misinformed and assures them of their beatitude, by certain appreciable and admirable social concessions, by the fan of patriotism, and by the retained comfortable *name* ' Soviet.'

That is the *de facto* system in Russia at the present moment, whatever it may call itself.

We have seen how the system stumbled painfully through twenty years of peace—no one can deny the painful stumblings of the early years; latterly we have seen it preparing for, and finally engaged in, war.

Should we now, having finally defined this existing system, and knowing it for what it is at its present stage of development, knowing it is not what we started out with—should we now go back and examine it anew with our five agreed criteria, test of Emotional Appeal, etc. ?

It would take up a lot of space, and it is not necessary. We know it is an autocracy. In our next section we examine a declared autocracy *ab initio*, and we there put all the tests.

Of this particular Russian model of an autocracy that we have looked at, however, we can at least say this:

We have examined it during a short period (twenty-five years) of peace, and we are seeing it in war. In this investigation we are com-

mitted only to cast judgment when we can base it on facts. The period of peace, being in the past, presents facts which may be checked; and here a cautious judgment is justifiable. The period of war is shorter still, it is contemporary and the war is not yet over; in these circumstances, in the spirit of this whole investigation, we are not scientifically entitled to form any judgments at all. We must be more cautious still.

Peace. The Russian propagandists adulate the attainments of the régime. We note the facts. And they are, that this vast people, the greatest single community in the world with pretensions to world power and influence, greater in population than the United States and Great Britain put together, a huge country of great natural resources, this single community living continually under a vaunted régime for twenty-five years, has shown to the world no obvious eminence in either art, culture, living standard, prosperity, or even in industry—and these are the attainments of peace.

War. No one has yet doubted—the reasons will be itemised later—that an efficient autocracy is a most effective system for conducting war (it at the same time being recognised that the life of a nation is not all war). Therefore it does not occasion surprise that the Russian régime, being an autocracy, was prepared and able to conduct war. With what *comparative* efficiency this régime conducts its first total war we cannot contemporaneously judge if we make any claim to proven exactness. The facts of future history will tell us that. We merely note that a community of two hundred million ordered uninterruptedly for twenty-five years by this régime, when attacked by a community less than half its size, of eighty million, which is already engaged with other adversaries, is forced in the initial stages to the retreat and the defensive.

There we leave it.

But before doing so recall this. It is so far a non-criticisable and non-freely-electoral strict autocracy; it is evidently not Communism, where, theoretically, in a classless society, anyone will take a turn at holding office: yet it clings to the word ' Soviet,' and Stalin's Constitution of 1936 lays down in the *intended* anatomy of the State all the famous freedoms, of conscience, speech, press, meeting, and association —which do not exist.

It is in this respect still an enigma.

At the best it is a temporary autocracy striving to bring advanced Socialism.

It has already undergone many changes: unless the protestations of the word ' soviet ' and of Stalin's Constitution are a black lie it is destined to undergo yet more. Unless the autocrat with his ruling

party has the determination never to renounce autocracy, the final form is yet far from being revealed. It is still an experiment.

In this investigation we are searching for a *settled* formula which will ensure us certain requirements. We should continue to watch this changing system with close interest; but I for one do not base weighty judgments, let alone plan my life and the lives of other unoffending people, on an experiment in progress.

THE GERMAN SYSTEM

COMMUNISM was conceived as a mode of organising the lives of the inhabitants of this planet on an idealistic basis of universal unselfishness. It was obviously an ingenuous basis to build upon. It was a gross miscalculation of general human nature. We saw from the beginning of the experiment a turbulent compelled onrush of bastard adjustments which in no time converted the visionary Communism into something quite unrecognisable as international democracy but easily recognisable as the very opposite: an uneasy nationalistic dictatorship.

Now, the story of National-Socialism, or Nazism, in Germany is the story of a man, Adolf Hitler, and he, in conceiving his system, did not make the same basic miscalculation. "The political organiser," he says in *Mein Kampf* (p. 319), "must first of all be a man of psychological insight. He must take men as they are, not having too high or too low an estimate of human nature. He must take account of their weaknesses, their baseness, and all the other various characteristics, so as to form something out of them which will be a living organism." We came to the same conclusion in our Introduction. Hitler decided, however, not only to recognise their inherent base and weak characteristics—such as cruelty, lust to dominate the weak, lazy tendency to avoid responsibility—he decided to capitalise them. That is to say, stress them and even exalt them into virtues, for, as he says plainly enough, his purpose was not to improve people but to manipulate them.

Now, we know that people of noble characteristics, who also have perfect control over their baseness—like Jesus and Confucius—are rare in this world of men. At the same time we are bound to admit that men do, on the whole, know which is which. There is a natural recognition of good and evil. However, though the majority of men do generally agree as to what ideals are noble, and though they frequently do in civilised countries have customs or laws embodying them, there come moments in the life of every man when for some reason, generally for some special advantage or gratification, he would like to depart from the common standard.

Again, there do exist a minority of people, as indeed there must in any cross-section, who are not influenced by the common conscience at all. Such are the bullies, the gangsters, the criminals, the eccentrics. It is for such eventualities and such exceptions that laws are formu-

lated; and in sensibly conducted communities that the laws are implemented with sufficient effectiveness to ensure that they are observed summarily, and that these eventualities and exceptions do not throw the community into a state of perpetual upheaval. There is a continual struggle between law and lawlessness. When the law is weak or equivocal, then gangsters flourish: we have seen it through history and in our own time. When the law is in abeyance, as after a revolution, then is the time for force, any force, gangster as well as any other, to impose its own local rule—and it can make that rule general if only it is strong enough and it has been intelligent enough to be organised.

Let us look at the case of Germany.

Germany was disorganised after the war, a defeated nation. There had been a revolution. The Monarchy had gone, the Army was disbanded. Various Governments had come and gone with their various experiments in policy. Finance was out of hand. New parties and factions were arising everywhere. Law was in abeyance.

This was just the soil for a successsful *coup d'état*—and Hitler saw it.

As a boy he had had a history teacher, Dr. Leopold Poetsch, who gave him a strong sentiment of German nationalism. " When we listened to him we became afire with enthusiasm and we were sometimes moved even to tears " (*Mein Kampf*, p. 19). " I developed very rapidly in the nationalist direction, and by the time I was fifteen years old I had come to understand the difference between dynastic patriotism and nationalism based on the concept of folk, or people, my inclination being in favour of the latter " (*Mein Kampf*, p. 18). He went to Vienna hoping to become an artist but was unsuccessful, and " during my struggle for existence in Vienna " (p. 27), in the building trade, etc., he naturally fell into discussions with his fellow-workmen about social questions. He then for the first time heard of Social Democracy, *i.e.* Marxism, and he says he " devoured book after book, pamphlet after pamphlet " (p. 32).

Then the war came. " I was then a soldier and did not wish to meddle in politics." . . . " In those days I cared nothing for politics."

In 1919, having no employment, he remained in the army, and influenced by a speech by Gottfried Feder he " determined to make a fundamental study of a question with which I had hitherto not been very familiar " (Marxism). . . . " His *Capital* became intelligible to me for the first time " (p. 125). One day he took part in a discussion in the barracks, and as a result was appointed an ' instructor officer.' " I was now able to confirm what I had hitherto merely felt, namely, that I had a talent for public speaking " (p. 125).

At this time he was thirty years old.

"One day I received an order from my superiors to investigate the nature of an association which was apparently political. It called itself the 'German Labour Party.'" . . . "I found approximately twenty to twenty-five persons present, most of them belonging to the lower classes" (p. 126). . . . "I found that, apart from a few general principles, there was nothing—no programme, no pamphlet, nothing at all."

After a day or two's consideration he joined this party.

Now the man who wrote that estimate of human nature that we have examined was no unpractical simpleton. He had no fixed job or profession; he had discovered that he was a bit of a speaker; by reading and discussions and also by common sense he knew enough of politics to realise that this post-revolutionary unsettled phase in Germany was positively *the* time for some political party or other, if only they could organise themselves strongly and at the same time somehow capture the popular imagination, to streak straight into power. In short, politics offered great, indeed illimitable prizes, and he made up his mind that that was the line for him. But which party? Personal ambition had to be satisfied, of course—that was the main thing—so definitely not one of the larger parties, where he would only have been a cipher. He dreamed of course, as he says ingenuously, of starting his own party, but did not know how to set about it. This small unorganised German Labour Party—which incidentally he did not report on to his 'superiors'—suited him down to the ground. Here, surely, with most of them belonging to the lower classes, he should be able to hold a position of some prominence. He became secretary, taking over the propaganda side with arrangement of meetings, etc., and his number in the tiny party was seven.

Now at length, definitely in the political racket, he began to think with realistic objectivity. Needless to say the object of every political party that was ever pupped—and there were dozens at that time in chaotic Germany, both large, like the Communist Party, and small, like the German Labour Party—is to gain political power, which is to say, supreme governmental control. They all had that idea, and no doubt they all had their special plans. What was the plan of the German Labour Party? At present there was no cut-and-dried plan. Very good! He, as secretary, would work out one.

That would be his first objective, to gain members and strength for his adopted party. He had also another objective, and that was of course his prime reason for selecting this meagre, badly-led movement—before long to gain the chief power in the party by ousting one by one the people above him. But one thing at a time.

" A young movement that aims at re-establishing a German State with full sovereign powers," he says in *Mein Kampf* (p. 189), " will therefore have to make the task of winning over the broad masses a special objective of its plan of campaign." Here the realistic psychologist got to work. He asked himself these things.

> Firstly, what ideas always attract the broad masses, that is the less intelligent human beings who are the majority in any State ?
> Secondly, what special ideas, if any, are calculated to attract the special German masses under consideration as a matter of what might be called tradition ?
> Thirdly, what current, or one might say fashionable, ideas are in fact at present attracting them ?

All these three groups of ideas he would of course incorporate.

For tips, which he would borrow, he examined movements with similar objectives that had been successful, and in particular Communism, under the banner of which a small party had in fact snatched power in Russia. This is what he found.

" Social Democracy and the whole Marxist movement were particularly qualified to attract the great masses of the nation, because of the uniformity of the public to which they addressed their appeal " (p. 194).

" The masses of illiterate Russians were not fired to revolutionary enthusiasm by reading the theories of Karl Marx, but by the promises of paradise made to the people by thousands of agitators in the service (pay) of an idea " (p. 266). (PROMISES OF PARADISE.) (PAID AGITATORS.)

" Here there were only two solutions:

" (*a*) That the movement should acquire the necessary funds to attract and train intelligent people who would be capable of being leaders. . . . This solution was the easier and the more expeditious, but it demanded large financial resources.

" (*b*) It must begin by depending on honorary helpers. Naturally this solution is slower and more difficult " (p. 198). (LARGE FINANCIAL RESOURCES.)

" Therefore for the conception of life that is based on the folk idea it is necessary for an instrument to be forged which can be used in fighting for the ideal, similar to the Marxist party organisation which clears the way for internationalism.

" . . The international ideology achieved success because it was organised in a *militant political party* which was always ready to take the offensive " (p. 216). (MILITANT ORGANISATION.)

"Popular support is the first element which is necessary for the creation of authority. . . . We must look upon power, that is to say, the capacity to use force, as the second foundation upon which all authority is based. . . . If popular support and power are united together and can endure for a certain time, then an authority may arise which is based on a still stronger foundation, namely, the *authority of tradition*" (p. 286).

"At that time the 'Reds' had developed this attitude towards other political meetings: the most effective means which they always employed in such cases were *terror and brute force*" (p. 202). (TERROR AND BRUTE FORCE.)

"Here again the Catholic Church has a lesson to teach us. Though sometimes, and often quite unnecessarily, its dogmatic system is in conflict with the exact sciences and scientific discoveries, it is not disposed to sacrifice a syllable of its teachings" (p. 257). (DOGMATISM.)

"*To secure name and fame for the movement and its leader* it was necessary not only to give this one town (Munich) a striking example to shatter the belief that the Marxist doctrine was invincible, but also to show that a counter-doctrine was possible" (p. 197). (ADVERTISEMENT.)

Thus he worked out the psychological programme.

Firstly, to the broad masses of human beings should be given *promises of paradise*: not only Socialism, but the supremacy of their community over all the earth.

Secondly, for the special German masses, he knew by his own feelings, when he used to weep with patriotic pride as a child, what were the dominant traditional ideas: German nationalism and a Bismarckian military obedience.

Thirdly, the current ideas which were catching the masses were: Socialism—and that they should be promised too.

Such was to be the programme of the movement: ardent nationalism, a military obedience, and Socialism. And it was to be enacted by dogmatism, terror and brute force, display and advertisement (mass meetings, etc.), paid agitators, propaganda—all of which would require large financial resources, which they must acquire by any means.

(We know how he acquired these large financial resources, from the *capitalists*, like Thyssen and others—needless to say, without the knowledge of the 'unintelligent broad masses.' He says (p. 55): "The aristocratic principle is a fundamental law of nature." The

capitalists financed him because he explained to them, truthfully, that his aristocratic military movement was the opposite of Socialism. Thus to the capitalists, secretly, the movement was reactionary; to the broad masses, ostensibly, it was socialistic.)

So much for his first objective, an effective programme. What of his second, personal leadership and power?

It took him nearly two cunning years, but he gained it. He got rid of one weak man, the first chairman, fairly early. "In the beginning of 1920 I put forward the idea of holding our first mass meeting. . . . Herr Harrer was the chairman of our party. He did not see eye to eye with me as to the opportune time for our first mass meeting. Accordingly he felt himself obliged to resign from the leadership of the movement. Herr Anton Drexler took his place" (p. 207).

"In the middle of 1921 an attempt which was made by a group of patriotic visionaries, supported by the chairman of the party at that time, to take over the direction of the party led to the break-up of this little intrigue and, by a maximum vote at a general meeting, entrusted the entire direction of the party into my own hands.

". . . From August 1st, 1921, onwards I undertook this internal reorganisation of the party.

". . . In the place of decisions by the majority vote of the committee, the principle of absolute responsibility was introduced" (p. 322).

Now, this single-purposed young man was not only an astute, clear-headed politician, as it happened he had a wonderful gift for public speaking. He was a mob orator of the first water. He had lived as one of the mass and he knew them. He could hold a crowded hall suspended on a whisper or by crashing his fist make them shout with frenzy. When he joined the party, though he had spoken before, he had no idea he possessed this intoxicating gift. It was revealed to him at the first meeting at the Munich Hofbrauhauskeller, which "was my first appearance in the rôle of public orator" (p. 201). This "strengthened my own position" (p. 203) and quite possibly for the very first time put the idea in his head that he, Adolf Hitler, could conceivably become an autocratic dictator. There is no incense to ambition like crowd adulation. And that he had, miraculously, from that first speech. No matter what prestige, intellectual or otherwise, others might have, he had the crowds. They were his. Jealously he clung to his altered position in the party, and craftily he enhanced it. "Some time in October 1919 the second meeting took place. I talked for almost an hour. . . . An attempt to disturb the proceedings was immediately frustrated by my [organised soldier] comrades. The would-be disturbers were thrown down the stairs bearing imprints of

violence on their heads " (p. 203). Thereafter, with trained cheerers scattered throughout the house, his meetings were always unanimously and hysterically enthusiastic. The crowds flocked to him and had their emotions—German nationalism, Jews behind the front who caused their war defeat, resentment at Versailles Treaty—played on like a musical instrument. What matter if he did not speak the truth, interrupters were bludgeoned, and a humiliated people were intoxicated with promises of paradise and glory. He became the party's star orator. Now he could afford to take a more haughty attitude at party meetings. In the middle of 1921 he felt himself strong enough. The moment had come. He challenged the chairman and his group. What could the party do ? He, the crowd orator, the man the crowd knew, was their greatest asset. He won. Now for the autocratic resolve that had been ripening in his breast and brain. He sprang it. The gun was at the committee's heads. He had the crowds, they knew. He was the party, and could take it away from them or break it. They accepted. Needless to say, since all were human, and all had previously been equal in council, jealous animosity remained with some members of the committee who themselves had had hopes of being elected as chairman. The wiser ones kept their thoughts to themselves, the other smouldering ones were finally assassinated, along with other dangers, at one stroke in his ' Blood Bath ' when he got to power.

Now at last, in August 1921, he was in the saddle. At last that vision that came to him during his first public speech when suddenly he saw himself in a bright new light, no longer undifferentiated but the masses' recognised spokesman, the master conductor, the Leader !—at last that vision, Himself the Leader !, which from that moment he had never allowed to fade, was realised. It must have been difficult many times in those first days to resist the temptation of smirking complacently in public, of exchanging an ingenuous confidence, difficult to avoid the many risks of spoiling the effect of leadership. With the dawning ambition of a great further prize, now credibly glimpsed, before long—the leadership of Germany itself !—he avoided them all. He saw that, to make the picture right, his behaviour should be that of a burning idealist, a kind of John the Baptist, careless of raiment and food but aflame with zeal; and, great actor, from that picture his behaviour never faltered. He was a man without any moral scruples whatsoever, who saw a chance, in the chaos that then existed, of snatching the rulership of Germany, and that chance he was going to pursue, pressing on with every force at his command. " Every possible means should be employed " he said in the very first sentence of *Mein Kampf*.

Three things, he decided, are necessary for any social change that will carry the people with it: one, an inspiring leader; two, a cause which sounds noble but at the same time is packed with promises of good things; three, a resolute organised force to accomplish it. From this moment, now that he can preach and impose on his legion of agitators the first thing, as well as the other two, without strengthening another man, a rival—from this moment his doctrine takes new force. The noble-sounding " cause " of his new doctrine, National-Socialism, becomes more clearly defined. First the Socialism. We have seen that Communism was already the doctrine of the moment. For the success of an idea there had been nothing like it in history. In the last six years or so he had seen it engulf Russia, Hungary (temporarily), Italy (almost), and now it was sweeping Germany. Its siren doctrine of equality, opportunity, and loot which unerringly attracts the revengeful non-possessing, found in defeated chaotic Germany almost the readiest soil in Europe. He would have been a fool not to make use of it. But how put Communism in his creed and still call it new? . . . Ah! his ingenuity was equal to that. He would use all of Communism that suited him, the socialist principle that was its universal magnet-galvanising factor, but, lest it should be thought he had borrowed from Communism, Communism itself he would vilify with the foulest and most contemptuous epithets of his tongue.

That was his cynical technique with regard to all other doctrines that he examined. He tells it bluntly in his book. Any that he found either in history or in current times that swayed any considerable mass of men's minds, he immediately rifled of its magnetic principle so as to attract those particular adherents; and the hollow husk of the doctrine thus left he attacked so as to destroy it, first with filthy obloquy, and later, when he was able, with " terror and brutal force."

Thus systematically he would eliminate rivals.

This must be clearly seen: the doctrine which Hitler shrewdly elaborated did not have any fatuous idealistic aim like bettering the human race or any section of it; it had one aim only—success! Success of his campaign to place in power his doctrine, the doctrine which now inseparably enshrined himself. Can you wonder that he laboured unsparingly?

History shows that so illogically and mass-hysterically are people made, that at prepared moments they will fight and die quite blindly and bravely under almost any leader—so long as he leads!; and for almost any dogma—so long as it is dogmatic! That was his fundamental premise. He would build on that in Germany. His

preliminary aim was, not the largest party in Germany, but all Germany united in one hysterical party, like a nation in battle.

This was his personal creed, then: this fundamental premise and his belief in it. As for articles of dogma, they only needed filling in almost automatically. Insidious they must be, but at the same time heroic, high-sounding, that, like the sound of a trumpet, they could not fail to fire the smouldering ungoverned masses of the Germany he knew.

Government they wanted, did they? He would give them government, the tautest and most autocratic that the most strident of them could conceive. There would be no argument: this was the government he would give them, explicit and effective. Dictatorship? Yes, dictatorship indeed—what else was so unanswerable?

The inhabitants of military-traditioned Germany admired obedience, did they? He would give them obedience or death.

There was a feeling of nationality deeply rooted in the German people by poets and historians, was there? He would root it deeper still. He would exaggerate it, stress it, shout it. He would make it his main, his central theme. But so as to centralise it more clearly, and make it seemingly new, he would lift it from the clogging nebulousness of its present dispersion into Bavarianism and Prussianism and a hundred other local patriotisms. Race, he would give them. Race! RACE! Untrue it might be, scientifically ridiculous, that the inhabitants of this broad section of Europe should be, after the mixing of two thousand years of turbulent history, any less polyglot than any other section of Europe. They didn't want truth, they didn't want 'exact sciences'; defeated Germany wanted a battle-cry, and he gave it to them: Race! No matter where they were, Germans must say to themselves, loudly and often, that they were one Race—and that Race superior to any other on earth.

There was a desire in men's silly hearts, was there, for a symbol of leadership? Someone to whom they can bare their heads, or, standing, drink a toast while their iron heels ring in unison? A king? A warrior? A prophet? A god? He hereby constituted himself a combination of all four. Fuehrer! Heaven-sent leader! Not, with modest unwisdom, did he timidly offer himself for this post, put himself forward as a suggestion to be discussed. No, he was their leader. Now! Existing as such! Who was destined to lead Germany to victory! Theirs was to follow and obey. And in so far as anyone was allowed to see, he believed in himself with implicit fanaticism.

Human beings, so weak-minded and illogical are they in the mass,

can only be really united when they are in battle against some common foe. That is an axiom of human nature which he shrewdly knew. Therefore to unite Germany, to give them the impulse, they must have some object to hate, must they? He would give them one. He would give them two. Nay, more; always more. He would see to it with his organ of propaganda, which he saw now must be created powerful, vociferous, stupefying, pervading all avenues of education—he would see to it that there would always be an object of common hatred held before their stupid eyes; and when one was gone he would always have another to take its place. Communism first. Yes, rival Communism; and thus kill two birds with one stone. But Germans who were tainted with common sense he would rather win than kill, and this object of hatred was only half satisfactory in that, where it had not involved them, it was largely abstract. This was a weakness. For the hysteria of hatred to be kept hot the mob must have a tangible quarry, and the salty savour of blood must be smelt in the nostrils. Therefore, the Jews! Always averse to retaliation, they are the natural victims of history. Also there was loot in their possessions, so the hand need not be held. For the squeamish he had other objects of hate: Versailles. (Later it was to be the beastly Czechs, the beastly Poles, the beastly British, the beastly Russians.)

After all, what had he to lose? Nothing. And his poker face, if he kept raising his bids unflinchingly, might win him Germany.

We know that it did win him Germany.

There was at that time only weak law in Germany that was timid of such defiance. When has defiance, particularly if successful, not been admired? His party grew. Ambitious, unprincipled men in other parts of Germany, or men abroad, like Goering, hearing of this bold growing movement, came to join; for if it continued to grow they wanted to be in its forefront, and so grasp the plums of office and power. Ludendorf, the old pagan General, whose religion was war, disliking the piping time of peace when serious Germany was trying to rehabilitate itself, favoured the bloodthirsty sound of the new hot movement and lent his name. This gave sudden great extra strength.

In 1923 so inebriated was Hitler by the deafening enthusiasm of all his meetings in the southern part of Germany, mostly filled with his own adherents, so convinced was he of the pusillanimity of the Government owing to their continued inaction in the face of his more and more frequent defiances, that, though the party had only been in existence a short while, he thought that he was already irresistible; that the time for his great coup was already ripe.

He found out his mistake. The Munich Putsch failed and, saving

his life by grovelling behind his comrades, Hitler was imprisoned. He had been, he discovered, crowing over only a local dung-heap.

But his imprisonment, far from finishing his movement, saved it. It martyrised him, and besides giving him leisure to set down all his confused violent dogmas in the form of a book, it gave him the notoriety of being a vivid witness at a famous trial, and it gave time for his name and ideas to spread through Germany. So that when he was released a couple of years later, from being a stump orator he was a political force.

He did not waste the situation. From that moment his succession to power was only a matter of time. His party began to secure seats in Parliament. The moneyed people, the Junker class (that is to say the wealthy aristocracy), the munition makers, big business, saw that he was a man to be placated. They made efforts to meet him and sound him. They wanted him to promise that if they gave him their support, he would give them his, that he would ensure their survival and their importance. He promised them anything. Enigmatical as ever in his rôle of prophet which he had so carefully adopted, he told them that he was sure to rule Germany very soon and they had better give him their support. Hoping for the best, they gave it.

At the end of 1933 another Government fell. Jealous and distrustful of one another, no party was proving strong enough to rule Germany. Old President Hindenburg, doddering stolidly on the President's throne in advanced senility, was at his wits' end. Every party in the Reichstag except the Nazis had been tried but had had to resign because of their inability to carry the House. The Nazi Party had never been tried, for three reasons. (1) It was not numerically strong enough in the House (the Reichstag) to warrant being summoned to form a Government. (2) It was actually waning in strength. In spite of the financial support now given—or promised—at the last election considerably fewer members had been returned to the Reichstag than at the previous one. (3) The old President was strongly averse to Hitler and the Nazi principles, and had even stated that never would he call the Austrian corporal as Chancellor of Germany. In plain words, he could not stomach him. Not only did he find this uncouth agitator, who was not even a member of the Reichstag, personally objectionable, he instinctively felt that he was nothing but an ambitious gangster who was out to use Germany.

However, necessity breaks many vows. Following the resignation of yet another brief Chancellor there was, in form, actually no Government in Germany and it was necessary to create one. Had Hindenburg been a Cromwell he might here have decided that since no one

that he could trust seemed able to form an authoritative Government, he would govern himself—when history would have taken a different course; but he was not a Cromwell, and in any case he was too old (and his faculties gravely affected by the slow poison of uræmia of which he shortly died) to exercise such abilities even if he possessed them. He was in the position of having to nominate some Government, and in extremity he was forced to a decision which he had hoped, and indeed sworn, never to take. But he was influenced in this decision. "Yes," said Von Papen and other advisers whom he knew and, as a failing old man, trusted. "Yes," they said. "We know the hard choice which confronts you. And we also, under ordinary circumstances, would cut off our right hand rather than recommend Hitler. But facts must be faced and he is the only choice there is. However, listen! There is an ameliorating factor which we haven't told you of before. We have bought Hitler! He is our tool! He speaks big, but rest quite assured we have him muzzled!"

So, reluctantly, and hoping for the best, the old man summoned Hitler and as Chancellor entrusted him with forming a Government, to lead the Reichstag, to implement its recommendations, and to govern Germany.

At last!!

But accept the recommendations of the Reichstag? . . . Hitler and his gang never had any such fatuous intentions.

What? Put their proposals up to be turned down by a majority of the other jealous parties? That would be absurd weakness. However, as constitutional Chancellor, which he undoubtedly was, he was bound to abide by the resolutions of the Reichstag, otherwise he would lose the confidence of the President and be cast from power. How, then, ensure that he would not receive an adverse vote in the Reichstag? That was the whole issue.

How ensure that he would not receive an adverse vote in the Reichstag?

Why! . . . Why!, the answer was blinding in its simplicity: Never have a vote in the Reichstag! Make it impossible for a vote to be put in the Reichstag—*by eliminating the Reichstag!* Burn the Reichstag!

BURN THE REICHSTAG!!!

And in the ensuing awkwardness put through his measures as the sole Government acting, as it were, in a state of emergency.

No political finesse here, no clever legal juggling; but a technique childlike in its directness, elementary, unanswerable.

The plans had been made for some time. Goering, speaker of

the Reichstag under Hitler, took up residence in the Reichschancellery, from whose garden an underground tunnel led to the proud building of the Reichstag. Until the first meeting of the Reichstag under the new Chancellor, the Reichstag building was of course untenanted, and during this interval fire material was carried and placed via the Chancellery garden, while at the same time the plan for action consequent on the fire was perfected. On the arranged night the Reichstag was fired, and almost instantaneously over the whole city of Berlin, so well did the organised already-planted rumour-spreaders do their job, there was a general rumour that it was the work of Communists. And this rumour it did not take much to fan into an angry mob-shout. The Communists ! How Hitler must have chuckled to hear that parrot-cry which he had so carefully initiated. Now he could act, and act he did. Without giving a moment for general sanity to return after the first imitative hysterical cry of " Communists !," he declared a state of emergency with Communists as the common enemy, and issuing orders in the name of the Government to both police and army as well as to his own toughened S.S. troops who were already no strangers to brutality and crime, he instituted an instantaneous purge throughout Germany of Communists and all other elements that he had cause to know were either inimical or dangerous to him. Altogether the Reichstag fire was one of the most brilliant and diabolical pieces of political stagecraft in history. From this moment, without any cavil, and without any possibility of dislodgment if only they continued ruthless, Hitler and his gang were the masters of Germany. The death of Hindenburg was now no more of an incident than a puff of breeze.

And with the example of Hitler, they would continue ruthless. Some time after this word came to Hitler that a number of his followers, in fact a very considerable number, including Ernst Roehm, one of his chief lieutenants, his oldest associate and former leader, considered of all people in Germany his closest bosom friend, were murmuring. They were saying that, Hitler having gained power, instead of pretending to pose as a constitutional leader now was the time for the promised share-out. It was said that not only were they murmuring in this fashion but that they were having conversations with General Schleicher, the former Chancellor, and other members of that moneyed conservative Junker element who, through Papen, had conditionally promised to support Hitler but who were beginning to sense that Hitler did not now have, and had never before had, any intention of fulfilling those conditions. In the ' blood-bath ' Hitler murdered them, one and all, proven plotter and suspected alike. Seven

thousand they say he murdered that day, and he even flew down and superintended the liquidation of his bosom-confidant Roehm, himself.

That is what he meant by ruthlessness.

True, he had accomplished his immediate objective and become master of Germany, but by now there were in his brain wider and more grandiloquent ambitions than these fools ever dreamed of. He did not want merely to dominate and loot Germany with his organised gang of several thousand toughs—that had become the petty felony of a pickpocket; his aim now was to organise all Germans, the whole sixty millions of them and more, into one gang, brutalised if possible, conscience-hardened, obedient, an instrument tough and pliant, and with that instrument to dominate and loot the world.

That instrument he immediately began to forge.

It meant altering the whole system of values and ethics of an entire nation. It meant brutalising them. It meant crushing out all tenderness, all kindness, all sympathy with the oppressed and weak. It meant eradicating all the nobler morals that have been laced into the human conscience through centuries of civilised experience, through the teachings of Christ and other inspirations, through the lives and writings of great men, and replacing them with a lust for power and blood and conquest.

How was he to do this?

He had no need to ponder a moment.

His dogma, conceived for political purposes almost by an intuition of genius in the early days, and set down as a categorical thesis in *Mein Kampf* during his term in prison—this concise dogma, together with the brutal subjugation of all opposition, had proved all that was necessary in Bavaria and elsewhere, wherever he or his image-imitators had propounded it directly with strident fanaticism. He saw no reason why it should not be equally successful throughout all Germany now that he would be able to face them all directly through the radio or from the cinema sheet if not at enormous, organised, theatrical rallies. Yes, he had the people under his hand for pouring his doctrine on them unceasingly. *Mein Kampf* would be compulsory reading for all. His enormous machine of propaganda—which directed radio, cinema, newspapers, and every word of published work whether book or periodical; all stage performances, every oration; the teaching of school-children from their veriest infancy, the teaching in universities, even the preaching from pulpits—was designed for no other purpose but to convert. The dreaded Gestapo, ubiquitous and shadowy, would supervise every other form of human intercourse, listening to the chance remarks of acquaintances on street corners or in cafés or

even in the homes; attending all gatherings, scrutinising what books were being read, noting demeanours; and removing suddenly to the concentration camp, never to be heard of again unless as a frightened, chastened convert, any whom they suspected of being subversive in deed or thought, be he eminent or lowly, doctor or sister-of-mercy, workman, scientist, poet or priest.

This was to be his scheme, then. First, his doctrine, the same, unchanged ! But now intensified and widespread to every corner of Germany, like the thudding, insistent tom-tom of war in a native tribe. This first and unceasing, the forcible inoculation of every mind with its intoxicating call. Next, a successful coup from time to time, speaking, like a flashing convincing sign, its efficacy and power. Next, now and again a victim flung to flesh their claws. Fourthly and finally, a watchful, eagle-swift plucking-out of all those immune to the infection, whose steadiness was causing little eddies and swirls in the swift on-rushing stream of hysteria. . . . And before very long, he did not doubt—nor need he have doubted, since he was dealing with a people already intellectually bludgeoned and infected by sixty years of Bismarckism and Prussianism and Kaiserism—that in three or four years he would have not merely sixty thousand, or six million, but sixty million all swaying drunkenly with slavering jaws and muscles flexed to shout and rend when his baton reached the crescendo.

" The German people is dangerous, for it is bent on intoxication." Nietzsche said that of his fellow-Germans many years ago. Germany, it must be remembered, was the last great State in Europe to attain unity. Bismarck, that master of power politics and craft, had astutely obtained that Bavaria, Württemberg, all those divided states, should fight shoulder to shoulder with straining Prussia against France; and after the fall of Paris in 1871, swept on by the unity of aim, the King of Bavaria had duly proposed that William of Hohenzollern should take the Imperial Crown. For the first time all those related but divided states tasted the emotion of nationalism. To England this nationalism was a long accustomed nourishment; but to Germany it was a new brew, and it was heady. Immediately vainglorious boasters of the German power and, further, of a strong Germany's mission of arbitrament in Europe, were not lacking; and no later than this very birth of this greater Germany, in the mouth and writings of such men as Treitschke, were even wilder dreams given utterance: that the destiny of Germany was, by stern application and disciplined violence, to wrest the trident from the frivolous Anglo-Saxon Empire and to dominate the world. That spirit never died in Germany. It was that same spirit, now dangerously grown to lusty maturity, nurtured

through forty years of passionate militarism, which informed the Germany of William II and caused the last war. They were with difficulty flung back in that war, at length soundly beaten until they whined for mercy, and the chivalry of the Christian democracies did not in the hour of victory—as might have been wiser—annihilate the noisome peril, but magnanimously withdrew. Thus the infection, which by its very nature when grown to such proportions can only be appropriately exorcised by fire and sword, was not destroyed but was left to simmer resentfully. Therefore when Hitler calculated in a few short years after he had power to constrain this large nation into one conscienceless mind, and that mind a mind of brutal aggression under stern military leadership for the dominance of the world, he did not have to call upon dry bones, he had under his hand a giant organism already jointed and breathing, a mindless Caliban, cowering and furtive now, but ready on the recognised voice of authority to lumber erect and lurch blindly forward once again headlong.

But, again, realise this: Hitler's doctrine is not a utopian doctrine to elevate the human race or make it happier. Such we saw was the original essence even of Communism, but that went wrong. No, Nazism is not utopian at all. It has no high idealistic aim based on wishfulness; it has a direct purpose based on existing and ugly practicalities: its purpose is to shape a people into one uniform obedient pattern. And its sole function is to wage war.

Now the analysis.

I have shown the growth and informing spirit of National-Socialism in an historical form. We now know what we are talking about. The next step is to analyse this political system, as briefly as possible, into its component parts; then, later, with our good old touchstone of hard realistic common sense, and with such wisdom as we possess, to assess it.

Analysis of Nazism

In the analysis of Communism we proceeded thus. We first considered Marx's historical-economic concept, which indicated, to his own satisfaction at least, the inevitable trend of the world, to wit: revolution; and a subsequent barrier-less internationalism with supremacy of the equalitarian proletariat. This, then, the International Workers' Paradise, was the *aim or concept* of Communism. We then examined the *principles* of the system as summarised in the Manifesto. Finally, we noted that the *instrument* of Communism was supposed to be an unselfish, *continual-shuffle* democracy, which was reckoned as being an inherent tendency in mankind.

So we have Aim or Concept, Principles, Instrument.

We, in our Introduction, visualised a different Aim or Concept of a desirable political system. We were not so extravagantly utopian in our aim as an international workers' paradise, for instance. We simply wanted something that we think we should reasonably be able to get, to wit: a system by which a broad community such as ourselves can live in self-respect and security for a considerable time ahead. What is Nazism's aim or concept? We find we do not have to guess.

AIM OF NAZISM

In the very first sentence of *Mein Kampf* Hitler introduces "a task to which we should devote our lives and in the pursuit of which every possible means should be employed."

Note these other pronouncements about it:

(1) "The State is the organisation of a community, homogeneous in nature and feeling, for the better furtherance and maintenance of their type, and the fulfilment of the destiny marked out for them by Providence. This and nothing else is the object and significance of a State."

(2) "As a State the German Reich shall include all Germans. Its task is not only to gather in and foster the most valuable section of our people, but to lead them slowly and surely *to a dominant position in the world*. . . . And the fight carried through with unswerving persistence" (p. 224).

(3) "The German people as a whole has a right to rulership" (p. 223).

(4) "Either the German youth will . . . create a new State founded on the racial idea or they will be the last witnesses of the complete breakdown and death of the bourgeois world."

(5) "The aim which is to be pursued in our political conduct must be twofold: namely (i) The acquisition of territory as the objective of foreign policy and (ii) the establishment of a new and uniform foundation as the objective of our political activities at home, in accordance with our doctrine of nationhood" (p. 357).

(6) "We must set aside consideration of political prudence and devote ourselves wholly to the struggle for a future that will be worthy of our country.

"The German people must be assured the territorial area which is necessary for it to exist on this earth. And only for such action as is undertaken to secure these ends can it be lawful in the eyes of God

and our German posterity to allow the blood of our people to be shed once again. . . .

" And this justification must be established also before our German posterity, on the grounds that for each one who has shed his blood the life of a thousand will be guaranteed to posterity. The territory on which one day our German peasants will be able to bring forth and nourish their sturdy sons will justify the *blood of the sons of the peasants that has to be shed today*. And the statesmen who will have decreed this sacrifice may be persecuted by their contemporaries, but posterity will absolve them from all guilt from having *demanded* this offering from their people " (p. 359).

Finally, as if all that were not enough, he sums up in the Epilogue written in 1926:

" A State which, in an epoch of racial adulteration, devotes itself to the duty of preserving the best elements of its racial stock must one day become *the ruler of the earth*."

And the next and very last sentence speaks of " the sacrifice demanded of them."

The aim and concept of Nazism is unequivocally stated in *Mein Kampf*. *That aim is to shape the German nation into an aggressive war-machine which shall rule the earth, this present generation to commence the process by war*. Its purpose is to conquer, dominate, and keep in subjection other nations.

(Note the German secret document captured in Libya as published in *The Times*, July 27th, 1942: " On the occasion of the Order for the Reorganisation of the Leibstandante Adolf Hitler on August 6th, 1940, the Fuehrer laid down the principles on which the necessity for the Armed S.S. (the Party Police Army) is based. These principles are summarised in the following text:

" The Greater German Reich in its final form will not exclusively embrace within its frontiers national units *per se* well disposed to the Reich.

" It is therefore necessary to maintain State police troops outside as well as inside the present core of the Reich.")

Its sole purpose is to wage war, to shed blood, not in some future generation but in this generation.

The sole concept of Nazism is to wage war.

THE PRINCIPLES OF NAZISM

Hitler enumerates two principles which, with their special applications to the German nation, form the whole doctrine of Nazism:

the Fuehrer Principle, and the Race Principle. These are theories upon which the doctrine is built.

1. *The Fuehrer Principle*—the principle of the unquestionable leader.

Without explicitly quoting *Mein Kampf*, where it is set out at considerable length, the Leader Principle is, briefly, the theory that autocracy is the natural governmental order of all living communities. An individual, it states, naturally establishes his authority over the community by force of character, and the rest naturally obey. It affirms this is the form that all communities of living creatures from ants to humans naturally fall into; that thus it can be universally observed in nature; and that thus it was designed by nature.

What are the facts?

First, insects. Insects do not carry out their individual or community activity according to the command of an individual insect. All the activities of all insects are governed by instinct. They cannot act otherwise, and they always act the same common way towards each different circumstance. Eating, mating, care for and protection of the eggs, migration, all are governed purely by instinct. There is no leadership. There is no democracy. Neither is there anarchy, for the law of the community is the instinctive law of the particular species. Bees, of course, in spite of the name 'queen bee,' have no community leadership. The fact is that this is the only female, conditioned as such, and thus to be instinctively protected; the other section, the workers and drones, carry out their activities not in response to orders but because of their special conditioned instincts.

Fishes. Precisely the same. There is no leadership, except of the young by the old, which is purely instinctive. The pseudo-discrimination that some higher fish possess is nothing more than a development by cause-and-effect experience of the instinct which recognises what is good and what is not, etc.

So we go through birds and the lower animals. Activities for food, for mating, for protection, are governed by instinct. The males protect the young and the females because that is the race-preserving instinct. These creatures, being more highly developed, can exist more individualistically, but they often do congregate in communities when conditions, climatic or other, instinctively compel them. Since this class is ascending in the evolutionary scale some members may, after a few seasons of life, learn to modify their instincts —but they cannot influence others whose instincts have not been modified. There is no leadership in the concept of the Nazi theory.

As we get higher among the animals we see further modification of

instinct, we see a thing called memory beginning to develop, and the beginning of the feature of choice or ratiocination, until we reach man where it (ratiocination) can definitely overcome instinct. Before man, however—and there is a very wide gap between man and the next animal—instinct dominates ratiocination in a rapidly progressive degree as you go down the scale. And you only go a short way before ratiocination ceases to exist.

Amongst the higher animals, therefore, for the first time in the survey of the whole animate kingdom, we have the possibility of community activity being affected by animal forces that are not purely instinctive. I deliberately say ' affected ' and not ' governed,' because in every animal, short of man, in any action of individual or community, instinct is preponderantly dominant. For instance, a bull buffalo may kill a rival and so become the unchallenged ' boss ' of the herd, but he cannot induce the herd to do anything against instinct. Further, every community action they do take, like migrating to better pasture or taking up defensive attitudes and fighting, is governed by instinct which involves the champion fighter precisely as much as the rest. There is nothing here of the explicit leadership principle enunciated by Hitler that one individual by some force of character naturally assumes authority and the rest naturally obey the whims of that individual to any lengths.

However, there is that fact of fighting instinct in the community—the cock of the walk—seen in a number of species. That is a scientific fact. But if you go still higher, to the monkeys, you may still find a ' boss ' fighter, but you will see community action taken after a conference of the community or the elder members: and this is getting very like democracy.

In short, amongst all animals, excluding man, there is no basis for the Nazi theory that the principle of autocratic leadership in communities is universal. In other words, thus far, the theory is disproven and incorrect.

What of man himself? In our Introduction we spoke of the priest-king governed communities; but that was only an instance of certain very large communities we had knowledge of which had made use of this form of government. We do not maintain that it was the only or universal form in primitive or barbaric communities. We know equally provably of many other primitive communities or tribes who governed themselves—and still do—by conference of elders, or democracy. One man who called himself a scientist, and who influenced more people than Hitler, and whose doctrine (and presumably views) has been supported by many intelligent people with access to

scientific knowledge—we refer to Marx—had the opinion that democracy was the form of government of communities in the primitive golden age, and was the natural form. That was his principle. And on it he founded his doctrine. It is a principle directly at variance with Hitler's. Which is right ?

The fact is there does not seem to be any natural form for large communities—perhaps because large communities, of millions under one government, are not natural things. The special point at present issue, however, is this—and it is not an opinion, it is positive science, *i.e.* truth : the universality of the Fuehrer Principle in nature enunciated by Nazidom is strictly nonsense. It is not true. And the presentation of it as a general principle applicable to natural science, philosophy, and history requires a radical falsification of truth in all of them.

Nevertheless, there is Hitler's theory—which we shall see, in defiance of testable science, is to be strictly embodied as universal truth in all Nazi education—and the reason for its brazen enunciation is, of course, not far to seek.

Note these extracts :

" The Movement lays down the principle that, in the smallest as well as in the greatest problems, one person must have absolute authority and bear all responsibility " (p. 195).

" The Movement is in its essence and organisation unparliamentarian ; *i.e.* it rejects in principle and in its composition any theory of the majority vote, implying that the leader is degraded to being merely there to carry out the orders and opinions of others. . . . This principle is the deciding one throughout the Movement and throughout the State " (p. 195). The precise organisation throughout the State is then laid down on p. 195.

" No vote will be taken in chambers or senate. They are to be organisations for work and not voting-machines. The right of decision belongs exclusively to the president " (p. 252).

Thus explicitly the Nazi state is to be an autocracy. An autocracy has never been more unequivocally defined.

But the Fuehrer Prinzip of Hitlerism means far more than ordinary, common or garden autocracy. It is the quintessence of autocracy. See primarily its direct opposition to democracy. In democracy every man has a voice in the Government, and elects trusted representatives to make laws for all. Thus every individual has an individual dignity and an individual responsibility. In Nazism the sole responsibility is to be the Leader's, and the dignity of the individual is to obey implicity the Leader who is appointed, from above, to command him. It is a simple system like a pyramid : the leader of the

State appoints a number of lieutenants to command departments, and these appoint lesser commanders to take orders and in turn command; until at length each ultimate group of the whole population is under the orders of a gramophone, dictatorial, petty leader. As is clear, these deputy leaders and petty leaders are not appointed on account of any qualifications of maturity or wisdom, for they are not required to take any part in forming policy; the only qualities they must have are blind obedience and the power to exact obedience, to command. This Hitler calls character—there is no other definition of character—and the more brutal the better. The sub-leaders are to be in fact nothing but the strident and, if procurable, pitiless executives of a gang.

But what of the top-fuehrer at the apex of the pyramid, whence all these strands emanate? He is the quintessence and the personification of the whole Fuehrer Prinzip. In him are united sole leadership, sole responsibility, sole authority, and sole command. It goes beyond the principle of ordinary dictatorship which has been so often availed of in history, whereby, to meet an emergency, a certain person is temporarily given sole command to stop argument and get action. It goes beyond that, because it makes the Fuehrer an unalterable and indivisible part of the permanent State. The anatomical head that cannot be removed without that particular form of State—Nazism—ceasing to exist. Not only its head to decide and order and orate, but its conscience! All moral responsibility is removed from the individual. Thus when this principle is thoroughly inculcated—*i.e.* accepted—the Fuehrer can do anything and command anything, even the most unethical procedures, unchallenged. Those astute politicians, the Roman aristocracy, desirous of settlement of the realm after its hectic phase of war-lord gangsterdom—Julius Cæsar, Pompey, Antony, etc.—noting the obeisance which simple people like to give to the great, and recognising in this natural obeisance a most useful governmental weapon, *made a god of their emperor!* A living god—during his lifetime! They had temples built to him along with Jupiter and Minerva, his, the Emperor's, taking chief place; and at these temples they themselves ceremoniously worshipped. For thus, by their glittering examples, they were ensuring the subservience of the masses to constituted authority. This fiction was an important factor in preserving the Empire for centuries with an unassailed and stable head: the Emperor. The Emperors often changed, but the office of Emperor remained stable, sacred, and unquestionable. Yet these men, the aristocratic worshippers, one of whom, mark you, would himself next sit in the exalted place, knew perfectly well while publicly worshipping that the several Emperors were vain and faulty,

sometimes actually insane—in most cases we may be sure they thought them less able than themselves. But, until Christianity became official, these politicians never thought of denying his fictitious god-head.

"My Fuehrer! humbly we recognise you are of different clay from ourselves. We will lay down our life for you—only command, my Fuehrer!" . . . When you hear all that balderdash spoken by haughty and unscrupulous men like Goering and Ribbentrop, don't believe a word of it. It is the same calculated cloak, to impose on the broad masses of Germany. It is a provenly useful political measure. A god the Romans made of their Emperor? When the drugged German masses hear these strong admired successes one and all making these public lowly oblations, what else is it indicated that they are to make of their Fuehrer? They are systematically encouraged to accept him as an infallible divinity.

That is the Fuehrer Prinzip, that and none else! Hysterical dramatic display and example are its nourishment, and in Germany it is arranged that they are supplied with a lavish hand. Now you know the reason for the Nuremberg rallies and the Sportzpalast frenzies.

Now also you know the reason for the unpopularity of the Christian religion with the official Nazi party, for a jealous god frowns on rivals. However, even Hitler was not foolhardy enough summarily and suddenly to forbid the worship of the Christian God. That he would have liked to, though, there is no doubt, and in the early sappy days when his barbarian pack were first beginning to blood their knives in the Jewish persecution, some of them exulted unguardedly that the persecution of the Roman Catholics and other Christians would soon follow; but Hitler with his realistic eye for practicability, seeing how still widely and deeply planted was this curious superstition, called them off, and even later sent Ribbentrop lying to the Pope.

The Fuehrer Prinzip is the chief functional factor of the Nazi political system, for in uniforming the minds of an emotional people it is well realised that there is no more potent factor than a single focus of attention. (Remember how Lenin and Stalin, those materialists, listened to its logic.)

In the Fuehrer Prinzip Nazidom lays down that, for those that must have Christ, let them worship Him with one, the abstract, side of their minds; but with the objective practical part the Fuehrer only must they worship: their leader! their conscience! their decider! their universal self! their infallible divinity!

(It is obvious that this principle, the Leader Principle, cannot be

accepted by the broad masses in its entirety unless they, the broad masses, can be induced to believe false facts—which means unless they are ignorant or can be *educated to ignorance*.)

2. *The Race Principle*—the principle that the Germans are the Herrenvolk, the master race, of the earth.

As we have seen, the *aim* of the doctrine of Hitlerism is to make the German nation into a military machine for the purpose of waging aggressive war. To sustain this aim it enunciates two principles of creed for the German nation, inscribed, as it were, over the altar of the Nazi temple: the Fuehrer Principle; and the Race, or Herrenvolk, Principle. The purpose of the first is, if accepted, to make the State into an uncritical autocracy, to impress all the population into a disciplined, ready unanimity. The purpose of the second is to give this unanimity incentive to battle.

Human beings, history and observation tell us, will always fight when they—that is to say their emotions or sentiment—have been sufficiently stirred to it. It is in nature. To encourage a whole nation to fight, therefore, it is necessary to find or create some universal sentiment. Some conviction of the mind that stirs a universal burning sentiment. Now, what emotion-stirring sentiments will men fight and die for? Men will die bravely for the sacred cause of defence of home and country. But this, the aim of this doctrine, is not to be defence. What else will they die for? Throughout history there have been various inspiring battle-cries, various 'causes' for vigorous war by communities; and two of these have had such a mesmeric gleam, even for high-minded men, that they have served as a reason for repeated wars for centuries. Revenge and religion.

To fire in the German nation a spirit for war, Hitler would use them both. The token calling for revenge was ready to hand: they were recently beaten in war and the words of that defeat were inscribed in the Treaty of Versailles—let them avenge it! But the aim of the doctrine went beyond mere revenge; so this token was used as a spurring adjuvant, but was not elevated to the status of one of the guiding principles of the doctrine. What, though, about a religious battle-cry? He could not invoke the Christian religion, for that was meek and forgiving, and therefore contrary to the spirit of Nazidom. No, nor any other religion which glorified a central Person, for that would weaken his Fuehrership.

For Germans the required burning sentiment is this principle of German Herrenvolk. The Nazi theory of Race.

They are told—and what vain humans are not ready to listen to such flattering strains?—that mankind consists of many races, but

one is supreme, marked off from all others and superior to all others by whatsoever standards applied, physical, mental, economic, artistic, spiritual: the race called the Aryan Race (alternatively Nordic), and of that race the Germans are the purest and pre-eminent examples. He states, that is Hitler states, with his usual bold disregard of scientific facts, that every single advance of civilisation has been carried out either singly (in the way of the spirit or discovery), or collectively (as an army conquering another nation and organising a civilisation)—by men of Nordic blood. (Of course it is sanely laughable. It is use-less pointing out examples like Christ and Paul, Julius Cæsar and Napo-leon, and hosts of others; Hitler immediately shouts that these men must have been individually Nordic in spite of their parentage—and that finishes the matter.) That these organised nations and civilisations successively crumbled, he goes on in his unsupported fiction, is due to one fact alone: that the higher Nordic race did not remain true to their blood, they criminally debased their blood by intermarrying with their subjects, and disaster due to the weakening of their control was inevitable and merited. (This, of course, cannot be sustained by fact. Anyone can dress a case for debate.) For, being the superior race, he vehemently preaches, is not enough: they must realise it, become vitally, insistently aware of it with every heart-beat and, what is more, they must accept and fulfil the obligations which such a superiority imposes upon them.

What are these obligations?

He tells them. (1) To keep their race pure, and not allow it to become weakened by miscegenation with the blood of any other race. (2) Since the Nordic race alone is the only source of progressive human activity the second obligation, and a more active one than the first, is this: with the cleansing sword of a crusader to subdue and dominate the inferior—*i.e.* all other—races at their doors who would hold civilisation back; for by so doing they are performing not merely a patriotic but a highly moral act for the advancement of mankind.

The ' chosen race ' idea is not a new idea, it is as old as time, and it has always been used by shrewd leaders or governments as a never-failing incentive in encouraging national unity. It is the function of poets to foster it, and national literature and saints and songs and shrines exist in all nations for no other purpose. The Jews are not the only other people, even today, who regard themselves as the chosen race by reason of the teaching of their ancient prophets. Kipling's British regard themselves so as well with much greater apparent justification; so do the French; so do the Italians with the stressing of ancient Rome; so do the Japanese with their Emperor-god. Even

America, though barely a brace of centuries old and composed of a mixture of all the races in Europe, with more than a sprinkling of Asia and Africa, has a growing national literature, written and cinematographic, and for some time now has been feeling the stirrings of chosen-ness.

Absolute racial purity and racial chosen-ness (Herrenvolk) are untenable theories for any nation on earth if you get down to facts, but in general they are harmless preoccupations, being indeed in most cases a praiseworthy stimulus to national good behaviour; but the Racial Theory of the Nazis, including as it does the crusading fiat to a large nation, to subdue and dominate and destroy, makes it one of the most repellent and dangerous myths of history.

It is obvious that also this principle, the Herrenvolk Principle, in view of the fact that it is readily denied by scientific examination, cannot be accepted by the German broad masses in all its implications —*i.e.* when its acceptance is to take a dominant part of their mind, and fanatically to impose the moral obligation to enslave all people of other race—unless they, the broad masses, can be induced to believe false facts (for to present also this principle, circumstantially, requires a radical falsification of physiology, philosophy, psychology, and history), that is, unless they are already ignorant or can be *educated to ignorance*.

There is an important corollary to this Nazi Race Principle which we must here note, it is the *Sub-principle of Anti-Semitism.*

The Nazi Race Principle commands: (1) racial purity; (2) subjection of inferior races—that is to say, every other race—which lies at its borders and beyond them. How much more does it command the subjection, nay the very eradication, of the distinguishable and therefore inferior race which lies within its very gates, and mingled parasite-like with its own people!

It is a concrete, and a usefully obvious, adjunct to the Race Principle which, to grow strong and active, requires to have its appetite whetted. The Jews are the aliens selected for persecution, for three logical reasons:

(*a*) They are distinguishable as well as accessible.

(*b*) They are weak in number, and also by history and nature they do not resist—therefore they can be persecuted without danger.

(*c*) They are lootable—therefore persecution is accompanied by gain to the persecutors.

It is to be noted that there is a governing principle of Nazism which grows out of the other two—or rather which is compounded of the other two, and for this reason is not designated a separate principle.

It is this: *Nazism makes war*. This is not only a matter of intelligent deduction. It is not a discovery. It is frankly stated by Hitler. What else, says he in effect, does anyone but a namby-pamby organise a State for? We must expand, he says; and all titles and all frontiers are established by force alone:

"What the sword must win the plough must till!"

"If anyone wants to live, let him accordingly fight" (*Mein Kampf*, p. 317).

"An alliance whose aim does not involve looking forward to a war is senseless and valueless" (p. 749).

And finally this: "The Movement ought to educate its adherents to the principle that struggle (*i.e.* warfare) must not be considered as a necessary evil but as *something to be desired in itself*" (p. 199).

Above is an analysis of the stated principles of Nazism, the two theories on which the whole doctrine of Nazism is built. They are cunning. For their purpose they are well conceived. They are calculated, if accepted by a nation, to induce in that nation the right mental attitude towards achieving the aim of the doctrine: to shape the nation into an aggressive war machine. But to an unbiased, intelligent observer, who takes account of established and provable facts of history and science, there is about both theories one outstanding feature: both are fallacious. They do not stand the acid of test. They are founded upon either incorrectly interpreted observations or deliberate falsifications of clear truth. Theories basically compounded of demonstrably incorrect premises are obviously misleading; and acceptance of them makes ignorance.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF NAZISM

We have seen the aim of the doctrine. We have seen the two principles which comprise the doctrine and which must be accepted by the community before it can activate the community to attain the aim. (Obviously they *must* be accepted by the community they are designed for if the doctrine is to 'get anywhere,' otherwise it is just another political doctrine on paper fit to be thrown into the wastepaper basket along with countless other unborn political theories.) Now the instruments of the doctrine. What are the instruments laid down by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* which will induce the designated community to accept these principles? There are only two methods of gaining acceptance of a doctrine: (1) force, (2) persuasion. The first imposes *de facto* acceptance in the sense of acquiescence. It obliterates denial and thus is *apparent* acceptance; but none the less acceptance for all

practical purposes. The second imposes acceptance in the sense of belief. It is *real* acceptance. These two instruments are sure enough provided for in the Nazi primer.

Before analysing them, consider for a moment, as Hitler did, the necessity for employing both instruments.

The problem was to impose a nonsensical doctrine (both principles are demonstrably incorrect, therefore the word 'nonsensical' is strictly legitimate) on a populous nation. Now, if the nation had been a primitive, ignorant (lacking knowledge, or superstitious, *i.e.* believing false knowledge) society, or illiterate as Russia largely was, the problem would have been easy, for ignorance is synonymous with credulity. It would simply have required a statement of the doctrine. The only instrument required would have been organised education. But Germany in 1933 was neither illiterate nor ignorant, and strongly they would have resented the imputation. On the contrary, they were amongst the most literate and knowledgeable—*i.e.* educated—nations on earth. They had a proud tradition of philosophy and science, both of which aimed at the discovery and presentation of truth. This philosophy and science was the basis of their educational system, and everyone in Germany was touched by this system. Their literacy was a hundred per cent. A hundred per cent. were educated up to a moderate standard, which embraced the major tenets of their philosophy and science; some of these, say twenty per cent., were educated to a higher standard. Just as in other cultured countries like England and America.

Now, I am not going to enter into a dissertation on education, but we all know what the word means. When we say a group of people are educated, we mean that they are primarily intelligent. But that is not all: so are many untutored savages potentially intelligent; so are children, as tested by their intelligence quotient, but they are not yet educated. We mean further that by educational treatment they are in possession of a body of facts of history, geography, biology, science, mathematics, etc. We also mean that they have been taught to call upon these facts, and so to think. Educated people therefore reject palpable falsities, like false generalisations and false theories, that contain statements that their education informs them are inaccurate. And not only that: it is obvious that once a person is educated he remains educated, and he never can accept such false theories with his mind even though he might be constrained under certain circumstances, like the *force majeure* applied to Galileo, to give a *de facto* acceptance in his actions and attitude.

The problem was therefore to impose two false theories on an

educated nation. We have said that the nation was a hundred per cent. literate. But what does that mean ? It means that they were all taught, but it does not mean that they all became educated persons according to our definition. Let us estimate how many were educated persons, in Germany in 1933. Take the parallel case of England or any similar country. Roughly the whole population is equally divided into seven decades from the age of nought to seventy. (The seventh decade is smaller, but we can put in it the over-seventies.) Every decade will then represent about fourteen or fifteen per cent. (15%) of the population.

Take a middle decade: 40–50. The intelligence quotient of a cross-section of the population varies. Some are low and can never become ' educated ' in our sense. Again, others, owing to locality or economic or other conditions in childhood, receive a poor and meagre education before entering the world as labourers and never develop further. Others, in fact very many, are mentally lazy. A last proportion receives extended education and in addition are intelligent, and thus go on educating themselves afterwards: these would definitely be ' educated ' people according to our definition. These are High Grade—the professions, etc.—and including thoughtful workmen, etc., they may be as much as thirty per cent. But let us put them less. I generously estimate the percentages thus:

Low grade—*i.e.* semi-ignorant .	20% of this decade.
Middle grade	60% „ „ „
High grade	20% „ „ „

Thus in the five decades from 20 to 70—each representing 15% of the population—this is the ratio (percentage of the total population):

Low grade	15%
Middle grade	45%
High grade	15%

We are left with the two early decades.

Obviously the first decade (15%) are uneducated, *i.e.* ignorant. Of the second decade we may say that none are high grade, indeed most will be semi-ignorant, but let us put them half and half, *i.e.* 7% low and 7% middle.

Here is our total:

Low grade	37%
Middle grade	52%
High grade	15%

or, to make it up to 100%:

Low grade	36%
Middle grade	50%
High Grade	14%

Now you see what Hitler has to work on.

We have agreed that the High Grade, 14%, are mentally uninfluenceable. For these persuasion is no good. Only force can impose on these, like Galileo, a *de facto* acceptance of a new doctrine which is at variance with their mental beliefs.

The Low Grade, 36%, of ignorant or semi-ignorant require nothing but systematic teaching to induce them to believe any theory.

What of the great Middle Grade, 50% of the population? They are not mentally dull, but their minds do not have the crystal-clear apprehension of fact possessed by the upper 14%. They are partially educated, in varying degrees; in some, knowledge just fills a quarter of the vessel, in some it comes half-way, some are nearly full, the rest is an amorphous vacuum. Obviously these are influenceable by systematic teaching. Their minds have not the ready data immediately to refute scientifically-dressed but false arguments. But lest their slow thought, assisted by reference and discussion, should in time refute—force steps in! Force will not give them the opportunity for reference or discussion; it will not indeed, if it can help it, give them the opportunity for thinking, for it will forcibly fill their minds with other things.

It is obvious that the acceptance, if gained, of the High Grade (14%) can never be anything more than tentative acquiescence; that of the Low Grade (36%) will be belief; that of the Middle Grade (50%) will be compounded of both—some will acquiesce only, some will believe.

This is an important fact, however, always to bear in mind: although the toleration of the mentally-individualistic High Grade and part of the Middle Grade can never be anything more than tentative acquiescence, the belief of the remainder is not necessarily stable belief, seeing it can be equally well changed to other belief.

I beg you, incidentally, to note vividly the enormous percentage comprised by the first two decades. Thirty per cent.! *All influenceable*. And twenty-two per cent. absolutely ignorant; virgin clay, ready for any impression. They will, they must, automatically believe any presented theory that has no opposition! And particularly will they believe it, not merely automatically, but avidly, if it is made both captivating and exciting (as, in emotional appeal, we shall see the Nazi

one is) and rewarding (as we are now to see that it definitely is, in our examination of the instruments).

Now for the two Nazi instruments of force and persuasion designed to gain acceptance of their doctrine, for, sure enough, both are provided for in the primer.

1. The Instrument of Force

This is the working machinery of the Nazi autocratic State, and may be thus sub-divided:

(*a*) The Party. There is to be only one political party in Germany, the Nazi Party. A band of sworn zealots. They are to be vociferous, which is ostensibly fanatical, believers in every tittle of the doctrine. No other party will be permitted. Members of this party will, of course, receive their guerdon—and non-members their slap-in-the-face—by this provision: only party members will be permitted to hold any position of authority. Not only does this refer to executives in the political structure, it includes the whole body of German life: in industry, factories, the professions, education, sport and amusements, the church—the higher executives in all these must be ardent Nazis, otherwise they are booted out and replaced by those that are. And they must keep a tight rein in their fields, only favouring those who ostensibly accept the doctrine. It is a powerful weapon, this. It strikes at livelihood. It strikes at every family and every individual.

(*b*) The Totalitarian Private Army. The S.S (Brownshirts) with its Secret Police (Gestapo). The function of this powerful and numerous Party Police Force is to enforce the enactments of the régime. This totalitarian private army is the normal machinery of any autocracy, but as the enactments of the Nazi régime embrace the acceptance of the doctrine its function is to compel that acceptance. By spying and supervision; by the display of force (terror); by correction (brutal beating-up or the concentration camp); or, in incorrigible cases, and for the sake of dreaded example, by death.

(*c*) Totalitarian State Control. Implicit in the Fuehrer Principle, whose acceptance is now enforced, is this concept and instrument of government. Both capital and labour are at the disposal of the State—that is to say, in Nazism, the leader and his henchmen. During wars this principle, as in ancient Rome, etc., has been from time to time introduced into England because in modern war, which must harness total economy, it is necessary; but in Germany it is to be not an emergency measure but permanent—an intrinsic part of Nazism. (Obviously this State is, as we have remarked before, designed for war.)

(*d*) What are the other instruments of force that are designed to influence the citizen physically? They are corollaries upon the acceptance of the first part of the doctrine, the Fuehrer Prinzip, which is now enforced. Since that principle demands *unquestioning* obedience to appointed authority, it follows that there are no such things as civil rights or civil liberties. Trade unions are forbidden. Also strikes, or any expression of opinion. All meetings, discussions, speeches, are forbidden, unless they are official ones, conducted by the Party. Criticism of the Government or any enactment of it is forbidden. In fact there is to be no liberty at all of thought or action. *No freedom*, as ordinary people understand the term.

2. The Instrument of Persuasion

This instrument, when successful, causes actual acceptance, *i.e.* belief.

It is designed primarily to teach the virgin youth and the ignorant Low Grade, and to convert or seduce from their present mental attitude the influenceable Middle Grade. Altogether eighty-six per cent. of the population. This instrument of Persuasion may alternatively be called Representation, or Education, or Propaganda.

Let us see what Hitler says about it; and then—since it is obvious that the future generations, *i.e.* the Youth (30%), are not only the most pliant section of the community but also the most important, because if the régime lives a few years they will become the majority adults—let us look at the actual system of education laid down for the youth of Nazi Germany.

"In the religious sphere the profession of a denominational belief is largely the result of education, while the religious yearning slumbers in the soul; so too the political opinions of the masses are the final result of influences systematically operating on human sentiment and intelligence."

(He does not add . . . while the yearning for truth slumbers in the soul, too.)

"By far the most effective branch of political education, which in this connection is best expressed by the word 'propaganda,' is carried on by the Press. . . . It represents a kind of school for adults" (*Mein Kampf*, p. 57).

"To whom should propaganda be made to appeal? To the educated intellectual classes? Or to the less intellectual?

"Propaganda must always address itself to the broad masses of the people" (p. 107).

"It must appeal to the feelings of the public rather than to their reasoning powers.

". . . Its purely intellectual level will have to be that of the lowest mental common denominator among the public it is desired to reach.

". . . The receptive powers of the masses are very restricted, and their understanding is feeble. On the other hand, they quickly forget" (p. 108).

"Its chief function is to convince the masses, whose slowness of understanding needs to be given time in order that they may absorb information; and only constant repetition will finally succeed in imprinting an idea on the memory of the crowd" (p. 110).

"Generally, readers of the Press can be classified into three groups:

"First, those who believe everything they read.

"Second, those who no longer believe anything.

"Third, those who critically examine what they read and can form their judgment accordingly.

"Numerically, the first group is by far the strongest, being comprised of the broad masses of the people.

". . . The third group is easily the smallest, being comprised of real intellectuals whom natural aptitude and education have taught to think for themselves and who in all things try to form their own judgments, while at the same time carefully sifting what they read. . . . Journalists appreciate this type of reader only with a certain amount of reservation" (p. 138).

(This is striking. Hitler appreciates this type with less than certain reservations; he does not permit them at all. He is determined to eradicate the whole class of thinking people who form their own judgments. The intention is that no one in Germany shall form their own judgments, because, as we have seen, and as we shall see much more clearly in a moment, in Germany there is to be just no discriminative education.)

"The follower of a movement is one whom the propaganda has converted to the doctrine of the movement."

". . . Because of its passive character, the simple effort of believing in a political doctrine is enough for the majority, for the majority of mankind is mentally lazy" (p. 320).

Finally, to repeat it: "The movement ought to educate its adherents to the principle that struggle (*i.e.* warfare) must not be con-

sidered a necessary evil but as something to be desired in itself" (p. 199).

There, above, in so many words, you see Hitler's contempt for the *broad masses*. Not only the broad masses of Germany, but the people everywhere. Expressly, though, the people of Germany. He looks upon them merely as something to be moulded. To be shaped. To be forged into a weapon of war—which he shall wield !

There can be no question about that simple, plain statement.

Their mind, he says in effect, those with natural aptitude, can be educated, but it can easily, too, be debauched; and I will debauch it ! Their minds can *all* be kept at the stage of brutal children; and there I will keep them !

Now for the Educational System of Nazi Germany, for school children from six to eighteen. And note, the same system is continued in the Press, the school for adults.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF NAZI GERMANY

The lines which education shall take in the German National-Socialist political scheme are laid down by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. The whole book is really a treatise on what the entire people of Germany should be instructed to believe. The older people, already adults before the Nazi régime, and therefore already educated by non-Nazi knowledge, must have their education changed, and thereafter be re-educated with the new Nazi ideology—of Fuehrer Prinzip, Aryan Race Theory, destiny of and highest glory in war, etc.—by every means of reaching the intellect. These include Press, literature, speeches and rallies, cinema and stage, the radio. It will be obligatory to listen to the radio, and thus all these people will be given forced instruction. The younger people, not already educated, will be educated from the beginning in the new ideology and therefore will uncritically accept everything. He devotes thirty pages of *Mein Kampf* to the education of boys and seven lines to the education of girls, who are to be educated only to become mothers. These explicit instructions are now in force in Germany as they were originally conceived. They are embodied in the official teachers' manual of National-Socialist Germany. No departure from this manual is permitted in Germany. It is universally enforced. It is decreed personally by the Minister for Culture and Education, Dr. Bernhard Rust. Its title is *Amtliche Ausgabe des Reichs und Preuszichen Ministeriums fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung, und Volksbildung* (Official Publication of the

Reich and Prussian Ministry of Knowledge, Education, and National Culture).

On p. 9 of the Introduction it states this: " The German school in the Third Reich is an integral part of the National-Socialistic order of living. It has the mission, in collaboration with other phases of the Party, to fashion and mould the National-Socialist Being according to party orders."

On the same page he intimates that Nazi education takes no notice of the facts of history, by ridiculing the educational systems of other countries " which attempt to find a basis of education in the past instead of the future. A new spirit only can arise from the glory shed on a nation by world-shaping events and experiences. Action and action only, not indolent pondering of the past, is the soul of education."

He goes on: " Democracies base their education on the doctrine that a man is a being who has reached perfection " (this is, of course, absurd) " through culture. This grievous mistake, monstrous as it is, is superseded by another—the illusion that spiritual culture can provide a nation with the stability which in reality can be obtained only through the political deeds of a great personality "—Hitler.

He states—it is there in black and white—that the aim of education is training for a life of Might. " All true education as we understand it stems from an active life. Life can be inspired only by life. It is only in the New Germany that this conception has taken root. . . . Before we can have a new *education of Might*, before we can rightly discuss a new system of culture, there must be a new order, a new régime inspired by the *Will for Power and Might*. . . . The new socialistic union of our nation, which is the fulfilment of our Fuehrer's vision, was created by a hard, bitter conflict, carried on by the fighting units of our Party."

Gregor Zeimer in *Education for Death* (1942) indicates how these fighting units of Culture are described on the same page as the above quotation. They are the S.A. (the Storm Troopers), the S.S. (Elite Guard), the true carriers of educational culture. Through their efforts, instruction has achieved a new meaning, has developed a new virtue of strength. Every phase of culture aside from political culture remains a mere abstraction and a chimera, because it makes appeal only to the intellect.

Here is Rust again: " If schools follow the dictates of the Party, they will find their proper places. . . . For the first time in history a political system, the National-Socialist System, has put the culture of a whole nation on an equal footing. This new culture is uniform,

unified, and welded into a coherent whole, not by false interpretations of civilisation, which classify human beings as 'accomplished' and 'not accomplished,' but by a single faith: the faith of a nation in its own Might, and in its Fuehrer!"

And listen to this: "Rust warns schools not to produce a crop of intellectuals. No individual is to think of himself as having a more brilliant mind than his neighbour" (Ziemer).

Listen to Hitler, in *Mein Kampf* (p. 183), on the same theme of depressing the intellectual standard: "By its very nature an organisation cannot stand unless leaders of high intellect are served by a large mass of men inspired by sentiment. It would be harder to maintain discipline in a company of two hundred men, all equally gifted intellectuals, than in one containing one hundred and ninety less gifted and ten with higher intellect."

In one sentence Nazism, through the mouthpiece of Rust, gives the whole purpose of schooling. He says: "*The chief purpose of the school is to train human beings to realise that the State is more important than the individual, that individuals must be willing and ready to sacrifice themselves for Nation and Fuehrer.*"

All Germany is to be educated, or distorted if you prefer the word, for the purpose only of offensive war (Might) and obedience. True knowledge, that is, apprehension of broad facts of truth, is not only deprecated, it is forbidden. "A wide cultural knowledge, a broad education in various phases of learning, dulls the senses; a general assortment of information weakens, does not strengthen; too much universal learning tires the mind, paralyses the will-power and the ability to make decisions." "Knowledge widens the view only if it promotes the feeling of power, if it promotes obedience and modesty in the individual."

Listen to this astonishing one. "National-Socialistic ideology is to be a sacred foundation. *It is not to be degraded by detailed explanation or discussion.* It is a holy unit that must be accepted by the students as a holy unit. It must be taught by teachers who fully comprehend the true meaning of our sacred doctrines." All classes have the same ultimate purpose—to create National-Socialists.

Gregor Ziemer (*Education for Death*, 1942), an American educationist living in Germany, studied the Nazi educational method at first hand. I can only here give extracts of his data.

First there is the birth of the child, with prospective mothers at one of the N.S.V. mother-and-child homes uttering a prayer of thanks to the picture of a deity, Hitler. "The women raised their right hands and spoke in chorus: 'Our Fuehrer, we thank thee for thy munificence;

we thank thee for this home; we thank thee for this food. To thee we devote all our powers (*Kraefte*); to thee we dedicate our lives and those of our children ! ' "

" We keep the children safe for Hitler until the schools take them over at the age of six," the matron summarised this phase of her work.

Here is one of the songs these young women were singing, from p. 114 of *Unser Liederbuch* (Our Songbook):

" Hurrah, hurrah,
To the battle-front march we !
With weapons,
With tents,
With helmets,
And lance
To kill the enemy ! "

" The woman admitted that every inmate of the Home was informed daily that Germany was the leader of the world, and that all other countries were enemies." (I ask you to note this was before the war.)

Here is a song at a pre-school nursery, translated.

" We love our Fuehrer,
We honour our Fuehrer,
We follow our Fuehrer,
Until men we are;

" We believe in our Fuehrer,
We live for our Fuehrer,
We die for our Fuehrer,
Until heroes we are."

Now the education of the boy from six to ten (chap. III).

" The Nazi Party takes him from the N.S.V. at the age of six and keeps him until he is ten. He wears a uniform. . . . The Pimpf [' little fellow '] organisation lays the groundwork for party activities in the Jungvolk and the Hitler Youth. The boy receives a number and is given an efficiency record book. Throughout the years it records not only his physical development and his advancement in military prowess, but also his ideological growth.

" At the age of ten the Pimpf must pass an examination as outlined in the Pimpf Manual. If he does pass, he is told he must be ready to die for Hitler in the Jungvolk, even as he was ready to die for him in the Pimpf stage."

This chapter should be read with its speeches to children on 'Our Nordic Culture,' its hatred of democracies (naturally the children don't know what it is), its 'Seig heils,' its 'Blood flags,' its Hitler songs, Hitler biography, Hitler oaths, Hitler holidays. Its Pimpf Manual with its military activities, marching, manœuvres, map-making, spy work.

On p. 116 of Rust's official teachers' manual, for instance, are instructions of what to teach about the United States. It instructs the teachers to use many illustrative examples, to embellish as much as possible when teaching about the labour troubles, the mixture of races, the over-production, the strikes, the minority problems. This is the *only* teaching about the United States, for all Germans, from Pimpfs to adults who read books or listen over the radio.

Here (p. 79) is a weekly schedule of class subjects at a girls' school. There are only eight subjects: German, Race Study, Ideology, History, Geography, Eugenics and Health Biology, Domestic Science, and Mathematics. Naturally every subject is in the Nazi version.

Next, Jungvolk, boys from 10 to 14 (chap. V).

"They go through a series of spartan tests. The marches are longer, the hunger periods come more often, the privileges granted are fewer than those for the Pimpf. They begin as Jungvolk with an initiation ceremony, at which they again swear to give up their lives to Hitler.

"The teachers, of course, throughout, are all in uniform. Mostly S.A.

"Here is the celebration of the Sun Festival (*Sonnen wende*) on June 20th on Mount Brocken. A pagan scene for the Nazi Jungvolk. The final song was this (translated):

"Adolf Hitler is our Saviour, our hero.
He is the noblest being in the whole wide world.
For Hitler we live,
For Hitler we die,
Our Hitler is our lord
Who rules a brave new world."

Then the sacred oath, with these boys, ten to fourteen, all standing: "I consecrate my life to Hitler; I am ready to sacrifice my life to Hitler; I am ready to die for Hitler, the Saviour, the Fuehrer."

Next, the Hitler Youth. Boys fourteen to eighteen (chap. VII).

"They are Hitler's secondary army—ready to die for him, but

ready to fight first. And they consider themselves well equipped mentally and physically."

On their ideological foundation, laid when they were Pimpfs and Jungvolk, the Hitler Youth erect a superstructure of technical knowledge useful to soldiers: Party history, military geography, natural science (bringing out the Fuehrer Prinzip), chemistry, mathematics, a foreign language. There is, naturally, further education in Hitler doctrine.

The Hitler Jugend, H.J., has its own system of ranks and promotions. It maintains its own leadership, schools, and camps. The uniforms resemble those of the regular Storm Troopers.

Here is the slogan which Goebbels has given them: "The older generation says, 'He who has the Youth has the Future.' We say, 'He who has the Future has the Youth.' That is why Youth follows Hitler and his ideology, which is the embodiment of the dreams and hopes of youth. Don't let the older generation influence you. We will win, FOR YOUTH IS ALWAYS RIGHT!"

The H.J. has four branches: the H.J. proper; the H.J. Marines; the H.J. Flyers; and the H.J. Motorised Division.

On p. 52 Rust lays down the lines of the German Culture course.

"First, the nation is a blood unit. ('The idea of race can be studied best if the teacher emphasies the study of Germanic races. The student should be made to feel the superiority of the Nordic Germanic race.')

"Secondly, the nation is a fighting unit. ('Sub-divisions: the fight of the German nation for living space; the life of soldiers; military heroism; the soldier at the front as the personification of power; principle of leadership and comradeship; Germans fighting for their ideals abroad.')

"Thirdly, the nation is a working unit.

"Fourthly, the nation is an ideological unit. (Discussion of the German ideology, and the German interpretation of life, as seen by Nazis; the idea of the Nazi State and its unification; national leadership and political thinkers.)

"Geography students must be made to realise that it is their duty to obtain for Germany the status in the world which it deserves as a result of its achievements."

Biology on p. 141 of the official manual: "In nature the fight for the survival of the fittest eliminates the weak and those unfit to carry on the race. The student of botany and zoology must be taught that this is the normal process in nature; must be made to realise the folly of the theory that there is equality anywhere in nature. . . . The

National-Socialistic State, through its racial laws and its decrees governing hereditary health, has again permitted the law of survival to function properly."

Next is the compulsory labour year; then he enters the army, with this oath: " I swear by God this holy oath, that I will unconditionally obey the Fuehrer of the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, as a brave soldier. I will for ever defend this oath at the cost of my own life."

There is the Educational System from birth to manhood. Thereafter, education of adults, by books, newspapers, even so-called scientific publications, and radio, is identically the same: the same distorted aspect of truth, to be accommodated to the Nazi ideology of Fuehrer Prinzip and Race Supremacy, is universally presented as facts of knowledge.

These are the obvious points that forcibly strike us about the Nazi Educational System: First, it is thorough. Second, it is untruthful. The untruthfulness, though, is deliberate and logical, for Hitler—we have his own word for it—despises truth. For this logical reason, he has another object.

Thus the Nazi Educational System.

What are the measures outlined to resist challenge to it? We have already commented on them: (*a*) forcible suppression of all challenge inside the State; (*b*) forcible insulation of the mind of the State from all outside knowledge.

This completes our analysis of Nazism.

ASSESSMENT OF NAZISM

Human nature being varied, one of our axioms is: you can't please everyone. We know that. Accordingly the definition of our aim, in the Introduction, if it means anything, means that we are searching for a formula which will give the greatest good and contentment to the greatest number of our community. Very good! But don't be misled, any one of you, that the latest plan you read about or listen to, even ours or one of Mr. H. G. Wells's, is the only plan which has this ideal. They *all* have this ideal. It is the ideal of democracy. It is the expressed ideal of Communism. It is the expressed ideal of Nazism! Thus: to bring the whole world under one firm integrated rule, like the old Roman Empire; then all wars would cease, and the world would be at last permanently happy and quiet. This ' Betterment of Mankind '

is the banner. It is the banner of every political party that ever strutted.

Of course it is. And the political platform of any party is their fabricated explanation of how their particular doctrine will ensure that end: the greatest good to the greatest number. Consider, I beg you, gifted reader. If you or I, dreaming of the sweets of eminence, were suddenly to throw aside our engaging modesty and decide to form a political party purely for our own greater glorification, would we, as intelligent people, calmly stand on a platform in our town, or in Hyde Park, or in a committee-room of the House of Commons, before the audience that we have assiduously got together, and boldly tell them so? Would we say: " There is the programme of my party. It's a new one, and a practical-sounding one you must agree. But I impress this: the only reason I propose this party is that I may become its leader and thus gratify my own ambition to exercise power in the community "? No; I give you credit for more intelligence. Such an ingenuous speech would invite nothing but laughter. I, personally, should say: " There is my programme, gentlemen. It's a new one and a practical-sounding one, you must agree. I ask you to consider it. But I impress this: the only reason I propose this party is that by it, in a higher degree than any other party we've ever had, the greatest good will accrue to the greatest number in the community. It is for the betterment of the country. It is, in fact, for the betterment of mankind." That is the speech that has always been made by every successful political leader throughout history.

Therefore examine the thing, its principles and instruments, and do not be bamboozled by a statement of specious aims.

Needless to say, Hitler uses this gambit, to the effect that an aristocracy of good stock, by, rightfully, ruling their communities with haughty authority, will be promoting the betterment of the earth. And this is explicitly why, in spite of its undisguised and horrid brutality of method, many Germans, previously sane and humane, many, as they are called, ' upper-class ' Frenchmen, many Belgians, aye and many English and Americans, have heretofore allowed themselves to be swayed by its argument. But seeing this brutality of method, and the organised perversion of truth, and the avowed organised debasing of community mentality, how can this claim possibly be fortified?

In this investigation we vowed to look facts in the face. To dodge no issues. What does a political doctrine of the scope of the things we are discussing—Communism, Nazism, etc.—set out to do? I take it it sets out to do two things. Firstly, to capture the attention

of a sufficiency of people in a community and convert them to enthusiasm, so that they may be able to take over the government of the community; secondly, in fact to govern by the explicit doctrines.

Our job is to judge on the facts. If a doctrine promises happiness and does not give it, if it promises more food and does not give it, if it promises peace and gives war, those things are not strictly germane: a doctrine baits itself to convert, but it undertakes to rule, by its instrument. If it can succeed in ruling by its instrument, then we must impartially admit its success. 'Succeed in ruling,' that is to say, *with stability*. To liquidate a ruler and take the title until liquidated in turn one week later does not mean ruling. Rule must be carried on for a certain *time* according to the tenets of the instrument before the doctrine can be said to have succeeded; but if it does succeed in so ruling, that is to say, if it does present stability, then the recognition of that amount of success cannot be withheld.

Now for Nazism.

The Test of Emotional Appeal

The name of the doctrine is National-Socialism.

Here, again, is dual appeal. First, the *socialistic appeal*, that modern intoxicant which for Communism was reaping in converts by thousands and scores of thousands, and which Hitler was too shrewd to omit—Egalitarianism it implied, a sharing of wealth by all who did not have enough; this is a trumpet-call which to the cupidity of humans never fails to appeal. (We know by reading his primer that his actual programme of aristocratic Fascism is the very reverse of Socialism, but it is the obvious that counts in emotional appeal, and the obvious in this case is the false label, Socialism.)

Second, *Nationalism*. Now, apart from the instinct of cupidity, Communism evokes and harnesses one passion only, hate of the possessors; but hate, though it summons to action, only destroys, it does not build, or weld into an army. Hitler, wiser than Marx, uses sentiment. He knows as we know that the sentiment of *family*, the love of children, of our blood and brothers and home, is an ineradicable sentiment of human nature in spite of all the materialistic twaddle of Marx. Men will fight for the family and die for the family, so, like the shrewd politician he is, he stresses this ineradicable sentiment, he 'plugs' it, as the Americans say, and he glorifies it and enlarges it into the sentiment for the greatest blood family of all, the national family—Nationalism!

Yes, Nazism passes the test of Emotional Appeal with high marks and easily.

The Test of Plausibility

As I have said previously, the entire population of Germany had been brought up on the heady pap of militarism and nationalism. (Militarism had been temporarily pushed into the background by a recent defeat in war, but it was only pushed down like a spring.) So this argument, Nationalism, as an integral part of a feasible method of government, had in Germany no trouble to convince.

What of the ' Socialism ' side of the doctrine ? Has it superficial feasibility ? . . . There is no need to ask—it has, in a degree, for everyone. Therefore when both these acknowledged plausibilities were lumped together there was very little for those to do who heard the doctrine rapturously propounded at packed meetings but jump on the band-wagon, even without further argument.

But there was further argument: the speciousness was documented—how that always paralyses Hitler's ' broad masses,' ' who believe all they read '—in a cunning, violent book which, under the cynically false label of *Socialism*, was flattering to the intelligent avaricious, and too deep, therefore quite convincing, for the simple.

Yes, the test of Plausibility is passed, too, with ready concession.

The Test of Practicability

In this section we, not other people, come into the picture and use our critical intelligence. Do we judge that Nazism has the stuff in it for practical success ? We know it has plausibility, but has it sound logic ?

We can answer from our chair. The whole argument is set down in the book *Mein Kampf*, and on it alone we must form our judgment at this theoretical stage. I remember reading *Mein Kampf* for the first time some years ago, and I remember being impressed. Full though it was of unsubstantiated, unscientific, really childish assertions, illogical though its conclusions were, unbridled, unbalanced, untenable as seemed the tenets and recommendations of the doctrine, I knew that it carried in it a powerful conviction to the inflamed mind of a defeated militarism—the unstable, politics-racked, leaderless Germany of the time. We, in the mesmeric euphoria of victory, felt the need of no such dream-feasts, but Germany was a pitifully puzzled giant turning his head from side to side.

As I say, we needed no dope, and in consequence when we first read the book seven years ago we looked at the exaggerations and inaccuracies, the laughably mistaken (or calculated misleading) readings of science and history, with superior amusement. Bruised Germany was not amused. They saw no joke; for them it was dead

serious. Naturally, intelligent educated adults in Germany—at the time the Nazis took power the great majority—did not at first swallow the Race Theory in all its ridiculousness, with Julius Cæsar and Christ and others all Aryans, nor the whimsical Jewish theory which gives all Jews a peculiar odour and squat, gnarled, hairy legs; but for peace even they were inclined to nod their acquiescence.

I remember in 1936 asking one of this class of Germans what he thought of the Nazi experiment. I was alone with him in a railway-carriage from Heidelberg to Munich. He was a man of fifty and was a director of one of the great government services—I still have his card. He spoke English well, had studied at Oxford as a young man, had formerly travelled extensively, was patently an intelligent man, and had belonged to the educated class since long before Nazism was heard of. He said after a pause that people of his generation were naturally not enthusiastic about the régime, it was not very comfortable for them, and particularly it was uncomfortable for their mental pride; but this was their attitude: they would not interfere. Germany had recently been in chaos, and this gave promise of at least some settled form of government. Many of the people in it were of unpleasant characters or antecedents, but Hitler, he and his friends thought, 'had a white waistcoat'—I remember the phrase—and they would see what he made of it. They, as a class, in the meantime would offer no obstruction to the experiment.

I can imagine—this is my 'common sense' acting—many thousands in Germany like my Munich friend, perhaps the greater part of all the thoughtful adults, becoming more and more shocked as, progressively, more and more affronts were offered to their conscience and intelligence; but I can imagine them still remaining timid as it became, progressively, more difficult and dangerous to revolt or speak. Nevertheless, I cannot imagine such a man, or such people, ever becoming believing, convinced Nazis—any more than I, with my mind already formed, should myself. There may be ten per cent. such people still in Germany, there may be fifty. But, whatever the numbers, people who have so accepted one change will accept another, and these at any rate cannot be considered confirmed or fanatical Nazis.

But they have for the time being acquiesced. That is factual. Almost all in Germany—except those in concentration camps or dead—have on the face of it acquiesced.

This is the long and short of it, human beings are inclined to believe—or at any rate tentatively accept, which for practical purposes comes to the same thing—what they wish to believe. Have you seen many women disbelieve flattery? No. You will never see many

of a nation, either. At the present moment—this section was first written in September 1940—after the defeat of Dunkirk and in the midst of the blitzkrieg air bombardment, we are being told daily by the Government and the Press that the British nation is the staunchest nation on earth, the cheerfullest under difficulties, the bravest, undefeatable. Personally I am inclined to believe all that about the British, but don't forget that every nation now at war has been told the same, too, by their Government and their Press—calling to example in each case their glorious history, just as we do—the Greeks, the Italians, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Poles, up to the very last. They cannot all be the bravest nation on earth, therefore it is plainly flattery in most cases, *but they all believe it*. Recognising, therefore, detachedly, that flattery may not be true, what is the value of it? This: that the people addressed cannot thereupon have a detached viewpoint; they believe, or at least are beguiled, and *they try to live up to the flattery*.

Salesmanship is a matter of convincing the purchaser, *i.e.* the average human. Hitler had flaunted his doctrine with an emotion-catching appeal, the name National-Socialism; he had decked it with familiar, well-digested arguments—little of his Nationalism was new, it was as old as Bismarck—clad in heroic words so that inherently to the Germany of the moment it had a plausible ring; now he sells it—with Flattery. They listen to the flattery; they believe; and the battle is won.

He tells them they are the greatest race on earth, a race of heroes, the king-race, whose moral duty it is to lord it over all inferiors. No one but a child, you would say, would have believed such arrant tripe; but this people, recently defeated in war and floundering in political ineptitude, wanted to believe it, and, like children, defiantly they did. A king-race, says Hitler, like an ancient captain exhorting his timid warriors before battle, or like an American cheer-leader—a king-race, fair-haired, blue-eyed, of noble mien and physique like Greek statues, that's what they all were. Even though patently many of them did not look like that, that's what they all were in inward essence, every man of German blood: Aryans, builders, and conquerors. . . . Well, wouldn't anyone like to qualify? Their colour heightened a bit and their eyes shone—and immediately, in those very reactions, they were inclined to believe and were won. A king-race. Were they really a king-race? By God, they would *be* a king-race!! What did it entail?

They listened avidly.

The obligations of the king-race, said Hitler, are these: First,

supremacy.—Yes, yes, readily nod the disciples. Supremacy, of course. We cannot be a king-race unless we attain ostensible supremacy.—Attain and maintain ! thunders Hitler, both now and all the time, constantly. Supremacy of our race means purity of our race, and for that we must purge ourselves of Jews and other excrescences without squeamishness. It also means, directly, the inferiority of all other races; and that we must not only recognise, we must effect, deliberately, sternly, without conscience or mercy, making them in demonstrable fact servants, hewers of wood, as they really are. This is our highest morality.—Yes, yes, feebly nod some. Yes, yes ! in a drowning roar shout the others, intoxicated.—The attainment of this object, states Hitler, cannot be got by wishing; it entails a certain discipline, it entails certain actions and self-denials; it necessitates certain adjustments in our meek, easy, peacetime point of view.—Yes, yes, what are they ? they clamour eagerly. It is obvious there must be some such adjustments, tell us what they are and we agree.—It means the stamping-out from our hearts of all private notions of justice and truth and conscience: there is for us only one justice, the justice of the Race; only one truth, the truth of the Race; only one conscience, the conscience of the Race. And the leader, the leader only, will define each: justice, truth, conscience. Obedience must be absolute, not only of action but of thought. This is your fanatical race-duty. To be supreme we must subjugate, to subjugate we must strike, to fit ourselves for striking we must harden ourselves in body, mind, and conscience. Ruthlessness is the virtue, not mercy; attainment of the object, not fiddling truth. Who would keep promises to a monkey ? Neither will we to anyone we despise. It is our racial duty to subjugate, and we shall subjugate by all means to our hand. Brutality shall be our means, lies, treachery, slaughter: these things are virtues when they are for the Race.

Thus are Nazis.

As I say, when I first read *Mein Kampf* some years ago and first saw the ' argument ' of Nazism, I shook my head. Logic, it must be realised, does not postulate the truth of its premises; it merely says, granted such-and-such, then thus will follow. Granted the acceptance of the Fuehrer Prinzip and of that fantastic claim to racial overlordship—the two theories which seemed so immature and laughable to non-Germans—the whole unpleasant argument followed with inevitable human logic.

Logically, therefore, it is seen that the whole question of the Practicability of Nazism boils down to the likelihood, or otherwise, of acceptance of these two principles by the German nation.

Now, children of the first, and more than half of the second, decade, obviously, will readily accept whatever they are told. About twenty-one per cent. (21%). The Low Grade, minimally-educated (ignorant) section of the remainder are equally credulous (15%). Here is a total of 36%. The Middle Grade of education, fifty per cent., have not a firmly crystallised mental objection to the temporary entertainment of any new theory, particularly if that theory promises them a bonus. There remain the small group of High Grade, educated, thoughtful adults (14%), and most of these we concede at that chaotic time in Germany were prepared not to interfere.

Thus I think we may logically and reasonably say that the German nation as a whole was, at a psychological moment, if not guaranteed at least prepared to give immediate acceptance. But, mark this, *continued practicability*, which goes beyond immediate workability, and is involved in the stability and durability of a doctrine, *demands continued acceptance*. This is the problem we must examine.

Recognising the frailty and timidity of human nature and its susceptibility to flattery, we are bound to admit almost the certainty of the temporary acceptance of the Nazi principles at that time in Germany. It has therefore that aspect of practicability. It can come into being, and can come to power. But what of the other aspect of practicability? Can it, without changing the tenets of its doctrine, then proceed to rule—with stability?

Let us approach from another angle.

We saw that the stated proposition of Communism did not stand because it was based on a misconception of human nature—on a general perfected unselfishness which is not human. Now Nazism is a defined autocracy. The anomaly that it stole power by constitutional means in a democracy throws light on its ethics but need not affect our assessment. We have countless instances of autocracies functioning for a period of time in history. Therefore if we ask, Can the Nazi autocracy, as defined in its two main principles, function for a period?, there can only be one answer: Yes, providing the principles continue to be accepted. To repeat: an autocracy of explicit complexion, as Nazism is, which comes into being by reason of acceptance of two definite principles, can only continue in that complexion if the two principles continue to be strictly accepted—otherwise you may find yourself with some other form of government; or you may still have an autocracy, but it will have lost its specific complexion and will not be Nazism.

The question therefore is, do we judge that demonstrably false

principles can continue to be accepted in a modern world, and for how long?

We might here, with value, enquire, how long can an autocracy itself function—any undifferentiated example of autocracy? The answer is simply: so long as the autocratic organisation is strong enough to keep the masses in docile subjection.

Well, firstly, is the autocratic organisation strong enough, as laid down in *Mein Kampf*?

The strength of any human organisation is the strength of a chain. In an autocracy the chain has three links: (1) the autocrat, (2) the machinery of the organisation, (3) the human individuals that compose the State. On the strength of the three will depend the strength of the régime. The strength of the autocrat is in his character. The strength of the machinery is in its tested efficiency. The strength of the human units in an autocracy is plainly in their docility, their unquestioningness, their credulity, or, as Hitler calls it, their 'acceptance.' Their acceptance of all, not some but *all*, the principles of the particular autocracy. Here comes again the particular provision we have already tracked down. Thus the whole question of the continued practicability of Nazism can now be answered under these three plain headings:

1. The continued character of the Nazi leader.
2. The continued efficiency of the Nazi machinery.
3. The continued 'acceptance' of the German community.

If we judge that all these three links are sound and will *continue constant*, then we must accept that this autocracy, being once in power, will continue; but unreliability of even one link will break, or at least call in question, the strength of the whole chain.

We will deal with them seriatim.

1. The Character of the Nazi Leader

Does it, as revealed in *Mein Kampf*, seem suitable for the purpose of autocrat; and is it likely to continue unvaried, for generations?

As regards the first part I think we may judge, Yes, the character as revealed should be adequate for this special job of Fuehrer *whilst he retains his support, his faculties, and his life.* (This is presuming the best, that the character is resolute and in face of any circumstances will have no indecisions.) But can we justly say any more?

It is apparent that we cannot. Remember that the 'build-up' of the Nazi autocrat is a very special one. Consider the whole outlined educational system. He is not an ordinary hard autocrat. He is certainly not to be a benevolent one: he is to be the most ruthless of

the ruthless. He is to be infallible, perfect in judgment, not only the head but the conscience of the whole nation, indeed, semi-deified. One man certainly may become that to a sufficient number by careful propaganda. But he will die—even supposing he should not lose his popularity or faculties beforehand.

What, then, of the second part, 'continue unvaried for generations'? There is no need to waste good time: it cannot happen. Consider many instances in history. Successors are uncertain quantities. They are question marks.

No one, in reason, can guarantee a continuation of the same character for generations.

In short, the continued character of the Nazi leader is not likely.

It could be adequate temporarily, but it is strictly limited as to time.

2. The Efficiency of the Nazi Machinery

This, with its Gestapo, its S.S. Party Army, its ruthless suppression of all opposition, must be taken as soundly wrought and prepared for if the whole conception of Nazism was made with any seriousness whatever. We must take it as reliable for a certain time.

But in all history one cannot find any such extreme-tempered political machinery remaining rigidly unvarying for very long. Consider the 'gestapo' of the Spanish Inquisition: that lost its sharpness and fervour in less than a generation. Consider many other historical instances. Remember these men are but men, with human nature. Fanatical fervour, which Hitler in so many words requires, can be temporarily inspired in officials, but fanatical fervour in humans does not last. They may be given special privileges to nurture it, and good pay (as they are), but such bribery is in itself not a stimulus for fanaticism, and bribery to do duty may, with human officials, be overbidden by bribery to neglect it. Consider: these officials must not only compel obedience to orders, they must compel acceptance of principles which even slight detached thought by adults will show to be false. Can an original hysterical fervour in such employment continue white-hot for ever? Twenty years is a very long time in this respect; to talk of centuries is merely to romance.

But if there is any relaxation of efficiency, then, from that moment, according to Hitler himself, the Nazi structure is in danger.

In short, we judge the efficiency of such taut machinery could be *adequate temporarily*, but it is not likely to last. It, too, is *strictly limited as to time.*

3. The 'Acceptance' of the German Community

This third one is our main consideration. The other two can apply to autocracies in general; this is special.

Here our interpretation of human nature is, just as was found in Communism—and just as will be found in the analysis of any political system—the nub of the whole matter.

The special point is that in an autocracy the community cannot be permitted to question authority. They must, ostensibly at least, accept the official attitude of the authority, whatever the official attitude of the particular autocracy may chance to be. Now, we know that people in the mass will believe anything, for a time. History gives us many instances. We know that in the past, and even in the present, superstitious and ignorant (which comes to precisely the same thing) communities have believed the most ludicrously false things. You remember quite an intelligent community—as things went then—who believed that Paul and Barnabas were gods, and wanted to worship them. We know, though, that these people would have soon discovered that Paul and Barnabas were not superhuman—unless, of course, they really were extremely feeble-minded and would not accept the evidence of their senses. The whole question, therefore, is: how long can people, as a community, be induced to swallow propositions that can be scientifically demonstrated as false?

I think the answer to that is evident. Because it is not sufficient for one clever man to demonstrate the falsity; the whole community, or the majority of it, must appreciate the falsity. The answer therefore is: *a community can be induced to accept a gross falsity as long as the community is ignorant; it will not accept a gross falsity if it is enlightened*, i.e. *educated.*

Thus, by the first part of the above, is explained the longevity of all the great autocracies of history, Persia, Egypt, etc.: the broad masses were kept ignorant.

The proposition that the Nazi authority calls upon the German community to accept is double: the Nazi Race Principle of Herrenvolk, whereby the German people are supposed to be a king-race, physically and mentally superior to all other people who are not German; and the Nazi Fuehrer Principle, which states that authoritarianism is the universal principle throughout nature, and which involves, inherently, semi-deification of the German supreme Fuehrer, Hitler. Both these principles can be scientifically demonstrated as false by anyone who is allowed to draw instances beyond the narrow German educational curriculum.

Firstly, therefore, can the German community (we still are dealing

with theory) be induced to accept these two scientifically false principles; and secondly, for how long can it be induced to accept them?

As to the first part, we have noted that human nature can be flattered, and that any of its varying characteristics can, by the correct psychological approach, be brought to the surface and stressed. Therefore we must answer: Yes, the great majority of the German community—excluding the fourteen per cent. High Grade educated—can be induced to accept these two principles, temporarily.

As regards the second part the answer should be: it can be induced to continue to accept them *for as long as the German community remains ignorant*. Now, is the German community ignorant? Let us be honest.

It depends, surely, on our definition of 'ignorance.' It cannot be taken in its literal interpretation: 'lack of all knowledge.' For instance, we might legitimately call some African tribe ignorant, whereas their knowledge of woodcraft may be far more accurate and complete than ours. Obviously, therefore, whenever we use the word ignorant we have in mind some amended connotation, special to the subject in mind. In our particular subject we might as well admit we have a well-understood amended connotation—for instance, we do not call a community ignorant simply because they do not all speak five languages. In fact, when we call an African tribe ignorant we generally mean, and we know we mean, that compared with ourselves they are ignorant in science. It is in that realm predominantly that cultivated communities have risen from primitive man. That is to say that, compared with ourselves, the African tribe has a less accurate explanation of the facts and laws of natural phenomena. The African tribe will of course have some explanation of the various natural phenomena, their own explanation, a superstitious explanation. This they will and do believe. This is their knowledge as regards these facts, but it is false knowledge. Scientific or true knowledge as we know can only be gained by a written summation of evidence, comparison, and then deduction. This process primitive people are not in a position to perform. Here lies the difference between superstitious 'knowledge' and true or scientific knowledge. *Thus ignorance can mean not only lack of knowledge but equally well false knowledge.*

Thus a community may have true or scientific knowledge in many respects (*e.g.* mathematics), but if in certain other important respects it in general believes false facts, then as regards those facts and in those respects that community is in general ignorant. That statement cannot be disputed.

Now we get back to Germany. Is the German community ignor-

ant?—for according to our analysis it is only if the German community accepts the demonstrably false historical and biological principles of Herrenvolk and Fuehrer Prinzip that Nazism can function.

First, was the German community ignorant in 1933, before Hitler came to power? The answer is, No. At that time free Germany (unrestricted by censorship) was in science and philosophy, etc., along with ourselves and America, in the forefront of civilisation. If we were not ignorant communities, neither was Germany.

Now, we have agreed that an intelligent community under certain conditions may be induced to accept false principles *temporarily*, but to continue to accept them for many years the community requires to be ignorant. Therefore the question we must now ask is: *is it possible to make an intelligent community, not only accept temporarily, but really believe false principles—that is, actually to make it ignorant?*

Look at the Nazi educational system, remember that propaganda of every sort (that is, all transmitted 'knowledge') is in this identical key, and you will have an answer. Remember this, too: the whole idea of Nazi propaganda is to insulate the German community from all outside contact, making them like one great island tribe, and then to give this tribe only one form of instruction, the Nazi principles, ruthlessly suppressing within the tribe every other shade of opinion. By this means (*a*) the already-educated, thus unimpressionable, adults are silenced (by death or terror); (*b*) the uneducated, thus impressionable, adults are beguiled and filled; (*c*) the waiting minds of the growing children and youths have no other form of pabulum and cannot help believing wholly. Here is the answer that is given both logically and by our common sense:

1. It is not possible to make already-educated individuals really believe falsities.

2. It is possible, with these suppressed, to make the remainder of a formerly intelligent community actually believe falsities—that is actually to make them ignorant.

Mark this, too: the longer such a tautly controlled régime remains in force, the greater will be the percentage of falsely-believing, or ignorant, because the dumb already-educated will be dying out.

Yes, to that extent it is possible, even in these modern days, to make an intelligent community ignorant. It must be admitted.

Now for the important question which is the whole nub of this section: for how long is it logically possible, in these modern days, to keep such a community ignorant? The answer obviously is: as long as the Nazi régime can keep the German nation strictly insulated from

outside knowledge, and can at the same time keep suppressed the expression of contrary knowledge within itself.

How long is that ?

Already we see the end of the argument. Nazism is designed expressly for war, *i.e.* expansion. And early war, *i.e.* while a lot of the silenced already-educated are still alive. Now, a war is either won or lost. Let us look at both possibilities as regards Nazism.

If the community (Germany) we have been discussing theoretically goes to war, we may take it, knowing history and human nature, that the community will at first fight unanimously, and during the war the form of government will remain unchanged. Now consider:

1. If Germany loses the war. (This is a total war, mark you, not a colonial affray.) What happens, always ? The Government will be overthrown. The Nazi machinery of officials will be thrown out of gear—they won't be paid for a start—and suppression of both submerged and outside knowledge and ideas will automatically cease. Other ideas will flow in, true knowledge, facts, which will establish the falsity of the Nazi principles; it will shatter them, and—you can argue about it as much as you like—that will then and there be the end of Nazism as a form of government. For a time, you say, not necessarily for ever. Very well, I will concede that if you like, but then and there, for that time, it will be the end of Nazism as a form of government.

To repeat : if Germany loses the war it will cease to accept the Nazi principles.

2. If Germany wins the war. Wins finally, that is to say. Attains all her objectives as laid down in *Mein Kampf.* Germany will then be at peace. You can't have it both ways; if she has won the war to her satisfaction, she must be at peace. Very well,Germany is then at peace. *But Nazism is not designed for peace.* The whole note of the doctrine is a fanatical (Hitler) screwing-up for aggressive war. Will this fanaticism keep up for years and years in peace, when there is no further *object* in it ? Obviously it will not. Quite apart from this specific Nazi fanaticism, we know human nature well enough for that. A high pitch of enthusiasm, fanaticism, is one of its most transitory traits. Fanaticism of any sort must always have an object, and when the object is attained, enthusiasm is expelled like a breath. Consider, for instance, a Germany having won the war, and then use your logical common sense. She is lord of the earth, or as much of it as she wants, and has the rest of the 'inferior races' in cowed subjection. There is nothing left to fight for, therefore militarism ceases. They now begin to enjoy—note the word, which Hitler

has so often promised—their racial deserts: the fruits of their labours and sacrifices. (This is the keynote of *Mein Kampf*, unmistakable.) They begin to enjoy easefulness, and spaciousness, and comfort, with slave labour to do the hewing. Does this picture fit in with political fanaticism? The question does not require answering. Such a fortunate community—or 'class,' for Germans would then be a favoured class in a subject world or continent—would do as similarly fortunately placed communities or classes have always done in history: they will go in for physical and mental recreations. The arts, the philosophies. *And that is what Hitler has promised them:* first the sacrifice, afterwards freedom of enjoyment. But freedom of mental enjoyment must mean freedom of theorising and freedom of discussion (which is, incidentally, the antithesis of Nazism), when true knowledge must, always does, will, emerge! This true knowledge—say in a generation or so after complete victory—will not be suppressed, because then there will be no point in suppressing it amongst the world's ruling class. Mental freedom for the class can only mean that. And true knowledge, unrestricted in the community, must automatically be the negation of the unscientific Nazi principles.

Therefore, also, if Germany wins the war, it will shortly cease to accept Nazi principles.

Freedom of historical and philosophical and scientific exploration will be death to false science and false principles. False beliefs, which constitute ignorance, cannot live in that sort of freedom. The outlook of the people will be different, and the outlook of the Government will be different, because there will no longer be any 'object' in keeping the people regimented by death and terror.

Perhaps a marked change may not have taken place within the first five years of victory, but think of twenty years, and fifty, and a hundred. Nazism will, must, mellow and relax; and a mellowed and relaxed Nazism is not Nazism.

I do not mean that the conquering race will progressively relax and lose their suzerainty in the natural course of human nature. That is not inferred at all. A nation that has well conquered, by watchful military precautions of a standing army, air force, etc., may well keep their suzerainty for hundreds of years, just as the Romans. But I do mean, that while keeping their suzerainty through the years, the political outlook of the favoured nation, if it was originally that of a fanatically distorted objective militarism, must, MUST alter from that in the natural course of human nature. A whole nation, already victorious, mark you, will not permanently live in a military camp. Indeed, the idea is patently so contrary to common

sense, so silly, that surely most of my laboured repetition has been unnecessary.

In the course of years, therefore, even in victory Nazism will cease from being the form of government.

We have shown that, according to the criterion of the ' acceptance ' of the German people either in winning or in losing, Nazism is time-limited as a form of government. Theoretically, in our judgment, it will not last.

Before we sum up the section I make a note on two interesting points.

(1) We have said that a fiery enthusiasm on any particular topic—which is what Hitler demands in Nazism—is one of the most transitory traits of human nature; therefore we concluded, from this general psychological point of view, that strict Nazism could not last. Yet elsewhere we said that Hitler, the author of Nazism, was a great, almost an unerring psychologist. Surely our two statements would appear to contradict one another. They do not. Hitler is a very great psychologist indeed. He is a realistic psychologist. He knew human nature. He knew what he could do with the German people—and he has done it. Be shrewd, I beg you, and take no notice of vague phrases about ' a thousand years,' which no one can prove. *I state that Hitler was working on a short-time policy, for conquest—during his lifetime.* And he knew that afterwards, if successful, Nazism would inevitably have to change. He knew that in that stage of Germany's moodiness it was possible to flatter and harangue her self-respect into a boastful attitude of challenge. He knew, as we know, that by playing on the baser instincts of acquisitiveness and cruelty it was possible to form that attitude into a burning lust for conquering. He knew, as we know, that he could influence most of Germany with his psychologically calculated creed, Nazism; and most was enough, because he knew, as we know, that a majority enthusiasm temporarily affects all. He saw the chance, by acting the prophet, of ruling Germany. He saw that a man with sixty million fanatics at his back *for a few years* might rule the world. He made them fanatics.

It was all so easy, he has indicated in his book, because people are such silly sheep. Such fools !

Here is an extract from *Mein Kampf* (p. 45). He is describing the technique of the Social Democrats, which he decided to copy and improve upon.

" They would select the adversary whom they thought most formidable, and on a given signal would bombard him with a regular drumfire of lies and calumnies. They kept it up, till the nerves of the

other side broke down, and to regain some peace they sacrificed the victim of the odium.

"Only they never got their peace, the fools!

"Repeat the same performance over and over again; and dread of the mad dogs exercises through suggestion the effect of paralysis."

They never got their peace, the fools! . . . Who are these fools spoken of so contemptuously? Some aliens? Some 'inferior' race? No; he is talking of the ordinary citizens of Germany, whom he was then determining to convert by his mad dogs, and whom he has now converted.

And still he feeds them and keeps them loyal—here he admits it—on this same diet of calumnies and lies, the fools!

He knew therefore that it was possible to bring Nazism into being as a governing doctrine of an enthusiastic Germany, and he did bring it into being—but how long did he himself reckon that enthusiasm was going to last? Long enough only, I maintain, to make a bold bid for conquering the world.

If anyone says here: 'Does that analysis of Hitler's project—first Nazism, then relax when in supremacy—does that analysis damn the policy from our scientific objective point of view?', I say, yes, because our objective is a long-term form of government, meeting *all* conditions while *not changing*, not a short-term one which will only have to change. If we had been looking for a form of government best adapted for war and conquest we would have stated that that was our aim—but it isn't. If someone even now irritatingly flings in, 'But Nazism is a good form for war, isn't it?', I shout: "WE KNOW THAT, DAMN YOU; WE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN THAT ABOUT AUTOCRACY; but we are looking for something serviceable in PEACE AS WELL AS WAR, and we consider that peace is just as important because, on the whole, periods of it in history are larger than periods of total war.

(2) A final word on enthusiasm. What do we know of human enthusiasm? Not approval, but an active enthusiasm which accomplishes things. What do we, unbiasedly, from our scientific observation of human nature, know of it? This: such enthusiasm is transitory. Like a fire, unless it is fed or fanned it quickly dies away and passes into tolerance or boredom. What, then, is the good of enthusiasm?, how is it kept glowing? There are two ways: one is by the periodic addition of inflammable fuel to cause the flame from time to time to leap. That is an irregular way; in the meantime the flames might sink right down to blackness. There is another way, more reliable because not spasmodic; it is the constant fanning breeze of

opposition. Just think for a moment: those metaphors speak psychological truth.

It is obvious that Nazism cannot employ the second way; they cannot have an approved official opposition within the Nazi State. Therefore Nazism, to live, must rely on the first, more unreliable, way. Spasmodic fuel. Excitements. These objective excitements, such as victorious advances, bold strokes, pogroms against Jews, etc., all of which are signposts along the road to the goal, must always be manufactured; but when the goal is reached, a pure Master-nation ruling the earth, the very point of objective spurrings will automatically have gone. That is where objective militaristic enthusiasm must wither, and without objective militaristic enthusiasm there is not Nazism. There would still be a government of that State, and going by the same name Nazism you can bet your life—just as the name Communism was naturally retained in un-communistic Russia—but it would no longer be Nazism. Its spirit would have changed. It would then be a spirit of conserving the *status quo*—the spirit of Imperial Rome, complacent and increasingly liberal—and not the fundamental spirit of objective struggle stipulated in *Mein Kampf*.

We are now at the point, arrived at by logical processes of knowledge and common sense, where we can sum up our conclusions on the *Test of Practicability* of Nazism.

How do we judge?

Recall, please, that we have to judge as to (1) its workability in peace and war; (2) its stability in peace and war; (3) its durability.

Remember that we are still treating the subject theoretically as applied to a large community of human beings such as ourselves—as Germany, in the main, was before the advent of Hitlerism. We have examined the special psychological characteristics of the Germany of the time and we have agreed that the doctrine had the appropriate emotional appeal and plausibility so that it could, in our judgment, come into being. Now we judge its logical practicability as applied to such a community. We know that, in general, government of a community in time of peace presents different considerations from government of a community in time of war, so in our assessment we judge of the system's Practicability—*i.e.* workability, stability, and durability—under both conditions.

1. WORKABILITY?

(*a*) IN PEACE? We have agreed that the political system of Nazism, or Hitlerism, is *designed for war*. Now, in peace as in war we demand

that a Government will ensure us security—that is, protection from outside assault and internal lawlessness—and self-respect. When the nation is at war that self-respect can only be ensured to the generality of the community by military action implemented by appropriate measures of national discipline. In other words, when at war a nation, if it wishes to retain its identity, expects and asks for—or, at least, we intelligent people do—some degree of autocracy. But when at peace, perhaps at peace for many years, the self-respect of the individuals of a community has a different connotation. It means to each individual the absence of discontentment—physical or mental or spiritual. Thus a community expects that in peace the Government will give attention to ameliorating grievances of various sections of it—*and*, of course, *hearing them*. It will, in short, encourage contentment, and permit discussion and the pursuits of peace. This is a definition of freedom. Thus, axiomatically, in war the accent is on obedience; in peace on freedom. That is, and can be, the only meaning of a benevolent autocracy: an autocratic form of government which hears, and strives to ameliorate, grievances; one which encourages the concept of individual contentment and freedom.

Now, in Nazism the accent is first and last on obedience. Freedom in the only terms in which we can define it—discussion, meeting, speech, thought—is not only not encouraged, it is categorically forbidden.

Therefore we cannot say that Nazism, as a form of government, is ever suitable for peace.

As to whether it, as outlined (an objective militaristic autocracy), is workable in peace—that depends on our definition of peace. For instance, a gunman with his gang can quite effectively rule a community which is officially at peace, *i.e.* when the community is not officially at war (*e.g.* incidents in Chinese districts, American cities, even Roman provinces), but can that state of local terrorism be considered peace? I consider that state is more truthfully a local state of war. Similarly, if a régime puts a larger community, as an entire nation, in this condition of rigid militaristic autocracy with the object of shortly waging war, I conceive that this nation is thereby not truthfully in a condition of peace. For instance, a nation may declare war, and therefore be in a state of war, for quite a time (England in 1939 and 1940) before clashing with the enemy. *The state of preparing for war is a state of war*. The Nazi system is, in plain statement, a condition of full-scale preparation for war—not only economic and military but educational—therefore to ask is it workable in peace is pointless. It can take a nation at peace and impose itself, we concede that; but thereafter,

if the system continues to function for another month or another day, in fact as soon as the system is actually established in full career, then from that moment the community ceases to be at peace; it is thence, for all real purposes of definition, in a state of war.

(*b*) IN WAR? Nazism is designed for war. We judge for that purpose it is well designed, and workable.

2. STABILITY?

(*a*) IN PEACE? As we have seen, Nazism equals preparation for war—whether the armies of the community are actually engaged in battle or not. Therefore to discuss the stability, which involves the passage of time, of Nazism in peace is strictly inadmissible.

In short, it does not pass the test of Practicability—as regards workability and, particularly, stability—in peace, because it does not allow peace.

Peace, for Nazism, is, strictly, prelude to war—and necessarily a brief prelude.

If we ask can, in our judgment, Nazism give stable government during this brief prelude, we answer yes, providing it is understood this prelude is not what is ordinarily understood as peace.

(*b*) IN WAR? Yes, we judge that Nazism can give stability of government during the progress of war—until the war is lost or won.

3. DURABILITY?

We judge that Nazism does not possess the quality of durability. It is a hot-house plant of war enthusiasm. We judge that it would not survive either in defeat or in the time of peace, which is the only possible sequel to complete victory.

THE TEST OF ACTUAL PRACTICE

Surely, some people might say, all this is quibbling. Here has Nazism been reigning in Germany for ten years with no rebellion; now in the tenth year she is master of most of Europe and the most-feared nation on earth; isn't that sufficient? Not by any means, we say. The Napoleonic régime did precisely the same, yet soon it came to its end. And again, England lived for eleven years under the militaristic autocracy of Cromwell. It was an efficient régime, and this particular example was as a matter of fact not terminated by war. At the end of eleven years England was feared on the Continent and in the world as she had never been feared before; she had increased her overseas possessions and she had the finest army

and navy in Europe; and she would have continued under that régime longer if Cromwell had continued living. But to the generality of the people in England that régime could never have been called a success. They obliterated it as soon as Cromwell died and they have never wanted it back. As soon as one of the component factors went—the autocrat in this case—it broke up. It did not fit in with human nature and so it did not last.

The ability of a régime to inspire uncertainty for a moment of history does not mean success. At least it is not our definition of a successful régime. In this investigation we are searching for a formula by which a broad community such as ourselves can live in self-respect and security. And not just for a moment but throughout our lives and throughout the lives of our children, and theirs after them. That is to say, a stable and durable practical proposition. A constitution, in fact, that is so in tune with facts of experience and common sense that we can 'put our money on it,' as they say, in the confidence that it will function through peace as well as war, and that it will last for the future.

The Communists gave their interpretation of such a constitution, but it proved impracticable: they never lived under it.

Hitler has now given his interpretation: hysterically-obedient militaristic autocracy, motivated by an induced fanaticism of race-supremacy. We are now questioning: What of it? Has actual practice of the Nazi constitution proved (1) its workability in peace and war? (2) its stability in peace and war? (3) its durability?

The brief history of Nazi Germany is known to all. There is no point in wasting time. The answer can be brief.

1. Has Nazism actually proved *workable*?

(*a*) *In Peace?*

What are the facts?

Not a year afterwards, or shortly afterwards, but as soon as Hitlerism got into the government saddle in Germany, using the Reichstag Fire as an excuse, it established a state of emergency, with military government. You can ask yourself if that state has ever been relaxed. *It has not!* Immediately, too, from the very jump, every realistic form of definite preparation for war was put into effect: military training, munition making, propaganda and education to cause war enthusiasm —all of them.

Was that peace? Was it? From 1934 to 1939?

It did not even pretend to be peace. Even actual acts of war were not lacking: the military occupation of the Rhineland (Saar) in 1936, of Austria in 1937, of Czechoslovakia in 1938. The fact that the

powers aggressed did not fight did not make the acts any less actual acts of war: Germany had her armed forces there and made the armed threat and marched in. If that is not war in your view, you might just as well throw this book away; we don't talk the same language.

From the time of Hitler's accession to power Germany has been in a state of war. Against whom does not matter—officially the victims were not named in advance (though the series is written down in black and white in the primer, *Mein Kampf*)—for the community of Germany it was a state of war.

In our theorising we deduced that Hitlerism meant categorical preparation for imminent war : the facts of actual practice of Hitlerism prove it.

Therefore has Hitlerism proved workable in peace?

No ! Because Hitlerism killed peace. It immediately converted peace into a dynamic prelude for war.

According to the evidence of actual practice that we have, a community cannot have Hitlerism and a continuation of peace.

N.B.—Do not forget this fact: in former days the preparation for war merely meant assembling an army and issuing them with simple weapons. The time occupied was merely the time of the recruitment campaign (propaganda). Nowadays, when war is mechanised, preparation for war means building highly complicated mechanical weapons and ensuring their continued supply (involving factory erection and conversion, importing of special commodities, etc.), as well as training the army in their mechanical use. This procedure takes much more time. It takes at least three but more like four years for full preparation.

Germany's first patently warlike act was the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. This was of a tentative nature, but it was military. It proves some preparation. In 1937, against Austria, it was not tentative but in full might, which proves a full three-years' objective national preparation for war—that is, since Hitler's accession.

(*b*) Has Hitlerism proved *workable in war?*

It has, eminently; but, after all, in our analysis we saw that it was expressly designed for war. We state that it has worked well both in the prelude period of war and in the fighting period.

By adding the word eminently we do not mean that a nation under it will win any war it enters into: that will plainly depend on many factors—the size of the nation in question, and the force (arms and men) it can put in the field; and, obviously, the size and strength of the nation or nations it opposes, and its ability to bring its forces to bear on them.

2. *Stability*—in peace and war.

(*a*) Has the Nazi régime proved stable in peace?

According to our interpretation Nazism, in respect of the explicit German experiment under examination, has not yet functioned in conditions of peace (nor can it, and remain Nazism). Therefore this question cannot logically be answered; there is no evidence.

(*b*) In what degree has the Nazi régime proved stable in war?

Here we have evidence. The outstanding fact is that for ten years of warlike conditions in Germany—the first two or three in declared, fervid preparation, the remainder signalised by successive military coups ending in outright prolonged battle—it has not toppled nor up to the time of writing been in obvious jeopardy of toppling.

It is the second, the presence or absence of 'obvious jeopardy of toppling,' that is the criterion of stability. For consider these: to be overcome by a larger external enemy power proves nothing about the stability of a régime. To be overthrown by an internal coup or revolution proves not merely instability but is the final proof of ineffectiveness of a régime. A régime whose existence is frequently endangered by revolutions, even though it survives—like those we recall in Mexico, etc.—is provenly unstable.

This bears out what we surmised in our theoretical assessment. There we deduced that Nazism would last as a fiery enthusiasm during preparation for war—if that were not too long delayed; and secondly, that it would last during war itself—provided it was not too long drawn out. The full war was not long delayed, only six years; but during this phase Hitler, knowing the danger, and shrewd psychologist that he is, did not allow their enthusiasm to wane—he fed it periodically and infected it with new life. Human enthusiasm always demands a 'sign,' and Hitler supplied them with periodical signs, first in the Saar, then in Austria, then in Czechoslovakia. Next, the enthusiasm has so far lasted during this war—for war has its own hysteria—and Nazism is still so far integrated; but as yet the war has not gone on very long. During the war, too, he has given the public 'signs'—Poland, Norway, Holland, France, Greece—but when the conquests cease, as they are now beginning to slow up, we shall see how long Nazism will continue to live.

Nazism, therefore, in actual practice during warlike conditions has been provenly stable. But there are degrees of stability. Surely this, if discoverable, is the yardstick of true stability: the percentage of the population that actively favour the régime. However, it is a figure that is difficult to obtain, for even ballots under certain conditions are not reliable. But there is a figure that is in concrete

existence, and does, conversely, give precisely the same indication: that is, the number of citizens that a régime considers it dangerous to their, the régime's, existence to leave at large—in other words, the number of people it considers it necessary to execute or restrain in prison or concentration camps. Political prisoners from amongst the community. Here is potential gunpowder. An effectively governing régime that finds it necessary to make no political arrests each year, or only a handful, is more truly stable than one which makes many. It is not known precisely how many political unsympathisers have been executed, imprisoned, or otherwise silenced in Germany during the Nazi régime, but the number is known to be considerable. (See many publications, including Hitler's, Goebbels's, and Goering's speeches. See the very existence of the Gestapo—the secret police.)

Hence Hitlerism has, in actual practice, proved ostensibly stable during six years of war-preparation and three years of actual war; but its true stability is an uncertain quantity. It is dubious. It has not been observed for a very long time, and it may turn out to have been balanced on a knife-edge.

The Test of Time?

Ten brief years is an inconsiderable space in history. It is time for a war, time for a new fashion to be born and begin to die, time for a young man to learn a profession, but it is not time for a new political system to prove its enduring effectiveness before the bar of history. In the story of mankind there are hundreds of political experiments lasting a handful of years that have then blown out like a candle.

Has Hitlerism in actual practice proved durable during generations, through varying lengthy phases of peace, and some of war—which is the normal lot? Has it proved itself adaptable to changing conditions through the years? The plain answer is, No. This is not a condemnation; it is a simple statement of fact.

Concluding Discussion

We find that Nazism is an efficient form of government in conditions of war.

On all the facts at our disposal that is the sole conclusion we can draw about this system. During war, for a space of ten years anyhow, it is adequately workable and adequately stable.

As regards the application of Nazism to conditions of peace we, as fact, have no evidence. We only have our opinion, based, logically we think, on our analysis of the system and our knowledge of human

nature and history. In short, not only our logical deduction but common sense tells us that it could not be workable in peace, let alone stable.

As regards durability, again we have no evidence. Our definition of durability—and, after all, it is our thesis—is that a political system shall, unchanged, continue to govern a nation through varying economic and other conditions, through times of peace and times of war, for an appreciable time in history involving successive generations.

Our assumption, based on the facts of history, and assuredly our expectation for the future, is that in the life of a nation times of peace are in general not less considerable than times of war. Our opinion—logical deduction and common sense—is that this system has definitely not the stuff of durability according to our definition.

As intelligent people we can only calmly conclude this is not the political formula we are searching for.

Here is our tabloid summing-up.

The doctrine of Nazism is the doctrine of aggression. Whilst aggression has continued, Nazism has continued; when aggression ceases, Nazism will cease. Plainly aggression will cease either by being defeated or by having no further object left to subdue. *That is to say, either in defeat or in complete success Nazism will fail and cease to exist.* The German people are now in the midst of war. So long as they can be kept in the pipe-dream of 'German supremacy' by successive injections of German victories, so long will Nazism seem to them practical politics; but the moment this heroic illusion is proved to be the bunk it is, either by the passage of time or, quicker, by a humiliating defeat, then they will wake up and Nazism will vanish.

Finally, Nazism was actually not conceived as a permanent form of government for the life of a nation in peace and war.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

FIRST read the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America.

"We, the people of the United States in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

Compare the terms of our own objective in this investigation.

We are looking for a political formula under which a broad community such as ourselves can live an orderly life, in self-respect and security, for succeeding lifetimes. We want a proposition that is practicable (*i.e.* workable), stable, and durable.

It is manifest that the aims of the framers of the Constitution and our own aims are the same.

There is nothing fantastically idealistic about these stated aims. They do not say "in order to ensure peace for a thousand years." They do not say in order to ensure peace at all, because they know that peace is not ensurable amongst humans and they propose to provide for the common defence. They do not say "in order to establish ourselves as the dominant nation on earth." There is no megalomaniacal grandiosity about the aims; domestic tranquillity is the type of thing they want. They do not say "in order to do away with all class distinction, so that there will be no more strife in the community"; they are not so stupid. In short, the group of men who drew this up seem to have been men of sense. They are aiming at a practical proposition without, they hope, any ifs and buts; and such is their confidence in their wisdom that they set down in definite terms the formula which they say will attain it.

Before examining the terms of this formula, which is so interesting to us engaged in an exactly similar search, let us review for a moment the circumstances under which they came to this historical consideration.

(Unless otherwise specified, all the quotations in this section are from *A New American History* (1938), by the well-known American historian, Professor W. E. Woodward [signified by W.]. All other quotations, except those of C. F. Strong, are also from American authors.)

BRIEF STORY OF AMERICA UP TO THE CONSTITUTION

In the first paragraph of his preface Woodward says: " American civilisation is basically English, with its roots running far back through the centuries into England's past."

On page 15: " Their going forth to the far corners of the world "—the English of the seventeenth century—" stands in history as the most important social movement of mankind since the formation of the Roman Empire. It is of paramount importance in that it has contributed so much to the shaping of modern civilisation. English speech and English law were carried to distant lands, and with them went English habits and customs."

There is no need to cover in detail the founding of the various colonies on the uninhabited—except for sparse Indians—eastern seaboard of the vast North American continent. Suffice it that by the middle of the eighteenth century there were thirteen colonies. Most of them were originally organised in England as trading ventures. England laid claims to the whole north continent by virtue of discovery (Cabot, 1497), consequently when the London Company set sail in 1606 to found a colony in the New World it was with the King's permission, and this company got an enormous grant of land, all Virginia and more. The rule of government of this colony was the royal charter given to its governor. In 1620 another colony of religious malcontents, Puritans, sailed in the *Mayflower*. These were financed by seventy London merchants to the tune of seven thousand pounds, and they settled in Chesapeake Bay—again, of course, with royal authority. The great Puritan emigration to New England began in 1630, having received from Charles I a grant of land that is most of the present State of Massachusetts. This Massachusetts Bay Company had their charter from Charles I, and quite a liberal one it was. It was the subject of court proceedings in England in the time of Charles II, who actively opposed all charters of a liberal character and whose policy was to turn all the American settlements into Crown colonies. In 1643 a colonist called the Rev. Williams, who had quarrelled with the Plymouth Separatists (*Mayflower*), went to England and got a charter from the King which embodied democracy and religious freedom as its basic principles. This was the Rhode Island colony. In 1636 another minister, the Rev. Hooker, left the Massachusetts colony and founded Connecticut. In 1639 the freeholders of this colony formulated a document which they called Fundamental Orders. It is the first constitution conceived in America. Its government was modelled on Massachusetts, with, later, a property qualifica-

tion for suffrage. In 1662 a charter was procured for this colony from Charles II which recognised Fundamental Orders. Like that of Rhode Island, this charter allowed the colony *complete self-government*. The Long Island and New York area was originally a Dutch colony, but the English immigrants swamped all others and in 1664 the fighting fleet of the Duke of York sailed in and took over as an English colony with the appointment of a governor. Maryland was different again. It was a gift from the King to a friend and Catholic, George Calvert, who became Lord Baltimore. The charter made him lord-proprietor; in short, Maryland was an autocracy and an hereditary one. In 1688, when James II was dethroned, the Baltimores lost Maryland ; it was simply taken away and made a Crown colony. New Jersey was another proprietary government—this time a gift of the King to his brother the Duke of York, who transferred it to Berkeley and Carteret. Some years later these families sold to the Quakers. It became a Crown colony in 1702. In 1682 William Penn, with his Quakers, received a charter from the King and founded Pennsylvania, a proprietary colony. A Barbados planter called Colleton formed a group of eight lords-proprietors, and secured a grant of Carolina from the King (1670). In 1729 North Carolina separated and became a Crown colony.

In all, as we say, by the middle of the eighteenth century there were in America thirteen colonies. They were English colonies.

They were thus divided according to complexion of government.

Royal Provinces.—Eight: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia.

Proprietaries.—Three: Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware.

Self-governing Colonies.—Two: Connecticut and Rhode Island.

N.B.—Don't forget the *self-governing* colonies.

"The differences between these three forms of government were not mere matters of detail, but ran clear back to the primary sources of political and social authority. In the eighteenth century there was almost as much difference between the colonial government of Connecticut and that of Maryland as there is today between the government of the United States and that of Italy." (Woodward.)

In general terms the government of the royal provinces consisted of a governor and a legislative assembly. At the head of the colony was a governor, appointed by the Crown and sent out from England. The legislative assembly was elected by the small restricted list of people who had a right to vote. Religious and other restrictions limited suffrage, besides the property qualification (those ' who had a

stake in the country'). Only in exceptional cases was the right to vote extended to all free men in the colonies in the seventeenth century.

Besides the governor and the Assembly there was a council, which in most cases was appointed by the governor. In function it was analogous to the Privy Council in England. In Massachusetts the council was elected by the members of the Assembly. The veto power of a royal governor was unlimited; it was effective against the unanimous vote of the Assembly, though an appeal might be made to the British Government.

It is easy to see how this would fail to work satisfactorily. The executive was not elected, and was therefore without responsibility to the people. The assemblies, however, controlled appropriations and could even withhold the governor's salary (W., p. 81).

With regard to the proprietary colonies Woodward says this (p. 61) in reference to Maryland: "The government was an hereditary constitutional monarchy. The Lords Baltimore had as much power in Maryland as Charles I had in England." Again (p. 67): "Pennsylvania was an example of the proprietary government at its best. The lord-proprietor lived in the colony for years at a time. He knew the people and understood their problems."

Now the self-governing colonies. "In the case of Connecticut and Rhode Island the voters of these colonies elected their entire colonial administration, from the governor down. *They were really free republics within the British Empire*" (W., p. 82).

As regards citizenship in the colonies: "The political literature of the day continually harps on 'men who have no stake in the colony,' and who therefore were not entitled to have a voice in its affairs" (p. 82). This is the property qualification for suffrage. This interpretation of democracy was the same—though gradually ameliorating—in England at the time; but I ask you to note this, in America after the War of Independence it continued to hold precisely the same interpretation.

Here are important comments (p. 83): "The colonies did not face each other; they faced England, and they bought and sold in English markets. Before the end of the colonial period, trade between the Northern Colonies and the British West Indies had grown into a highly important branch of commerce. Travel was costly and difficult; most of it was done in sloops that went up and down the coast. The sectional differences in manners and mode of life, in the character and trend of mind, are striking" (p. 83).

In short, the thirteen colonies were thirteen completely separate

communities. The only characteristic they had in common was English speech and the tie with England.

Here is another important factor. In 1734 a certain colonial gazette was involved in a libel trial before the English courts. 'Not guilty' was the verdict. "The importance of this verdict is that it went far towards the establishment of a free press in the American colonies. . . . The case gave courage to the newspapers. It opened the way for tons and acres of printed criticism that preceded the Revolution. They were no longer mere piffling circulars. Men could criticise the government, the British authority, and the British Crown" (W., p. 90).

Thus during all this time, on the fringe of a rich, untapped continent, the colonies had been waxing without any external problems to speak of. "There is no doubt whatever that the Indian, as a potential or active danger to the colonies, has been so overrated that he has become a sort of historical myth" (W., p. 92).

"The colonies, or 'plantations,' had grown up like neglected children. The colonials had been doing business—buying and selling—all over the world." Mark this also: "Colonial shipping was protected by the imperial navy, though the colonies made no contribution toward the support of naval vessels or their seamen. . . . In the latter half of the seventeenth century the British Government decided to put the household in order" (W., pp. 94, 95).

This was the beginning of the '*unwelcome restrictions*.'

First the Navigation Acts. It was provided that the prices on goods, both in selling and buying, were made in England. Needless to say, agents in England took advantage of this to the disadvantage of the colonies, both exporters and importers.

The colonies were regarded as producers of raw materials and manufacturing was discouraged. Consequently "rum distilling"—conveniently obtained from the British and French West Indies—"became the leading manufacturing industry" (W., p. 97). The British imposed a high duty on the molasses imported from the French West Indies. Even though this tax was generally evaded, and rum smuggling became the order of the day, this was a wide grievance. Nobody likes taxes—particularly when taxes have never been imposed before.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the expanding and ambitious northern colonies were beginning to look at the hinterland westward, towards the Ohio valley. The French who were established in Canada were also looking in that direction and began to build a chain of forts

there. " The Governor of Virginia decided to give the French commander of these forts a notice to clear out, as he was trespassing on British ground. That was in 1753. Twenty-one-year-old George Washington was selected by the governor to carry the message. It was the first time the youthful Washington had come into the public eye " (W., p. 105).

As we know, the French declined to leave. British soldiers were sent from England under General Braddock and war opened. The war fluctuated. On September 12th, 1759, General James Wolfe defeated the French on the plains of Quebec.

This war for England meant vast expenditure.

" Even before the Seven Years War English landowners were paying taxes that ran up to 15 per cent. of their incomes not counting local assessments " (W., p. 109).

" The King's subjects at home had to be taxed heavily. That was inevitable. But how about the American colonies ? "

Note what an intelligent present-day American says:

" The right of His Majesty's Government to levy taxes undoubtedly existed. Government implies the power of taxation, in all countries and in every age " (W., p. 109).

" A considerable part of the colossal war debt had been incurred in defending the colonies " (W., p. 109).

In short, Britain decided that America should bear part of the burden and pay certain taxes.

" To make the issue clear," Woodward stresses (p. 110), " it must be here said that England had never, from the beginning, received any tax revenue from the American colonies, except the custom duties, and they were so small that they did not pay the cost of carrying on the service."

New taxes. Here was a new substantial grievance for gossip. And agitation.

" Benjamin Franklin, agent of Pennsylvania, in London, declared that the colonies had gone ' deeply into debt ' and that ' the colonies had provided 25,000 troops.'

" In spite of our great reverence for Franklin we feel impelled to declare that he did not continuously tell the truth. He was not only shrewd and able, but also tricky, and his assertions in a political controversy should be taken with a bushel of salt. . . . The colonies did not raise and send to the front anything like 25,000. . . . The colonials made money by the war instead of losing it. The British army in America had bought large quantities of supplies, and had paid cash. Many merchants accumulated wartime fortunes. The colonials

had not mortgaged their estates to carry on the war. In fact, the war debt of the colonies was not large (W., p. 110).

A minimal tax was therefore decided upon by the British ministry—a stamp tax. "The theory was that such a tax would not fall upon the poor or the landless, but only on the well-to-do; and in any case it would be so light that nobody could possibly consider it a heavy burden. The Government expected to raise about £60,000 annually in this manner; *and the entire amount was to be expended in America, as a partial support to the military establishment*."

How unworldly-wise the British Government were, we observe with a smile, to impose a tax, however light, *only on the well-to-do*. These, we know, were the only ones that were likely to squeal, because they were the only ones that could squeal, and squeal they did. "The weight of it fell chiefly on the public-houses, on liquor sellers, and on the newspapers" (W., p. 111).

The newspapers!

"The storm broke as soon as the Stamp Act became law, and in a month was a howling tornado. Nothing like it had ever been seen before in America. The brutal, muscular force displayed by the Stamp Act objectors astounded most of the men of prominence in America" (W., p. 111).

"The mobs, which were then becoming a feature of American life, took a hand under the guidance of radical leaders such as Samuel Adams of Boston" (p. 112) "Samuel Adams was a penniless radical of 'fine family'" (p. 124). "He," in the newspapers, etc., "was the most energetic of them all. The stamp distributors were hanged in effigy and their houses were torn down."

The pre-revolutionary mobs were composed almost entirely of working men, of men without land or votes. They would not have occasion to use a stamp on a document to the end of their days. Why then the rioting and the bitterness? We, in these days of propaganda, of course know the answer. "The answer is that it was inspired —at first—by merchants and lawyers. The working men were simply pulling out of the fire the chestnuts of political agitators and merchants who owed money in England.

"After a while the mobs got out of control. The discontent of the working man was very real and very bitter, though it had long been inarticulate. *This dissatisfaction had nothing to do with British rule, though the illiterate mob was made to believe that Britain was the cause.* The protest of the working classes was, in reality, an unconscious revolt against their position in the colonial world" (W., p. 113).

Is there any need to look farther for causes of the Revolution? I think not.

Or is there any need to doubt that revolution was now, in due course, a certainty? Again I think not. Remember that they were three weeks distant, by the quickest mode of travel, from any arbitrary correction, and the population of the colonies was by that time approximately two million.

(" In the middle of the eighteenth century the total population of the thirteen colonies did not exceed a million and a half. About 300,000 Negro slaves were scattered through the colonies (p. 28). . . . In 1790 the total was slightly over three millions, of whom 91 per cent. were British. The remaining 9 per cent. were composed of Dutch, French, and German " (p. 16). (C. F. Strong, *The Story of the American People*, 1942)).

Needless to say, incidents were looked for by lawyers and merchants who wished not to have to pay their debts and by radical agitators who wished high office and power without the fetters of distant restraint —and incidents were found.

We merely record these notes of the overture.

" The colony of Massachusetts (Boston) asked all colonies to send representatives to a meeting in New York to devise a measure to resist the Stamp Act. . . . The famous Stamp Act Congress, 1765. . . . The congress "—naturally of propertied men—" passed a resolution which denied the right of Parliament to tax the colonies without their consent " (p. 114).

" His Majesty's Government, weary of controversy and alarmed at the violence, decided to repeal the Stamp Act in its entirety. The Act had lasted less than a year " (p. 114).

Was that the end of the matter? Not in that atmosphere of recent violence. And again, needless to say—we know our propaganda—by this time even detached men of property were affected by the violence of the public mind.

" The spokesmen of the revolutionary dissenters explained—after the rioting and yelling had died down—that their only objection to the Stamp Tax was because it was an internal tax. That is all; no other objection whatever. Great Britain, they said, had the right to devise tariffs and collect duties at any port " (p. 117).

" My own conviction," says Woodward, " is that this unsound argument was wholly insincere, and contrived to lead the British into a trap " (W., p. 118).

" Charles Townsend, the Prime Minister at the time, took the Americans at their word, and announced that all taxes in the future

would be external. . . . His bill was passed in 1767. Customs duties were laid on paper, paint, glass, and tea.

" The colonials forgot immediately all that had been said about the difference between external and internal taxes. Parliament was flooded with American protests " (p. 118).

Then a dramatic incident occurred in Boston. A British sentry before the customs-house was attacked by a mob. In the mêlée four Bostonians were killed. This was the celebrated Boston Massacre.

" Samuel Adams was the busiest man in Boston. He was busy from dawn to dark writing letters to far-away settlements, describing the horror of it all; and from dark to midnight he was in secret meetings, organising, pledging, and arranging. The inhabitants of the more distant colonies, reading the various exaggerated accounts of the massacre, believed that the British troops had gone through the streets, slaughtering hundreds of good Americans. The Revolution was at last down to the level of the common people. Men to whom the Townsend Acts were Greek certainly could understand plain vile murder " (W., p. 119).

On the very day of the Boston Massacre, as it happened, the British Government, under Lord North as Prime Minister, put through a repeal of the Townsend Acts. " At one sweep the duty on everything except tea and molasses was repealed. Lord North explained that *the King did not want the tea duty abolished* as he would like to keep some trifling import in existence to maintain the right " (p. 119).

" The revolutionary patriots suddenly found themselves without a cause " (p. 120).

But were they nonplussed ? Not at all.

" The leaders of the American insurgent movement declared that the British Government had repealed the Townsend Acts only because manufacturing of the dutiable articles had begun in America, and that the Government's intention was to kill American industry by removing the duty so that British manufacturers could undersell American producers. This argument led them into a strange position. They had opposed the duty, but since it was removed they appeared to want it back again " (p. 120.)

In short, nothing would satisfy them. They had seen that violent disorders would get them anything, and they wanted independence.

" Disorder increased—not here and there, but everywhere—and as time went on it deepened into anarchy " (W., p. 120).

In 1773 the East India Company "resolved to furnish tea to the American public at a price so low that the smuggling importers could not match it. . . . The smuggling element in America was strong and

highly respectable. Imagine the seething indignation. . . . Something had to be done. Honest Samuel Adams, who almost automatically opposed anything the British did, had to think hard. Tea would be cheaper under the Company's plan—and the problem was to convince the common herd that a reduction in the cost of living was a hardship. A necessity of the situation was to keep the tea from being landed at all. If it ever got to the people, the game would be lost. When the first consignment of tea arrived at Boston, 'unknown parties,' dressed as Indians, went on board the ships and threw their cargoes into the harbour " (W., p. 123).

This was the celebrated Boston Tea Party.

" Benjamin Franklin, who was certainly a true American, described it as an act of violent injustice, and he said he hoped its perpetrators would be punished. John Adams wrote a tirade against mobs. . . . Some of the patriots advised payment for the tea destroyed, but New York, Philadelphia, and Boston held public celebrations " (p. 123).

" Just then the British Government, with its usual thickheadedness, came unwittingly to the aid of the rioters." It closed the port of Boston and " announced that it should remain closed until the loss on the tea was made good. The political effect was to turn the whole of Boston into a revolutionary camp." . . . Then the British Government went a step farther. " It took away the Massachusetts charter and established a provincial government of its own, which made the governor—appointed by the King—virtually the ruler of the province. That was the ultimate limit of stupidity " (p. 124).

It resulted in the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1774 " to consult on the present state of the colonies and to deliberate upon the wise and proper measures for the recovery and establishment of their just rights and liberties and the restoration of union and harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies, most ardently desired by all men! "

Note that there was no general determination, or even desire, yet for independence from Great Britain, as is attested in the writings of Franklin, Hamilton, and Washington; for note this (W., p. 125): " Joseph Galloway, a Pennsylvania delegate, brought out a plan for harmonious union of Great Britain and her colonies. His proposal ought to have a place among the documents of history. Its essential feature was an administrative separation of America and England; both, however, to be under the British Crown. America was to remain in the Empire, though as a separate political entity. What he advocated was a political and imperial relation such as exists today between

Canada and Great Britain. Galloway's plan was defeated only by a majority of one in a vote of eleven colonies."

However, the Radicals were not having that solution, and it might be said, to use Bismarck's phrase, that independence was in the 'logic of history.'

The logic of history was to be war. The Convention separated, to meet again the following May, having determined to advise a general colonial boycott against Great Britain—only advise, since the body was without official authority.

Obviously in face of this a climb-down by George III and his ministers was unthinkable, and before the Congress could meet again the first blood of the war had been spilt at Lexington, near Boston. In May the Second Continental Congress met, and following the second incident, the battle of Bunker Hill, near Boston. Although, in the words of a mid-nineteenth century American historian, "it represented nothing more than the unformed opinion of an unformed people," it assumed the powers of government. It appointed George Washington military commander, issued paper money—the existing financial chaos due to the troubles was one of the immediate causes of the Revolution—sent agents to foreign courts, and advised the colonies to set up governments of their own.

This they did, as we shall mention again later. *Each colony elaborated for itself a new constitution*, which, since there was no restraint of precedent upon their deliberations, we may reckon that each State considered the 'ideal' constitution. Connecticut and Rhode Island did not make new constitutions since they were already free republics, except for the King's title in their documents—this they now left out—and evidently considered their constitutions did not require improvement. Here is an interesting feature, though, to remember: "*Under the new State Constitutions the right of suffrage was restricted to people of property.* (Except in three of them.) . . . The new Massachusetts Constitution included a property qualification for suffrage that was twice as high as that which prevailed under British rule. The practical effect of these restrictions was to deprive the greater part of the inhabitants of any share in the government" (W., p. 190). In short, in spite of the cry democracy we may see that in practice it was not yet very literally interpreted by the propertied men who made these constitutions. They were irked not by the 'system' of the British Government but by the inconveniences its imperspicacities caused them. And these imperspicacities they naturally attributed to its pompous figurehead, the reigning King. "Nor must we overstate," says Strong, "the personal influence of George III, *as the Americans*

of that day certainly did. Most of his Ministers were good average politicians, whose last desire was to establish tyranny" (p. 47).

It is noteworthy, however, that another American, Louis Kronenberger, in *Kings and Desperate Men* (1942), considers the King's influence paramount. He talks of "a monument of blunders and presumptions, wherein a stupid Government outrageously supported an arbitrary King" (p. 132). "In many respects North was a scapegoat, though one of the most spineless on record. . . . With the most damnable good-nature he allowed himself, for upwards of ten years, to be the mouthpiece of the King" (p. 133). "*The best minds felt (and said) that the colonists, in their rebellion, were actually defending the principles of the British Constitution.* . . . Great Britain had lost America, . . . but the outcome of the war may have saved her from something worse: from the peril of complete engrossment by the Crown." As a result, "in 1780, Dunning's famous motion: 'That the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished,' was carried" (p. 135), . . . "and in consequence no King was henceforth to rule England again" (p. 138).

However, the war commenced.

In June 1776 a delegate put to Congress a proposal for independence. A committee considered it, consisting of Franklin, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and two others. Jefferson, they say, sat down 'without book or paper' and wrote the Declaration of Independence. Here is the *Declaration of Independence:*

"When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal status to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organising its powers in such form, *as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.* Prudence, indeed, will dictate that govern-

ments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes."

There now follows a long list of ' Specific Charges against the King ' of Great Britain.

And finally the ' Conclusion and Declaration.'

" We therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and Independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that as free and independent States they have full force to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do. And for support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour."

Here is a comment by an intelligent American of this day, Dr. W. E. Woodward. " There is no doubt that the delegates were caught by the magic of his words. The declaration contained statements that none of them really believed. In its second paragraph Jefferson says: ' We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' Of course, Negro slaves were not included in this generalisation; they were property, and as such they had no ' inalienable rights.' Even with the slaves left out, the assertion does not fit in with ordinary common sense. Jefferson knew, and the Continental Congress knew, and everybody knew, that men are not created equal. There are great differences in men by nature—in intelligence, energy, and other qualities. As to inalienable rights, man has none.

" The Declaration of Independence is on the whole a reverberation of the ideas of John Locke reworded in Jefferson's luminous style. It is a philosophic document, for its author was a philosopher rather than a statesman. He had a passion for logical forms, and for arrangement of ideas in sequence. And it was excellent revolutionary propaganda. The signers of the declaration may not have believed in the equality of man, but the common people did."

And again—from C. F. Strong: " Some of these postulates, far from being self-evident, are not even truths, and it is now generally

admitted by American historians that the philosophy of the Declaration is dubious, and most of its grievances hardly fundamental. The fact is that the Declaration of Independence was essentially a political manifesto, a piece of propaganda " (p. 56).

The war dragged on for eight years. In February 1778 France, naturally not missing the opportunity against her inveterate enemy, entered into an alliance with the colonies against England—and she was not the only one. Woodward says (p. 155): " There can be no doubt whatever that the British were winning the war before the French came in on the American side. . . . (p. 176). The financial and military strain of fighting France, Spain, Holland, and the American colonies all at the same time was more than the English nation could bear." France, mark you, the ally of the colonies, was an entirely despotic form of government. The peace treaty was signed September 3rd, 1783.

But though independent the colonies were not yet united. They had become ' thirteen small countries in a row all facing the Atlantic.' " All of them wanted mutual protection, but not one of them was willing to give up anything. States' rights was a kind of political religion " (W., p. 183). Without unity, economic and social conditions got worse instead of better. " We may," cried Hamilton in 1787, " be said to have reached the last stage of national humiliation. . . . The delinquencies of the States have at length arrested all the wheels of national government. . . . The frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads."

In these circumstances a Convention assembled in Philadelphia in 1787. The Convention was broadly divided into two opposing camps: the Federalists, under Hamilton—these desired a strong federal or central authority; and the Republicans, as they were called later, under Jefferson—these feared the loss of State powers and wished to keep the powers of the federal authority to a minimum. Accordingly the resulting Constitution had to be a compromise.

Regarding the assembly of the Convention and its delegates, here is the American Woodward: " The impulse behind it was aristocratic and middle-class. The common people had little or nothing to say about it. The delegates were chosen by the governors or legislatures. . . . The fifty-five delegates all came from the higher social and financial circles. They were men of substance—merchants, planters, shipowners, lawyers, capitalists. The wealthy Robert Morris was there, and his namesake Gouverneur Morris, whose constant distrust of the ' mobility,' as the common people were called, was one of his outstanding traits. From South Carolina came John Rutledge, the

two Pinckneys and Pierce Butler—aristocrats and great landowners. Butler was a descendant of the Duke of Ormond and ' very vain of his noble birth.' . . . The motivating spirit of the Convention—not expressed but clearly understood—was to make the nation safe *from* democracy. The intention is unmistakable, as one may deduce from Madison's own notes, and also from the antecedents of most of the delegates. ' The people,' said Robert Sherwood, ' should have as little to do as may be with the government.' That assertion represents fairly the tone of the Convention. But the finished work did not measure up fully to the aspiration behind it. The reason is that without ratification by the States the Constitution would have been simply a worthless piece of paper. If the Convention had produced a document in which wealth and land were flatly given a dominant position in national affairs, it would have been rejected by every State, with possibly one or two exceptions. That being the case, cleverness was necessary—and the American Constitution is one of the cleverest State papers in the world's history " (W., p. 196). Be that viewpoint as it may, our job is to judge the thing itself, and at any rate these fifty-five delegates represented a great wealth and variety of intelligence and practical experience. They had all recently had a hand in forming their own States' new constitutions. Thirty-nine had been in congress. Seven had served as governors of States. Twenty-one had fought in the Revolution. Eight had signed the Declaration of Independence. Some, like Dickenson the prominent lawyer, were there who had refused to sign the Declaration.

It was not one theorist conceiving a Utopian scheme for a fanciful community all conscious of their political obligations, nor was it a man cunningly conceiving effective propaganda for the limited purpose of intoxicating a nation to militarism : it was a comprehensive collection of practical men determined to give some definite settled form of order and stability to their loose and shaky community. The set of rules they would hammer out was to come into effect amongst their community of humans, *now* !

This, again, is the noble *Preamble* :

> **We the People of the United States, in order to**
> **form a more perfect Union,**
> **establish justice,**
> **insure domestic tranquillity,**
> **provide for the common defense,**
> **promote the general welfare,**

secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution . . .

These are our aims, we agree. Therefore if the Constitution of the United States can convince us sceptics that by its articles these aims have a practical certainty of being attained—and, in the final event, that the test of time can show they have been attained—then we must fairly admit that the end of our quest is reached. We must fairly admit that, whatever the régime decided upon—whether autocracy, monarchy, socialism, democracy, modified autocracy, communism, national-socialism, or whatever form or name they may care to give it.

Let us proceed. It will be interesting to see what type of régime they have chosen.

They have chosen a democracy. But they have laced it with a framework of authority. And they have put at the head a single figure—a President in whom is vested the executive power, and who is commander-in-chief of all the armed forces.

This is their democracy:

('The Constitution' should be read in full: the following is the gist.)

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ARTICLE I. The Legislative Department

Section 1. All legislative power is vested in a Congress, which consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Section 2. Representatives are elected by the citizens of every State (according to their suffrage restrictions) for two years, the number from each State depending on the population. These Representatives choose their own Speaker and other officers. These Representatives have the power of impeachment.

Section 3. The Senate is composed of Senators from each State, selected according to the decision of individual States, for six years. (In the Seventeenth Amendment, 1913, the election of Senators was made popular.) The Senators have the sole power to try all impeachments.

Section 4. Congress shall assemble at least once every year.

Section 5. A majority of each house must be present to do business; and a journal of proceedings (except secret proceedings) must be openly published.

Section 6. Senators and Representatives are paid, and shall not at the same time hold any other civil office.

Section 7. Before a bill becomes law it must be passed by both houses, and then by the President. If the President does not approve, he states his objection (veto); but thereafter if both houses, after reconsidering the bill with the objections, still pass it with a two-thirds majority, then it becomes law. All bills for raising revenue must originate with the House of Representatives.

Section 8. The Congress have power to levy and collect taxes, etc., provide for defense and general welfare, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to coin money, etc., to establish post offices and post roads, etc., etc., to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to exercise exclusive legislation over the district of the seat of government (*i.e.* Washington, D.C.). The Congress has the power to declare war.

Section 9. No title of nobility is granted.

Section 10. No State can enter into treaties, etc., or coin money, or lay any duty of tonnage, or keep troops or enter into compact with another State or foreign Power.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

ARTICLE II. The President and Vice-President

The President is also elected by the people, but indirectly. Thus: a certain number of Electors—the Electoral College—are appointed by each State, according to its population, who vote for a President and Vice-President. The votes are simply counted in Congress and the person receiving the greatest number for President becomes President. Similarly the Vice-President is voted for.

(In the Twelfth Amendment (1804, and see Amendment XIV, Sec. 2) the election of the President also becomes popular.

Whether the intention of the Fathers of the Constitution was to make the election of President free and impartial, or whether it was to ensure an aristocratic election, does not now matter. Nowadays, with the growth of the party system, when the populace vote for the Electors of the President they actually vote for a Presidential candidate, Democrat or Republican—and the candidate who gains a simple popular majority in any State carries the whole of the electoral votes of that State.)

The Vice-President acts for the President in his absence, or, in the case of his death or removal from office, etc., becomes President.

The full executive power of the Government is vested in the President.

He and the Vice-President are elected for four years.

The President is commander-in-chief of the Army, Navy, and Militia. (Naturally, as both Commander-in-Chief and supreme government executive, he has the right to come to what tactical or strategical decisions he considers necessary in time of war or emergency—as Lincoln showed later, also Jackson and Wilson, and the Roosevelts. Woodward says, rightly (p. 198): "It confers on the President an authority greater than that of the sovereign of any limited monarchy.")

With the advice of the Senate the President makes treaties, appoints ambassadors, consuls, and judges of the Supreme Court. He commissions all officers of the United States, and he can both convene and adjourn Congress. He can be removed from office on impeachment by Congress.

(He personally appoints Ministers of State, *who are responsible to him only, and not to Congress.*)

ARTICLE III. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

The judicial power of the State is vested in one Supreme Court, and other inferior courts which may be established by Congress. The judges hold office for life during good behaviour.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, is by jury.

Treason against the United States consists only in levying war against them, or giving aid to their enemies.

ARTICLE IV

This deals with the faith and credit between States, and states that there is equality of all privileges and immunities amongst all States in the Union, and that a person charged with crime in one State fleeing to another must be delivered up by the other State. New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union.

Section 4. The United States guarantees to every State in the Union a Republican form of government; and it guarantees to protect them against invasion and domestic violence.

(Note, it does not say a ' democratic ' form of government, because Democracy implies universal suffrage. Woodward says (p. 201): " Republican form of government has never been defined constitutionally.")

ARTICLE V

This makes provision for amendments, but it ensures that this shall be a thoroughly weighed and *lengthy* procedure.

ARTICLE VI

The Constitution, and the laws and treaties made in pursuance of it, are the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every State are bound by it.

Also all Senators, Representatives, members of State legislatures, all executive and judicial officers are bound by oath to support it.

(That is to say, it is an authoritative Constitution which shall not be evaded.)

ARTICLE VII

States that when nine States have ratified this Constitution it shall thereupon become law amongst them, and also with every other State subsequently ratifying it.

There is the original Constitution.

It was ratified by nine States in two and a half years, and since May 1790 it has functioned as the Constitution of the United States.

Not, however, without amendments.

For instance, although the aim of liberty to citizens and their posterity was mentioned in the Preamble, nothing was laid down in the Constitution about individuals' rights. This was corrected by the first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, which were added in 1791, and so may be said to form part of the original.

AMENDMENT I is this: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT V states: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due processes of law.

AMENDMENT X states: *The powers not delegated to the States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.*

AMENDMENT XIII abolished slavery in 1865. (Prior to that slavery was recognised in the Constitution by its references to persons " held to service or labour.")

Only in 1870, in AMENDMENT XV, does the Constitution first refer to the question of suffrage, by removing the bar on race, colour, and " previous condition of servitude."

AMENDMENT XIX granted suffrage rights to women (1919).

Here is in skeleton the Constitution of the American System.

I ask you all to get a copy of the complete document and study it.

My *Concise Oxford Dictionary* gives the definition for 'republic': " A State in which the government is carried on nominally, and usually in fact also, by the people or its elected representatives."

America is therefore a republic, but a qualified one: it is a State in which the government is carried on by the elected representatives of the people, in accordance with a fixed constitution.

In short, *America is a Constitutional Republic.*

That was what the makers intended to make the State in 1787—whether we think that by their original method of suffrage and election of President and Senators, etc., they wished to ensure an aristocratic attitude in the government, or not—and that is what it is today, a hundred and fifty years later, under which live a hundred and thirty millions of the most enlightened people on earth.

So it deserves consideration.

We can analyse it right away. But before that I want to make a small pertinent excursion into English history—not exclusively our history, mark you, but equally the history of the American colonies.

Charles I came to the conclusion that autocracy was the most effective form of government. However, to do him justice, it was not a personally ambitious form of autocracy he conceived, like Hitler, but a paternal one. He reckoned that since he had been born to be king, and since he (don't laugh !) had in him all the qualities that a king required, therefore it was evident that God had given him the commission (Divine Right) to act as the king of his conceptions, and his conceptions were that he should never consult anyone, that he should make treaties and declare war, impose taxes and chastise—not for his own greater glory, but for what he thought to be the good of England. Now, the people of England had had altercations with their kings before in their history, and they were used to being consulted in Parliament, through their representatives, by the King for some hundreds of years, particularly during the last fifty years of Elizabeth's reign and latterly during the reign of the newcomer (Scot) James I. They therefore did not take kindly to this autocratic attitude. They, Parliament, were a serious and responsible body of men, able and wishing to be consulted; but they never were consulted by this King

except to be commanded in a haughty fashion to produce money. The King was so purblind he would not or could not see which way the wind was blowing; he persisted in his arrogant pig-headedness, and finally the inevitable happened: the people rebelled. They beat the King and captured him, but as the ridiculous King still would not abate one jot of his arrogant attitude that even in captivity he had the right to make what decisions he pleased for the country, they had to cut off his head.

Thus there was now a republic established in England. At least that was the intention, but Oliver Cromwell, a strong-willed, practical, and short-tempered man who had been made President (Protector), was too impatient to watch the thing work itself out, so, stepping into the parliamentary wrangle, he kicked them all out and ruled as autocrat.

It was an amusing situation: here was Cromwell wielding much more tyrannical power than Charles had ever dreamt of; but since the people of England argued to themselves that this was what they had asked for by fighting the King, and also because Cromwell was a strong autocrat, they put up with it for twelve aggravated and frustrated years. England experienced secret police and abolition of freedom of speech and Press. During this time they became regarded as a powerful nation abroad, but they had never lived with less individual freedom since feudal times; and they were no longer feudal-minded—they were politically the most advanced people in Europe.

Never again ! they said.

So when Cromwell died, they invited Charles's son to come back as King. But, believe me, they put certain conditions on the invitation.

So England went on as a more limited monarchy from 1660. Charles II minded his Ps and Qs. James did not entirely and was removed, the English Princess Mary being enthroned with her shrewd husband William. Then came the childless Anne, and then cousin George I from Hanover, followed by his son. By this time England thought she had things running pretty well as a constitutional monarchy.

But countries learn by experience just as individuals do. George III, by reason of the fact that he succeeded as a young man on the death of his father, had not had the opportunity—afforded by years of observation—of learning the important regal virtue of discretion. Without anyone with authority to counsel or warn him, he began to have dreams somewhat similar to Charles I. There were extra restrictions now, of course, and ministers had to be drawn from

Parliament, but he would not appoint ministers unless he assured himself they were going to act in accordance with his wishes. So the shadow of autocracy again raised its head. Parliament still had supreme power if she cared to exercise it, but only a short hundred years ago they had seen the result of curt dictation to a King of that frame of mind—a state of affairs which no proud nation would willingly have back. So they said to one another, "Let him go on. Let us put up with it for the time being, because it is only a moment in our history—so long as it does not go too far. It is the lesser evil."

Did the King entirely influence his ministers in the question of the American colonies, as the colonies themselves widely thought at the time, since he personified the Government? Who can tell now? That, at any rate, was the monarch reigning when we lost America. That was the monarch whom America cut herself off from.

I don't know whether you agree with me, but that is the spirit I see breathing through the whole of the American Constitution. Throughout all its practical wisdom and humanity I see this spirit informing it, as it were, from behind, in the minds of all the makers of the Constitution all the time: *the spirit of distrust of people put in authority*. "Let us cage them," it seems to say. "Let us clip their wings. Let us keep them under our eye, and never let them have a long run in office, because no man is trustworthy." The only people who are allowed to have a long run are the judiciary of the Supreme Court; but they actually have no power in government—they only interpret.

Whether that distrust is an unqualifiedly good thing in politics, or whether short-sighted, we must examine.

As a tailpiece to our story of the birth of the American system, always remember this. The making of the Constitution was not a heavenly choir sitting there perfect in wisdom and perfect in agreement. "Time and again," we are told, "the Convention deadlocked on critical questions." That is, the Constitution is a sum of compromises.

Now, compromise, we have found in our human story, generally means wisdom.

ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

Aim. The aims of the system are explicitly set down in the Preamble. These are the stated aims. But we look deeper. Knowing the circumstances and, to some extent, the minds of the men concerned, and having studied the principles and the instrument, do we say

that these are the real implicit aims? Yes, we do. Their viewpoints were varied, but we judge their aim was common, and honestly stated: to make a union, to try to ensure to the people its defence, and tranquillity, and an individual fair deal (liberty).

Principles. The principles are set down in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence.

1. That all men are created equal. (Scientifically this cannot be accepted literally, but in general it states the principle of justice: that the law should be interpreted similarly for all.)
2. That all men have rights of life and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
3. That government should be by the consent of the governed (the principle of democracy).
4. That it is a serious thing to change an established form of government that the people is used to.

Altogether none of these principles, except as regards the note made above on equality, is at any point in sharp contrast with common sense. The principle of rights in 2 is rather a statement of aspiration than a statement of fact as we know it in the wide world and in history, but the concept does not strike us as scientifically impossible. 3, you will note, is the precise opposite of the Fuehrer Prinzip of Fascism; and 1, 2, and 3 together spell Democracy. 4 is, in our view, a principle of experienced human wisdom and common sense.

Instrument. The instrument of the System is the Constitution. Note these points:

1. The Constitution was enunciated not to make a homogeneous or unitary State (like Great Britain, for instance), but a Federal State comprised of distinguishable members. It defines and provides a central legislature, a central authority, and a central judiciary; but it only empowers the Federal (or Central) authority to act for certain *limited purposes*, which are categorically stated in the Constitution. For all other purposes each separate State has absolute power to act as it thinks fit through its own State government (Strong, p. 71). Thus the Constitution controls only a limited part of the lives and activities of all the citizens of the nation, so as to ensure them justice in those parts. *The remaining part—the larger part—it does not control.* For example, the method of appointment of the local judiciary in the various States is entirely up to the State: they may be appointed

for life or merely during the term of the administration—*i.e.* the judges may be rapidly changing political appointments.

2. The Constitution is rigid. Thus Congress cannot pass laws to meet novel circumstances unless the laws concur with the Constitution—and then they are only interim laws, not constitutional. The Constitution cannot be altered except by a special process of amendment.

3. All executive power belongs to the President, who has no official contact with Congress beyond surveying bills, except through annual or special messages he may deliver to it. The executive Cabinet that he appoints have nothing to do with Congress whatsoever; they are responsible only to the President.

4. A President is elected every four years, and the Representative House every two. Since both elections are now by popular (party) vote, at the time of a presidential election the President is assured of a majority opinion in the House. By the next two-year period, however, public opinion might have changed and the people may then vote a majority into the House in opposition to the President, *but they cannot change the executive*. In this case it is possible to have, for two years, an executive governing *against* the consent (*i.e.* the majority consent) of the governed.

ASSESSMENT OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

(*i.e. the assessment of the American interpretation of a Constitutional Republic*)

1. The Test of Emotional Appeal

Lincoln gave democracy its best slogan: "Government of the people by the people for the people." This idea of constitutional democracy—self-government according to a worthy set of rules—appeals to a thinking man's sense of responsibility; but, of a truth, can it be said to call to the ready emotions and stir the blood? It does mine and perhaps does yours because we have thought much about these matters and look upon responsibility as the highest guerdon of evolution, but can it intoxicate like "Equal division of all wealth, and death to everyone we envy!" (Communism), or "Victorious dominance of our race over the rest of the world!" (Nazism)?

No, we must admit that nowadays, compared with other loot-and-glory doctrines, in the test of emotional appeal constitutional democracy is tepid.

'Republic,' now, is different. It was in the nineteenth century a new thing in the world (apart from history), just as nationalistic fascism is today. A new wine. 'No royalty!' it said. 'No sneering superior-by-birth.' This incontestably has its immediate appeal to the common man. In every man born of woman, in every child when he begins to think, pride resents the necessity for public submission when in his thoughts he admits no superiority of qualities.

So to that extent the American doctrine of Constitutional Republicanism has an emotional appeal; and it must have had it much stronger a hundred and fifty years ago when what was represented as an imperceptient royal arrogance had recently driven them to war. Indeed, the appeal of republicanism at that time must have been, and in fact was, to the broad masses in the State, as intoxicating as the supreme-race slogan has been to the defeated German nation in our own time. Ten years later it caused the French Revolution.

The Test of Plausibility

The question that is to be answered is: Does the American doctrine of Constitutional Republicanism give to superficial judgment the immediate persuasion that it can do what it promises, that is, regulate a large community with justice, tranquillity, etc.

Yes, immediately.

There can be no other answer. People immediately say: It is, after all, the way we run our clubs. We always make rules and have a secretary, and so on. Surely it is the most natural way in the world to run a community of any size, now you come to think of it, if only you can get your rules settled.

It passes the test of Plausibility without faltering.

The Test of Practicability

Using our critical intelligence, do we judge that, according to its articles of doctrine, constitutional republicanism of the American pattern has in it the stuff of practical success? Does it give logical promise of being workable, stable, and durable?

Cautiously we reply thus: We know that an elected-committee-with-a-set-of-rules—rules made to bear out the intent of the organisation—works with small organisations. But if a new committee is elected which interprets the intent differently and thereupon makes different rules, and if this happens again and again, then no one knows where they are standing and the whole thing becomes chaotic. In fact it will not work unless there is a set of guiding rules decided

originally, and this is stuck to. Needless to say, members must be made to obey the rules. And of course, since no one can foretell the circumstances of the future, the rules must not be so rigid as to become obsolete; so either they must be flexible, or provision must be made for amendment from time to time.

Here, then, are the logical provisions:

Firstly, that the rules laid down do faithfully and fully contain the original intent or spirit of the undertaking.

Secondly, that the rules are definite—*i.e.* they prevent misinterpretation—but at the same time not so rigid that they cannot meet new conditions as they arise.

Thirdly, that the rules are enforced.

In this particular undertaking we know its intent: the Preamble. Therefore in assessing its theoretical practicability it will be a convenient and logical method to set down the various aims of the intent, in order, and alongside each examine the rules—that is, the document of the Constitution itself—to judge if each is explicitly contained and enforced. Later, as a review, we can briefly employ our usual method in assessing the practicability in peace and war.

AIM 1. To form a more perfect union.

Note.—The aim is not to form a perfect union—*i.e.* an homogeneity—but a *more* perfect union, comparatively. Formerly they were thirteen separate entities flimsily related by a Continental Congress, without authority. The aim is to improve that relationship and make a concerted federation.

(*Note.*—The stated aim does not say " to make of the several states, one nation." Hence we cannot justifiably here discuss that aspect of a government's obligations. We shall, however, discuss it later.)

MEASURES: A (within-limits) fixed Constitution, and laws made in pursuance of it, are ordained the *supreme* law of all the States (Article VI)—though not the *total* law of all the States. Each State becomes subject to the Constitution when it ratifies it (Article VII). That is to say, federation primarily by consent, subsequently by enforced law.

This federation is typified by (1) a central legislature, Congress, comprised of representatives of all the States; (2) a central authority consisting of a single man, the President, who is in himself the sole executive and is commander-in-chief of all the forces; (3) a central judiciary, the Supreme Court, who give final rulings on all matters relating to the Constitution.

The individual States of the Federation are still permitted their own individual legislature, governors, and judiciaries; and the laws of

individual States may be whatever the individual State pleases, provided they avoid conflict with the cautiously limited Constitution (Amendment X). Thus groups of citizens throughout America will be mainly governed still by their individual States, but in certain activities they will be governed by the Federal authority.

COMMENT: History gives us Rome for comparison. That heterogeneous empire, after its phase of conquest, held together as an entity for centuries by virtue of (1) an universal system of laws enforced by the army. (2) A single executive, the Emperor. (3) An universal language, Latin, which was used throughout on all important social or political occasions; it was a means of making the citizens of the whole empire comprehensible to one another.

America has all these, but here the universal law is not the whole law, as it was in Rome, but only part of the law. However, as against that, the universal language, English, though not mentioned in the Constitution, is a much weightier factor. It was and is not only universally available in all the States, but, by luck, was the natural language everywhere spoken: the circumstance was so taken for granted that its importance was not realised. A common language is one of the most influential factors in community of outlook.

VERDICT: We judge that the Constitution contains measures which, if enforced, are adequate to ensure an improved union of the States, but not a single unity. Not unanimity. Because these measures leave the population divided into groups still substantially different in the way they are obliged to conduct their lives.

AIM 2. To establish justice.

INTERPRETATION: "What is justice?" might well have asked jesting Pilate. The *Oxford Dictionary* gives "just conduct, fairness; exercise of authority in maintenance of right." Obviously in this context it should only mean, and can only mean, what it is commonly understood to mean, that is: fairness; fair dealing. Which means an absence of discrimination and favouritism.

MEASURES: The measures are certain clearly-worded laws set down in black and white, and published: these particular laws being those referring to the Federal Constitution, and enacted by the Federal Legislature; this group of laws to apply impartially throughout all the States; no mention of any exceptions to this group; and the enforcement of them by police force, militia, etc.

However, there is another measure, Amendment X, by which the remaining laws which govern all the individuals of the nation, grouped into separate States, are entirely at the discretion of the States, and

cannot be influenced by the Federal authority (beyond guaranteeing a republican form of government, etc.): *i.e.* the Federal authority controls the administration of half the laws affecting individuals (originally the smaller half); it cannot control either the form or the administration of the other half.

COMMENT: The Federal laws referred to are, in form and procedure, on the known English pattern formerly existing in the colonies, *i.e.* based on and adapted from Roman Law, which had been tested for centuries. Again the law-makers, the Assembly, are elected biennially and are thus kept under check. Consequently the laws should be well adapted for justice.

Next, the Federal judiciary are adequately salaried and *appointed for life*. It is recognised that this sensible measure, permanent guarantee of livelihood during good behaviour, tends to keep ordinary people scrupulous. Consequently the interpretation of the Federal laws should be well adapted for justice.

But the administration, which executes the laws, changes every four years. That is, all the Federal administrative officials might—not necessarily will, but might—change every four years. Officials, after four years of opportunity, might be suddenly, by a change of administration, cut off from livelihood. Common sense would say this does not encourage scrupulousness. Ordinary people, whose instinct is to preserve their lives and families, might be tempted to accept bribes. And again, being sensible, we know that where continuity of office depends on continuity of popularity there is a temptation for popularity to be bought at the expense of justice. As regards the rest of the laws affecting individuals, the State laws, the Federal authority has no power at all to guarantee justice except when appealed to.

TO SUMMARISE: Justice can be assured to a community by just administration of just laws. For laws must be understood *all* the laws affecting the individuals of the community, to wit—in America—Federal laws *and* State laws.

VERDICT: The Federal laws are likely to be just.

The odds are that the Federal laws will be justly administered, but according to the Constitution it is far from a guarantee. The likelihood will be higher if federal officials are in practice given some permanency of office from administration to administration—though this is distinctly not provided for in the Constitution; indeed it is rather against the spirit of the Constitution.

As regards the State laws the Constitution can give no direct assurance that justice will be served.

AIM. 3. To insure domestic tranquillity.

INTERPRETATION: This phrase, like the others, is vague; but it has a commonly-understood connotation, a double one, and that must be accepted. Firstly, it means the prevention of community disorder; and secondly, the preservation of the individual peace of mind or contentment of the citizens, with reference to the redress of discontents or grievances. You could not have domestic tranquillity with either one, but only with both.

First, as regards domestic disorder, there are only two types: one is criminal lawlessness, against which a State provides a police force; the other is the more legitimate demonstration of people demanding what they conceive to be their rights. In fact it is, once again, a discussion of justice. Second, as regards individual discontent, surely this is again an interpretation of justice. (Except when the discontents refer to community danger, which comes under 'common defence,' or community hunger, etc., which comes under 'general welfare.') So that domestic tranquillity, apart from the small section where it means protection from criminal law-breakers, boils down to the dispensation of justice, which we have discussed above. But there is this particular angle: tranquillity connotes time. You cannot talk of national tranquillity momentarily or for an hour, but you can for months or years. There must therefore, for tranquillity, be continuity of lack of disorder and continuity of community contentment. In other words, there must be continuity in administration of justice. Again, the interpretation of justice must not alter from time to time or that will, necessarily, give rise to discontent. So for tranquillity there must be continuity in the interpretation and administration of justice. For *the essence of domestic tranquillity is that people should know where they stand.*

How can there be this continuity where, in the Federal System, the entire administration may change every four years; and, in the various State systems, where the interpretation even may change as well?

MEASURES: The Laws, the Judiciary, the Administration with the police, etc. The constitutional recognition of the rights of man (the first and subsequent Amendments constituting the Bill of Rights).

COMMENT: In respect of the recognition of the individual rights of man the Constitution is perhaps the noblest document up to that time penned; and to quite a large extent, given goodwill, domestic tranquillity does seem to be provided for. For these rights are basic in the matter of human content. But—for we must be critical or we are not doing our job—again in this deep-seated distrust of rooted

authority, this lack of permanence, in this frequent variation in policy towards internal as well as external affairs consequent on a four-yearly change of administration, there are the seeds not of tranquillity but of domestic unsettlement.

VERDICT: By the provision that the Federal Constitution administers only half the laws affecting the lives of the nation it has not the scope to assure general domestic tranquillity. By its provisions it does undoubtedly assist that aim; but equally, by its provisions, it does put a brake to their settled attainment.

AIM 4. To provide for the common defence.

INTERPRETATION: This refers to the defence of the Commonwealth.

MEASURES: These are provisions for an army and a navy under a unified command—who is also the supreme executive of the State; provisions for making treaties and declaring war.

COMMENT: Here is provision for a dictator on the Roman model. Precisely.

In an emergency, war or other, the President can make what strategical decisions he wishes in his capacity of commander-in-chief, and he can enforce them throughout the nation in his capacity as supreme, indeed sole, executive. And these emergency strategical decisions can even override the Constitution. Also he makes treaties whose provisions, if in conflict, override the Constitution. It is anomalous for a man who is sworn to obey the Constitution, but there it is. His power is almost unlimited. It is only limited by this: only Congress can vote him the money for his projects. But if they refuse, it seems unquestioned that he has the power either to arrest them all or seize the treasury.

That is colossal power. Is there danger in it?

According to the Constitution there is not the danger that he might become a permanent or tyrannical dictator, because he must retire or come up for re-election in his fourth year.

What other danger, though, is there in this arrangement?

Firstly, that a presidential candidate selected by a group for domestic reasons, and subsequently elected, may not have any qualifications for a war leader. And yet he is, by office, commander-in-chief; and must *be* commander-in-chief for four years. He cannot hand over, or be changed, unless he is impeached.

Again, a president is elected in November but does not take office until March. What of that four months? Is that not a dangerous time if a nation is at war; or even perhaps more dangerous if a nation is uncertainly hesitating in the shadow of war, with the country divided

by electioneering speechifying? Then, for four dangerous months, you have as sole commander and sole executive, lingering redundant and ineffective on the scene, a discredited man, whose right to rule the nation has been taken away from him by the voice of the nation.

(NOTE: Since writing this section this period of four months has been reduced. The Inauguration of new presidents is henceforward to be in January; thus it would seem that the danger of this period has been recognised by the Congress of the United States no less than by ourselves—but the hiatus that must exist before a completely new President and his executive host can assume *effective* control cannot be eliminated.)

Again, without a permanent Civil Service, there is a possibility that a change of administration might dislocate for quite an appreciable and dangerous time the executive instrument before it is again working smoothly.

Yes, these are dangerous aspects; but otherwise, with a qualified man, the arrangement of a sole command and executive is, as we have agreed, very suitable for a nation at war. In parenthesis this might be said, that it seems likely that a nation with such a system would probably not change their administration in times of danger.

I think we may fairly say this in conclusion, to refer to it later, that if a country having this system were living cheek-by-jowl with equally or more powerful neighbouring countries, then the dangers mentioned above would be commensurately greater, these being dangers to the defence of the country and to its existence.

VERDICT: In the geographical circumstances in which the United States is placed we judge the measure likely to secure the common defence.

AIM 5. To promote the general welfare.

INTERPRETATION: Under Aims 2, 3, 4, and 6, justice for the individual, domestic tranquillity, defence, and liberty of the individual are dealt with. Apart from these, what can the vague term 'general welfare' connote? It can only refer to such concepts as: seeing that individuals of the State are not allowed to perish for want of food, warmth, and clothing; assuring employment to all individuals or sustaining them when unemployed; supervising living and working conditions; keeping the individuals of the State in health or caring for them in sickness; caring for the fatherless and young, and the aged, infirm, or mentally affected; providing the benefits of education and other forms of culture. In a word, Social Services.

MEASURES: The Constitution provides no measures for such social services.

COMMENT: This realm of government responsibility in the American system is implicitly left to the individual States. It is noteworthy that of late years Federal administrations have, it would seem, been compelled—at least they have done so—to consider these aspects part of their responsibility. The New Deal of the present administration is largely concerned with these matters. But it must be remembered that such intercurrent administrative measures are—unless the system is altered—merely temporary and may be reversed by any subsequent administration (so the Republican Party vow).

VERDICT: We judge of course that such social services are not promoted *by the Constitution.*

AIM 6. To ensure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

INTERPRETATION: What is generally understood by liberty comprises freedom of speech, freedom of the Press, freedom of assembly, freedom to petition the Government for redress of grievances, freedom from arrest except by due processes of law. To this may be added freedom of religious observance.

By 'ourselves' we must understand that the founders of the Constitution meant the white (European) colonists, because slavery still went on for another eighty years. And not all the white population either, because there were white slaves as well—indentured servants—to whom these freedoms did not apply and were not meant to apply. Quite half the founders owned slaves or indentured servants, and large numbers of them too.

Thus it was to be a discriminated liberty: not general, but to 'ourselves and our posterity.'

MEASURES: There were no distinct measures in the original Constitution, but they were added in the first ten amendments—the Bill of Rights.

COMMENT: As noted above, the recipients of the blessings of liberty are circumscribed by the definition of 'ourselves.' Here is distinct discrimination, which is another term for aristocracy. It may be republican, as we stressed farther back, but it is not yet democratic.

Perhaps 'ourselves' meant voters, who were at that time a restricted class owing to property qualifications.

VERDICT: To that section of the community to which this part of the Constitution refers (? only voters) we judge that the blessings of liberty are assured. And if the franchise was to be enlarged, so would the blessings of liberty be enlarged in the community.

INTERIM SUMMARY

By this method—analysing specific aims and measures—we have arrived at one assessment of practicability of the American system, to wit:

We judge that the aims of the system, agreed to be admirable aims, are only to a certain extent faithfully and fully contained in the rules or measures, *i.e.* the instrument—mainly for the reason that the Constitution controls only about half the lives and activities of the people under it, but for other intrinsic reasons as well. After that we judge that to the extent to which they are laid down in the instrument (the Constitution) the aims are likely to be seen in practice.

To a certain extent only, we say the aims are contained in the Constitution. We cannot give an exact estimate of the general situation, like 40 per cent. or 75 per cent.; but if I were compelled to give a figure, I think I should say that the aims of the system were likely to be assured by the explicit instrument something over 50 per cent., but less than 75. For instance, improved union seems to be assured 80 per cent. Justice, however, is only handled to the extent of half-way. Domestic tranquillity, again, is only handled half-way; and there also in the four-yearly change of administration are the seeds of recurring unsettlement. Common defence does seem to be assured to the modified extent to which it can ever hope to be assured under whatever system. General welfare, if we have interpreted it correctly, leaving out liberty and justice, hardly seems to be touched on at all by the Constitution. The blessings of liberty are assured almost a hundred per cent. to the restricted class to whom they apply.

This is the practicability of the attainment of the aims. Now for our special method of assessment that we have already applied to other systems—to wit, workability in peace and war, stability in peace and war, durability.

Assessment of *Workability*. (*a*) in Peace; (*b*) in War.

(*a*) WORKABILITY IN PEACE

Read the Constitution and you will find that except in a few sentences, such as that which states that Congress will declare war, and the other that the President is commander-in-chief of the forces—except in a few sentences, I say, and then brief ones so that they are liable to escape notice, you will find that the mind has not been directed to war at all. In short, the Constitution is not designed for war; it is designed for peace. The American system is drawn up on the supposition that the normal condition of the community is to be peace.

Do we, using our critical intelligence, judge that the system, as set down, a constitutional republic, would be workable in peace?

We have already been over this in some detail, and we have called history to witness, and we do so judge.

We judge that the system, as set down, will work with a community 'such as ourselves.'

We have not said we judge that it would work with a community of ignorant people divided into groups speaking different languages and with different religious superstitions, but that is not the point at issue.

(*b*) In War

We have seen the provisions for conducting the common defence, and we judge the provisions, *once they are put into concerted function*, adequate in scope to make the system workable in war.

These provisions are: (1) a presidential military-dictatorship; (2) a voting Congress who alone have power to raise and maintain armed forces, and who alone can declare war. It is obviously only when these two are in concert that the nation is likely to reach a war footing.

The question is: is this duality likely to occasion delay in putting the nation on a war footing in the event of a threat of attack, for a space of time dangerous, or conceivably fatal, to the safety of the nation? For instance, the executive, who is also commander-in-chief, by virtue of his government machine (foreign intelligence, etc.) is likely to apprehend danger before the legislative Congress; but he cannot increase the strength of the nation to resist the potential or approaching danger until he has persuaded the deliberative Congress of the necessity.

There is no need to go into this any deeper; I am sure the circumstances are readily visualised.

We judge: this system is workable in war, but, since it is not expressly designed for war, it, not unnaturally, has a weakness. This weakness is liable to be a serious matter in a community so situated that speed in putting the nation on a war footing is from time to time essential—*i.e.* if a nation has close neighbours who are powerful and in rivalry. If a nation has no close neighbours who are powerful and in rivalry, this weakness is not likely to be so serious.

N.B.—With progress and quickening of communications the 'closeness' of neighbours is liable to change, and the seriousness of this weakness to change also.

STABILITY IN PEACE

The Federal Constitution represents only half—to give a rough figure—of the government of the total community. If, therefore, government controls stability—and it does !—then it is evident that the Constitution cannot in any event control the total stability. It obviously does affect it, though; and it affects it largely, not only in its own special half, but indirectly to a certain extent in the remainder, in its injunctions, like the Bill of Rights, and a republican form of government, which are laid on all the States.

We agree that most of its provisions are in the direction of ensuring stability in time of peace. This likelihood is indeed inherent in the democratic form, because grievances—which are the seed of any disorder—may rightfully be aired and, according to a majority vote, rectified.

So that stability of the community in peace is, superficially, provided for.

But here we cannot afford to be superficial. We know that, as regards government, for stability a community like to know where they stand. They want a constant. Indeed, for stability, they *require* to know where they stand. For this a fixed constitution of rules is one great asset. This the American system has. But also, for constancy, there is required some fixation of the *interpretation* of the rules by the officials who administer them. Continuing consistency. This the American system does not provide. Indeed, this in a considerable measure it provides against by a four-yearly shuffle of its executive and administrative personnel.

In short, we expect the system to survive in peace because the power given to the executive is sufficient to quell any minor, and even major, discontents; but owing to the variability in the interpretation and administration of the laws made possible, we will not expect a continual universal placidity of content and lawfulness. In fact, knowing human nature, we consider we are likely to see frequent, perhaps widespread, evidences of discontent and lawlessness, minor or major.

STABILITY IN WAR

By war, in this connection, we can only mean full-scale war, or full-scale preparation for war, which requires a hundred per cent. effort of the nation. Boundary affrays or expeditions such as can more reasonably be regarded as military police duties, which do not endanger the existence of the nation, cannot be counted.

We have noted the weaknesses of the American system when threatened with or in a condition of war of this magnitude. It is now our duty logically to assess the possible effect of these weaknesses on the stability of the nation and government.

To recapitulate, these are the constitutional factors: (*a*) the power to administer the nation and forces in war, *i.e.* to fight the war, belongs inalienably to the President; (*b*) the power to raise military forces, to pay them and pay other war expenses, and to declare war, belongs inalienably to Congress.

I say 'inalienably,' because although the President might take their powers from Congress, if he did so the system would no longer—for that time at least—be the American Constitutional System, it would be an autocracy. (Consider this instance. France had a certain system of government. It was a republic, a breed of democracy. In 1940 France bowed to another nation. Afterwards it still had a government, and even the personnel of the government was recognisably the same, but now it was an autocracy. It was not a continuation or a phase of the first system of government; it was for the time being the end of it. And who can tell, when you get a new form of government, how long it is going to last ?) Therefore if this explicit American system, and not something else, is to work in war, it can only be when these two factors work in concert.

The first question under stability is therefore the question of the continued existence of the government under the impact of war; and since failure to act in concert may be presumed to be fatal either to the nation or the system, that question boils down to these two: first, can these two factors be guaranteed invariably to act in concert on the impact or threat of war ? Second, can they be guaranteed to act in concert *in time ?*

Knowing human nature, we cannot say other than that neither of these guarantees is watertight.

We know that for a nation to fight a dangerous war efficiently the war executive must be able to call upon the resource of the nation without hindrance.

So much for the continued existence of this form of government on the impact of war. What about the continued stability of it during the conduct of war ? I ask you to picture not a war fought at a distance on foreign soil while the homeland remains scathless, but the war such as most countries suffer, on the home ground. History tells us that countries so embattled find it necessary to suspend general elections during the time of life-danger. But the American system, according to its Constitution, cannot. What then ?

All these conceivable, but very probable, problems present very striking question marks, and there we must leave them.

We judge that the American system, in view of its inherent division of power, gives promise of being less stable in dangerous war than in peace.

DURABILITY

We have logically deduced the disorders that may threaten the American system in peace and the dangers that may threaten its continued existence in war. Durability means continued existence, as such, through many years of changing circumstances, peace and war. Therefore in this section we must try to conceive if it is possible for the discontent, lawlessness, and internal disorders instanced ever to become major national matters—*e.g.* mass lawlessness, or mass disobedience, or civil war—so that the particular system is no longer able to govern; and secondly, whether the constitutional weaknesses underlined by war are real and likely dangers or only faint possibilities.

A lot could be written here, but I think we will say no more than this.

Major internal disorders are, idiomatically, disorders affecting the broad masses in which considerable numbers of them give active expression against constituted authority. There are only two possible explanations for such universally widespread demonstrations. One is that a real cause of discontent is at the same time affecting large numbers. The other is that there is no real cause—or it is not really serious—but that agitators have convinced large numbers that there is a real cause. The cause is always a question of what the people understand to be their rights; and, taking all the reasons for major internal disorders in all countries in history, nine times out of ten the particular right demonstrated about is economic. Bread! Wages! The necessities of life for self and families! In a word, livelihood. It is an historical fact that if the masses are economically satisfied you do not get *spontaneous* major community disorders; the major disorders that may arise during times of general economic satisfaction (religious, ideological) are those created by agitators. And further, the other type of major disorder it is always easier to create during times of economic dissatisfaction. These are facts; and the simple reason is, of course, that economic dissatisfaction stimulates directly the strongest and most basic instinct, that of self-preservation.

Therefore we may say regarding the likely durability in peace of this particular system, which owing to its inherent variability of interpretation is prone to give rise to frequent uncertainties and discontent-

ments—that internal disorders are likely to remain minor, and the system remain unendangered, during good economic times; but that they are liable to become major, and the system be endangered, during bad economic times. Now, bad economic times may mean either actual national poverty, due to drought, pestilence, national disaster, or over-population; or pseudo-poverty, due to maldistribution of wealth. Looking at the vast untapped continent lying at the disposal of the young republic,we may safely judge that actual poverty in the means of livelihood seems, on the face of it—unless their right to it is contested by other Powers—far distant. On that aspect the system, as applied to this community, gives promise of enduring until the population increases to absorb the resources of and fill the continent.

On the war aspect, where time to reach effective government unification is the factor, we note that the original republic was distant from the nearest big enough—*i.e.* big enough to threaten State defeat—foreign Power by more than a thousand miles of water, which means for an army many weeks. And this Power they had successfully defended themselves from, showing that the distance was then sufficient. Therefore we judge that on this aspect the system gave promise of being durable so long as no big enough foreign nation grew up closer to them either in distance or time.

Summary of Test of Practicability

Let us see if we can summarise this important section of analytical assessment. It appears that we have two main criticisms of the system, both concerning the instrument. One, that by regulating and regularising the citizens of the nation only partly, leaving the rest to a varied pattern of State legislatures, the system fails to confer on the nation such a high degree of uniformity in conduct and outlook as would be conferred by a more unitary system. This may prove either a good thing or a bad thing. Secondly, that by its provision for recurrent change in administration—due it would seem to a lack of trust in human nature and a determination of the founders of the Revolution never to have any permanence amongst personalities in authority—the mass of the community are apt to be in a recurring uncertainty as to interpretation of the law.

The provisions are that the President shall have sole executive power and be elected every four years; and that he shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, judges of the Supreme Court (they only for life), and *all other officers of the United States* whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for. This means the bulk of the Federal civil servants of the country, including

police. Every four years there is a possibility of a clean-sweep replacement of all these paid, often highly paid, officials by new ones with different ideas. We saw in this the seeds not of domestic tranquillity but unsettlement; the seeds of variability in the interpretation and administration of justice with consequent disorders; the seeds of phases of deterioration in public morality, the seeds of graft. Every four years we may expect some alteration in the method of dealing with social, economic, and other great national problems, some alteration in domestic and foreign policy; accordingly every four years every individual in the United States as well as other outside organisms affected by it—other States—have to be prepared for fundamental readjustments, because 'no one knows where they stand.' We judged it would be difficult either for individuals or for States to give the régime settled confidence. There is a third great, indeed fundamental, criticism, and that is the inflexibility, the constitutional inflexibility, of the Constitution, whereby flaws such as those above cannot be adjusted without vitiating the identity of the whole system.

Thus we picked out 'on paper' some points which we have called seeds that in our judgment might in practice lead to trouble or even the breakdown of the whole doctrine. They are theoretical weaknesses only so far. They may show up vividly in the natural course of events, or, under favourable circumstances, they may not show up very perceptibly; but this much is certain if our logic has been good: if stress is put upon the whole structure, then if these are weaknesses they are bound to give evidence of their existence.

Broadly, the American political system passes the test of practicability. The doctrine is eminently common-sensible and in our judgment will function exactly as it stands. (Workable.)

As regards lasting—that is, resisting circumstances—stably any length of time, our judgment has detected in the Constitution certain flaws which might disrupt; but we know that nothing can be perfect, and we know that ordinarily sensible humans who are not suffering marked discomfort and are left in peace have a genius for compromise. So we consider that, given prosperity and peace to deal with their flaws as they become obtrusive, such a State might last a considerable, even an indefinite time.

As regards lasting permanently, it certainly, theoretically, stands a greater chance than the other two systems we have already put this test upon—Communism, which never stood a chance because it never started, and Nazism, which bears in its own essential structure the continually on-driving impulse to violent end. But can both prosperity and peace, both in continuing conjunction, ever be reasonably

anticipated for an historical period for any nation? That is the question.

The Test of Actual Practice

Here we are on solid ground: we leave theory for history.

The question is: did the American system of Constitutional Republicanism work in practice?

It did. And a hundred and fifty years later, with a comparatively few amendments, still does.

That is the striking fact, that during all this time substantially the same instrument has continuously governed a community which has progressively grown until now it includes a hundred and thirty million people of mixed nationalities. The special point for us, however, is not whether this political formula merely succeeded in governing a community for this period, but whether in so doing it did in fact continuously ensure to the community those things that it was designed to ensure—intrinsic cohesion, justice, security, tranquillity, general welfare, and liberty, those things, in fact, which *we* decided were desirable to secure?

The only way we can scientifically decide that is to study a complete history of this community in the last hundred and fifty years. We cannot set it all down here, so we must take it for granted that you know this history well enough. If not, it is your duty, if you are serious on this quest, now to do so. A good reference for the purpose is *A New American History*, by W. E. Woodward, written from the angle of a loyal but historically-minded, *i.e.* unbiased, American. We shall here content ourselves with making certain extracts from this history, more or less in the order they appear, which seem to us pertinent to this aspect of our discussion.

Washington (1789–1797), 'always rich in land and slaves,' was the first President, elected according to the original Constitution directly by the electors. "It is quite clear that Washington did not consider himself as the head of a party, and it is equally clear that, at first, he did not foresee the drift of political opinion into mass alignments which would be definitely directed by political leaders. Apparently he envisaged a Government which would be, at all times, in the hands of the Best People" (p. 214). "His intellectual outlook was that of an industrialist or banker. . . . The banker is not without human sympathy, though in a struggle between men and property he instinctively takes the side of property."

At that time there was still the burning discussion between the Federalists, led by Hamilton, the financier, and John Adams, and the

(original Republicans) 'States Rights' party, led by Jefferson, the idealist of democracy. Adams was Vice-President and Hamilton was entrusted with finance. " He was the father of American high finance, and the founder of the (new) Republican Party (p. 215). . . . He had a profound conviction that the United States would never rise to power and greatness unless there was a concentration of its wealth in the hands of a relatively small group of moneyed and talented aristocrats " (p. 219). The question of debts, national and State, was one of the first subjects for solution by the Government. All over the country people held old certificates that by the passage of time they thought were now worthless. Hamilton brought out a 'Report on Public Credit,' which his party got through Congress, by which all these certificates were to be bought by the Federal Government at par. In the meantime sleek city men had appeared in the hamlets of the backwoods and bought up the old certificates between ten and thirty cents on the dollar. Nevertheless Congress passed the report. " Congress had set a precedent for future generations. It had come out flatly for sharp dealing. . . . Swindling was on the way of becoming a national tradition, to be held in high esteem, provided it was legal and sustained by eminent counsel. . . . Everyone with a feather's weight of foresight knew that swindling was to take its place among the dignified arts and sciences, but who could realise that it was to be sadly overdone ? " (p. 220).

" Hamilton's influence on the American social structure can hardly be over-estimated. It was Hamiton's life-work to create a philosophy of rich versus poor. He showed the wealthy how to acquire legislative and economic domination of the United States, and how to hold it, in one way or another, through the vicissitudes of time and circumstance " (p. 222).

" The United States Chamber of Commerce has today no greater loathing of Communists than the Federalists of 1795 had for Jefferson's Democratic Societies. Washington shared this antipathy. In his Annual Message to Congress in 1794 he made an attack on them in which he said, in effect, that the masses had no right to organise " (p. 226).

As a result of Washington's influence, Adams was the next President, 1797–1801. " Democracy was one of his pronounced aversions. Long after he had retired from public life he wrote: ' Democracy has never been and can never be so desirable as aristocracy or monarchy, but while it lasts is more bloody than either ! ' " (p. 213).

Under him the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed by Congress. These were aimed at the Democratic Societies and were " plainly

intended to suppress free speech, in contemptuous disregard of the first Amendment of the Constitution " (p. 240). Under the inspiration of Jefferson and Madison, the Legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia passed resolutions in which the Alien and Sedition Acts were declared ' void and of no force.' That was the first appearance in our history of the *theory of nullification*. " This doctrine, which declares that the powers of the Federal Government result from ' a compact to which the States are parties ' and that States accordingly have the right to act independently outside the explicit compact: this doctrine was destined to be kept alive during the decades, to grow and flourish and finally to mingle inextricably with the allied doctrine of secession " (p. 241).

By the time of the next election Hamilton had fallen out with Adams and used his influence to oppose him with another Federalist, Pinckney, and so split the vote (Jefferson 73, Adams 65, Pinckney 64), whereby Jefferson, the democratic idealist (old Republican), was elected. " Let us beware of the hour when our dreams come true, when our ideals must clothe themselves in the robes of responsibility. Jefferson's dream had come true, and he had to look facts in the face. He found himself in conflict with the Constitution " (p. 253). " He disregarded the Constitution whenever he was convinced that it obstructed the general welfare; and he left behind a trail of violations of his cherished document." He wrote to Madison: " The earth belongs to the living generation. They may manage as they please. . . . The Constitution and the laws of their predecessors are extinguished in their natural course with those that gave them being " (p. 247). It was he that made the great Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon in 1803—the whole territory from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, and from the Gulf of Mexico to Canada—for 15,000,000 dollars. As a result of it he was re-elected in 1804.

Madison, " a midnight scholar and political doctrinaire," became the next President for the sufficient reason—sufficient in those days, when things were going prosperously with the Jeffersonian party—that the " all-powerful Jefferson named him as his political heir " (p. 265). It was during his term that the 1812 war broke out with England. " The war of 1812 was senseless, stupid, and need not have happened. A vigorous, dominating President might have settled all the points in dispute without much trouble. But the administration was fumbling, vacillating, and its line of policy was not clearly marked " (p. 266).

Meanwhile the wealthy New England States were becoming dissatisfied. With the expansion westward of the United States they saw,

and they resented, a flood of congressmen " pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles at least from their residence." " The Massachusetts Legislature, in 1814, called a convention of the New England States to consider the *secession of the Eastern States from the Union and the creation of a New England Republic*." Note, this was the second time already that secession was spoken of. " It was agreed that ' The Federal Constitution is nothing more than a treaty between independent sovereignties,' and that any State had a right to withdraw " (p. 277). It did not come to anything, but the convention is worth noting.

" The year 1814 closed in gloom. Madison saw his administration falling in ruins about him. The war was evidently lost, Washington had been burned, etc. . . . In the midst of these perplexities General Andrew Jackson encountered the British at New Orleans and gained one of the most astounding victories in the history of modern warfare. Joy succeeded gloom " (p. 277). Madison was re-elected. He, in 1817, chose Monroe as his successor. " The Government at Washington had grown, through successive administrations, into a pleasant little oligarchy. A handful of men ran everything, and when they departed from the scene they chose their successors. . . . Nominating conventions did not exist; there was hardly a chance for a ' dark horse.' A candidate for President had to be acceptable to the leaders in Congress, no matter who he was, or to what faction or what party he belonged. Candidates were nominated by caucus, and the members of the various caucuses were invariably members of Congress " (p. 301).

" By the time Monroe's second term began there was no Federalist party . . . as the Democrats (old Republicans) had acquired by seizure a fairly complete set of Federalist opinions " (p. 290).

At this time the west of America was opening up. In 1820 nearly a third of the inhabitants of the United States lived beyond the Appalachians. Six Western territories became States in Monroe's time: Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, Missouri. "The spirit of the new Western States was intensely democratic (though there was still a property qualification for voting—however, they all were given property almost gratis), and in a few years they swept Andrew Jackson into the White House."

In 1818 the territory of Missouri applied for admission as a State, and that first brought to prominence the political antipathy between the North and South that was to end up in the Civil War. The point was that the capitalist or industrial interest of the North was in natural economic opposition to the agrarian (cotton) interests of the South.

Since the Federal Legislature imposed tariffs and other economic measures, the decision as to whose interests would be served, industrial North or agrarian South, depended on who had the majority of representatives in Congress. Each new State admitted meant additional representatives in both Houses—Representatives or Senate—according to where the new State was located: North, where they had no necessity for slave labour and were under the influence of the industrial Eastern States, or South, where their economy was based on growing cotton with slave labour. At the time when Missouri applied for entry the balance was even, but the new State, a Southern one, would have given a voting balance to the South and Southern economic interests. The debates in Congress as to the admission were hot, and the result was the Missouri Compromise, which meant that it was admitted, but a northern limit was set for slavery; but it also meant that a bitter sectionalism was sown in the Southern States. As can be seen, slavery, *per se*, was not the point at issue.

" As Monroe's administration drew towards its close the question of who would be his successor became bigger day by day. Office-holding was then, as it is now, the only really important business in Washington. . . . Four candidates were in sight." Three were " well-cushioned office-holders, with seats at the Round Table. Besides these there was Andrew Jackson, a dark horse of the deepest dye, with disquieting possibilities. The Legislature of Tennessee (one of the new vigorous Western States), with foresight and enthusiasm, had nominated him for President as far back as 1822 " (p. 301).

" In the way of personal abuse and baseless lies, coming from both sides, the campaign of 1828 holds the top-notch record so far in our history. It resembled a street fight, in filth and mud, between two gangs of ruffians " (p. 315).

Jackson, a Western lawyer and famous general, was elected. " The Jacksonian presidential era was one long uproar of controversy. The political squabbles of the time, intensified by personal animosities, grew into a many-sided fight which ran criss-cross over party lines " (p. 320). Jackson was of course a Democrat (called Democrat-Republican), because there were only Democrats at that time. Andrew Jackson was a strong President. It was he who set a presidential precedent in the stand he took against a verdict by Chief Justice Marshall. " John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it ! " Says Woodward: " The mechanism of government stalled on that one. The Supreme Court had no means of enforcing its verdict . . . and the President cannot be impeached by the Supreme Court."

In 1830 a famous debate took place in the Senate between Daniel

Webster and Haynes. "It was the first time in our history that the whole case for and against States' rights was brought out, clearly and brilliantly, on the floor of the Senate and, indeed, before all the people of the United States." It showed the difference of interpretation of the strength of the bond of Union—the first aim of the Constitution—that the Constitution in fact exercised as regards the States. *The debate was inconclusive.* "The debate revealed the fundamental antagonism between the agrarian civilisation of the South and the industrial civilisation of the North" (p. 324).

In 1832 South Carolina adopted an Ordnance of Nullification of the recent Tariff Act. Jackson prepared to send troops and the revolution collapsed. Jackson declared "the tariff was only a pretext for nullification; the real reason was disunion and the establishment of a Southern Confederacy, and predicted that "the next pretext will be the negro, or slavery, question." (p. 328).

All through Jackson's two terms as President the second "United States Bank was the centre of a blazing controversy" (p. 330). "On this question, with the revelation of scandals, etc., both National Republicans, or Whigs (the new party), and Democrats held national conventions in 1832" (p. 334). *N.B.*—These were the first party national conventions in American history.

Here is a picture of America about that time. The illimitable natural wealth of the continent was realised and took the imagination of the people. "Railroad building began and became the raw material of fantastic promotion schemes. Stock salesmen flourished in every large town. . . . The major part of this hectic speculation was in land. It was sustained by the constantly rising prices of agricultural products. . . . The astonishing migration to the West went on steadily. . . . The speculative value of land acquired from the Government was much larger than the Government's selling price. As a result, tens of thousands of men who might have been good farmers turned their backs on their fields and spent their time buying and selling land. . . . The United States imported grain. . . . Year after year we bought more than we sold. The European sellers of merchandise left a large part of the proceeds in America, to be invested or put out in loans. '*So our good fortune*,' says the biographer of Van Buren, 'fired the imagination of even the dull Europeans. They helped to feed and clothe us that we might experiment with Aladdin's lamp'" (p. 336).

"During the inflationary boom of the Jackson period there was a tremendous increase in domestic commerce. The capitalist manufacturers, in active competition with one another, sought to enhance their profits and to capture as much as they could of the expanding

market by reducing the cost of production. The burden fell on the great mass of unorganised workers. Wages were cut to the bone at a time when all prices were rising. . . . Even little children under twelve years of age worked thirteen hours a day. . . . There were spontaneous strikes . . . the leaders were hounded venomously by the employers. In some cases they were indicted for conspiracy" (p. 340).

Whilst the boom still lasted, and before the panic which developed later in the year, Van Buren, another Democrat, and the financial member of Jackson's Government, was elected President in 1837.

In 1841 the Republicans (Whigs), who "had watched Jackson's amazing career, and had come to the conclusion that military heroes possess a special and powerful magnetism, in a political sense," nominated as their candidate Harrison, who had "defeated some Indians in the battle of 'Tippecanoe,'" hence his nickname. "For his running-mate (for Vice-President) they chose John Tyler of Virginia, who, though a Southerner, happened to be an out-and-out Democrat, yet was nominated by the Republicans (Whigs) merely to get Southern support—the all-time record as the most extraordinary nomination ever made by a national convention." After making their nominations the convention adjourned *without adopting a platform*. Harrison, furthermore, was to make no speeches. "So, with no platform and a speechless candidate, their campaign began" (p. 356). Yet they won! They had a stunt slogan of 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too,' and a sneering remark on Harrison by a Democratic newspaper about "sitting in his log cabin with a barrel of hard cider" gave them the rest of their ammunition. They had log cabins put on wheels with barrels of hard cider which they handed round. "It was one of the strangest episodes in our history, and can be compared only with the happenings within a lunatic asylum" (p. 356). The greater part of the campaign speeches of the Whig spellbinders were devoted to derogations of Van Buren and his sybaritic personal habits.

"It was a valuable lesson for the Democrats, and they profited by it in the years to come. They learned that in presidential elections the American people do not vote *for* a candidate, but *against* a candidate. The suffrage, in national issues, expresses itself in malice" (p. 358).

"Harrison was sixty-eight years old, and utterly out of touch with the spirit of his time, . . . but his abysmal ignorance of current issues did not reduce his value to the Whig leaders. All they wanted him to do was keep alive; and they would do the rest" (p. 358).

However, he disappointed them and died one month after inauguration.

Now Tyler, a Democrat, became President as a result of a Republican victory !

" With Tyler as President the legislative situation became nothing less than fantastic " (p. 358). The entire cabinet resigned and he put Southerners in their places. " That was the finishing stroke. From one end to the other the executive department, with its vast authority, was in the hands of Democrats in spite of the Whig victory at the polls."

In short, government was being conducted against the consent of the governed.

Now came the trouble with Mexico over Texas, which belonged to Mexico, though predominantly populated by Americans. Tyler was for annexing, but this was voted down in the Senate, because it meant admitting another slave State and overthrowing the northern balance. At this time, 1844, the presidential election came round, again. " During the campaign the word ' roorback ' was created and it has lived in the American language to this day. A roorback is a political lie invented to influence public opinion against a candidate. . . . A roorback usually appears at the last minute before election, so that the candidate so discredited will not have time to deny it " (p. 364). However, as almost anyone would have beaten a Whig candidate, a Democrat called Polk was elected, " a quiet, colourless man. Nothing whatever could be said against him; he possessed all the static, negative virtues " (p. 363).

Now came the Mexican War, in which the U.S. took Texas and, much more valuable, all California with its gold. General Grant said later in his *Memoirs*, " I do not think there was ever a more wicked war than that waged by the United States on Mexico."

Needless to say, although America benefited by the war, the Whigs (Republicans) in opposition to the administration publicly disapproved of it; but nevertheless for their next candidate they chose a military hero from it: ' Old Rough-and-Ready ' Zachary Taylor, with " his soiled shirt, his unshaved face, his brutal manner of speech, and his tendency to enforce discipline by shouting " (p. 370). " Nobody knew what Zachary Taylor's political views were, for the simple reason that he had none " (p. 370). " In finance, economics, social welfare, and foreign relations he was almost wholly illiterate." Taylor won the election.

Taylor died after sixteen months, and he was succeeded by Vice-President Fillmore, " who was a nonentity according to any standard by which a President may be judged. . . . Coolidge resembled Fillmore in that neither of them possessed a trace of statesmanship " (p. 383).

Unceasingly during this time the antagonism between the capitalism (industrialism) of the North and the agrarianism of the South, " between two opposing conceptions of human society which could not exist side by side in a single nation " (p. 387), was growing. In 1850 a Convention of Southern States was held to consider their position in relation to the Union; secession, however, was not yet the result, but the 1850 Compromise. There was trouble nevertheless with a number of sects, like the later Ku-Klux-Klan. People were by this sick of the subject; it was evident there would be a political swing at the next election, so the Democratic Convention passed a resolution accepting the Compromise as final and nominated Pierce of New Hampshire, who was almost unknown to the great mass of the Democratic electorate. " He was a handsome, agreeable man of commanding presence. As an orator he was impressive. Further than that there does not appear to have been much to him " (p. 390). He was elected 1853.

In 1854 came the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. It was promoted by a 'railroad statesman,' Douglas; the intention being that the vast unoccupied area should be opened up as two new Territories, that in these Northern Territories all should be admitted, Southerners with their slaves and Northerners with their Free-Soil opinions; and that when the time came for their admission as States, the Territories should decide by popular vote their future status 'with or without slavery.' The Democratic majority in Congress passed the Bill because it had become a party measure. Obviously it was an inflammable Bill, because it was an incitement to strife in the Territories from the very beginning, and to strife about it outside. The strife duly flared. " Both sides were equally lawless; both used trickery and fraud; both committed hideous crimes. Farmers ploughed their fields with rifles strapped to their backs. The violent abolitionist John Brown killed five unarmed men in the 'Pottawatomie Massacre,'" but after his death at the end of a hangman's rope 'his soul went marching on.'

The Democrats did not forgive Pierce for passing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill and reopening the Slavery question, and they chose Buchanan of Pennsylvania as their nomination. " Buchanan was not a great statesman—or any kind of a statesman—but he was good political timber. There was nothing to be said against him, and that amounts to a good deal when a man is running for President " (p. 399). He won the election, carrying only his own Pennsylvania, in which he was immensely popular, and three other States in the North, but the solid South. " Thinking men who had managed to keep level heads in the political tornado saw an ominous portent in these election

returns. The struggle between the parties had become almost purely sectional; the North and the Republicans, on the one side, and the South and Democrats on the other " (p. 400).

Two days after his inauguration in March 1857 the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Taney announced its decision in the famous Dred Scott case, a negro. " The Court decided that Dred Scott was not a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution, and could not be made a citizen. The Constitution was made by and for white men, said Chief Justice Taney. Negroes had been and were regarded ' as beings of an inferior order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relation.' " This was while the sentimental *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, written by a Northern lady who had never been to the South, was a best seller. " Indignant mass meetings were held all over the Northern States " (p. 404).

Now we see opinion definitely crystallising for war.

To the Southerners " the nature of the abolitionist onslaught was particularly offensive. These attacks stiffened the Southern backbone. . . . Intelligent people in the South were well informed as to social conditions in the Northern States. They knew that the slums of New York City would be considered a disgrace on any slave plantation; that the working day in Northern factories was longer than the working hours of slaves; that the Northern cities were infested by beggars while there were practically no beggars in the Southern States. The growth and onward sweep of great personal fortunes in the North, as compared with the modest incomes of Southerners, was another factor. . . . Twenty-one millionaires were listed in New York City alone in 1852. . . . Many of the Northern fortunes had been acquired by sharp practices, by usury, by semi-fraudulent dealings, and chicanery of one kind or another " (p. 412).

Douglas and Lincoln, a Republican lawyer from Illinois, then had their famous debates in a senatorial election and Lincoln became a public figure. He received the Republican nomination for the next presidential election.

" The Democrats," on the other hand, " made a miserable mess of their convention." It nominated Douglas by a small majority. Thereupon the delegates of eight Southern States seceded from the convention and put up another candidate, Breckinridge of Kentucky. This was lucky for the Republicans and Lincoln, for the popular voting was: Lincoln, 1,860,000; Douglas, 1,291,000; Breckinridge, 850,000.

" The slavery question was paramount in the 1860 campaign " (p. 420).

" Lincoln did not receive one single vote in any State south of Virginia " (p. 423).

At a conference of South Carolina State leaders in October it was decided to secede in case Lincoln was elected. . . . On December 20th, 1860, a convention of the people declared the State out of the Union. By February 4th, 1861, the five States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida had followed, and a convention on that day created ' The Confederate States of America,' adopted a provisional constitution, and chose Jefferson Davis of Mississippi as President " (p. 425).

" President Buchanan was in a quandary " (p. 432).

Note the following and do not forget it:

" Some of the Southern States had seceded, and while Buchanan thought a State had no right under the Constitution to leave the Union, *he could not find any constitutional authority to coerce a seceding State*, to invade it and bring it back into the fold by force of arms. *Even if he had reached some determination, he would have hesitated to act, because Lincoln and his (opposite) administration were coming in, and he did not want to embarrass his successor* " (my italics).

Thus came the Civil War.

" President Lincoln's conduct was conspicuous for the number and variety of his unconstitutional acts. Yet every one of them may be justified on the ground of necessity. *The situation demonstrated clearly the constitutional weakness of the chief executive power in a time of emergency*. Buchanan was right in declaring that he could find no constitutional authority for using force against a State that had seceded. But Lincoln did not look to constitutional authority. He said, in effect, ' I have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, which means, in my opinion, a union of the States. I shall do everything in my power to sustain the Constitution and the union, regardless of the constitutional aspect of what I do.' That is obviously a dictum of the most dubious character. It could be invoked by a Fascist dictator, and it sets a bad precedent, yet the whole proceeding has been sprinkled with the holy water of history because Lincoln was right. *But what about a Lincoln who might be wrong, or inspired by ulterior and selfish motives? There may be some day; it is not impossible or even improbable* (my italics).

" Lincoln suspended the right of *habeas corpus*, . . . though it would appear that Congress alone has authority to do that. Thousands of men were thrown into jail and confined for months without even being informed of the charges against them. He gave stupid military officers the power to arrest citizens and put them in prison without a

warrant or an indictment. His subordinates raided the offices of newspapers and stopped their publication in defiance of the First Amendment. . . .

" The power to raise armies and declare war is invested in Congress under the Constitution. Lincoln paid no attention to that. He assumed the authority. That it would have taken time, and the emergency was so pressing that every day counted heavily, was his explanation of his failure to call an extra Session of Congress for the purpose.

" The Military Commander of the Maryland district was instructed to arrest all members of the Maryland Legislature who were suspected of disloyalty. Many were seized and imprisoned. . . . Chief Justice Taney declared they were held illegally, but they were not released. In this action of President Lincoln's a most dangerous precedent was created. *Through the acquiescence of Congress, then in session, the President had become a dictator. A repetition of these incidents may be expected in future emergencies, and we should not lose sight of the possibility that an 'emergency' may be readily trumped up to suit the circumstances* " (p. 437) (my italics).

Lincoln on September 22nd, 1862, summoned the Cabinet. He said he had an important paper to read. He said, " I think the time for acting has now come, and I have got you together to hear what I have written down." He then read the Emancipation Proclamation. This was an executive order issued under the war powers conferred upon the President by Congress. Thus by calling it a strategical measure *he altered the Constitution*.

The war lasted four years. The North lost 360,000 men, and the Confederates 250,000.

The war had just been won by the North when, on the evening of April 14th, after his election for a second term, Lincoln was shot at a theatre by an actor called Booth, by reason, they say, of vanity and liquor.

Vice-President Johnson became President.

The time of reconstruction after the Civil War, under Johnson, is a peculiar period in American history. " There is hardly a paragraph of contemporary comment on Andrew Johnson and his administration that can be accepted at its face value. There was not one speech delivered in Congress, or out of it, in those troubled years that can truly be called the utterance of a statesman " (p. 479). " The whole nation, both North and South, was suffering from the hysterical war psychosis which is the invariable aftermath of glory and bloody conflicts. Hence the extravagant assertions, the readiness to believe

lies, the fixation of absurd myths, the impulse towards cruelty" (p. 481).

Johnson grew up 'in ignorance and poverty' in Tennessee. He became a tailor, his business grew, he acquired lands and slaves and became a leading citizen. He detested the Southern aristocracy and became the leader of the poor farmers in Eastern Tennessee, who sent him to the Legislature, elected him governor, and later sent him to the Senate. Lincoln made him Military Governor of Tennessee in 1862 and suggested him as his running mate (Vice-President) in 1864. He was an honest, sincere, and fearless patriot, but his manner was coarse and quick-tempered (p. 483).

Congress met in 1865 and the long struggle between Johnson and the radicals began. The famous Committee of Fifteen, from the House and Senate, was dominated by the radicals, whose purpose was to take reconstruction out of the President's hands. In 1866 Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill, which guaranteed equal rights to all citizens, and assumed the freed slaves were citizens. The radicals rounded up a two-thirds vote in the houses and the veto was overridden. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed, which included a provision to force, by indirect methods, the Southern States to give the ballot to the negro (p. 492). To get sufficient States to ratify this before it became law " the Southern States had to be put under Federal *military rule*, and their ratifications were obtained at the point of the bayonet " (p. 492).

" Ohio and New Jersey tried to recall their ratifications when they learned that the real purpose of the Amendment was to protect corporations, but the Secretary of State declared that a ratification, once given, could not be rescinded " (p. 493).

" All Americans have a dual citizenship. They are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they live. One of the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment was to augment the importance of the citizen's relation to the Federal Government and to diminish correspondingly the authority of the States. It was a move towards the centralisation of authority, and was *part of the plan of large financial interests and industrial corporations to gain control of the nation's economic life* " (p. 493).

The financial interests wanted the negroes to be given the vote in Southern States because the ignorant negro was malleable. Then was the time the 'carpet-baggers' poured into the South. " They gained the negro vote by telling the freed man that slavery was about to be restored, and that it would be unless the coloured voters went to the polls and cast their ballot for Republican candidates "

(p. 494). " The most grotesque lies were solemnly told and believed " (p. 495).

Johnson was against these things, but his vetoes were out-voted in Congress. " During 1867 there were six attempts at impeachment which failed " (p. 496).

In 1868, "*for the first time in the history of the American nation, a President was put on trial for 'high crimes and misdemeanours.'* The impeachment proceedings were solemn and dramatic " (p. 500). " Thirty-five senators cast their vote for impeachment, and nineteen against it. Johnson was acquitted, having won by a single vote " (p. 501) (under a two-thirds majority).

" If the impeachment of Johnson had prevailed, it would have thrown the three departments of the Federal Government out of balance. The President would have become merely a lackey of the prevailing majority in Congress. . . . It would have been a long step towards the adoption of the British system, under which a Government may be turned out by an adverse vote in Parliament. The British method may be all right—it works well in England—but it is very different from the American federal system. If it were adopted, we would have to recast the whole structure of government."

Thaddeus Stevens (an opponent of Johnson) " remarked that no President could be removed hereafter by process of law. 'If tyranny becomes intolerable,' he said, 'the only recourse will be the dagger of a Brutus' " (p. 501).

" Everyone knew, of course, that Grant would be the next President. He was the ideal candidate, in that he was a military hero who had 'saved the Union.' The great mass of voters knew nothing, of course, about his dull ignorance, and his almost slavish subservience to crude and vulgar money-makers " (p. 501).

" Grant's simple trustfulness was pathetic. He did not seem to understand that intricate and designing shrewdness lay beneath the surface of human affairs. The gifts were to him just an expression of friendliness. Friends everywhere; friends sending him this and that. The selections for his Cabinet astonished everyone, including some of the men who were chosen " (p. 503). " It was a period of social transition. The nation's centre of gravity had shifted from politics to business. Moral standard in finance was at low-water mark. *People admired trickiness.* If a man could swindle the public without getting into jail he was called 'smart' " (p. 504). " Compared with the majestic legal thievery of Commodore Vanderbilt, men like Jay Gould and Jim Fisk were second-story workers, burglars who got in the toils of the law. Yet they, too, were admired " (p. 505).

" Gould and Fisk planned a gold corner—they came to the conclusion that they would have to get President Grant on their side. . . . Grant's brother-in-law, Corbin, told them that he could manage the President " (p. 506).

" The tariff had grown into a monstrosity . . . 42 per cent. of the total. Behind the entrenchment of protection the manufacturers of the North and East were making millions of easy, unearned profit at the expense of the South and West " (p. 511).

Then the railroad promoters. " The promoters felt that, to be on the safe side in these doings, they would have to pass a little sugar to the leading members of Congress " (p. 512). " After the exposure Grant wrote Colfax a letter of sympathy in which he said that he knew the charges were false. . . . His unswerving loyalty in such cases was of immense assistance to the swarm of rascals that surrounded him " (p. 513).

" There was a strong movement for reform by the ' Liberal Republicans.' They demanded a reduction of the tariff; a *strengthening of the civil service*; a cessation of Federal military intervention in the Southern States; and a general house-cleaning in the Federal administration " (p. 513). Grant was re-elected over their candidate Greeley—who, incidentally, " after his defeat became a raving madman and died within thirty days " (p. 514). (*N.B.*—This man might have been President.)

" The re-election of Grant (1873) gave the cheats and grafters of the administration an impression that they had an unlimited licence, by consent of the American people, to turn the national treasury into a free-gift shop " (p. 514).

Then was the phantasmagoria period of graft.

Note the comment of the American, W. E. Woodward:

" In the face of these startling thieveries and hypocrisies in high places one wonders, naturally enough, how and why the American nation has managed to keep reasonably civilised and decent. [He could not say it was by reason of the Constitution: he could not truthfully say that, because these things happened under the government of the Constitution—which has not been altered; and similar phases have happened since, and may happen any time under this Constitution.] The answer is that there is always a majority of honest, just, and well-meaning men and women. . . . We are a true social democracy . . . but we are not a financial and economic democracy by any means. In the place of the high-born nobility of Europe we have set up, through the operation of unrestrained and triumphant individualism, *a low-born aristocracy of wealth*.

" The wealthy aristocrats, the emperors of business, the grafters

and politicians sit uneasily in their places of power. There is always a possibility that a Mr. Bristow, a Secretary of the Treasury, may be unbribable, either directly or indirectly. And there may be a Mr. Clymer in Congress who wants to expose everything and impeach a Secretary of War " (p. 518).

" The powerful financial interests " in the Grant period—and not only in the Grant period—" were united by the common bond of possession. . . . Their policy was to secure control of the Government and direct legislation that would further their own ends. . . . Money captured the country."

" In 1911 F. T. Martin wrote a devastating book about his own moneyed class. In *The Passing of the Idle Rich* he depicts their political outlook in this fashion: 'It matters not one iota what political party is in power or what President holds the reins of office. We are not politicians or public thinkers; we are the rich; we own America. We got it, God knows how, but we intend to keep it if we can by throwing all the tremendous weight of our support, our influence, our money, our political connections, our purchased Senators, our hungry Congressmen, our public-speaking demagogues, into the scale against any legislature, any political platform, any presidential campaign, that threatens the integrity of our estate?' " (p. 520).

Whilst we are on the subject, compare this with another American, Howard K. Smith, in *Last Train from Berlin* (1942, p. 250): " For instance Mr. J. P. Morgan possesses several million units of economic power in the form of funds left over after he has satisfied his bare necessities, and these he can use to influence State and national Governments and big issues. On the other hand, my friend Steve Smith, a dock worker, possesses no units at all of economic power after he has paid the rent and bought food. . . . There are in Mr. Morgan's group perhaps 10,000 people . . . in Steve Smith's between fifty and eighty million citizens.

" Take the single example of electing a national President. In America a President is elected not by votes alone but also by money. It takes upwards of ten million dollars to elect a President. After the Steve Smiths have taken care of their necessities, they have little or nothing to contribute to the fund to influence an election. But the Morgans can pay ten million and more, and they do. (' This is not meant to be specifically a criticism of President Roosevelt's election. . . . However, it remains an actuality in respect of every one of our past Presidents from Lincoln's day on; and it remains a potent factor in future elections.') . . . They can influence all the means of moulding public opinion."

Again, another American, W. W. Johnson, in *Roosevelt* (1942, p. 165): " The propertied classes were the American equivalent of the aristocratic classes in Europe."

To continue with our history.

" The financial freebooters who pulled the strings of the Grant administration " carried through " these piratical measures in the Southern States to prevent the Southern whites from having a hand in the national legislation. . . . The radical majority in the South Carolina House of Representatives consisted of ninety-four negroes and seven whites. The extreme generosity of these law-makers has become historic in the annals of bad government." (These are State Governments that *can happen* and *have happened*, under the Constitution !) . . . " There was a restaurant and bar in the basement of the State Capitol where members of the Legislature were given food and liquor, in unlimited quantities, free of charge. But that was not all. . . ." (p. 526).

The Ku-Klux-Klan of white citizens then arose in the South. " The glamour of its actions infected the Southern people with a spirit of lawlessness that still shows itself in murders and lynchings and in a violent outlook on life which is incompatible with a high order of civilisation " (p. 530).

" The Grant administration, mired from head to foot, presented a sorry spectacle. Times were changing and the chill of a political autumn was in the air. Big Business, having gained about all that it hoped to gain, . . . had lost its enthusiasm for the stolid soldier in the White House " (p. 532). They chose Hayes of Ohio for the next election, " honest, well-meaning, and mediocre." He was elected (1877–81), and " his efforts at reform were greatly impeded by lack of support from his own party "—who were still the Republicans, of course.

The Republican Party bosses disliked Hayes on account of this reforming tendency, so next they chose Garfield, of Ohio. " Garfield was wholly subservient to the leaders of his party in matters affecting their interests. . . . He would have made an ideal President for the Rockefellers, the Carnegies, the Huntingdons, the Morgans, and others of the same class who were occupied in transforming the United States into a feudal domain, but his career was cut short by assassination, 1881 " (p. 543).

Arthur, the Vice-President, now President, " was a Republican machine politician who had been put on the national ticket of 1880 as a sop to the spoilsmen of the party who longed for a return to the good old days of unlimited pillage " (p. 544). But " there was an

unsuspected and remarkable change in Arthur's personality. He dropped the methods of machine politics and became a determined champion of honesty, efficiency, and good government. He was the first modern President in that he governed for all the people and for all sections, regardless of party " (p. 544).

The first civil service law was passed, basing appointments to clerical positions on competitive examinations regardless of party, and advocated a tariff revision, but this was evaded by Congress. There was a great stir at this time over great post-office frauds, but " nothing came of it, for the reason that the accused proved that every step taken by them was legal. . . . The grafters were acquitted, but the nation-wide agitation over the affair led to a reform of the system " (p. 546).

It also led to the return of a Democratic candidate in 1884. " Grover Cleveland began his public career as a small-time politician in Buffalo. During his early years he was a bar-room lounger, street-fighter, and canvasser for Democratic votes; in short, a ward heeler with enough legal knowledge gleaned discursively from law books to get himself admitted to the Bar. When his career came to a close after he had had two terms as President, he ranked as a statesman " (p. 546). The Republicans, for candidate, had put up Blaine, who " was thoroughly tarred with financial scandals. . . . For the first time in our history a major political party nominated as its candidate for President a man who was known to be dishonest " (p. 547).

Thus there was a Democratic President after twenty-four years. But though there was also " a Democratic House, there was a Republican Senate. A legislative situation of that kind is exceedingly trying to any President. When the opposition party is strong enough to control one branch of Congress, the administration can work only along lines which are approved by both parties " (p. 550). The hands are tied.

" Cleveland extended the scope of the civil service gradually. . . . He cast out the unclassified employees of the Government, practically all of them being Republicans. He removed them in wholesale fashion and Democrats took their places. (Note this section well.) The Democrats had been kept away from the spoils so long and were so hungry for rewards and emoluments that there was a mad scramble. The time of the new President was occupied for months by office seekers, almost to the total exclusion of public business " (p. 530). However, he was a strong President with a policy for reform. He ' persistently goaded ' Congress on the question of reducing the tariff. " It was a fateful hour in our history. If the tariff was ever to be revised

downward, the course should have been set in 1888. The nation was losing its agrarian character. The tariff-protected industries were growing all over the country; they were becoming the central core of our industrial life " (p. 552). But he could not beat the influence of the industrial magnates and the tariff remained, and in the next election, under their influence, the Republicans got back.

" Harrison was a meek and unobtrusive nonentity. It would have been just as well, so far as his influence was concerned, if there had been no President at all during his four years' sojourn in the White House. Congress could have done all that was required; and, as a matter of fact, Congress, under the leadership of aggressive advocates of the money power, did initiate and carry out its own programme. Harrison's function was simply to approve " (p. 553). In his first Annual Message he urged *increased* tariff protection for American industries, and an astonishingly liberal pension scheme, the Message prepared in consultation with party leaders (p. 554). " But they had overshot the mark, and long before Harrison's term was over it was plainly seen that the Republicans were losing ground " (p. 555).

Cleveland went back.

" At this time a third party, the new Populist party, arose, and in the 1892 elections won a handful of States in the Mid-West. They stood for a redistribution of wealth, for restricting large fortunes, for a national currency independent of the banks, for ownership of public utilities by the whole people.

" Although the Populist Party has long since disappeared, its ghost still lives. It was revolutionary in character. In various guises it has hovered over the national conventions of both the great political parties for the past forty years; and it has coloured the whole body of political thought " (p. 557).

Now came Bryan's silver controversy, and the financial panic of 1893. " It approached quietly. All over the country mills shut down, one by one. The primary causes were, as with all panics and depressions, (*a*) low wages, (*b*) over-capitalisation, (*c*) speculation, (*d*) extensive borrowing and accumulation of debt. . . . According to time-honoured American custom, Cleveland was blamed for the depression." There were strikes, disorders, and violence; mails were obstructed, trains derailed, cars and shops burned. Cleveland ordered Federal troops to Chicago to preserve order. This, of course, a President has no right to do. There was shooting. Cleveland lost popularity with the working man and only pleased the Republican politicians. The Democratic Party abandoned him and in the half-term election 1894 " the Republicans regained control of both Houses

of Congress. *Cleveland had become a President without a party, in Congress or out of it*" (p. 563).

It was fortunate there was no war or outside danger threatening America at that time.

In the 1896 Election the Democratic Party chose Bryan the Puritanical, free-silver advocate of finance, and the most moving orator who had ever appeared in American politics. The Republicans nominated McKinley, a former Congressman of Ohio. "During the campaign it was generally recognised, even by the Republicans, that McKinley was the catspaw of Mark Hanna," a plutocratic Republican boss (p. 566). "Bryan was beaten by the lavish use of money, and by threats and intimidations. . . . Hundreds of thousands of factory workers got a slip in their pay envelopes the Saturday before the election which said: 'If Bryan is elected, do not come back to work. The plant will be closed.' The campaign against Bryan was unspeakably vile. He was called a traitor, an anarchist, a madman" (p. 566).

"The people of the United States, through their verdict at the polls, declared themselves to be on the side of Big Business. Thereafter, for a space of years, the invisible empire, the power behind the throne, was to be a financial oligarchy consisting of monopolists, promoters of trusts, and their lawyers and bankers" (p. 567).

Now came the war with Spain over Cuba. Senator Thurston of Nebraska said at the time: "War with Spain would increase the business and earnings of every American railroad, it would increase the output of every American factory, it would stimulate every branch of industry and domestic commerce" (p. 571).

That was when Colonel Theodore Roosevelt was in command of the 'Rough Riders.'

About the same time there was a revolution in the little kingdom of Hawaii "inspired by wealthy American sugar interests. So the revolutionists overthrew the native queen and Hawaii was annexed and admitted into the American union as a territory."

"The war with Spain was a small, comic-opera affair, but it fed the flame of imperialism mightily" (p. 576). In the peace settlement the United States took Puerto Rico and the Philippines and ceded the independence of Cuba.

The Republicans renominated McKinley with Theodore Roosevelt for Vice-President. The Republican platform included adherence to the gold standard and a protective tariff. Again they beat Bryan and the Democrats. "The general prosperity contributed greatly to McKinley's election. Wages were rising; there was little unemploy-

ment; the farmers were doing well; the merchants and industrialists were prosperous."

Woodward here makes this comment: "The Republican Party has been, for many years, the normal governing authority in the United States." (It would seem to be analogous with Big Business interests.) When they "are tangled up so thoroughly in their own devices that they have no way of extricating themselves, then the Democrats have been voted in, but only for a short period, their business being to set things right" (p. 577).

McKinley was shot by a demented anarchist September 1901, and Theodore Roosevelt became President.

"The effort to bring democratic institutions and Big Business into harmonious relations on the same social terrain has been a perplexing problem for more than a hundred years, and as time goes on it becomes more insistent and more difficult. With the rise of immense fortunes and industries of huge capitalisation and, on the other hand, the submergence of millions of Americans into a state of poverty which appears to be hopeless and permanent, the complexities of the problem are increased. It is a fundamental question that cannot be settled without profound changes in our social system and in our national outlook on human affairs" (p. 579).

"Our forefathers went into the wilderness and conquered it. There was opportunity for all, and each man was for himself. The pioneers created wealth; they did not take it from other people; they made it for themselves." (IT WAS THERE, IN AND UNDER THE SOIL, FOR THE TAKING.) "Then, in the course of time, there was another and different tribe of money-getters, men who did not work for what they received. They developed an amazing dexterity in manipulating the equities of corporations, in watering stock, . . . etc. . . . That they were dealt with so lightly by the repressive forces of the Government and public opinion will doubtless be one of the curiosities of history to men and women a hundred years hence. . . . It is just lately, within the last few years, that we began to enquire what else he became besides becoming a millionaire. We discovered, to our great regret, that he usually developed an impressive capacity for ruthless greed, and a tendency to disregard other people's rights" (p. 583).

Roosevelt apparently had these thoughts too. "This remarkable personality had an unbounded admiration for physical prowess, an unquenchable desire to shine in public; . . . also, he loved a row" (p. 588). "In many ways he resembled Andrew Jackson in temperament. Both were annoyed by the limitation of executive authority and

they endeavoured to extend its scope by actions of dubious constitutionality. 'I did not usurp power,' Roosevelt wrote in his Autobiography, 'but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power.' . . . He swiftly made decisions in complicated matters, berated people he did not like, praised his friends, criticised Congress. . . . His antagonism to trusts, and to large corporations in general, which he referred to as 'malefactors of great wealth,' was disturbing to Republican leaders." Indeed, he was "far away from the central core of Republican doctrine" (p. 590).

He attacked the great trusts and was instrumental in dissolving the Northern Securities Company (Morgan–Hill–Harriman) in 1902. He further increased his personal popularity by settling the coal strike. He issued an invitation—it was really a command—for both operators and strike leaders to send representatives to the White House. The conference was a failure. Roosevelt immediately made plans for taking over the mines by force and operating them in the public interest. The mine owners climbed down and increases in wages and a nine-hour day were given. Roosevelt said he was carrying out the Jackson–Lincoln theory of the presidency, that he is the 'steward of the people,' and justified in taking vigorous executive action in great national crises.

He bought the Panama Canal route from the French, but whilst the offer was unaccepted landed U.S. Marines to 'restore order.'

"As the President's popularity grew, so also grew a darkening distrust of him among politicians, bankers, and the moneyed classes generally" (p. 594). "He was nominated by popular acclaim for another term at the National Republican Convention of 1904" (p. 596).

Roosevelt picked Taft as his successor (1909–13).

For the time being Roosevelt had evidently scared the money interests and for a while there were no loud graft scandals, etc. The Taft administration carried on to make "an excellent record. . . . The civil service was greatly extended; the eight-hour day was granted to all government employees. . . . The Sixteenth Amendment authorising income-tax was passed and submitted to the States. . . . And the Seventeenth, providing for the election of senators by popular vote" (p. 598).

Taft was elected on a platform which called for a downward revision of the tariff, and that is what he conscientiously tried to effect. But the Bill suffered the usual fate of tariff measures in the maw of Congress. It was mutilated and amended so thoroughly at the urge of *special interests* that the original intention was lost" (p. 598).

Roosevelt, in retirement, did not admire Taft's easy-going mildness and the two men fell out. Furthermore, he organised another party,

the ' Bull Moose ' Party, to oppose him in the next election. Accordingly the Republican vote was split and Wilson got in (1913–21)—a Democrat.

Woodrow Wilson was a university professor who had been elected to the governorship of New Jersey as a Democrat and was now nominated for President. He was a remarkable person. An idealist. In his inaugural address, with reference to the history of the American system of government he spoke of " ideals lost, of government too often debauched and made an instrument of evil." " Sustained by an indestructible sense of superiority. . . . He detested politicians. . . . The overwhelming disaster of his life came from his conviction that men are reasonable beings, that right and justice, sustained of course, by logic, must win in the end. Such noble conceptions are not supported by experience, unfortunately " (p. 602). " His policies, embraced under the head of ' New Freedom,' had as their objective a series of internal domestic reforms. Freedom for the average man from the pressure of High Finance and Big Business. But he was not a Socialist. He applied himself to the task of reconciling capitalism and democracy " (p. 604).

However, the War came.

America did enormous business. " As the months rolled by the purchases of the Allies increased enormously. Millions of people were employed " (p. 605). Woodward considers America was taken into the war by the profiteers in war supplies and the lenders of money to Germany's enemies. He says America's paw was badly singed in pulling the Allied chestnuts out of the fire (p. 608). On p. 609 he says: " We were forced into the war by Germany. The German Government created a diplomatic impasse which placed the United States in a position which no self-respecting nation could endure "—*i.e.* the sinking of U.S. vessels, etc.

" In the back of President Wilson's mind there was a half-hatched notion of bringing all the combatants together on a basis of goodwill. He was appalled by the war. It was so completely devoid of common sense " (p. 618).

On January 31st, 1917, a German note forbade American vessels to approach the British Isles. On April 6th, Congress declared war.

" Of 4,255,000 men selected by the draft, a little more than 2,000,000 were sent to France. Of these about 1,400,000 served in the trenches. . . . America was the decisive factor in the war " (p. 626). " American losses were: killed, 48,909; wounded, 237,135; missing, 2,913; taken prisoner, 4,424; total, 293,291 " (p. 629). " American troops were on the ground only during the last six months, and

American losses were trifling as compared with the staggering casualties of the Allies. . . . To the Du Ponts the World War meant a fabulous multiplication of riches. . . . in one year—1916—their net profits ran up to $82,000,000. . . . The Du Ponts were not alone in their profiteering and rapacity. The figures speak for themselves. . . ." Here follow figures (p. 638).

During the war, in America ' dictators ' were appointed in various branches of activity and industry, *e.g.* War Industries Board, Food Administration (Herbert Hoover). " In December 1917 another dictator was appointed. All the railroads of the United States were put under the control of McAdoo."

In 1918 the Nineteenth Amendment was put to Congress, giving suffrage to women. It passed both Houses in June 1919. The suffrage enthusiasts " argued that women would bring a new element of purity, honesty, and nobility into politics and even national affairs. Unfortunately this has not turned out to be the case " (p. 650).

On p. 651, Woodward says: " *Our continental empire produces almost everything that is essentially needed by mankind—cotton, sugar, wheat, tobacco, wool, iron, coal, coffee, oil, meat, lumber, hides, fruits.*"

In January 1918 Wilson produced before Congress his ' Statement of the War Aims and Peace Terms of the United States '—his famous ' Fourteen Points.'

The war ended November 11th, 1918.

The eyes of the world were turned on President Wilson. He went to the Peace Conference at Versailles in January 1919, with his plan for a world-wide League of Nations.

He took with him four men, and " he made it a point to overlook the Republican Party. . . . It was what the newspapers call a ' hand-picked ' delegation " (p. 657). " In these proceedings Mr. Wilson ignored the Senate, which was a dangerous mistake. The United States Senate is the most powerful legislative body in the country. It ranks far above the House of Representatives in its potentiality for good or bad. . . . Any small group of senators can defeat a measure, whatever its merits may be, by simply talking it to death " (p. 657).

In short, when Wilson came home, Congress would not ratify his undertakings. " On March 19th, 1920, the treaty was voted down in the Senate. It had a majority of votes—49 to 35—but it failed in carrying the necessary two-thirds. Thereupon Congress passed a joint resolution declaring the war with Germany at an end, and Wilson vetoed it, as it did not ratify the Versailles Conference treaty of peace. The situation dragged along. Finally, during the Harding adminis-

tration, separate treaties of peace were signed with Germany, Austria, and Hungary " (p. 663).

" *From September* 1919 *to March* 1921 *the United States was virtually without a President*. . . . He was not insane, but he was very ill. . . . He was forgetful of even the most important matters and easily fatigued " (p. 665).

The Republicans had lost the election last time on a split vote; this time they regained it with Harding (1921–23).

" Harding was a small-town newspaper proprietor. . . . He liked people and was the sort of man who always had a gang of cronies around him. On Saturday nights he played poker at his club, sitting up until the early hours in an atmosphere of cigar smoke and Scotch highballs. . . . He went into State politics in a mild way and was elected to the Senate. After his term in the Ohio Legislature he was chosen by the Republican Party for the office of lieutenant-governor and served one term. . . . Largely through Dougherty's manipulations (Dougherty was a Republican Party boss in Ohio), he was sent to the United States Senate in 1915. . . . It suited him exactly. . . . All he had to do was vote occasionally, serve on a few committees, and get positions in the Government service for friends and henchmen. . . . There were two leading candidates for the Republican nomination, Wood and Lowden, and another Johnson. . . . Dougherty thought they might fight each other to a standstill; . . . in that case, what about a third man, a dark horse? . . . Harding did not want to be President. He preferred the easy comfortable Senate. By dint of pleading, Dougherty got his consent to go ahead. . . . When the Convention met, . . . Wood and Lowden kept each other from being nominated. . . . Harding ' was nominated because there was nothing against him; and because the delegates wanted to go home.' Harding himself said, in his poker-playing language, ' We drew to a pair of deuces and filled ' " (p. 668). " He did not lack intelligence; he was merely soft in character and lazy in mind " (p. 666). " Alice Longworth says: ' Harding was not a bad man. He was just a slob.' . . . To balance self-indulgence with prudence is a fine art, and Mr. Harding was not an artist " (p. 667).

" The choice of a Vice-President was an afterthought. . . . Johnson declined, not wanting to play second fiddle to Mr. Harding. . . . So in the midst of leave-takings and good-byes, Calvin Coolidge, then Governor of Massachusetts, was nominated " (p. 668).

Harding's slogan was ' back to normalcy.' " It was revealed, in the end, that Harding's idea of normalcy was to give a free hand to money-getters, sharp-witted tricksters, stock manipulators, and other

bandits who lived by raids on the national income. That is called 'individualism' in the American language, a high-sounding term for money greed transfigured and parading as a virtue" (p. 670).

"The painful truth is that Harding knew nothing whatever about any complicated questions of economics or international relations—or indeed of social welfare—nor did he intend to learn, for learning would have meant an irksome discipline of mind and prolonged application" (p. 670). "As to his knowledge, the chances are that he had never read the League Covenant through from beginning to end" (p. 671).

"For the financiers and large-scale industrialists he was an ideal candidate. Big Business and its cousin, High Finance, were then riding on the crest of the wave. As a presidential candidate in the interest of special privilege and millionaire money he was, indeed, too perfect. Some of his advisers counselled him to devote more of his speeches to the common man—and he did" (p. 671). "Many of Harding's selections for important places were astonishing. . . . Fall, the Secretary of the Interior, was virtually bankrupt when he entered the Cabinet. He was not only lacking in money but also in principle—so much so, indeed, that before his career was over he managed to get himself in prison" (p. 672). "Forbes, made head of the Veteran's Bureau, was an inspired looter" (p. 674).

The administration was flagrant with peculations, and graft, bribery, and dishonesty in high places; indeed, it was the fashion throughout the land. "Though the Harding Administration is memorable chiefly because of the scandals which characterised its troubled course, it made a notable contribution towards the limitation of armaments" (p. 676).

"In those days one encountered racketeers and minor politicians from Ohio in every hotel lobby in Washington" (p. 678) "Whisky permits did not constitute the entire stock-in-trade of *Attorney-General Dougherty's friends. They could get convicts out of Federal penitentiaries on parole; they could procure Government jobs for those willing to pay for them; and they were good at getting indictments quashed and sentences suspended*" (p. 679). Then were the great oil scandals, Teapot Dome, etc. "It appears likely that if Harding had lived he would have been impeached" (p. 684). He died August 1923, and Coolidge succeeded him (1923–29).

In a great criminal bribery case regarding Liberty Bonds a Cabinet officer, Fall, was convicted of a penal offence. "The most startling thing about it was that both Doheny and Sinclair were acquitted. . . . Scores of people of vague status had suddenly become rich; convicts

had been unaccountably paroled, and the Department of Justice, under Dougherty's direction, had been almost unbelievably negligent and inefficient " (p. 685). In 1924 Dougherty, after having resigned his post, was tried on a charge of conspiring to defraud the Government, but was acquitted.

'Silent Cal' Coolidge was " to Big Business a beautiful dream come true. His idea of President was to let everything alone; to give business and finance a free hand. It was not necessary to persuade him to take this attitude; that is the way he thought without prompting. It was instinctive with him " (p. 696). " He sat quietly in the White House, fiddling about with trifling affairs, and drawing his salary. It was a good job, better by far than he had ever expected to have in his moments of most ardent optimism " (p. 697). " Just the same, by reason of his policy of letting everything alone in the interests of Big Business, Calvin Coolidge gave such a tremendous impression of sanity and common sense that when the Republican nominating convention met in June 1924 he was almost the unanimous choice of the party " (p. 699).

" The decade of the 1920's was one of industrial evolution " (p. 708). There was great industrial prosperity which was felt everywhere —or nearly everywhere. " The glittering sunshine of the Coolidge Administration did not cast its glow over the American farmer. His days, in that ebullient period, were cloudy and cheerless. The contrast of the condition of agriculture with that of stock speculation, let us say, was painful " (p. 714). But the impoverished farmers carried no weight of political usefulness and the Republicans were firmly in the saddle. Hoover was elected (1929–33).

" The election of Herbert Hoover as President of the United States is one of the curiosities of political history. Until the year 1917, when he was appointed Food Administrator for the United States, he had spent nearly all his adult life abroad, mostly in far-away, outlandish places, . . . as a mining engineer and financial promoter of mining properties. . . . In 1919 he was asking newspaper men and others to explain to him the difference between the parties, and what each of them stood for. Nine years later he was elected President by the largest popular vote ever recorded up to that time. The story of how this came about reveals . . . the value of skilful publicity, and several other things " (p. 715).

" He was so far behind the times, and so completely lacking in social vision, that he never knew what it was all about " (p. 717). " In the moment when he made his New York speech—October 1928, with the phrases of ' rugged individualism,' ' paternalism,' ' individual

initiative,' and ' unparalleled greatness '—we were the victims of brazen swindlers who made hundreds of millions of dollars in the promotion of rickety enterprises " (p. 718). Within twenty months of Hoover's address 3,000 banks failed ingloriously. They simply collapsed; there was no money to pay their depositors " (p. 719).

Patchwork attempts to relieve agriculture were tried—the Agricultural Marketing Act—but proved " fatuous " (p. 722) and were dropped. Congress again debated tariff reduction. " As usual, when a tariff measure is before Congress, Washington was full of log-rollers and lobbyists " (p. 723). Instead of reduction, the Smoot-Hawley Bill was passed, by which " the average of tariff duties under the Act was 40 per cent., an increase of 7 per cent. as compared with 1922 " (p. 723).

This was the Great Depression. " Hoover appeared to be completely bewildered and lost in the immensity of disaster. . . . The depression, he thought and said, was a mere passing phase of the prosperity wave " (p. 724).

Mr. Hoover and the Republicans were foredoomed to defeat in the election of 1932. Nevertheless 15,761,841 voters cast their votes for Hoover against 22,821,857 for Roosevelt.

John McConaughy said in his book *Who Rules America?*:

" There could be no better proof of the persistent authority of propaganda than the fact that in 1932 more than 15,000,000 grown men and women voted to return President Hoover to office. After Returning to Normalcy with Harding and the oil-thieves, Keeping Cool with Cal and the corrupt inflationists, and finally Standing by the Great Engineer, 15,000,000 adult Americans asked for a repetition of the dose."

" Roosevelt came to power almost exactly as Harding and McKinley did—that is to say, the people were intent, not upon electing him, but upon defeating his opponent. To adopt a much-misquoted remark of H. L. Mencken, the Democrats could have beaten Hoover with a Chinaman " (H. K. Smith in *Roosevelt*, 1942).

Roosevelt was elected with substantial majorities in both houses of Congress.

" The way was open for the New Deal " (p. 726).

The New Deal is tackling social welfare and other problems in a vast way; indeed it is in some respects encroaching on preserves that were formerly considered to have belonged to the States. To that extent it is a step in the direction of making the Government of the nation of America more unitary. *But it has not altered the Constitution.* Therefore the measures of the New Deal may not become

permanent; indeed at each election the Republicans swear to sweep away the New Deal which is ' ruining America.'

There is another significant thing about the Roosevelt Administration from our point of view. He was re-elected in 1936 partly because many people consider him the shrewdest political campaigner in American history, but mostly because he and his Administration had *done something*, when formerly chaos had been threatening. But, for the first time in American history, this man was elected for a third term! Why? Partly because of the above factors, partly because he was recognised as a great man who had seen what was coming and had in a measure prepared for it against loud antagonism, but surely very largely because ' it is a bad policy to change horses in mid-stream.' The mid-stream then, towards the end of 1940, was easily the most dangerous moment to America's existence in the whole of her history. With conquering Germany stretching out fingers and only England between, with Japan in arms on the other side, it was the most fatal threat that had ever loomed.

Before closing this review, note this table of immigrants to America, in decades—and the corresponding population each year designated (figures from *The Story of the American People*, by C. F. Strong):

Year of Census.	*Population.*	*Number of immigrants during each decade.*
1860	31,443,321	2,598,214
1870	38,588,371	2,314,824
1880	50,155,783	2,812,191
1890	62,947,714	5,246,613
1900	72,994,575	3,687,564
1910	91,972,266	8,795,386
1920	105,710,620	5,735,811
1930	122,775,046	4,107,209

What are the outstanding facts to be elicited from this history of the American system in actual practice?

In my opinion there are five.

1. That the vast rich continent has been, as one put it, a veritable Aladdin's lamp. From the time of federation a continual stream of immigrants has flowed there from other countries, in some decades, especially this century, as great in numbers as entire new nations, to be absorbed without difficulty into its wonderful pros-

perity. Plainly up to the present (till 1930 anyhow) the natural internal resources of America have never been strained by its population. With its unabsorbed resources there has so far been no *natural* economic problems for the national community, though there may have been some transient artificial economic problems.

If the natural resources are by now, in the 1940's, approaching satiation by population—as there appears to be some evidence—we may expect to see these evidences of economic problems become less transient.

2. Since federation up to 1941 the United States has never been in jeopardy by foreign war. She has engaged in wars, but she has never been frontally attacked by a power capable of destroying her. Up till 1941 the nation has never been engaged a hundred per cent. either in defensive or offensive war against a foreign enemy. This has probably been owing to her situation. About the present war we cannot draw conclusions yet.

(In his Annual Message to Congress, January 6th, 1941, President Roosevelt said: " It is true that prior to 1914 the United States often had been disturbed by events in other continents. . . . But in no case had a serious threat been raised against our national safety or our continued independence." And again, in an Address on Armistice Day, 1935, referring to the World War of 1914–18: " We were not invaded, nor were we threatened with invasion then or later.")

3. The federation temporarily ruptured and a terrible civil war ensued, owing to economic and other less basically important differences between groups of States. That rupture was healed; but mark this: since America is a Federation and not a unitary State, the conditions—that is the possibility of group differences—are *still the same*, and there is no guarantee that the future will not see a repetition. For the Constitution which did not prevent the rupture is still the same Constitution.

4. The President is a critical figure. The personality of each President, who is irremovable for four years, is critical for the nation. If he is a strong President, he may—and has in the past—make autocratic decisions by manipulating or disregarding or even breaking the Constitution; if he is a weak President, he may—and has in the past—be influenced almost totally by financial or other, perhaps unnational, interests.

(Of one aspect, President Roosevelt said in an Address at Chatauqua, New York, August 14th, 1936: " The effective maintenance of American neutrality depends today, as in the past, on the wisdom and determination of whoever at the moment occupy the offices of

President and Secretary of State"—the latter being selected by the President.)

5. For most of her history, the democracy of America has been influenced, if not ruled, by an oligarchy of financial (aristocratic) interests. This is an observation. It is not a criticism. It may be that this form of government is in fact better for a nation than a pure non-capitalistic political democracy.

Now for our analysis as to WORKABILITY AND STABILITY IN ACTUAL PRACTICE.

But before that let us briefly survey the system in actual practice as regards the aims, as we did in the case of the test of Practicability, and parallel to that analysis.

We first note of the Constitution that since 1791 (after the Bill of Rights)—a hundred and fifty years—there have been only nine amendments. (This excludes XVIII and XXI, one of which was admitted to have been a mistake and is cancelled by the other.) None of these amendments essentially alters what appears to have been the general intent of any section of the original, unless the abolition of slavery (XIII), widening of suffrage (XV and XIX), or more democratic method of electing President and Senates (XII and XVII), are interpreted as such alterations.

AIM 1. To form a more perfect union.

PREVIOUS VERDICT: We judged that the constitutional federation did show promise of making America an improved Union of the separate States, but not a unity. There was a loophole for substantial differences in group viewpoints and hence, possibly, for group strife.

ACTUAL PRACTICE: This was proved by the grim Civil War, and by several attempts of States or groups of States to leave the Union. So far since 1864 no individual States or groups of States have declined to fight in the Federal cause—but there is no guarantee: the Constitution has not been changed to bind them closer.

AIM 2. To establish justice.

PREVIOUS VERDICT: This was seen to be a matter of the administration of the laws and was wrapped up in the question of stability (permanence) of officials. It was seen to be on the whole likely, but incompletely ensurable by the instrument. We saw that the States' justice was not influenceable.

ACTUAL PRACTICE: On the whole justice has reigned, but there

have been many flagrant exceptions; judges tried for bribery, lynchings, etc.

(In relation to this and the next aim, which are ordinary duties of government, note the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his Annual Message to Congress, January 4th, 1939, when he is speaking of required 'legislation to provide greater government efficiency.' He says: "We see things now that we could not see along the way. The tools of government which we had in 1933 are outmoded. . . . Most of us recognise that none of these tools can be put to maximum effectiveness unless the executive processes of government are revamped—reorganised if you will—into a more effective combination. And even after such reorganisation it will take time to develop administrative personnel and experience in order to use new tools with a minimum of mistakes.")

AIM 3. To insure domestic tranquillity.

PREVIOUS VERDICT: It was seen to be doubtful.

ACTUAL PRACTICE: We see the black fact of the Civil War; we see for a time over wide areas the flouting of law and the rule of force and the six-shooter; we see lynchings and riots, even Presidential riots; we see great financial and political scandals, with notorious evidence of bribe-taking and contempt of law; we see the reign of racketeers and gunmen, 'bosses' who constitute themselves the law of a district or city. No one can say it has been a time of uninterrupted domestic tranquillity.

AIM 4. To provide for the common defence.

PREVIOUS VERDICT: In the circumstances in which the United States was placed a hundred and fifty years ago, and so long as they remained in those circumstances, we judged common defence secured by the measures laid down.

ACTUAL PRACTICE: It has so proved. Conditions (speed of communications, distance, etc.) are changing, however, and no one could guarantee the future under the same measures.

In his Annual Message to Congress, January 4th, 1939, President Roosevelt said: "We have learned that effective timing of defense and the distant points from which attack may be launched are completely different from what they were twenty years ago. *We have learned that survival cannot be guaranteed by arming after the attack begins*—for there is a new range and speed to offense."

AIM 5. To promote the general welfare.

PREVIOUS VERDICT: We saw that nature, in the lavish wealth and resources of the continent, had laid down measures in mass for the general welfare of a large population. The Constitution, however, had laid down no measures for the distribution of this livelihood. Nor has the Constitution laid down any of what are commonly understood to be the measures of general welfare in a community—pensions, medical attention, unemployment relief, etc.—these measures being left to the States or transient administrations.

ACTUAL PRACTICE: Until recently the Federal Government has taken no part in providing for the general welfare; in some of the recent Administrations it has done so, but not under measures laid down in the Constitution. And a large section resist the Administration taking these measures. They may be reversed.

AIM 6. To ensure the blessings of liberty.

PREVIOUS VERDICT: The blessings of liberty, with enlargement of the franchise, we judged assured.

ACTUAL PRACTICE: So it has proved.

. . . . . .

We now pass to our general method of assessment under the headings: WORKABILITY, in peace and war; STABILITY, in peace and war.

Workability in peace, in actual practice.

As a matter of simple fact we have seen that when the system was inaugurated during peace, towards the end of the eighteenth century, it did work.

Workability in war.

Apart from the war of 1812 and several other minor wars which never endangered her existence, America has only been twice nationally extended by foreign wars, 1917 and 1941, and once by civil war. How did the system work on these three occasions?

We judged previously that the immutable (constitutional) duality of the system: (1) the administrator-commander President, who alone issues orders, and (2) the voting Congress, who alone raise and maintain armies, and declare war—that the duality was a possible source of weakness in emergency. Either they must immediately act in concert or the executive (President) must supersede Congress—because the President is irremovable—or they are lost.

In the civil war we saw it was a matter of emergency. There, for America's fortune, they had a strong President who *acted unconstitutionally* and superseded Congress. He commanded the raising of armies and he declared war. Thus the nation continued in existence *by a denial of the system.* After that, by keeping some members from Congress, there was concert.

In 1917 it was not an emergency. America had plenty of time to watch the event (declaration) developing; at the time of the event she was not mortally threatened; the time of development had brought the duality into concert.

In 1941 the events of development had brought the two near concert, and that concert was welded in a flash by an enemy's blow on a sea outpost. But, in the opinion of many, the fact of the incomplete concert of the two before this had rendered the nation less well prepared than she should have been, and thus increased and lengthened the danger to the nation.

After concert was gained, actual practice showed that the system has been workable in war.

There is, however, another aspect of the system that must not be passed over. That is the laid-down four-yearly election of President. There are those who think that but for this unevadable provision of the system there would have been no civil war. The Confederate States had vowed to secede if Lincoln were elected. It hinged on that. When he was elected, they seceded. The writing of war was on the wall. There was an interval of four months before he came to office. That fatal interregnum. A President with power at that time, or an unchanged President, might still have avoided war. . . . And who is to say that this dangerous interregnum could not be just as fateful in the case of a threat of foreign war? It could. Hitler we know watched matters very closely and used his influence to effect a change. But let us pass on.

Stability in peace, in actual practice.

First, the stability of the system.

After the first ten there have only been eleven amendments in a hundred and fifty years of almost uninterrupted peace, none of which essentially changes or disfigures the original. This shows an extremely high degree of stability. In short, as a matter of historical fact, it has been a remarkably stable instrument in peace. But there have been a number of occasions during this time—not war occasions—when various Presidents, as another matter of historical fact, have carried on government by acting unconstitutionally. On those occasions,

therefore, this system was, or was considered, inadequate. In any event, the fact is that in peace the system has not been *completely* stable.

Second, the stability of the community under it. Stability here means absence of community unrest and dissatisfaction, and community disturbances.

To be truthful, the American scene, as reviewed, does not present a picture of unbroken placidity. Apart from the terrible civil war, and the widespread unrest, shootings, riots, etc., which led up to it, and the disturbed picture which also followed it for some time in the unfortunate Southern States, there have been frequent evidences of group discontent with conditions both before and since. Now changing economic conditions, inevitable in the march of history, demand continual readjustments. These are inseparable from the life of any nation, particularly one which is living through a time of substantial change such as that imposed—the most substantial in history—by the great industrial revolution which coloured the whole nineteenth century (in England, Russia, and everywhere else except backward Asia and Africa) and is still in progress. America was grossly industrialised much later than England, but the adjustments it required in the lives of the American community were just as vast, once it got started. These adjustments with their concomitant discontent and unrest are evident in the history, particularly in the latter section. But since they may reasonably be regarded as inevitable, we may put them aside for the moment. In the history there are frequent other legal and social and political disturbances unconnected with industry. In our theoretical analysis we judged that the recurring unavoidable (constitutional) change of administration—that is continual alteration in administration of the laws and instrument—was likely to produce such effects. *Because the community which goes on living does not know from Administration to Administration precisely where it stands.* The community does go on living, and after episodes of unrest—sharp or mild—does accommodate itself successively, but, throughout, there is not settled placidity or stability. This, I think you will agree, we have seen in actual practice.

The point is that the Constitution does not make provision of any permanence, or continuity, of personalities—and after all, the whole thing is to do with human beings—between one Administration and the next. Though personalities (in the civil service, etc.) may in practice continue, it is not in accordance with the provisions of the constitutional instrument. In short, the Constitution deliberately conditions variability of administrative interpretation every four years. That is the point we must grasp.

But though rightly critical we must not, however, be hypercritical. Being sensible we do not, and never will, expect perfection. What are the facts ? For a hundred and fifty years under the American system this large community, with one terrible and prolonged exception, has been on the whole comparatively stable. Throughout, however, there has been running an undercurrent of minor instability. And this must, *must*, be put down to the composition of the system—the Constitution.

Note these striking statements by Americans, summing up after a survey just as we are doing.

" In some respects the Constitution has a cast-iron rigidity, an inflexibility which is definitely obstructive and without any useful purpose :" (Woodward, p. 197).

" The singular good fortune of the United States provided it, at the moment when each of the first three of these upheavals (a deep, almost revolutionary movement) swept into our history, with a national leader able and energetic enough to blast rigid obstructions out of the way and let the tide run free. The result is that the United States has survived at least three crises, every one of which contained enough potentially explosive force to wreck any country " (G. W. Johnson, p. 27, *Roosevelt*, 1942).

But, note, the Constitution remains *the same !*

" We have been tinkering with our government continuously. Hardly a day has passed since the adoption of the Constitution that has not witnessed the projection of some scheme for its alteration " (Johnson, p. 28).

" The Constitution was conceived by our forefathers one hundred and fifty years ago to fit the conditions of that time. Now we are living in a new world, with new problems, new necessities, and new economic realities. Yet we have among us an antiquated, senile Constitution, creaking with the rheumatism of age. In the efforts to circumvent it, to climb over the obstacles that it raises against a free-flowing national life, various subtle devices have been, and are being, used. Congress has expended a considerable part of its energies, during the past twenty years or so, in inventing ways and means to ' get around ' the Constitution. Would it not be better to call a convention every twenty years and revise the entire Constitution, so that it would be in harmony with actual existing realities ? " (Woodward, p. 207).

Note that the ' subtle devices ' used in each Administration (*e.g.* New Deal) to adapt the Constitution to factual conditions are not part of the laid-down system we are examining, not part of the Constitution,

because the Constitution is an unalterable—except by amendment—fixture.

We conclude that the American system has proved stable during peace in actual practice—with distinct modifications.

Stability in war, in actual practice.

First, the stability of the system—the Constitution.

We saw that Lincoln conducted the Civil War, not by adhering strictly to the Constitution, but by acting contrary to the Constitution. "His conduct was conspicuous for the number and variety of his unconstitutional acts" (W., p. 436). Thus in one war, the fiercest, and the only one on the soil of America, the system was not stable; it broke.

The 1917 war was not an all-out war for the American nation. Nevertheless, though there was not the original note of emergency, it was war and it meant a war régime. It necessitated the appointment of 'dictators' in various industrial and other fields, and various 'rights' were abridged. These measures, found necessary, are *not* to be found in the fixed Constitution—quite the reverse. So in this war, too, the system did not remain stable.

What of the third war? We find similar things happening again.

We conclude that in actual practice the system has not remained stable in war.

Second, the stability of the community under the system in war.

We find that the community governed by it has remained stable enough during the war, but, at that, they were not under the laid-down system. They were in each emergency under an altered system specially (and temporarily) adapted for the circumstances of the moment—not the inflexible Constitution.

The Test of Time

Having now examined three systems, for the first time we feel entitled to put this test. It is the crucial test.

How does the United States form of government face up to the Test of Time. This is what we mean by *durability*.

Now wait a minute. Before we rush into a hasty judgment we must define our terms. Our dictionary gives the definition of durable as 'lasting, not transitory; resisting wear, decay, etc.' The 'resisting wear' is surely the important part from a political point of view. For instance, a navvy may wear out a pair of corduroy pants quicker than, say, a politician may wear out a silk shirt; but that does not mean that the silk shirt is a more durable article than the corduroy

pants. Again, you may put some wax flowers under a glass case and keep them there for a hundred years, or dig them out of an Egyptian tomb after five thousand, but that does not mean they are durable. In other words, time is not so much a matter of hours and minutes as of events; and the durability of a creed or political constitution, just as much as an army tank, is a matter of ability to sustain hard knocks. Unless, therefore, there have been events in the last century and a half of America's story which can be construed as 'hard knocks'—by which we can only mean the type of events which normally endanger a nation's stability—that period of time alone cannot fairly be construed as a test of time.

The cardinal hard knock which tests and endangers a State is war.

(By States we here imply, of course, the political constitutions with which they are identified: in common parlance 'the destruction of a State 'infers that, not the blotting out of its individuals.)

By war we mean in this connection WAR, in capital letters. Not the incidents of war that the British Empire is constantly engaged on in its frontiers, or even far from home like the Boer War, but a war which demands the whole resources of a nation, and the loss of which will mean *defeat* with all that implies—being absolutely at the victor's disposal.

Now, the United States, from inception as a nation, has never fought such a war!

I must, and I do, leave entirely out of account this present war. It is not over yet; and there is no one to say whether at the end of it, or as a result of it, the fixed constitutions we are studying may not be changed.

The Civil War was not of this order. Defeat of the North by the South would have meant—that is what they were fighting for—separateness of the South. Defeat of the South by the North, as happened, did in fact mean—*no change in the pre-existing Constitution* (except the Slave Amendment). The Civil War was unquestionably a hard knock from other points of view—as being a tremendous community disturbance—but at no time, expressly by it, was the system, *i.e.* Constitution, endangered either in fact or in intent. Defeat of the North might have meant a reframing of the Constitution, but not at the dictation of the South. The 1917–18 war was not of this order either. Then America, with nobility, and naturally self-interest, decided to help beat down a distant aggressor nation with greater despatch.

Nor, until now, on account of her position, has America ever had the *threat* of this type of war from a powerful neighbour.

These are the hard knocks from without.

What are the other hard knocks which endanger the stability of a régime ? They are the hard knocks from within.

It is clear that to endanger there must be some form of attack, and we can name such serious events in order of degree.

(*a*) Organised rebellions against the existing order.

(*b*) Sporadic uprisings and riots (either organised or unorganised) due to dissatisfaction with the existing order.

(*c*) General or sporadic unrest expressive of dissatisfaction with the existing order not amounting to the dignity of uprisings, in that law is not flagrantly defied, but that is none the less a danger to stability.

(It is to be noted that (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) can all be stirred up by agitators without there being anything radically wrong with the existing order, but nevertheless if successful they constitute the same danger.)

We saw by our survey of the history that America has had her experience of all three. To have survived them all for a hundred and fifty years without changing the system is surely a high commendation of that system. It unquestionably is. But do not conclude there. The question must be asked : how serious have been these hard knocks ? Were they really hard knocks ? Apart from the Civil War, which we have already dealt with, how serious have been the remainder ?

We must recognise that in the last hundred years America has been going through the throes of the same industrial revolution which has caused the dislocation or smashing of many political systems in various other parts of the world. That fact must come into our assessment of how serious have been these internal hard knocks.

We take it into our account ; but we also take the well-recognised and well-attested political truism : *the facility with which political unrest can be fomented in a country, and the seriousness which it may reach, are in inverse ratio to the standard of living enjoyed.* It is the people with the ' lean and hungry look ' that are tinder for rebellion.

I think it would be difficult for anyone to argue that America's prosperity, which has from the beginning beckoned an uninterrupted flood-stream of immigrants, is due to the Constitution alone, and has nothing whatever to do with her wonderful ' Aladdin's lamp ' natural wealth.

Therefore when we ask the question, how does the American system face the Test of Time ?, we are logically compelled to give this guarded reply. In its treasure-house isolation America's history has so far been different from that of all other nations. It has not yet in its hundred and fifty years been subjected to enough of the

harsh criteria which, in this connection, we mean by Time, for us to judge.

The question cannot yet be definitely answered.

The system has lived, however, and functioned with a few temporary arrests (when Presidents have been forced by facts to act unconstitutionally) for a hundred and fifty years. That is a tremendous fact. It is the greatest fact established so far in our whole study of political systems. But the full test of Time has not yet been applied.

. . . . . .

This is the conclusion of our analytical tests. It seems a guarded conclusion. And so it should be if we are doing our critical job correctly. But let us look up for a moment. We cannot pretend to pass unemotionally over a fact like that we have just uncovered. As, some distance back, we saw the conclusion emerging we felt excitement stirring within us, and we must be honest enough to say what was in our minds. *After a hundred and fifty years this mixed-racial, enlightened community are still living—and have been continually, with occasional interruptions when Presidents, to meet emergencies, acted unconstitutionally—under the very letter of the original Constitution as regularly as ever.*

We take a great breath.

Is there any need, we ask ourselves, to search farther ?

Out of our own mouths, we are searching for " a political formula by which a community such as ourselves can live in self-respect and security for succeeding generations. A Constitution that will function and that will last." We have admitted that the political aims of the framers of the Constitution are ' manifestly our own aims '; we have witnessed it functioning unaltered; and we have now seen it lasting, practically uninterruptedly, for one and a half centuries of history. In all honesty, then, is this not the end of our search ? We have found some flaws in justice and tranquillity and welfare and so on, but, let us be completely honest, long before that we said we were not looking for perfection; we were not even looking for morality; we were merely scientifically and detachedly looking for a political formula by which a broad community such as ourselves could with reasonable certainty count on these named requirements.

Well, by all the gods, haven't we got it ? Aren't all the conditions complied with ?

The answer must be: *All except one.*

Note that little phrase " a broad community *such as ourselves,*" and particularly the words italicised.

"But," I can hear someone retorting swiftly, "surely U.S.A. is a broad enough community in all conscience. Although racially it is predominantly Anglo-Saxon, there are quite a number of other 'races' mixed with it of every shade of opinion, property, and extraction. And as for 'such as ourselves,' why, apart from the Dominions, we can't think of any other community that is more precisely such as ourselves—for the English aren't so purely Anglo-Saxon as all that; there has been quite a mixture of other European 'races' in their thousand and more years of history. Quite frankly," says this person, "we can't see any difference apart from superficial mannerisms and so on, except that the Americans live in America and the English live in England."

"Precisely," we reply quietly, "that is just the point. You fetched out this geographical difference as a joke. It is no joke."

Geographical situation is a very important political factor indeed.

Look at certain established facts of history.

Modern Iceland, a small and poor (it is not an Aladdin's lamp) island community, has a thoroughly democratic form of government. They have no armed forces, having, they consider, nothing to excite envy, and being geographically isolated. In short, they take no precaution for defence and are an extreme of the democratic form of government—completely unmilitary, designed exclusively for peace. In consequence, they may be used as a catspaw by any armed nation.

On the other hand, modern Germany, intending to fight, assumed the other extreme form of government, a military autocracy, designed exclusively for war.

These two are extremes. That extreme democracy is suitable only for peace and extreme autocracy only for war is proved by history.

Look at Greece. The other democratic States were prosperous and extremely enlightened; but against the military autocracy of the Macedonia of Philip and Alexander they fell like grass. Alexander's State and army conquered the world, but when he died the Empire shattered; it had no organisation for peace. Alexander left no will or successor, in consequence there existed no plain *instrument of permanency* in the system by which the organisation of the Empire could be uninterruptedly carried on.

Next, Rome.

Before Empire, whilst it was an isolated poor community distant in Italy, it was a republic. For some hundreds of years, whilst it continued isolated, it remained a republic, the same recognisable republic with the same continuing basic Constitution—the Roman Laws. This Constitution was its continuing plain instrument of per-

manency. After its fight with Carthage, however, it suddenly found itself rich, with a comparatively wide-flung Empire. It was now no longer isolated, but in contact with other nations all round. Through great military leaders the Empire increased until at about the time of Christ it was vast, and required to be always prepared for enemies both within and on its boundaries. Was it still a republic? Yes and no. It was still supposed to be a republic, with no permanency of leaders or officials, but it was actually, the Empire was actually, a battleground for powerful military leaders, Cæsar, Pompey, etc., striving for pre-eminence. In fact the republic had failed; this was no State-government at all. They made a change. *And in its changed form the Empire lasted for five hundred years.* From now on it was not exclusively a matter of isolated peace, nor was it exclusively a matter of war: it was a matter of conserving a great State in all eventualities. We know that autocracy—or arbitrary government without reference to rules or a constitution—is the best form for war because it gives unified control; but we also know that it becomes intolerable to a human community if it is too strict or if prolonged beyond the time that circumstances render it necessary. So the Romans moved towards, not *to*, but *towards* the autocratic form. This was the Roman system, described by Gibbon in the first paragraph of *The Decline and Fall*: "The image of a free constitution was preserved with decent reverence: the Roman senate appeared to possess the sovereign authority, and devolved on the emperors all the executive powers of government." In short, to their tried-and-found-wanting republican system they added a life-appointed supreme executive, the Emperor (which in Roman meant general), with his life-appointed executive officials. Thus they increased their community stability and control by adding to their long-term factor of permanency, the impersonal constitution, a new lifetime-intercurrent or short-term factor of political permanency, an executive human one. It is evident that there can be every shade of gradation along the line between a pure republic, whose essence is an impersonal constitution alone, and a pure autocracy, whose essence is a person alone, the unchanging head of a State; and each community, if it wishes to survive, must adopt the special gradation that is best suited to its particular circumstance.

Where does America stand along that line?

At one end we have the debating democracy with perpetually changing executive—geared for peace: at the other the taut, unified, arbitrary control of an unchanging executive—geared for war.

In answering this we put the question: Where, from her geographical position, would you expect her to stand? There is our

answer about the geographical factor. Surely along towards the first type of government—geared predominantly for peace. We have seen that this is where she does stand.

(President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in his Address before a joint session of Congress, May 16th, 1940: " The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were reasonably adequate defense barriers when fleets under sail could move at an average speed of five miles an hour. . . . Later the oceans still gave strength to our defense when fleets and convoys propelled by steam could sail the oceans at fifteen or twenty miles an hour.

" But the new element—air navigation—steps up the speed of possible attack to two hundred, to three hundred miles an hour."

And again, in his Annual Message to Congress, January 6th, 1941: " *Even if there were no British Navy*, it is not probable that any enemy would be stupid enough to attack us by landing troops in the United States from thousands of miles of ocean, until it had acquired strategic bases from which to operate.")

What about England?—for, after all, we are discussing a community ' such as ourselves.' Where, from her geographical position, cheek by jowl with the warring nations of Europe—and they have always warred—would you expect England to stand? Surely we are compelled to answer, reluctantly perhaps, certainly not as far towards the first type anyhow, unless she is highly improvident. In other words, we would expect her to be geared—it is no use blinking facts—rather more readily for war. We would expect to find a greater degree of permanence in the executive.

Therefore, in the American system have we come to the end of our search?

We have been critical, but there is no need for us to be niggardly. We say this: It has imperfections which were evident to us theoretically and were demonstrated in actual practice; but we do not expect perfection in our search. Beyond question, the American system is far and away the best form of government we have yet examined in its approach to our requirements. It almost answers everything—but not quite. We are looking for a system *for ourselves, in the situation that we in fact occupy*. This system may give us self-respect; but would it, in our position, guarantee us safety—security—the second and equal requirement? We say No; it would be far too dangerous to risk it. For if it were a mistake it would only be made once; it would be our finish.

Apply the system imaginatively to our own community in England for a moment, and see the result.

To take only one aspect of it. Every four years there will be a national climacteric—the presidential election, with the country split into two camps, each half vilifying the other's nominee, with our entire executive, crown, and civil servants, in the melting-pot. Every four years—if there is a change of party—an interruption of government, a powerless executive, or a discredited executive (which comes to the same thing), for a period of four months, and then possibly a completely new and untrained set of officials throughout the country to administer it. Would inimical nations at our elbows—and all other nations are potentially inimical—appreciate this recurring situation, and utilise it? They would be fools if they didn't. Would it be a safe system for us, in our position? There is no other answer than No.

This form of government may be a very good form of government for the community that it concerns. It may even be quite the best possible for the American people, living where they do. We may have our own private opinion about that, but after all it is their concern.

But we do not live in America. We live in a little coveted and envied island off the coast of powerful-nationed Europe; and with our intelligent awareness, through blunt experience, of the ever-present likelihood of being threatened with, or thrown into, war at short notice, we know instinctively that the unqualified United States form of government is not the best for us.

No, we have not yet come to the end of our quest.

THE BRITISH SYSTEM

"England has grasped the fact that only that is conservative which moves forward, and only that is progressive which does not break with the past."
(ALEXIS HOMYAKOV, in *The Russian Review*, Vol. I).

WE come finally to a consideration of the British or English form of government.

Before doing so it would have been interesting and instructive to have considered certain other forms of government at present reigning in the world—for there are scores—each one of which is, it must be supposed, considered by the nation living under it best suited to their aims and particular circumstances; but while we would in most cases quickly be able to classify each one as more or less similar to one of those already studied or to be studied, it would make the investigation extremely long. In any case, I think that the little phrase 'such as ourselves' does render their examination not very pertinent. Besides, we have so often referred to the British system in late pages that we cannot with any face defer it longer.

The British system is not nearly so easy to classify or define as the last three: Russian, German, and American. Whereas with each of these we had a clear-cut creed, either set down as a short statement (U.S.) or easily extractible as such from the pages of a specific 'bible' (Russia and Germany), like a newly-minted articulated object which can be conveniently taken in the hands—howbeit, in Russia, though still advertised under the name of the patented object, the system has never been that in action—in England, on the other hand, we have what at first sight appears to be a clumsy mass of custom and expediency and compromise that has grown with the centuries. Indeed, when the U.S. system, by far the oldest of the other three, was giving notice of its birth, it, the British form of government, was already centuries old in its establishment and functioning. Further than that, the signers of the Declaration of Independence themselves declared that when correctly administered it was a definitely recognisable and admirable form of government by making one of the specific charges against the King, "for abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighbouring province, and establishing therein an arbitrary government." They proved that this was their rooted opinion by incorporating much of this 'free system of English laws' in their own Constitution, bearing in mind their own wise dictum that "Prudence will dictate that government long established should not be changed for light and

transient causes." Finally, that the mass of custom and expediency and compromise is, in spite of appearances, not hopelessly clumsy but well articulated is proved by the fact that it, structurally unchanged, still recognisably 'it,' is still functioning as well as ever.

Nevertheless, we are not to be led away by other people's opinions, even though favourable. The duty to which we have vowed ourselves is to examine, define if possible, and then assess—using, in this latter process, what we can scientifically admit as facts both of history and human nature, and applying to every conclusion plain common sense.

England has as executive head a King, therefore it is a monarchy.

The King cannot act except with the consent, that is to say by the direction, of Parliament. This is one of the customs or laws of the State that collectively are known as the Constitution. Parliament itself cannot pass tentative laws (bills) or decisions for submission to the King (who alone can make them laws by signing them) unless both the content and procedure of these decisions are, again, in conformity with approved precedent or law—again, the Constitution. In other words, there is a laid-down Constitution, and the King, just as the President of the United States, rules or administers strictly in accordance with it.

Therefore, England is a Constitutional Monarchy.

What about Parliament, which we know is composed of members elected by the community? It would appear that this is the body which actually draws up and makes the law, whereas the King only signs it, and that therefore *they* really have the power. That is correct. But, says someone, if the people in their elected members really have the power, and thus govern themselves, surely that is Democracy! Of course, that is also correct. Beyond any question, England is governed by democracy.

Therefore, England is a *Democratic Constitutional Monarchy*.

Democracy and Monarchy. It is a strange, almost contradictory, duality. And it is not the only anomaly. There may be discovered in the Constitution of England many other coexistent circumstances that are, on the face of them, contradictions; but—this is the crucial point—they will be found to *work*. They will be found to have been working, through all the ups and downs of the life of England, for a long time. And on analysis they will in every case be found to have been arrived at as the result of hard experience. But this is jumping ahead.

Examine, define if possible, and then assess, was the order. But to examine the Constitution of the English Government—to see how the various customs grew which came to be our Constitution, before

we have any hope of being able to define it—if we follow the precedents we have set ourselves in this study, means really to review the whole of English history, for that is actually the space of time during which it has been growing. Fortunately, that is not necessary in any detail, for the facts are known to us through our studies in childhood alone, if not since. It is the story of a nation—our nation—growing up. There is first the picture over two thousand years ago of a rabble of small tribes in a verdant island, at the mercy of one another and of casual invaders. Then a more civilised invader came who gave them order and peace and centralised law for four hundred years. When the Romans withdrew there was again a lapse from order and centralised defence; and the natural instinctive struggle for dominance was again resumed by vigorous men, including further invaders. But the experience of the advantages of justice in ordinary dealings with one another which they had known for so long under the Romans was not forgotten. Perhaps it was always there; perhaps it, too, is instinctive. Throughout all that time until the coming of the Normans, local councils gravely met to discuss local affairs, and larger councils (the Witenagemot) to discuss larger. It was this quality of responsibility, this sturdy sense of what was owed them, that determined William the new conqueror in his intelligent policy. The Rights of an Englishman, which were what the American Declarers of Independence were referring to when they spoke of the free system of English laws, were proclaimed clearly then; and William, who as the head of a conquering army came with an instrument to enforce a strict autocracy, saw that this was not a community of slaves to be put to work, but a community of men to be worked with. Shortly, there were no longer Normans: there were only Englishmen.

Since William, for nine hundred years there has been an unbroken line of English kings. For nine hundred years, save for one interval of eleven years, an unbroken thread of undisputed executive authority. That is a considerable period. (The interval of eleven years was the period of the brief Republic and then Cromwell's dictatorship.)

Before I pass on, I can see that the word 'undisputed' needs explaining. I mean that the executive authority of the Crown was never disputed (except in the one instance referred to), and as the line of these kings was not interrupted, neither was the undisputed executive authority. This does not mean that the succession was never in dispute—the identity or person who automatically and uninterruptedly took up the executive authority on the termination of office (death) of the predecessor. Of course it was, once or twice, in nine hundred years; for people are only human, and title-deeds, for instance when a

king dies childless, are not always clear. So was the succession in Rome disputed, where the successor was not indicated with such natural simplicity, often and often. But those arguments, which in England were generally settled swiftly and without much disturbance, do not vitiate the statement that the executive authority of the Crown (whoever might wear it) was undisputed; and that the succession of kings continued without hiatus. There was always a recognised king. They had a saying, and still have: "The King is dead; long live the King," which simply means that at the moment one king breathes his last, in that moment his successor is already reigning. He is the King whether ceremonially crowned or not, and the monarchy is uninterrupted. If this one's title to office is disputed and another claimant (pretender) displaces him, legally or by force, then the second becomes King at the moment the first dies or abdicates, again without a time interruption. (That was, indeed, William the Conqueror's argument when he came to England and defeated Harold: that he was the correct and legal heir of Edward the Confessor, and was, in fact, already King of England.)

I have said that most of these disputes as to succession have been accomplished without much disturbance. By that I mean general disturbance by which the whole country, or a large section of the population, is thrown into two disputing camps. Only at one unhappy phase (the Wars of the Roses) has that happened in England, and then it was accompanied by much bloodshed, though mostly confined to the nobility. That was a bloody phase of the Middle Ages, from 1453 to 1483, when the throne passed by murder and battle from Henry VI (Lancaster) to Edward IV (York), to Edward V (Princes in the Tower), to Richard III, to Henry VII (Lancaster and Tudor). But as a distinguished historian, H. A. L. Fisher, says: "The contest between the rival houses of York and Lancaster was distinguished from the feudal insurrections upon the Continent during the same period by one notable characteristic. *Both English parties accepted the unity of the kingdom and the system of government by King, Council, and Parliament which had been handed down from earlier times.*" That was the one phase in English history of the last nine hundred years when the country was generally disturbed, in the sense of being divided into two camps, over the question of succession to the monarchy (which is all part of England's political experience); and that, it should be noted, was nearly five hundred years ago. There has been none since. That is a considerable time, too.

Nine hundred years, save for one interval of eleven, an unbroken thread of undisputed executive authority. An impressive time, and a

striking instance of one aspect of political permanence. But does the fact that, throughout, England has had a monarchy (whose succession is not disputed) for constant executive head mean that during all that time England has had the same form of government? No. It has been said that politically England has been constantly growing up, and now we must tell the story.

The people of this island he had conquered, William found, were a people who already for some time had been accustomed to having something to say in the management of their own affairs; and that, too, in a fashion that showed some measure of organisation. The value of this in practical government was not lost on William: the organisation could be used and improved. Now, these were feudal times; and with the Conquest, England automatically took the form of a feudal state, by which the country was parcelled out into a number of great fiefs with Norman rulers, all owing allegiance to the King, and each fief what was really a small autocracy. As was to be expected, there was at the beginning considerable oppression of the native inhabitants, but they were not a people that could be oppressed for long (apart from the fact that the Normans intermarried with them), and this dogged sense of their 'rights,' with the organised means of representing them, persisted in being heard. Soon it was to be an issue between the two systems, the feudal and the national, and in it the feudal was to disappear.

Here is a picture of the period given by Fisher: An intelligent central authority using an existing partially-trained sense of citizenship. As well as Normans, responsible Anglo-Saxons, too, were consulted in this way; and soon (comparatively soon), as we know, Normans—the children and grandchildren—forgot they were Normans. This may be said to have been a form of government by King and Council. "The fact of the Norman conquest, while bringing England fully within the zone of French civilisation, was one of the causes which ultimately led England and France to pursue different lines of constitutional development. *William I made of England a single State. That work was so well done that it was never undone.*

"The period of feudal anarchy under Stephen was repaired under Henry II, to whose great series of administrative and judicial reforms England owes centralisation of justice, for which France had to wait for many centuries. By the time of Henry II's death, four great lessons had been instilled into English people. They had been taught to pay taxes, a lesson which the French monarchy never succeeded in teaching the French people, and which even now is not fully learned. They had been taught that crime is an offence against the King's peace, of which

the King's court desired to have exclusive cognisance. . . . They had learned that there was *one law for the whole country*, administered by one supreme court, the Civia Regis, with its judges going on circuits through the country, and everywhere, when on these official errands, representing the power of the King. And, finally, they had become habituated to the duty of co-operating in the task of government, either as tenants called upon to render knights' service in the wars, or as citizens called upon to follow the hue and cry, or as jurors for the assessment of taxes, the punishing of criminals, or the adjudication of civil suits in the country courts. The system continued to work under an absent king, like Richard, or under a bad king, like John, who in nothing more fully showed his remarkable ingenuity for extracting fleets, men, and money from the national administration which had been bequeathed to him by better men."

And a little later, with reference to the latter part of this period:

"The monarchy manifested itself as the chief constructive principle of the State, and developed representative institutions around the central meeting of a *royal council*. . . . These assemblies owe their being not to any abstract theory but rather to the pressure of financial needs, or because business was thus most conveniently discharged, or as a means of reinforcing the crown in times of crisis."

This, within a hundred and fifty years. Here we have a State ruled by a strong central authority (Crown) and council, with a considerable means of self-government allowed to the people in local affairs. The Central Council (or Great Council, as opposed to local councils) is no longer a staff of powerful nobility—for feudalism has gone—but is a representative body comprised of the barons and prelates, certainly, but also of landowners and burgesses of the towns. "The strength of this English body, the feature which gave it a permanent and continuous rôle in English government, was that it was in the main an assemblage of persons of an intermediate social rank, who were accustomed to the discharge of public business in their separate localities."

But the King cannot yet be constitutionally controlled, because as yet there is no Constitution—at least, no written one. Or, rather, there appears not to be a written one, but, as we shall see in a moment, there actually is one, comprised in the proceedings of the Great Councils (*N.B.*: customs and precedent) to which attention is shortly to be drawn.

Read on:

"While the French monarchy was thus tending towards absolutism, England was set upon an opposite course. The Norman nobles who

had conquered and pillaged this wealthy island did not long remain an alien and exclusive caste. They intermarried with the Saxons, merged with a population too vigorous to be permanently subjected, and came in the course of a century to regard themselves not as Normans but as Englishmen. After the last great feudal revolt had been crushed by Henry II, they were compelled to accept the national government of the Crown as an established institution, in the working of which they were called upon equally with the knights of the shires and representatives of the towns to bear a part.

" With this transformation in the character of the nobility from the position of an alien caste to that of a native aristocracy, the principal obstacle to the growth of an English nation disappeared. The tyranny of a bad king was sufficient to provoke a national opposition in which churchmen, barons, and townspeople were alike involved. The Magna Carta, extracted from King John, ranks as the first of our English statutes and is rightly regarded as the cornerstone of English liberties. This document was no revolutionary or philosophical manifesto, but *a restatement of the rights and privileges which were already assumed to belong to the Church, the nobles and the townsmen, and 'the community of all the land.'* The barons of the charter were not concerned to make new law, but to prevent the violation by the Crown of *existing rights.* They had no theory of liberty as such. The liberties which they were concerned to defend were feudal, ecclesiastical, and municipal privileges. Against royal caprice, they offered the bulwark of *legal custom.* The charter does not mention the word ' Parliament,' which first came into use in the succeeding reign, but lays down that no extraordinary aids or scutages (taxes) are to be levied by the Crown save with the consent of the common council of the realm, an assembly of prelates, barons, and tenants-in-chief. Nor yet does it mention the word ' jury.' What it does say, however, in effect is that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the *law of the land.*"

The framers of the charter, says Fisher, were in grim earnest. In the event of an infraction of the charter, they were ready to proceed to civil war, and appointed twenty-five of their number to guard its provisions and to constrain the King if necessary by force to observe them.

They did not dispute his executive authority, but they were going to darned well see that it was correctly wielded.

Here, at last, was something like a written constitution. Statutes founded on justice. And, what is more, a binding of the King to ob-

serve them. It is already a constitutional monarchy, and already, too, there is the shadow of something else: there is a provision that the executive (king) shall not levy extraordinary taxes without the consent of that recognised thing, the General Council, which was shortly to be called ' Parliament.'

This was 1215, seven hundred years ago.

Now the people were awake, they were gaining experience in the ticklish matter of government. They wanted stability in the pattern of life, they wanted both then and for the future *to know where they stood*; and as a practical matter, which was all they were concerned with, not theories, it was proved to them that stability demanded some form of a settled constitution to bind the King. They ensured it. And they were so convinced of the practical necessity of the arrangement that they—not only the townsmen but the nobility also—were prepared to unseat a king who would not agree and replace him with another. We see later on that they did this. The next king, Henry III, was such an impercipient, self-opinionated man (very like Charles I), and the resolute people, led by Simon de Montfort, first gave him an ultimatum by which he was " compelled to accept a scheme of government which placed the conduct of affairs in the hands of the baronial party," and then, as he still frivolously failed to conform, they resorted to what was, of course, civil war, and arrested him (1264) and his infant heir, later Edward I. But they had no thought of doing without a king. Far from it, they knew that such a form of government would be successful and stable if carried out according to existing provisions: the result of this civil war was not to unseat a king, but " *to bind him in the eyes of the nation assembled in Parliament to act on the advice of a council.*"

" The reign of Edward I," says Fisher, " is marked by such legislative activity as this country has only twice witnessed (in the reign of Henry VIII, and again under the Commonwealth) before the Reform Act of 1832 released the floodgates." It settled our law of entail, and finished with the last vestige of feudalism in the matter of tenure. Questions of trade, commerce, public policy, justice, police, administration, were put on a formal and settled footing. " The greatest, however, of Edward's titles to fame is that in his reign *Parliament assumed its completed form* and became an established instrument for the transaction of public business—1290.

" It was composed of prelates, earls, barons, and judges, summoned by individual writ, and by two knights from every shire, two citizens from every city, and two burgesses from every borough."

A representative body, you will admit—in other words, as it was called, a Parliament. It is true that the main business of an Edwardian

Parliament was not so much to legislate as to vote supplies and to handle petitions; but do not forget that, including the judges as it did, the King's Council was the highest court of justice in the land, and its judgments became *by custom the law of the land, which subsequent kings found they were not able to transgress.*

So well founded was this system by which the King ruled by Council and Parliament that it persisted unchanged in any radical fashion for over three hundred years, until the time of Cromwell. But it did change, as growth must during three hundred years of exciting life. And as Parliament, during three hundred years of precedent and statutes and repeated customs, was not growing any smaller in authority or significance, the main change was to be seen in the relationship of the two components of the system, King and Parliament, to such an extent that at the end of that time the question was who held the true seat of sovereign authority, Crown or Parliament?

The three hundred years in question were comprised of a number of prosperous years without involvement in foreign wars; then a hundred years of the futile but not materially unprosperous war in France (because the English King Edward III had a claim to the French throne); again a period of peaceful development, upset by the disastrous Wars of the Roses, which ended in settled Tudor rule for another century. We are not concerned with these incidents and complexions beyond the effects they had on our form of government. These were not uninteresting. *First*, it is to be mentioned that at the beginning of it Parliament was divided into two houses: the barons and prelates, and the burgesses and knights. *Second*, Richard II, grandson of Edward III, in a time of temporary remission of the war with France, with theories of autocracy, showed a plain intention to discontinue parliamentary government: *he was deposed and replaced* by Henry IV, who stood for constitutional government. Parliament now pressed for the control of legislation and finance. This advance made at an advantageous time was not maintained, but it was significant, and it was to be seized irrevocably later at the time of Cromwell. *Third*, there was during this time a great growth of industrial and mercantile prosperity, a growing sense of pride in their language (Chaucer) and, in contrast to France and elsewhere, in their free constitution.

Altogether, the effect may be thus stated: With the end of feudalism, the King had no longer any royal means of assembling sufficient reserve —certain taxes had previously been his due and remained to him, but these were insufficient—to conduct government (payment of officials, public works, wars, etc.); and Magna Carta amongst other resolutions

had bound him from imposing other taxes without consent of Parliament. Accordingly, throughout all this time Parliament was regularly and frequently called. Particularly was it necessary to call Parliament frequently during war; therefore during the hundred years of war with France, the indispensable Parliament might be said to have been sitting almost incessantly; whereas, since in those days the king fought with his army, during the same period certain of the successive kings were only spasmodically in England. Who, then, governed England? Parliament governed England through the ministers appointed by the King; or, alternatively, you might say the ministers of the Crown governed it through Parliament. That was now the responsibility to which Parliament had attained.

The Wars of the Roses, which were really merely an arena contest amongst the restless nobility, who, deprived of the opportunity of fighting in France, ranged themselves into two factions to dispute theatrically the Plantagenet inheritance—this interlude did not disturb the constitutional development to which England had attained in any special particular. One authority refers to it as "the suicide of the feudal nobility," and certainly after that time, nobility, regarded as a distinct class—as they did themselves in the fantastic Middle Ages of chivalry—ceased to dominate the scene. In fact, they ceased to be a different class; the feudal virus was at last absolutely extinguished. Now was the hundred years of the intelligent and politically steady Tudors. With the rise to prominence of the commoners, it is the gestation period of modern democracy. It is the time of the great merchant millionaires like Dick Whittington, of Richard Cromwell, of Wolsey, Cecil, of Walsingham, and Bacon; the time of Drake and the great captains and adventurers; the time of the colonising of the new world; the time of Shakespeare. Ability is ousting lineage. Certainly nobility continued to exist and was constantly being newly created, but now it is a different matter: it is to become a badge of the *aristocracy of attainment*, that may be won by any. With the Reformation and the throwing off of the chain of foreign ecclesiastical control, it is a time, too, of a new freedom and a new sense of nationalism. Even with a return of some degree of despotism under the firm hand of the conquering general Henry VII, Parliament nevertheless holds an important place in the national life; and, signally, it was Parliament at Henry VIII's earnest instigation, not Henry himself, that formally passed the statutes that secured the independence of the English Church from Rome.

At this stage, we have an enlightened and prosperous State governed by: monarch, with ministers, and Parliament. Parliament is in the

main deliberative, but powerful because it controls most of finance. Also, it is legislative to the extent that it can represent petitions to the King, which, when approved, become law. This mass of law, already basically historic, is a constitution. But in spite of precedent and custom, the monarch is not, either by the Constitution or in any other concrete way, specifically controlled by the Constitution. It is evident that, with the precedents of John and Richard II and others to guide, if the monarch is shrewd and in practice does observe the Constitution, then the system can work almost indefinitely—and Elizabeth, at a very ticklish time in English history (high religious feeling), was particularly statesmanlike in this respect; but what is going to happen if you get an unwise king—for instance, one inflated with a sense of his own importance or infallibility, as is always humanly possible? That is the circumstance we are now to examine.

Such a king was Charles I. Consistent, moved by sincere theocratic motives, but pig-headed. Unrealistic in the extreme degree. His father had been tactless with that serious, responsible body of men, Parliament, when they loyally welcomed him, a stranger, to the throne; Charles was, one can hardly find another word for it, idiotic. Believing in his Divine Right to decide every policy for England, foreign, domestic, and religious, he talked to them as to rascals, commanded them to vote money for foreign enterprises as if they were lackeys, and when they, still loyal, deferred voting these supplies until they could represent and receive some reply to their petitions of rights, he summarily dissolved Parliament and resolved on personal rule, which he continued for eleven years, eking out his revenue by new angles of taxation. But he had to come to them again. Unwisely trying to foist a religious ritual on Scotland that they did not want, he had goaded them to arms, and an army to suppress this required more than his resources. He had to summon Parliament. This time they were ready for him. They had been waiting. Before they would discuss any other business, they wrested from the King his signature that this Parliament could be dissolved only by its own consent; and then they had him. They controlled finance, and now they made their demands: with regard to the Church, the army, and the appointment of the King's ministers.

It had now become the plain issue we spoke of before: who held the sovereign authority, Crown or Parliament?

In a crescendo of unwisdom, Charles came personally to the House with a military force to arrest the ringleaders of these impertinent proposals, but 'the birds had flown,' and, seeing now very clearly the temper of Parliament, Charles withdrew from London, knowing that by his act he had declared war on them. This civil war of Parliament

against the King was the Great Rebellion. In this war the King was defeated and passed into the guardianship of Parliament. Now, surely, he would listen to reason. Alas ! he had not departed one iota from his principles or his monomania. Indeed, while appearing to concede, he was secretly negotiating with and inciting the Scots to rise for him in arms and start the bloody struggle again in its second phase. Cromwell, the ordinary member of Parliament who in the army had risen to general, decided the 'man of blood' must die. He was plainly intransigent, and, while alive, a perpetual source of strife.

So began the Republic ruled by a Council-Parliament.

Bear in mind throughout this that all these different shifts of government (and there were several during the Republic) were not the balloted suggestions of theorists; they were practical structures necessitated and changed by the hard circumstances of the facts of life-going-on that hammered at them. The first clumsy supreme Parliament tried to get on, but stuck fast in selfishness and disagreement. Cromwell kicked them out. A new Parliament was elected under a new principle of comprehensive representation; they, too, were ineffective; and still a third, with upper and lower houses. Authority was required. A central, apical authority. It became evident, proved, that this was a political necessity of government. So what can now be seen was all along inevitable in the circumstances—without patience—happened. Dictatorship.

In the years of the Civil War something had been happening to England. The parliamentary side that won, which was the greater part of England, had formed themselves into an effective army. That, at least, was organised. In the chaos of leaderless government, Cromwell, the head of the army, was compelled to assume military autocracy. He continued it till his death—eleven years.

Here was constitutional experiment with a vengeance; and political experience for England.

England never forgot.

Though England, with the best army and navy in Europe, was feared abroad, it was the most unpopular form of government England ever had. Indeed, that a freedom-loving people (and which are not ?) *can* ever have. This was not life they were living, but a penal sentence. It was detested. There were all the usual trappings of dictatorship—police spies, repression of free speech, political imprisonment, control of press—which some people are inclined to imagine so new. All were there. It may have been, for the time of its existence, a stable government in which a community could live in security, *but not in self-respect or in happiness*. At the end of it, England said: *Never again !*

They recalled the son of the late King.

But if they were smarting from the recent experience of, on the one hand, shameful dictatorship, and, on the other, unled and indecisive parliamentarianism, they had not forgotten the sore danger of an uncontrolled king. As the same distinguished historian has it, "*the ultimate solution, a Cabinet of Ministers, at once advising the Crown and responsible to Parliament in all its actions, has stood the wear and tear of every kind of political weather, and,*" as he adds, "*has proved to be one of the chief contributions which the sagacity of man has been able to make to the science of free government.*"

From that it has not changed for three hundred years (*less fifteen*).

During the reign of this King (Charles II) the 'two-party' system came into being in Parliament which has persisted since and which we shall refer to later. It originated in the division of parliamentary opinion as to the succession, seeing that Charles's heir, his brother James, was a Roman Catholic.

It was just said that this ultimate form of government had stood the wear and tear of every kind of political weather since. It had need to prove it thirty years later. James, under the influence and with the avowed support of France, was trying to bring back Catholicism to England officially and thus again stir up sectarian strife. In the 'glorious revolution' of 1688 he was deposed and his daughter Mary, with her husband William of Orange, put in his place. It was glorious because bloodless and followed by no political persecutions. It was done by constitutional act of Parliament. *England is now established as a parliamentary country.*

It next stood the test of an exhausting war with France (1688–97, Marlborough) under Anne, as a result of which England became, to remain, a Great Power.

In the next reign, the *permanent Civil Service* was born, when, for the first time, Treasury experts continued from ministry to ministry—Tory and Whig at that time.

Listen to what two Frenchmen said, in wonder, about England at the beginning of the eighteenth century, that is, over two centuries ago. Voltaire: "A man is free to say or publish what he likes. There is no torture or arbitrary imprisonment; religious sectaries of all kinds are permitted to flourish. An Englishman goes to heaven by the road he pleases." And Montesquieu: "England is the freest country in the world. I make exception of no republic. And I call it free because the sovereign, whose person is controlled and limited, is unable to inflict any imaginable harm on anyone."

The felicity of this form of government was at that time unique in

the world, and it became, as we know, not only the envy but the model of other countries.

Another circumstance now came to pass which proved what competence had now been attained in ordering their own household of England. Anne, who followed William and Mary, had no direct heir. Her brother was alive, but was not desired by Parliament on account of his religion. Her successor was decided by Parliament, a second cousin. He was a Hanoverian and could speak no English; in consequence his attendances at meetings of the Cabinet were pointless and were dropped. We now see a *Prime Minister and a Cabinet*—appointed by the Crown but directly responsible to Parliament—who actually make executive decisions themselves and govern the country. This is identically the form of Government still functioning today, after two hundred and forty years. The final evolutionary form.

Parliament makes laws: the King enacts them: the Cabinet, in the King's name, governs the country and makes all current decisions. Parliament, however, can call the members of the Cabinet to account either individually or collectively and can throw them out of office by forcing them to resign, though the King, having formally given them office, is actually the only one that can accept their resignation. The general franchise can also make the Cabinet feel its will (as we saw as recently as 1936 in the matter of sanctions). Thus the Government (Cabinet) governs.

It might seem in this, therefore, that the King has no real power. He has remaining to him real power; though except in the wilful case of George III it has not since been exercised. Here is where his real power still lies: the King appoints ministers. He appoints a Prime Minister who is capable of forming a Government—*i.e.* an experienced man who belongs to the majority party in Parliament. This Prime Minister selects his Cabinet team and recommends them to the King. But the King does appoint them. Further, it is only he who can formally release them. How many times do you think the leader of a Government that is temporarily unpopular on some score has gone to the King to offer his resignation and has been persuaded by the King to stick it out or try another way? I assure you, many.

In the same way, the King, if he is obstinate and tendentious, can still theoretically do these two things: (*a*) he can refuse to sign, or be extremely tardy and tiresome about signing, bills that he dislikes, or until they are modified towards his liking (just as the U.S. President can, though the King has not the power to veto—he is constitutionally compelled to accept the advice of his ministers in the last analysis); (*b*) he can be reluctant to appoint certain ministers or be extremely

fastidious about the selection presented to him until he has got the men he wanted. A king who took such a line, we know (because we have the experience of the history of England both mediæval and modern), would run the plain risk of being dropped or being compelled to abdicate. Theoretically, however, he could do it. Theoretically, and quite practically, we know that the President of the United States has far greater power. He appoints ministers without any reference to Parliament whatsoever.

But, practically, could a King of England do it?

The answer is: Yes.

George III did precisely this; and, successfully relying on the unwillingness of Parliament and England to resort to extreme measures, got away with it for a number of years—until as a result of it a dreadful fatality overtook England, when England again took control. That period lost us the American Colonies. The experiment will never be repeated. That was the final experience that England required.

The balance had now been struck, and henceforth is maintained, securely and firmly, with the judgment of experience. Succession has gone on with calm and naturalness. Though the monarch's powers are still constitutionally what they were at the time of George III, no king since has ever seen fit to attempt to exercise them in opposition to his Parliament or ministers on any essential matter. One king, Edward VIII, did disagree with his Cabinet on a matter which was so construed, but rather than exercise these powers which he knew he had and call for a showdown, he preferred not to put it to the test, not to disturb this equable balance: he preferred to abdicate. On the other hand, no Parliament has ever for a moment since thought of doing without a king.

That, therefore, is how the matter stands.

A balance, and an equable one.

The King is the executive, acting *only* on the advice of his ministers: these are themselves answerable to Parliament: this is freely elected by the people.

What is the permanence in this form of government? The King: in settled, unquestioned succession.

Anything else? Yes, the Constitution. And the *form* of the government which we have just defined.

Is there any other important permanence? Yes, the Civil Service. Permanent officials, experts in their departments—Foreign, Financial, Home, Dominion, etc.—with a high tradition of integrity (which they can afford, because they are appointed for life and are often officially

honoured by the State after long service), who advise and work for successive changing ministries.

That is the form of government *for Great Britain.*

It is also the form of government for the Colonies which are governed by Great Britain.

It is also—the Governor-General being the Viceroy—precisely the form of government of the self-governing Dominions.

And the King, the monarch, is the only common factor in the *whole* Empire.

. . . . . .

We are talking, however, for the present of England. That is, its form of government. We have examined it growing into its settled shape. We then defined. It is now our duty to assess.

Before going on to the assessment, however, I must point this out clearly. It is very important. When I say that the English form of government has reached its settled shape, this is not to say that the form of life lived by the generality of the people, or, as it is loosely called, the 'politics' of the country, is necessarily bound down or fixed. Far from it. In England alone in the last few hundred years we have seen wide changes in politics—now this way, now that—as determined by Parliament, who represent the people. We have seen the franchise widened until it includes every sane adult in the land over the age of twenty-one, man and woman. We have seen Socialism marching in the land, with powerful trade unions and legal strikes, with measures of social welfare far in advance of other countries. We have seen Parliament in a time of crisis—as at present and in the last war—voluntarily surrender for a time certain of its most precious and most fought-for freedoms, and freedoms of the people it represents, creating of the Government thereby a virtual oligarchy—a temporary cabinet autocracy. We see at the present time, in the Empire of England and the Dominions, Governments of widely differing, and from time to time still changing, colours of politics. But throughout, throughout it all, the *form of government* remains the same, settled because tested: King (or Viceroy) acting on advice of ministers; ministers responsible to Parliament; Parliament elected by free ballot. That would seem to be the salient feature of this form of government: flexibility. It allows wide ranges of politics while remaining completely stable. (Because the King is, as we say, above politics. He is King of a people who choose their own form of politics. Unlike the American President, who is by election Democrat or Republican, whatever policy those parties at the time represent.) Surely such flexibility represents strength, and spells durability.

How far, we are tempted to ask ourselves at this juncture, before passing on—how far can this form of government go towards further Socialism, if so demanded by the people, with State ownership of the means of production, etc.? How far towards Socialism without changing its structure of King, Cabinet, and Parliament? Think a moment. Surely, very far indeed; then, if the next generation or election did not want quite so much, it could change back. . . . On the other hand, if the situation demanded it, how far could it go towards a military autocracy? We are seeing just how far at this very moment. Very far. And when conditions change again, as after the war they will, the people, in Parliament, will decide about that again.

ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM

Having described it, we may now try briefly to analyse it into Aims, Principles, and Instrument.

AIMS. As ever, we do not gullibly swallow stated aims, whether directly or indirectly stated, but logically deduce the true intentions from intrinsic structure, and, where possible, from historical facts —what the system has actually done or striven to do. Thus if a nation declaims peace but its basic structure is aligned for war, we do not believe it. On the other hand, if we find that a form of government encourages the free presentation of grievances and makes legislation to assuage them, we may logically deduce that one aim of that system is public content and tranquillity. Again, if we find that a system has made standing provisions towards unifying a community, and has from time to time employed those provisions in enjoining the community to fight together against an aggressive enemy, we may take it that another aim of the system is common defence.

On these historical criteria, the broad aims of the British system are clearly seen: to make a nation; to preserve it; to give the community in it the maximum of freedom and contentment.

It is not an international idea, the British system. It is national. Deliberately and honestly national; and not furtively or privately national, as the Russian system now, in fact, is, though it still externally, to influence the credulous, waves the banner of internationalism. (This section was written before the official dissolution of the Comintern, May 22nd, 1943.) The British system's reason for this explicit nationalism is clear. If it is the duty of the system to preserve and defend the community, it says, the system must act logically. Union is strength. To fight best, which is entailed in preservation and defence, it is necessary to fight *as one*. And, to make the union at all times readily effective, to live as one. Therefore, says the system, we will

use all measures for community unanimity. It says, in short, that community preservation and defence cannot be ensured without unanimity—without making one self-conscious nation.

Now the question may be asked: does the United States Constitution make a nation? for they are logically not a distinct nation on the usual definition of common race or ancestry. Neither does a common continent make them a nation, for Canada and Mexico share it; nor a common language make them distinct, for it is Britain's tongue. We are left with common political institutions. But to have one or a minority of political instruments in common is not sufficient, because no one with common sense could say that all signatories of the League of Nations Covenant thereby became one nation. No; for a broad community to become one nation on account of political institutions requires that the large majority (if not total) of all political institutions throughout the groups should be one and the same. In the United States, as a fact, this is not the case; and, accordingly, to our question we must answer: it does not. Although presidents and poets may extol the idea of American nationality, the Constitution, *per se*, does not in fact make them one self-conscious nation. It was not intended to do so. Indeed, quite the reverse. Each individual in the United States has two citizenships—one of the United States and the other of the particular State he belongs to. As the name of the organism implies, the United States of America, it is a federation, not one State, not one politically homogeneous community.

The English system does intend to make one politically homogeneous community; because, it says, thus will the community be more certainly preserved, and thus will the community be more certainly content and stable and tranquil. America did not think that homogeneity necessary. There is the difference.

Apart from this clause, therefore, to make one nation of conscious unity (in contrast with the American, to make an improved union of separate groups)—apart from this clause, which is only an adjuvant measure, the aims of the British system are the same as the American (Preamble). And these we agreed are the aims of our own definition.

PRINCIPLES. The principles of the British system are not anywhere definitely stated, but they would appear, by reference to her constitutional history (Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, Workmen's Compensation Act, etc., etc.), to be summed up in the simple word: Justice. The British system is not impossibly idealistic, like the Marxian, nor has it principles of racial pre-eminence, like the Hitlerian. It is merely intended to be a practical system for the preservation and comfortable

continued living-together of a community. They found as a matter of practical fact that individuals cannot comfortably continue living together unless the individuals receive justice, otherwise there is continual friction and dissatisfaction and disturbance. So the system upholds above everything the principle of justice.

INSTRUMENT. The instrument by which the British system proposes to ensure its aims is the British Constitution, that mass of parliamentary procedure and enactments which has run like a river through the centuries, now adding to itself new enactments for current conditions, now shedding unnecessary or obsolete ones.

ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM

Look again at the thing we are discussing. Crown, Cabinet, Parliament, a free voting people, with its laws. A Democratic Constitutional Monarchy.

TEST OF EMOTIONAL APPEAL

As regards the democracy part of it, we have already agreed that while not being, nowadays, an intoxicating draught to catch the empty-headed, it passes the test highly for one type of people, at least: the people of self-respect. But the English form of government has a further qualification: it has as the chief figure in the community an hereditary King, with all that office entails of symbolic permanency, of loyalty, of tradition, of mannered procedure. To one part of the community, this dignified office is an additional emotional appeal, to another part it is a stumbling-block. Which part is greater? On that will depend whether we can say this test is passed. It will be discussed.

THE TEST OF PLAUSIBILITY

Here, where mental judgment, though superficial, comes in, it is necessary if possible to define the system in clearer outline. Here are the four legs:

I. An hereditary King, who is (*a*) a figure-head representing permanency of the State; (*b*) the mouthpiece of the executive.

II. A small executive council, who represent the majority will of a large national committee, and who can be displaced at any time by this majority. The executive council (the Cabinet) is selected by and is under the command of one single individual (Prime Minister), but to be eligible for selection all members of the

Cabinet must already be members of the larger national committee, to which they must render an account of their stewardship, and by whom they may be freely criticised. Under the executive council is the executive machine (Civil Service), who are at all times experienced and trained in their job, because they are not affected by changes of Cabinet, being permanent.

III. A large national committee (Parliament) elected by free votes of the entire nation, and consequently representative of the nation.

(Actually this definition describes precisely the House of Commons. The House of Lords—the senatorial house of peers both hereditary and elevated, and bishops—though deliberative in legislation, has the powers only of a referee. Judicially it is the highest court of appeal, but legislatively, though it has modified powers of initiation, it has none of veto.)

This committee—Parliament, by which we mean the House of Commons—makes laws, which then become new parts of the Constitution; can modify the Constitution; and, as mentioned above, either confirms the Government (Cabinet) in its action, or, if displeased, can displace one which is acting contrary to its will and set up another.

This committee, therefore (Parliament), has supreme power; and it is for this reason that the Government of England can correctly be described as a democracy.

IV. A settled Constitution of laws and customs, in conformity with which the other three parts, Crown, Cabinet, and Commons, must guide all their actions. This legal Constitution is immovable, and cannot be scrapped or suspended. If it is required to add to it, or modify some out-of-date section, this can be done by designedly deliberative and formal processes of the representative Parliament. And every new Bill thus deliberated and passed by Parliament, when signed by the King, becomes a further permanent part of the Constitution.

On superficial judgment, does it seem that this system can work?

There is no need to waste time on, nor can there be any doubt about, the answer: it does. It has form: a monarchy—albeit a democratic one—and is not a mass of protoplasm continually changing and falling into new alignments. It has a settled policy: the Constitution; but though settled it is not muscle-bound, for it can be gradually altered to suit changing conditions. It has the executive day-to-day power of government in the hands of a small council of heads of departments, one for each department, in which there is a readily obedient

and trained machine, all this council being under the command of a single captain, so that decisions can be taken and things be done without interminable debate. It provides, though, that all is done according to the majority will of the people by giving them, in the persons of the freely-elected great national committee—that makes or throws out government councils—the critical and final power.

The system seems one of eminent common sense. It has the appearance of being both effective and at the same time controlled; so that it seems unlikely there should be any lapse towards, on the one hand, autocracy—where individuals hold uncontrolled power—nor, on the other, towards revolution—where dissatisfied large sections have no constitutional opportunity for representation or redress. In short, on superficial scrutiny all the above-mentioned interacting provisions of the system seem to be of the highest wisdom, and it passes the test of plausibility a hundred per cent.

The Test of Practicability of the British System

The question is a theoretical one. On careful analysis, do we judge that the British system, as set out on the previous pages under I, II, III, and IV, is capable of attaining what it—in common with each of the other systems we have examined—sets out to attain, to wit: stable and durable government of a broad community, such as ourselves ?

The desiderata for attaining the aim of stable and durable government were originally set down in our analytical introduction as ' self-respect and security ' of the people governed, for it was evident that without these two assurances no Government anywhere could long live. Therefore, any likely form of government must be shown to embody adequate concrete provisions for ensuring these desiderata.

In our examination of the U.S. Constitution, we found that in the Preamble these desiderata were defined and itemised; accordingly, in our assessment of the theoretical practicability of that formula, we considered it logical (*a*) to see what measures were embodied in the formula designed to attain each itemised aim, and (*b*) to form a judgment whether the measures provided were adequate for the attainment of them.

We will employ the same method here. And since we agreed that the aims of the Preamble were, as it happened, precisely our own aims—apart from the first, which we had not specified—to be fair, we shall use the identical items. That will get us some of the distance in assessment.

(1) AIM. To form a more perfect union.

(It is to be clearly understood that in the present section when we say England we refer only to the people of the British Isles who are actually under the British form of government whose Parliament is at Whitehall. The question of the sister Dominions and Colonies we shall look at later.)

This aim was and is vital not only to America, which previously consisted of thirteen quite independent States, it is vital to every community that wishes, when the necessity arises, *to act as one*. Many people, including Lincoln, consider that it is not too much to say that this is the main aim of any system of government—unification. I think we are intellectually compelled to be of that number. Indeed, if self-preservation is the cardinal human factor, it is the main and immediate reason for a community having a system at all. And only if you have the *total* system *generally* imposed can you really have an individually-recognisable and individually-conscious State. (Compare the League of Nations.) As we have seen, America only took half-measures in unification, because many of the founders had strong feelings in those days about the individuality and independence of the several States—and the Constitution has not since been altered. They did not impose generally a total political institution, but only *partial*. Accordingly the American system makes the several States centrally controlled: it does not make them unanimous. It has the machinery for compelling uniformity of action, even uniformity of total action, when the necessity arises; but it does not go beyond that brusquerie, it does not prepare the soil for that total uniformity, it does not keep the population continuously aligned in that spontaneous unanimity of outlook. President Franklin Roosevelt, in his third inaugural address, January 20th, 1941, again speaks of the existing and different "processes of governing in the sovereignties of forty-eight States."

Obviously this aim, to form a more perfect union, does not apply here, because England has been a single State since the time of William the Conqueror. The corresponding aim of the English system is to form not a union but a unity: a national unanimity of the whole community.

We will discuss that national aim.

MEASURES: (*a*) 'Total' system of laws universally applied. This gives a practical and compulsive political entity, but—as the Russian Marxists found—does not give the community unanimity (one heart) of human sentiment. Therefore, the British system gives additional sentimental 'focuses' as well. And not just temporary, changing focuses, but permanent ones.

(*b*) An hereditary monarchy. This is a permanent 'personality' focus.

(*c*) Tradition. This is an imponderable but most potent factor for humans. It is a personal sentiment which belongs equally to every individual—the history of a nation, with its songs and stories, which for a long time has retained the same character.

DISCUSSION: It is evident that the purpose of this aimed-at uniformity is duofold: firstly, to prevent the community, now a State, from breaking up in peace; secondly, to ensure that it acts as one in war.

It is considered that as far as these purposes are scientifically ensurable these above measures, *with the never-to-be-forgotten addition of a common language*, do ensure the necessary sense of brotherhood.

It is conceded that the political and sentimental unanimity they engender under a Constitution which permits freedom of ideas and free criticism may not, at any given moment, be as *apparent* as the compelled unanimity artificially engendered especially for a given moment by another State which suppresses free variation and criticism; but both history and our own knowledge of human nature instruct us that fanaticism abates and suppression cannot be practised for ever. In other words, the pliancy of the unanimity of this English formula is likely to be more durable than the brittleness of the other.

As compared with the general political uniformity engendered by the American formula, this formula has a three-fold greater potency.

VERDICT: The measures provide a high degree of durable unity.

(2) AIM. To establish justice.

MEASURES: The abiding verity of the aim, and the measures to secure it which are documented in the British Constitution from the time of Magna Carta onwards, are too well-known to require discussion. The world so well recognises, and has for centuries, that the factor of justice is inalienable from the British Constitution, that the term 'British Justice' has become an aphorism.

VERDICT: The existing measures, with the standing democratic provisions for altering the Constitution if it should become in that direction unsatisfactory, are adequate to secure the aim.

(3) AIM. To ensure domestic tranquillity.

MEASURES: The basic measures, just laws soundly enforced, are the same as those we found in the American system. We considered this would give a considerable degree of tranquillity.

But the prime essence of *enduring* tranquillity lay, we further

considered, in people *continuously* knowing where they stood. In the fixity of their Constitution, and their four-yearly change of administration, we considered the American system vitiated the continuity, in that interim laws to ensure tranquillity under one administration—such a group of laws, for instance, as they may call a New Deal—may be summarily scrapped by the next; because such interim laws do not become part of the Constitution, which cannot be altered. But the British system, in which laws of Parliament become part of the enduring Constitution, does not permit this weathercock variability. The community does *continuously* know where it stands.

Again, two additional factors do assist this continuity of legislative temper, so far as the man-in-the-street is concerned: they are the continued identity of the formal head (the Crown), and the continued identity of the *permanent* Civil Service, who are the legislative middlemen familiarly known to the people governed, who make the thing work.

VERDICT: No system, through continually changing economic and other conditions, can absolutely ensure domestic tranquillity—there must be agitation before it is seen that changes are necessary—but the measures outlined do (perhaps as far as is humanly possible) ensure a high degree of it.

(4) AIM. To provide for the common defence.

MEASURES: Defence, or military safety, requires that a State shall have in readiness, or be able to assemble in sufficient time, adequate military strength to oppose successfully any possible assailant. Thus there are seen to be involved questions of foreign policy, economics, and intelligence, that cannot be briefly discussed or itemised. However, we have, I think, agreed on this: that, in general, in actual war, a State which has, at the one extreme, a purely autocratic form of government is, other things being equal, more likely to be effective than, at the other extreme, a purely democratic form. Therefore, in this section we can at least examine what constitutional measures exist in the English formula for translating temporarily their stated democratic form in the direction of the other. Further we might examine how swiftly it can be done, and how far.

The answer to the first is, very swiftly. Parliament can within an hour vote the requisite emergency powers—quite constitutionally—to the Government, which can be ratified and become law immediately.

As to how far, as far as you like. There is no limit to the autocratic powers Parliament may allocate, temporarily, to a body, or even to an individual. And the Civil Service is always there, permanently

trained. Parliament's criticisms are still, however, no less valuable, and are not by any means interfered with. Nor do they really lose control, because Parliament can at any time, if they decide to, cast out this Government and replace it with another, similarly autocratic.

Note.—In America we have seen that an autocratic form can be assumed—except that the Civil Service machinery may not be, at any given moment, life-trained—just as quickly and just as far, but in that case (Lincoln) the assumption was *unconstitutional*: it was not done under the American system. It could be done, however, and has been —though what about the likelihood if, after a half-term election, there is a Congress in opposition to the President? Again, the Congress cannot control the autocrat or change him.

VERDICT: The bare bones of the measures for providing for the common defence are considered manipulable and adequate. The fighting power which they could wield is another matter, and one which cannot be laid down in any constitution; for a judgment of what is adequate at any moment of history can only be made by individuals of that moment.

(5) AIM. To promote the general welfare.

DEFINITION: We have dealt with justice for the individual, with domestic tranquillity, with common defence, and later we deal with liberty for the individual; what now remains under general welfare? We decided before it could only refer to such concepts as: seeing that no individuals of the State were allowed to perish for want of food, warmth, or clothing; assuring employment to all individuals or sustaining them when unemployed; supervision of working conditions; keeping the individuals of the State in health or caring for them in sickness; caring for the fatherless or young as well as for the aged, infirm, or mentally afflicted; providing the benefits of education and other forms of culture for all individuals in the State. In a word, social services.

MEASURES: It is not disputable to say that England has led the world in social services. And still leads. The measures are laid down in the British Constitution. You have only to look at the laws (Factory Acts, Insurance Acts, Workmen's Compensation Acts, etc., etc., etc.) and their dates, and compare them with other countries. The social services laid down in the British Constitution—note, *in the Constitution*—are hardly surpassed in the constitution of any state in the world.

Note.—Explicit measures in this regard do not figure in the United States Constitution, and such welfare provisions as individuals of the

various States enjoy—or that they all temporarily enjoy as a result of the New Deal—they enjoy as a result of extra-constitutional measures: they are not due to the Constitution.

VERDICT: The constitutional measures laid down—expandable constitutionally at any time (*e.g.* the Beveridge Report)—are judged to promote the general welfare most advantageously.

(6) AIM. To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

MEASURES: The desiderata are a settled body of laws based on justice, which permits freedom of speech, meeting, etc. There is no need here for recapitulation or repetition. We know that measures embodying these individual rights and liberties are clearly laid down in the hoary, yet ever self-refreshing, system of English parliamentary enactments—the British Constitution.

VERDICT: These blessings are secured—subject to occasional and temporary necessity of abridgment in emergencies—as far as it is humanly possible to secure them. We note that the U.S. Constitution, subject to the same conditions of exception, secures them just as firmly.

. . . . .

If our assessment of the practicability of the British system merely consisted in a comparison with the American system, here should be the end of that section. But it is not the end.

The American system, we saw, aimed at the same goal as we do. We saw its measures and on them passed our judgment. We incidentally observed that to attain the same goal—stable government through war as well as peace—a variation in the geography of different countries (that is to say, the nearness or otherwise of dangerous neighbours) imposed automatic variations in the required responsiveness of such measures. Thus a community which is liable (through geography) to be threatened by war, perhaps frequently and at short notice, will be wise to have a more *taut* form of government than one which is not so subject. 'Taut' is the same word as 'responsive.' A community that is to be responsive, so that in emergency it can readily act *as one*, will, we decided, if it is wise—and the whole point of the book is to find a wise form of government for our own community—have, first, a unitary form of government. A 'total' form of government generally applied throughout the entire community; not a federation of partly-differently governed groups. Secondly, the form of government should be such that it can be swiftly, and at any time, transformed to an autocratic form of government.

Leaving this observation aside for the moment, however, on putting the American system to the test of practicability, we judged that it gave promise of attaining each of its stated aims (with the exception of the last, liberty) only incompletely. That in consequence, though it might be eminently workable, its likelihood of stability and durability was fraught with distinct modifications. Now, so far, with the British system, in relation to the same aims, we have not levelled the same criticisms, or we have not levelled them so strongly. Is this, therefore, the end? We have already said, not. This is why:

Communism, seen in Marx's elaborate thesis, looked plausible; but on analysis we found that the creed conflicted with one of the elementary impulses of human nature, and in practice that it was not even workable, let alone stable and durable. In the same way Nazism passed superficial tests; but on analysis it also was found to conflict with an important fact of human nature—that human nature cannot *for ever* be kept at a high pitch of enthusiasm about childish beliefs. We reckoned that such a fanatical war policy must only drive it on and on to its own destruction; for if it relaxed, in peace, from the fanaticism of its childish beliefs, it would be no longer Nazism. In other words, in our judgment it failed in the requirements of durability. Now in our analysis of the American system we found no essential conflict with human nature; and, as it happened, it gained from us by far the highest marks yet in its promise of durability. Surely this last is not merely a *coincidence*: surely it is a *result*.

Very good. What of the British system? At the end of one method of analysing its practicability, we have given it higher marks still; but is it possible that in looking at the individual trees—the measures which will regulate a community of people—we have failed to see the wood, which is the people themselves? In short, before we go one step farther towards forming a conclusion about this section, we must apply to the articulated anatomy of the British system this specific criterion alone; human nature.

We know its anatomy. It is a democracy of a special type. Its four legs are: (I) Crown; (II) Prime Minister and Cabinet, with permanent civil servants; (III) Parliament; (IV) Constitution. A constitutional-democratic monarchy. We have agreed, in the American system, that there is nothing foreign to human nature in a constitutional democracy, which disposes of the last three legs. But what about—Crown?

What about the concept of a king, which—it cannot be argued about—is an intrinsic part of the British system? And, what is more, an hereditary king. A being accorded an unusual regard on account

only of his birth. What about the king-idea in the light of this cardinal criterion, human nature? Human nature in general, remember!—for we are catering for a broad community, not individuals, whether it be you or me.

The blunt question is: Is the king-idea in general a natural one? Or is it, on the other hand, foreign to the human nature of the broad mass of human communities?

What facts does history place before us?

This: for nine-tenths of the time of recorded history, nine-tenths of the communities of the world have had kings.

It is, therefore, not altogether unnatural.

"But," someone will coldly and legitimately object, "nine-tenths of recorded time is in the past; it is the present I am interested in, and the future. You cannot say that nine-tenths of people at the present time have a king; it is less than half; times have changed; kings are out of date."

"Indeed," I reply to that, "and have all these great communities that comprise more than half the world no kings?"

"No, they have not."

"Oh!"

"What do you mean—'Oh'? They haven't. The dictator states have dictators and the republics have presidents."

"I see. Individuals! But they have not got the *title* of kings, is that it? Gerald W. Johnson, an American, in *Roosevelt* (1942), says: 'It is simplest to think of the President as a limited but powerful monarch elected for a short reign.'"

"They are not kings. That is the statement."

"What is the difference? Do they have less power than a king, these dictators and presidents? Than a constitutional king, like the King of Britain, to take this definite case?"

"Don't be frivolous. You know perfectly well that a dictator has far *more* power. There is no comparison. And even a president, the American President, for instance, has far more power whilst he is in office."

"I am not being frivolous. If it is not their power as king that you object to, what is it? Is it merely the name?"

No answer.

"I am afraid I must insist on an answer to this, because it is important. If you see nothing unnatural or objectionable in an individual at the apex of the State whose succession is decided upon by a periodical upheaval, what sticks in your gizzard in having an individual whose succession is decided without a periodical upheaval?"

A short silence, and then: "Do you want a plain, unvarnished answer to that?"

"Naturally. We are trying to get at the facts of all this."

"All right—here goes. And, mind you, no offence to any individuals."

"That's understood."

"There are a lot of self-respecting people who do not feel that, simply because another individual is born in Buckingham Palace, he is thereby better than themselves. Or that that individual's children must be automatically better than his own children. There is no good reason why they should be better. In fact, they might not be."

"Agreed."

"What! Are you agreeing with that?"

"Naturally. One is compelled to agree with common sense. Quite a number of other people may turn out to be far more brilliant, intellectually, for instance."

"Don't hedge. Have you admitted that a king is not better than the rest of the people—yes or no?"

"You must reasonably define your 'better' for me. To take four consecutive cases at random, do you consider, for instance, that at various times Johnson, Grant, Hayes, and Garfield were unquestionably the best men in America?"

"If you mean intellectually, or morally, or as creative artists and that sort of thing, perhaps not; but——"

"Yes, but what?" I ask.

"It depends on what you mean by better or best. In this case, it is a question of suitability for occupying the supreme executive post in the country?"

"Ah!" I retort. "You have answered your own question as to whether a king is better than any other people in the community. Perhaps not, as a creative intellect, etc., but that is not the point; the point is, is he, by reason of his special training, better suited to occupy the, nominally, supreme executive post in the country."

I might have gone on with the dialogue. I might have asked about another three consecutive presidents: "Were Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover the best men in America at the time? Were they even the most suitable for president?" Of course they were not, and no man could be found to say they were. *The cold fact is that no method has yet been devised of unerringly selecting the best man in a community of many millions by popular vote.*

Let us look at the method of selection constitutionally employed by the community of the United States, perhaps one of the best it is

possible to devise. What happens there? National conventions of the major political parties meet, they decide on their party policy in the forthcoming election, and the party leaders then make their party nomination for president. One man is selected by each party as their nominee, and these go to the country for election. As Johnson, in *Roosevelt* (1942), says: "A candidate nominated for the first time may be known to few but the party chiefs—and not to all or nearly all of them." Further: "The voters may be expected to want to know something of the party policy, since they may know very little of the nominee." In other words, under this system, are the community with their eyes open intelligently voting for a man that they really *know* to be the best man in America at that time for the exacting post? We know that the great majority vote simply according to their party loyalties—the man, so long as there is nothing against him, hardly counts. What is the result? "The flat truth is that less than a third of the whole number were really memorable men . . . the unimpressive majority." And finally this: "The people elected Grant. The people elected Harding. Evidence is lacking that the people's perspicuity or their morality has increased so largely that a repetition of such mistakes is henceforth impossible" (Johnson). And yet under this 'unimpressive majority,' including some distinctly unsuitable presidents, the community went on functioning quite uninterruptedly with its tested Constitution. There is also this proven feature—that many, like Cleveland, after one term or after some time in office, did improve their suitability for the position's responsibilities—that is, training in the job did improve their suitability. Out of thirty-two presidents (six of whom died in office), eleven were elected for a second term. There is also this feature which cannot be left out of consideration: some were not specially elected to the job, but simply 'succeeded,' being Vice-Presidents, on the death of the President.

What are the facts to be elicited from this review?

(1) There exists no infallible method of selecting the 'best' living man.

(2) In practice, the 'best' is not necessary: an ordinary man can do the job.

(3) Training for the job improves the suitability.

In America they talk of 'grooming' a man for president for a time before he may be called upon to undertake the duties, because it is recognised that when he becomes the titular head of the State he ceases to be, or should cease to be, an individual, but instead becomes the impersonal representative and mouthpiece of the nation. In England the heir to the throne commences the training in the cradle. Or even

before that, it commences in the selection of his parents, on which the nation, in Parliament, have something to say (as was recently instanced in the case of Edward VIII's projected choice of spouse). Every activity from infancy is part of the training. The whole curriculum of life is laid down for him by parents imbued with the Constitution, in conjunction with Prime Ministers and Cabinets. All his actions, studies, even recreations—all must be approved. And not only the heir, his brothers and sisters and close relations—just in case. If the monarch should die before the heir is of age, regents carry on for him and still training goes on until he is fit.

Training, training, unremitting training for a serious, formal, public—so extremely public—and rather funless job, that can be relinquished only by death.

That is the king-idea in England.

That a man, or woman, is trained from birth for the job he is *certainly* going to assume.

That succession to the supreme post is not a matter of strife or argument or uncertainty; that it can cause no national split.

That the King is an ordinary man doing a job that some man must do; but succession is above argument, and ambitious or ruthless men need not aspire to it.

It is a job, says the British Constitution, that only one man can do at a time; it is a job that no longer has the power or responsibility that it once had, because, constitutionally, the King can only act on the advice of his ministers—so that an ordinary man can do it without mistakes if he is thoroughly trained. It is, however, a post of great dignity, for it personifies the State. Therefore, says the British Constitution, so that it shall not be a prize of dangerous contention to be grasped by the most vigorous thruster, let us put it beyond dispute, settled in succession, and secure.

This king-idea, however, does not preclude men of ability from exercising great influence on their generation. Far from it. A man, anyone, can rise to the second highest post in the land, and one of actually far greater temporal power—that of Prime Minister—and to all other posts. This post alone, with the name of King, is out of reach. It is the Crown of England, it represents England, it is England. Therefore let it go on naturally, like a steady stream, unquarrelled over; let it be one important factor of evident stability. *In short, the British Constitution says that its experience of many hundred years has shown this arrangement to be one of very sensible convenience.*

All the history of the past has shown—and all sensible theorists,

such as ourselves, must accept—that any form of government whatever, to be practical, requires a single titular head of the executive. One only. An individual—be he dictator, despot, president, or king. The British people, as we note, have decided as a result of their historical experience that of these a constitutionally-controlled king is the most sensible, convenient, and practical. These are hard-headed terms, and you can rest quite assured that the decision to retain a king in England—and there have been quite a number of times in our history when the question was raised—was a hard-headed decision. For politics, in a world where nations must fight to retain their existence and identity, is hard-headed, and not a mere matter of emotion. Does anyone affirm that the British race, who have acquired dominion of a quarter of the world and have administrators ruling millions in every section of it, are a self-abased nation of individuals? Do you think Drake was spineless? Were Marlborough and Clive and Rhodes without manliness, who carved continents? Or Wellington, who held kings between his fingers, and partitioned Europe? Or Chatham, Pitt, or Gladstone? Do you think Gladstone felt mental or physical inferiority to the woman, his Queen? Is Churchill only half a man? Are these any less men than any chest-slapping and catch-phrasing American, or Argentinian, or Frenchman, simply because they slap their chests and say they dislike the idea of an hereditary king? The question does not require an answer.

If, then, these men, and such people in successive generations in their thousands, were men in the full sense of the term, why did they, each and every one of them, accept unquestionably the propriety of having a monarch in England, settled, above them? Believe me, it was not because these able men had not conceived of anything else: they knew the history of the many temporary republics of the world, including their own, as well as you or I. Why, then, did they strive for greater glory for England always in the name of that monarch, addressing the monarch always unhesitatingly in the traditional tones of respect?

Why? There must be a good reason.

This is plainly the reason: because they considered that this, an uniform discipline towards a settled throne, was the best method of maintaining the greatness and stability of their community. Because they considered that unity was strength. *Because they were prepared, nay, they were proud to sink selfishness in the interests of the community they were born into and which was, in any case, going to outlast them.* Because, in short, it was for England. Because it is a little thing to pay a formal respect to a traditional institution; a little thing to say

'Sir,' when by doing so they are preserving, strong and stable, a thing which they believe to be good for their community: the British Constitution, of which the hereditarily immovable King is an inseparable part. They believed that what it stood for, and had nourished, was good: the broad principles of freedom and justice, and brotherhood in the great empire linked by the Crown, and morality. They believed that to break it or weaken it would be a crime; because after many hundred fumbling years of forming and growing it had reached a strong and proven elastic stability, and if it were broken, God knew when, if ever, it might grow again.

That is why the monarchy was retained in the past; that is why it was retained in the last century; that is why in the minds of the Government and Parliament today there is no question about retaining the monarchy still.

That is the king-idea in England. It is for us to judge.

That is not *all* the king-idea, however. The monarchy is not only an integral legal part of the British Constitution as it now stands, it is something much more personal as well to every member of the British Empire.

And here, I know, comes the rub with my mythical debater of the dialogue above. He says: "With regard to the legal constitutional aspect of king, if you can prove to my satisfaction that the British Constitution is a good thing in that it can definitely guarantee a good and stable Government to large numbers of people, and, as a by-product, exerts a good influence in the world—if you can prove that, I am prepared to agree that to say 'Sir' to a single individual hereditarily appointed is a small price to pay. I'll accept the King; but I'm a plain man, and I don't like nobility—people who, simply because they have a handle to their name, carry themselves with an irritating superiority that in many cases they have not earned, etc., etc. And, unfortunately, it seems to me that if you are going to have a king, you are going to have nobility as well."

To that I reply, yes and no. The last observation is only partly true. If you are to have hereditary succession, logically the heir and siblings must be specially prepared and trained. So that nucleus is inevitable and it is convenient for them to have titles—though they could be called First Heir, Second Heir, etc., if the democratic community wanted it. *But the other nobility is not inevitable at all.* There are none in some Dominions, which are British just as much as England is—and which have precisely the same form of constitution with King, Cabinet, Parliament. Indeed, if anyone feels so hot about the matter in England, let him take steps by constitutional means to do

something about it and get rid of them. It is quite open to him. If he can get enough support in the country, as represented in the House, he can get rid of them quite constitutionally, with no revolution, and without affecting the constitutional government as it stands—King, Cabinet, Parliament (two houses as in America)—in any way. Indeed it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that we who read this may live to see such a thing happen; but, if so, it is also conceivable that we might live a little longer and see a general wish for their re-installation.

For my mythical debater must realise this: he is not the only pebble on the beach. We have reiterated often enough in this book that you can't please everyone. He may have quite a number of friends who think the same way as he does, but he must realise that others exist also, others who consider that a title of nobility is merely a prize for good service to the community which it is cheap for the Government to give—certainly cheaper than encouraging a man to make a nest-egg of a million or so out of his position because no such plainly recognised prize for honest service exists—which hurts no one, and honours the recipient and his family. It is reserved from none. Many people also think that such honours are graceful in a country; and that they improve manners, which they also think are important. Apart from these, there are quite a number of simple, unaffected people who like the idea just for its own sake alone and the colour it gives the community. He must allow himself to listen to the conversation of ordinary people. Perhaps, though, he is not surprised but merely pours scorn on them for their simplicity. Nevertheless, there they are. And the majority of people in any community, he must know, are comprised of such simple people who do not think too deeply; and he must recognise that these people have a right to exist and to their thoughts. They are the broad mass of the people that a Government is designed to keep stable.

However, all this argument does not affect the truth of this statement: *the question of nobility, excluding only the King and likely heirs, does not affect the structure or stability of the Constitution in any essential particular.* Therefore, it does not logically come into the propposition of the Constitution, and the British system must be considered apart from it.

The discussion on it has been useful, however, because it has led us back to the personal aspect of the king-idea.

It is a matter—have no illusions about it—of very considerable importance.

Consider this one instance. The Russian revolutionary Marxists—

to give them credit for unselfish aims—set out with the definite object of bringing into being an ideal socialist State. It was to be materialistic, impersonal, equal. What do we find? They give the people the creed. They force it upon them, religiously ruthless—on the didactic principle that 'this hurts me more than it hurts you'—with bloody force and starvation. So this impersonal, intellectual creed is imposed. The community does not rebel, but has this *abstract* creed made this largely illiterate people a mental unity? It has not. The simple people cannot easily grasp an abstract thing like a creed, they cannot visualise it, to give them all a focus: they want something more concrete, more tangible, something they know and can take hold of, more related to themselves, something they can *feel* about—something, in short, to personify the new form of government. So as a concession to ineradicable simple sentiment—human nature being recognised, my friends—they give them now in addition, a *Person!* The picture of Lenin is displayed all over Russia.

What is the conclusion from this? Surely an elementary one, and one which has been well grasped by Lenin's successor, Stalin (the 'Little Father'—just like the Tsar), and also by Hitler, and all other people who would form an unified State. That if a community is to have unity, they must be given a common comprehensible idea—which they can all share, and which is partly the possession of each individual. Thus they become welded. And the most effective, because easily comprehended, such idea, for the mass of humans, is another human. A central Person

"My Fuehrer," are instructed to say the obedient Germans, for there this psychological truth was well grasped. By frantic propaganda the temporary leader—who will mortally die, and then the frantic propaganda must start again for the new one—is thrust before the eyes, and in the ears, and down the throats of the people; because with calculating political insight it is well recognised there how important for unity is this simple, childish if you will, human trait. Soon all know him. All, by the fact of visualising him, now share him. Each one can talk about him with as much proprietary right as anyone else in the realm. Whether they particularly like him or not, or whether they would go so far as to die for him or not, he is now none the less the common property of all. Each one has a personal relationship to him because of thus knowing him; and between each one and him there is, as it were, a bond. A thread of union comprised of human sentiment. The form of government they all live under is one bond uniting the community; their common descent or country is another; a common language is a third; and this warm thread which brings them

more into the relationship of a family is yet a fourth bond, and by no means the least considerable.

How supremely important is the bond of family sentiment, politically ! It is recognised—since we are not children—that crises are bound to come to a nation. Crises either from within or without, of which the greatest danger is that they may cause the community to divide. How important when the crisis strikes is *every* circumstance which tends to bind. The heart (sentiment), then, is actually more important than the head (intellect), for by it you have not a brittle reasoned cohesion but a warm spontaneous one. Any Government would be a fool to neglect it.

It is all part of the king-idea. It is another hard-headed political reason why the statesmen of England have not wished to give it up.

Yes, don't be surprised—all this that I have been describing with regard to the dictators is precisely the king-idea. All that they struggle to engender with such frantic and undignified pains is the sense of family cohesion which England almost unconsciously, calmly possesses in having an hereditary King.

Do you dispute it ? You can't. I am not talking about you, you stiff-necked intellectual, but I am talking about the mass of the people. Listen to them in the 'bus, in the streets, in the corner pub, in the barrack-rooms and the mess-decks and in the officers' mess, in the poor houses and in Mayfair. They discuss how the King is looking. How he is getting more like his father. What the Queen said and what she wore and how she looked. How the Princesses are growing up and what characters they are developing. Hear a daughter hotly disputing a question about them with her mother, a soldier telling exactly the King's age and explaining where Princess Louise comes in, as if he knew the family intimately.

How can the dictator States or Republics hope to attain to this unartificial, unforced, natural family interest ? There the temporary cynosure drops out like a stone, and a new unknown one has to be foisted—foisted into their consciousness, yes; but can he be foisted into their affections ? . . . Here they have known him and followed all his activities since he was a rosy babe; through his boyhood, manhood, his first appearances on State occasions, his courting, his marriage, his State tours to the Dominions and abroad, the birth of his children. But not only him have they followed, his father, too, and his grandfather, and his great-grandmother.

You can call it a trick if you like, when it is seen that, after all, the individual has practically no political power, but you cannot deny it is a useful one.

These are some aspects of the king-idea, not fanciful or sycophantic, but solid and practical.

. . . . . .

Now, to return.

We had asked the elemental question: Does the concept of the British Constitution, or any essential major section of it (the four main legs), conflict with human nature?

We decided that the constitutional-democratic section of it did not. What of the monarchy? Bear in mind that we are talking of the average human, not me or you, who may be intellectually un-average, but the broad mass.

We saw that historically the concept had not been noticeably unnatural to humanity. We now agree, I think, that amongst a broad section of contemporary humans—especially those with whom we are particularly concerned in England and the Empire, where it is tradition-as-a-fact—it is not strikingly foreign either, so far as one can notice.

. . . . . .

We now pass to our own special estimation of the theoretical *Practicability of the British System*, under the headings: Workability, in peace and war; Stability, in peace and war; and Durability.

WORKABILITY

In Peace: Under analysis the architecture of the British system is logical, and its workability is unquestioned.

In War: It has been agreed that for war an authoritarian régime is more efficient than a purely democratic, therefore the efficiency in war of government systems which in peace are non-autocratic will be judged according to how swiftly and how completely they can, on necessity, be transmuted to the other form.

We saw that the ready adaptability of the British system confers on it a high degree of workability in war as it stands—that is, without altering its essential form. As to readiness for war, that will always depend on the human wide-awakeness of Parliament to effect the gear-change in time. To the extent that this change takes time to become complete (*i.e.* virtual dictatorship in various departments), but only to this extent, the British system is, at the beginning, less efficient in war than a permanently authoritarian system.

The permanency of the Civil Service is a factor rendering this change more readily effective than in the American system.

Conclusion: The British system is shown to promise a workability (*a*) in peace, of a high degree; (*b*) in war, of an adequate degree—depending on the foresight of Parliament, *i.e.* the community.

STABILITY

Apart from gradual change, experience shows that only two things radically alter the form of government of a country (which is another way of saying terminate the stability of a given régime), and they are: Defeat in war; Revolution.

Therefore, in examining the British formula as regards its promise of stability we must examine its provisions against these two things.

As regards defeat in war, we note that there are provisions for defence, for changing over to an authoritarian gear, for maintaining the community in an unified outlook. These provisions seem adequate not only for keeping the community stable in war but for preserving the system.

As regards revolution, we must enlarge. A definition (*Concise Oxford Dictionary*) of revolution is " forcible substitution by subjects of new . . . ruler or polity for the old." Democracy, by the very essence of its structure, has the strongest of all provisions against revolution: (*a*) if a change of polity is desired by a sufficient number, a majority, it can be effected by vote, unforcibly; (*b*) if such a change is desired by a minority, then, contrary to an autocracy, their views and grievances can be tabled and debated. If, however, a minority should illegally attempt such a change by force, the British system is seen to possess the machinery to resist and quell it. Thus, therefore, against forcible and radical change in the basic formula—which would mean in effect the termination of the formula—the British system is seen to be provided.

But stability, in our connotation, means more than that. It means ability to withstand change in the basic formula, *in any essential particular*—in this case, the four legs: Crown, Cabinet, Parliament, Constitution—while continuing to effect government during changing economic and other conditions of peace (and war) as month follows month and year follows year. We saw that the machinery of the British system was adequate for government in peace or war at, one might say, any given instant; it now remains to see if the conditions hold for successive instants in the lives of the community. We here examine not only mathematically but psychologically. For a human community, to remain continuously equable from month to month and year to year under any régime demands two 'human' requisites:

(*a*) The community want to 'know where they stand' as regards government, so that they can map out their lives and the lives of their children. In short, they want some obvious and concrete pledges of *consistency* in the régime.

(*b*) There must be no essential ingredient in the system which is contrary to prevailing human nature.

First, (*a*). In dictator States this pledge of consistency is only the word of the dictator. In U.S.A. it is *solely* the ancient written Constitution, which is basic in principle but gives no assurance of consistency of interpretative measures or policy between administration and administration, or year and year. In the British system there exist three obvious and concrete assurances of consistency between administration and administration, or year and year, (i) in the Constitution, of which new parliamentary measures become, and remain, part; (ii) in the immovability of the hereditary monarch; (iii) in the permanent Civil Service.

Second, (*b*). In the basic democratic structure of the British system there is nothing that conflicts with the broad mass of human nature. In the Constitution, which hearkens to expressed human rights, there is nothing inherently contrary. The king-idea on analysis is shown to be, it is considered, not unpalatable to the major portion of the total community cross-section.

Conclusion.—The promise of stability of the British system is judged to be high.

DURABILITY

It is evident that the elements of stability in a political formula such as will give sustained and orderly government to a community, maintaining the safety of the State and vouchsafing self-respect to its citizens through all the domestic and foreign hazards in the life of a great nation—that elements which promise such a degree of stability for a few years must figure in some shape, and figure centrally, in any formula that is going to be of continuing use for generations.

Such elements the British system has been shown to possess.

These I would call the elements of rational political structure. In view of unpredictable events, both internal and external, economic or otherwise, it is an important point that, for durability, the component parts of this structure should not be made too rigid. Here, we considered—as did certain American commentators—might be a fault in the American Constitution: inflexibility.

But durability of a form of government designed to last usefully for generations—or for hundreds of years, for honest people legislating for the happiness of millions both living and yet unborn should not experiment fitfully—involves more than these legalistic elements. If it is to keep succeeding generations of human beings contented under its government, surely it does not need history to tell us that primarily

it must, it inescapably must, be based on justice and liberty. Freedom of the human mind and the human spirit. These are not glorious ideals; they are political necessities to a régime that would endure. It is absence of revolution that mathematically spells durability. And that absence of revolution in a community for hundreds of years—you know it instinctively—can only be conceived where these two are given respect. Freedom, in fact, cannot be submerged indefinitely, nor justice, any more than truth; and the political formula which is legislating for durability will build on them, in spite of the loopholes they plainly will give for fleabites of insubordination and disrespectful criticism. This the British system does. As well, of course, as the American.

I have said that these two corner-stones are, after rational political structure, a primary requisite for durability. Between them they cater for the intellect (rational structure) and the spirit. Under a formula of these alone, thus limited, like a set of logical rules and good precepts, one can picture a community preparing to live together without strife or mutual resentment. But is that enough ?

For a community to endure, in accordance with a certain political formula—which is the subject of this book—requires that the community maintains throughout, *and senses in itself throughout*, recognisable and individualistic characteristics. Otherwise, we might as well be talking biology and the simple continuation of the species. Now, a nation may submit to a set of rules for ten years or a hundred years, but does that in itself confer this community sentience ? No; for a community of human individuals there is required something warmer and more human than a set of rules or abstract precepts. What is required in addition is the warm blood of sentiment. What other blood is there in the life of a nation ?

The sentiment of a nation is Tradition.

It is composed of sentiment about the present, but more particularly about the past. There is the sentiment inspired by the commonly-shared personalities, events, and literature of the present; and the sentiment inspired by the commonly-shared personalities, great events, struggles and victories, and literature of the past, *of their own community*.

Remember how Hitler said: " If popular support and power are united together and can endure for a certain time, then an authority may arise which is based on *a still stronger foundation*, namely, the authority of tradition " (*Mein Kampf*, p. 286).

Look how Stalin, despite the fact that the Revolution was to produce something new and objurgate everything of the past, now, in the grip

of practicalities, invokes and accents nationality, the history of the past, its emperors, its struggles, its victories.

Look how America manfully tries to heroify the pioneers' brushes with the Indians, through a paucity of material, because it does not wish generally to admit that all Britain's history before 1780 is really her own.

So this is the third requisite for durability in a régime. First, rational political structure; second, principles of liberty and justice. Now, national tradition.

Does the British system possess an adequate portion of this third useful adjunct? It does, of course, abundantly. In fact—and this is an exceptionally useful factor, unique to the British system amongst those we have examined—the Constitution itself is actually a distillation of tradition, which cannot be forgotten because it is every day in use. Moreover, not only is the continuity of the nation impersonally symbolised in the Constitution, it is personally symbolised in a human being of flesh and blood—the hereditary monarch.

CONCLUSION ON DURABILITY: If the British system can be shown, in practice, to have a rational political structure, then the chances of durability are the highest we have yet examined.

GENERAL CONCLUSION ON THE TEST OF PRACTICABILITY

Though its workability and stability may be argued to be inferior to certain other test systems over short test periods, owing to the latitude it allows its subjects in the name of liberty, it is none the less seen to possess the machinery to meet circumstances of emergency, and to survive. Its chances of durability, however, explicitly on account of this elasticity—which can allow within its unbroken framework wide variations of complexion between the extremes of authoritarianism and socialism—are considered to be second to none.

Altogether, I think we are justified in saying, theoretically, that in its promise of the combination of workability, stability, and durability —all three—it is by far the best so far.

. . . . . .

TEST OF ACTUAL PRACTICE

We saw that the British system in its growth had reached its present form of constitutionally-controlled Crown, Cabinet, Parliament, Constitution, at the Restoration of 1660 after the Protectorate—that is, nearly three hundred years ago—and during that time this precise form has not changed.

Truthfully its form has not changed; but in practice its complexion has, precisely as we saw, theoretically, was possible.

The complexion of the system has changed because the complexion of one of its components—the Constitution—is progressively changing, by the accretion of new parliamentary laws in each administration which automatically become part of the Constitution.

Now compare that with the American system. Its complexion, a non-socialistic democracy, cannot change, because its Constitution is fixed. In this fixed Constitution there are no provisions, for example, for Socialism (State ownership of means of production, etc.); and it lays down that any prerogatives it does not specify it does not possess, but are possessed by the separate States. Any socialistic measures an administration may enact do not become part of the Constitution—unless they (*i.e.* the Americans) alter the Constitution, when it would be no longer *this* American system, in which, constitutionally, the Constitution is fixed. Otherwise, they would be copying the British system. That is one of the differences.

Thus, in practice of the British system, we have seen in the last three hundred years many variations in complexion: variations in the strictness of control of the King; variations in the power assigned to the Cabinet (with a new useful form under a Prime Minister in 1714, and with a useful accretion of permanent functionaries—the Civil Service); variations in the form (the development of the two-party system from 1678) and in the representation of Parliament itself; and, more broadly, quite wide variations in the general complexion of government, far along the road to temporary autocracy on the one hand, and far along the road to Socialism on the other.

Therefore, whereas, in this section, it is our duty to examine this system in actual practice as to (*a*) workability in peace and war, (*b*) stability, it is difficult when that practice extends over three hundred years in a variety of complexions to examine all the salient facts and yet be concise. It must suffice, therefore, to examine one complexion only, the present-day one, in relation to the modern conditions that confront it—for that is, after all, our overwhelming consideration in this whole book—and to leave the wider review for the next section, the test of Time.

What is the present complexion? Let us look at a recent time when England may be said to have been at peace having settled down after a war: see if and how it has changed since; and examine (*a*) its workability, (*b*) its stability, under the conditions that have confronted it.

In the early nineteen-twenties the form was, as ever, Crown, Cabinet, Parliament, Constitution; but these four instruments each have a twentieth-century complexion.

CROWN: The monarch at that time had been reigning for about fifteen years, and during that time he had never shown any disposition to resent or flout constitutional control, so that that control, which had last been radically tightened to curb George III, was under no necessity of alteration. It still left the Crown the sole mouthpiece of the executive (he must sign all enactments), and with initiative—as most usefully displayed on occasion—of questioning the wisdom of projected government measures, of summoning disputants to conference, and thereby of ameliorating threatened disturbances. This King, a second son, had served in the Navy, and though strictly preserving the dignity of his office was notably democratic. His second son, later to be King, had married a British commoner, and his third son was to do likewise.

CABINET: The Cabinet consisted of a Prime Minister and his team of ministers, each in charge of a special department of government: home affairs, finance, foreign affairs, agriculture, transport, labour, health, etc. After each minister had decided on his policy—divulged to and open to criticism by Parliament—and issued orders, the further working and organisation of each department, from the central office in London to its farthest ramifications in the country and beyond, was in the hands of whole-time executives, mentally tested before enrolment and thence permanently employed and trained in their special department: the permanent Civil Service.

Since the majority of members in the House of Commons at that time voted with the Conservative Party, the Cabinet was drawn from the party—which accordingly represented the majority will of the community—and they governed, in general, according to the programme of the party uttered at the previous election. But in view of the sweeping social reforms of the earlier part of the century which were now part of the Constitution, of the further steps towards socialisation which the war had caused, and of the strength of the Labour Party, which was the vociferous critical Opposition in the House, the Conservative Party was no longer the Conservative Party of the last century, but a highly liberalised and socialised one.

As regards power of the Cabinet: as there were no emergencies in the air either at home or abroad at that time (the General Strike inspired by Russia came in 1926), no emergency powers were vested in the Cabinet; so that though they had power to govern and to force the acceptance of their government, they had no power to interfere with the liberty of the subject beyond the limits laid down in the Constitution. Thus they could not compel a citizen to fight in defence of his country, nor could they appropriate his property for that purpose without his consent.

PARLIAMENT: Parliament consisted of two houses, the House of Lords and the House of Commons; but since 1910, when the Parliament Bill had deprived the Lords of any power of veto against any measure passed by the Commons, the total disposal of legislation had manifestly lain with the Commons alone.

(Note what G. M. Trevelyan says on the topic in reference to evidence of the Crown's prerogative and value (this was a question of a budget which Commons had passed but the Lords rejected): "George V, after the second election had confirmed the result of the first, *compelled* the peers to pass the Parliament Bill, by using, at Asquith's behest, the same method of a threatened creation of peers *en masse* as William IV had, at Grey's dictation, employed to pass the first Reform Bill. Again, the prerogatives of the Crown had proved the weapon of democracy, a fact which helped to move the working classes still further from a republican doctrine.")

As regards the composition of this Parliament (Commons), since the franchise had been enlarged in 1918 to include women, it represented every section of the community and every individual over the age of twenty-one. Members were elected for the life of the Parliament only, which had recently been on an average three or four years—but had been as low as a few months or as much as seven years—and they had to offer themselves for competitive election again.

The two-party system, which had been useful for so long by reason of perpetual constructive opposition, was again in vogue, at this time the two most substantial parties being called Conservative and Labour. From the party which had the greater number of supporters in the House the members of the Government were drawn, and this party was consequently called the Government, the other party forming the Opposition.

As explained before, the Cabinet, when called upon by Parliament —by questions of members—had to render an account and reasons for their stewardship. If the majority of the individuals of the House should be at any time dissatisfied with this stewardship (when dissatisfied members of the Government party crossed the House to vote with the Opposition), the Government could be defeated and flung out of office. This could be the cause of a general election, when the question at issue could be decided by the general public at the election booths. If, as a result of a general election, the party that was previously the Opposition gained the major number of seats, it would become the Government party, and its Cabinet would govern, in the fire of the criticism of the new Opposition.

The Cabinet, as we say, carried out the government of the country,

but it did not have the power to make new laws to be added to the Constitution: only Parliament could do that. Such proposed new laws are put before the House as bills which have to be openly debated, considered in this way three times by both Houses, and are only passed into law when the King has given his signature. Such bills may be proposed by the Government or by private individuals.

CONSTITUTION: The Constitution at that time had a complexion superficially very different from that of several hundred years ago, or even one hundred. The corner-stone principles of justice and liberty, enshrined in such past parliamentary procedures as Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus Act and Bill of Rights, were always basically embedded in it, had never been contested, and were always paramount, but the newer colour of more recent acts gave a more striking impression.

Take a glimpse, for comparison, at the Constitution of a hundred years ago. Then the franchise was restricted to substantial owners of land, and thus the landlord class had an absolute monopoly of political power. They were still bounded from extremes of abuse by the enshrined corner-stones mentioned above, but these things are—justice and liberty—when all is said and done, a matter of interpretation; and the interpretation of the man in the street, and in the field, and in the factory (which was but now coming into existence) was hardly guaranteed to be the interpretation of the unexceptionably aristocratic Legislature. It was the early days of the Industrial Revolution, with the synchronous striking rise in the population which necessitated the enclosure of land (Enclosure Acts) to increase agriculture and feed it. With the rapid fading of 'rural England,' life became unquestionably and suddenly harder for the greater portion of the increasing community, and these striking changes required for their adjustment striking measures. Needless to say, the measures were not automatically included in the Constitution, or even very quickly, because it was not exactly easy to see what these changes should be. This time saw the birth of the 'working-class movement.' It also saw the ignorant reaction to it with, in 1819, the hysterical suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, and Peterloo.

This, then, was the complexion of the Constitution a hundred years ago, basically the same as now in corner-stone principles but coloured by the attitude and training of an exclusively aristocratic Legislature vainly striving against recognition of the march of progress. Now, in the early nineteen-twenties, we see the same instrument, vastly changed by the mighty Reform Bill of 1833, and more recently overlain by the widely-embracing, penetrating, and world-leading

social measures of the Liberal Government of 1906–15. "Measures of social reform," says G. M. Trevelyan, "on a scale beyond all precedent." Old Age Pensions; Democratic Budgets, to shift more taxation on to the wealthy; Workmen's Compensation; Miners' Eight Hours; Medical Inspection of Children, and the Children's Bill; the Town Planning Act; the Sweated Indentures Act; Measures of Unemployment and Health Insurance; the Small Holdings Act for rural districts; and others. These things placed England far in advance of the world in social legislation. And this is the complexion of the same Constitution at the beginning of the present period.

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With what degree of success has this system, comprised of the four parts thus specified, functioned for this present twenty years in Actual Practice?

WORKABILITY

Primarily, has the community been an ordered community under it (has it governed?); and secondarily, has the community, under it, maintained self-respect and security?

(*a*) IN PEACE: In the time of peace—up till 1939—in the period under review, there is no question that the system has worked in actual practice; because, very simply, the community remained recognisably the same community, throughout the time it continued in general orderly and well-regulated. (The General Strike and other incidents are discussed under: Stability. 'Security' is under: In War.) As for self-respect, they continued in general as contented as—perhaps more than—any other community in the world. Finally, the system did not change.

Indeed, not even the complexion of any of the four parts changed during that time, save only the last, which is, of course, perpetually while it lives showing signs of growth.

This was a noteworthy incident regarding the Crown. In 1936 a new King, Edward VIII, after a reign of eleven months was determined to take a matrimonial step which was contrary to the advice of his ministers; being thoroughly constitutional, and in order to avoid an impossible position, he abdicated in favour of his brother. Thus the hereditary succession was unchanged, and the system remained unimpaired.

These were some of the accretions to the Constitution to meet newly developed conditions in history; the Local Government Act of 1928; the Statute of Westminster of 1931, giving new legal status to the

Dominions; the Act of 1935, offering Responsible Self-Government and Federal Constitution to India.

CONCLUSION: Its workability has proved high in peace.

(*b*) IN WAR: I think we can say that thus far, 1943, it has proved pretty workable in war, too. At least, the system is still the same, and the British as an ordered community are still in existence—very much so.

Let us see how *it*, the adaptable democratic system, does it; for we have already agreed that the best political form for waging war is an autocratic one.

This is how it did it. Voluntarily giving up for the nonce its prized liberties, it deftly turned itself into an autocratic form. Assembled Parliament (carrying the mandate of the people) within a day passed legislation—the requisite number of times through both Houses and signed by the King—granting emergency powers to the Cabinet commanded by the Prime Minister. Read the Emergency Powers Act of 1939 and see the extraordinary powers placed in the hands of the Cabinet for the duration of the emergency.

The Prime Minister, who, legally, assumed the portfolio of Minister of Defence, is thus able to define the position:

"The Minister of Defence represents the Service Ministers in the War Cabinet, and he, in the name of the War Cabinet and subject to its accord, *directs the conduct of the war*. Why, then, it is asked, have we not got on the civilian side another similar minister . . . . who would equally *direct and concert the whole home front*, or a great part of it? *The answer is this: The Minister of Defence is also Prime Minister*, and he can therefore exercise his general function of superintendence and direction without impinging upon the constitutional responsibilities of the Service Ministers." (Statement in Parliament by the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, January 22nd, 1941.)

Note that the system has not crumbled, however. It is still the same. The Crown still the titular executive; Parliament still exists, too, as critic, and inquisitor, and public guardian. Also, it is still able at any time to cast out the team which it has given such spectacular power, and replace it with another in which it has more confidence; and this we actually saw it do in June 1940. The Constitution is still applied, universally: a Constitution added to, and here and there temporarily modified by, this new Act.

Nor is this the first time such an alignment has been taken up by the British system. In the 1914–18 War Mr. Lloyd-George had precisely equivalent "wide powers to deal over the whole field" (Churchill, January 22nd, 1941).

CONCLUSION: That government can, in actual practice, continue under the new alignment is, of course, just a matter of stating the obvious. The question of War Plan does not enter into our thesis. So we conclude that the workability of the British system in war also has been proved.

STABILITY

What has been the stability of the community under the British system of government during the period under review?

It would be easy to reply that the community lived constantly governed by it, and during the time the precise four-sided formula remained unchanged. But though perfectly true, that statement is not comprehensive enough. To illustrate stability of a system it is not sufficient to point out survival—as, for instance, the Mexicans might do after having just had a revolution.

Stability means a continued use of the precise system, but under it a lack or, rather, comparative lack, of disturbances that rock the boat—in other words, that interfere with the equilibrium of the community. (Greater disturbances that result in revolution, or complete change of formula, or drastic modification of it—as in Russia—connote, of course, a primary failure in workability.)

Note we said a *comparative* lack of disturbances. Since we are too sensible to expect perfection, we know that no form of government could conceivably guarantee freedom from civil unrest. (For instance, the 'perfectly contented and unanimous' dictator States, strangely, do not expect freedom from civil unrest—they prepare for it by a strong secret police, shootings, and floggings, and large prisons for the restless.) No Government could *guarantee* freedom from even considerable degrees of civil unrest, because such things can have quite fortuitous causes—such as floods, droughts, earthquake, pestilence, famine, all of which tend to cause extensive fear and hysteria; or, of course, war; or foreign agents who deliberately sow disaffection; or even one fanatic who may hypnotise whole groups of credulous people. These fortuitous phenomena cannot be legislated for.

Note.—The General Strike of 1926 was an unrest, partly of economic origin—in that a premature return to the Gold Standard necessitated, before adjustment was reached, an unpopular cut in wages in certain industries—and partly of what we have called 'fortuitous' origin. It is thus described in Bernard Pares's authoritative book (*Russia*).

"In 1926 the challenge of world revolution came to a head in England, which Marx had regarded as the vital test of success. When in September 1925 the Trades Union Congress welcomed the Russian

trade unionist leader, Tomsky, at Scarborough, it adopted from him the very programme by which the Bolsheviks had come into power in Russia: the T.U.C. was to claim obedience of all manual workers and practically take over the government of this country. The result was a most ironical failure. At the moment when the killing should have begun—' a heavy Civil War,' as Lenin had put it—the British workers were far too respectable for anything of the kind. Moscow was furious—especially at the football match between strikers and police, in which the strikers won by two goals to one and the Chief Constable's wife kicked off. Radek, the witty writer in *Pravda*, described the result as a bombshell. Trotsky was for going on. Stalin might reasonably have asked his opponent whether *all the abortive attempts at revolution in foreign countries* (my italics) had had any other result than the promotion of Fascism."

Fortuitous phenomena, we say, cannot be legislated for. What we have to decide is whether the ordinary *likely* causes of civil unrest have been provided against in the particular system; and, more vitally, whether such causes have not been intrinsically included in the actual instrument of government, the Constitution itself.

We have noted that in the American system—(1) Presidential elections, (2) impermanence of officials and administrative interpretation—such causes of potential boat-rocking are inherent.

Are they present in the British model? As far as we can see, no. General elections are part of the Constitution, but, without again entering into causes, the historical fact remains that they have not caused the disturbance, vituperation, and sharp community division of the American (Presidential) counterpart. That does not mean to say that this model is perfect; but a flexible Constitution which is continually budded by new acts made to ameliorate new dissatisfactions, in other words, a Constitution which profits and alters by experience, is not likely to have so many or so serious dissatisfactions in front of it as a rigid one. What do come will be new ones. For, of course, there must always be new problems.

These new problems seem to present themselves thicker and faster than ever in this modern world; and to an observer it is evident they are mainly economic—which immediately means social.

There is the perennial problem, in this age, of Unemployment. This may be a reproach on a form of government; but it is not a phenomenon which is peculiar to England: it exists in every industrial country. And it is no scientific cure to absorb them during peace-time in vast war-preparation of armaments. Indeed, it would seem that the more industrialised the country is, the more pronounced the prob-

lem is prone to be. Is it possible that the explanation of the problem lies in this very observation? Is it possible that the Industrial Revolution, which began mightily changing the world a hundred-odd years ago, is not yet complete? Look around. You know it shows no sign of being complete or of abating its pace. Listen to what a great historian says on this topic:

"Up to the Industrial Revolution, economic and social change, though continuing, has the pace of a slowly moving stream; but in the days of Watt and Stephenson it has acquired the momentum of water over a mill-dam, distracting to the eye of a spectator. Nor, for all its hurry, does it ever reach any pool at the bottom and resume its former leisurely advance. It is a cataract still. The French Revolution occupied a dozen years at most, but the Industrial Revolution may yet continue for as many hundred, creating and obliterating one form of economic and social life after another, so that the historian can never say, 'This or that is the normal state of England.' To speak, for example, in terms of traffic. Four successive civilisations of the riding-track, the canal and coach road, the railway, and the motor have been superimposed one on the other in the course of a hundred and sixty years" (G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England*).

So the Industrial Revolution still goes on, and each successive stage, each new development of the process, produces a further stream of the same by-product—Unemployment. The solution is not yet clear; but palliatives like unemployment relief in England, and the vast public works programme of the New Deal in America, are at least not explosive mixtures like an armament race.

As we said above, there must always be new problems in a changing world, and that is why a flexible accumulative Constitution is the highest insurance of stability.

But the proof of the pudding is the eating. Has that last statement been borne out? This is a true statement: apart from fortuitous events, and then not of serious effect, the British community under the British system in the period under review has undergone no serious breaches of civil equilibrium.

CONCLUSION ON STABILITY: In actual practice, in a reviewed test period of modern conditions, the British system has proved reliably stable.

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GENERAL CONCLUSION ON THE TEST OF ACTUAL PRACTICE

A gruelling trial of the British system of government in a large community, during a period of peace in the velocity of the Industrial

Revolution, and during four years of a war in which it was swiftly and closely and totally embattled—in degree of these latter respects being differently placed from America—has shown it to be both workable and stable in a high degree.

. . . . . .

The Test of Time

Here is the crucial test.

Without any equivocation, we are able to say the British system has been subjected to the test.

Unaltered, it has lived through a thousand vicissitudes and hundreds of years; unaltered, it has led a community up to greatness and maintained it there, from a rural five million to a forty-five million in the jostling van of competitive industrialism, with dominion over four hundred and fifty million and influence over the rest of the earth, proving adequate in every situation and every successive age.

At the very least, one quality must be allowed to such a formula—utility. There exists no higher recommendation for a political system.

Let us look at some of these vicissitudes—with many of which we did not credit America.

First, let us make up our minds what are political vicissitudes. They are, of course, matters which are seen to upset the equilibrium of a State; and, as a pyramid is not pushed over by a child, so a large State cannot be said to have its equilibrium disturbed by, for instance, a small local disorder

Note this: *disorder*, which is actual or threatened non-compliance with the laws of the State, is essential to our definition—for otherwise the State would require to take no rectifying measures, and so far from having its equilibrium disturbed would plainly remain quite unaffected. Thus conflict or attack, actual or threatened, on the laws of the State, is the crux: in short, attack on the State.

This attack may come from without or within. From without, it may range in degree from customs evasions, or spy activities, up to an assault of total war. From within, from petty larceny, or incitement to mutiny, up to civil war. All these things require the State to take defensive measures; and according to the degree of these necessitated measures, compared with the size of the State, so they may or may not be admitted under our restricted definition of 'political vicissitudes.'

We have now come to the point, therefore, where we can make the definition: a political vicissitude in our context is a disorder which it requires a major measure of the State to correct. These measures

may be summary (military or police) or ameliorative (concessional or legislative).

From our knowledge of history, these are the most important political vicissitudes, in order of severity:

(A) From External Causes

(1) *Forcible attempt to seize, destroy, or disrupt the Government, by a foreign Power.* The reason may be economic, ideological (religious), or dynastic. The defensive measure this necessitates is war. It may vary in degree from total war, requiring 100 per cent. of State effort, to what may be described as frontier brushes; but under this heading we only put the higher categories: *defensive foreign wars of first degree.*

(2) *Other foreign wars of minor degree.* These may be wars of policy compelled by the action or attitude of foreign states or tribes, and may be argued as offensive or defensive. But since the actual existence of the Government is not the primary stake, these wars are not *ipso facto* of first degree.

(3) *Piracy, etc.* At various times in history, as Rome, Spain, China, etc., found, this vicissitude has required considerable State measures to adjust. This is one reason for maintaining a navy, which, after all, is a fairly considerable State measure.

(4) *Foreign propaganda, etc., including the activities of spies and foreign agents.* Throughout history this has always been a vicissitude to be watched, as France found only recently, and an alert State will supply counter-measures.

(B) Due to Internal Causes

Isolated crimes—which are acts against the State in the interpretation that they are punishable by law—and individual acts of sedition—which, like propaganda, are agitations against the authority of the State—are always within the power of an alert State to control without major expenditure of effort. Hence ordinary penal disorders do not come into this category. More organised crimes, to wit, gangsterdom, are also within the power of an alert State to control—unless there should be inherent in the statutes of the State some irremovable circumstance that conduces to the perpetuation of the crime, when its control will be much more difficult without alteration of the statutes. (The statute in the American Constitution which discourages permanence, and hence pecuniary independence, in government officials—high officers of the law, etc.—encourages a

venal outlook, and it is not surprising that many of them have fallen to bribery and allowed organised crime to flourish. A continuance of such organised crime is a reproach to a State; and by the prominence given to it in America in press, literature and cinema, and by the famous reputations established by certain men as 'gang-busters,' amongst whom a presidential nominee, it would seem that the circumstance there has at times risen to the level of a serious political vicissitude. It is to be remembered that many incidents of non-observance of law reported in the United States that receive prominence are beyond the province of the Federal Government (and the Constitution) to control, it being the prerogative of the individual State concerned.)

Therefore, internal political vicissitudes sufficient to demand major measures by a large State can, faithfully, only be disorders of *groups*, and large *groups*, though possibly with small beginnings.

What factors do disorder large groups in a community—that is, set them in defiance of State authority, either threatened or open? Many factors. And this is worth noting, for such is human nature: any factor, no matter how apparently unfundamental, can, if aggravated, lead to violence and bloodshed (and we in our lives have seen women welcome violence—for votes). I wonder how many thousands or millions died for Arianism! So a great variety of factors can, depending on the number of people influenced, bring upon a State an insurrection (small numbers), a rebellion (larger numbers), or full-scale civil war. Of course, mild aggravation will merely cause unrest; but even so, if large numbers are involved, major measures of the State will be required to ameliorate the matter.

Note.—Each factor can cause, in degree, either insurrection, rebellion, or civil war. Such factors are:

(1) *Forcible attempt to seize supremacy or State control by an internal group.* This is, of course, always a major vicissitude. The contending group assembles adherents and makes the assault. It is a common story in the history of all countries that are not, or have not always been, democracies. In a democracy, State control is in the hands of an elected Parliament, who entrust and can withdraw special authorities. It is a vicissitude that neither the England of this discussion nor America has had to face.

(2) *Religious and ideological factors.* There is no need to recapitulate the long and shocking disorders and civil wars that have torn nations in the past on these grounds.

(3) *Economic factors.* There is one consideration that all individuals on earth hold in common to be important, and to each

individual it is a private consideration of more importance than all others: life, the continuation of existence.

That is why the means of existence—food, and, in cold countries, heat and clothing—form one of the fundamental factors of politics. People will fight for life and the means of life in spite of laws. That is why want automatically means political disorder. And a wide distribution of want means wide political disorder. Poverty to a degree which spells want means the same thing.

No matter what causes want; whether it be an inequitable distribution of wealth, due to a badly adjusted economic system; or whether it be a fortuitous circumstance over which the State has no control, such as a famine or a breakdown in the means of distribution by wars or floods, etc.; there will inevitably be political disturbance. There is no need to advance all the instances from history. Some revolutions have been largely caused by it, such as the French; most others have been facilitated or precipitated by it, such as the Russian.

(4) *Political factors.* Man is a political animal.

All human beings have an instinctive idea, sometimes uninstructedly hazy, sometimes instructedly clear, of their human rights: rights of differentiation from the animals, rights of life and freedom. For these instinctive rights, man will instinctively fight. Any political system—which means no more than the rules of a community—to have any chance of survival, must therefore automatically include these rights, which by this simple process of inclusion in the rules have become political rights. As the community becomes larger and more complicated, these simple rights require interpretation in the light of each new complication. These interpretations are the particular community's system of laws.

Man, as we say, will instinctively fight for his rights; therefore, as the anatomy of a community changes with the march of time from complication to new complication, it is inevitable, not probable but instinctive, that the community, or the section of it affected, will fight for a ' rightful ' adjustment of the constitutional laws to meet each new complication.

This is the whole meaning of political struggle—which Marx so erroneously interpreted, for it is evident that there can never be any permanent adjustment. This is the explanation of all the political disorders of history. Rights !—actual or imagined. For all political unrest, stimulated by this or that new complication, be it economic, religious, or other, is not, by nature of being unrest, correctly directed. Indeed, history has shown that many, based on misleading or incomplete premises, have been ignorantly wrong. So for ' rightful,' above,

we should have said: people will fight for *what they seriously think to be the rightful* adjustment.

It is clear that in the midst of complications of progress an uninstructed community will only have a hazy idea of their rights, and in consequence a less defined incentive to demonstrate; whereas in an instructed community, both idea and incentive will be clearer. So it follows, as is clearly shown in history, that all despotisms strive to keep the community ignorant. And, conversely, the history of free democracies must always be the history of political adjustment.

Such we find to have been the history of both England and America in, respectively, the last three centuries and one and a half.

For the political factors, therefore, which have caused civil unrest during this period of England's political system, we must review the new complications that confronted it, and looming gigantic over the rest will be found to be the upheaving, ceaselessly on-rolling complication of the Industrial Revolution.

. . . . . .

The above list of internal and external factors then, being the major political vicissitudes that may confront any State, constitute, we say, the only assessable events which really mark the passage of time in the history of a State. And most of them in heavy degree we have denied America.

Which of them have confronted England in the last three hundred years alone?

The term of life of both the Russian and German systems are too brief for these systems to be considered in the test of Time, but the American system has, after all, lived a century and a half, so let us, for comparison, keep glancing at it as we proceed to survey which of the factors have confronted Britain and how the system sustained them.

A. External Factors

(1) *Defensive foreign wars of first degree.*

G. M. Trevelyan says: "Modern England has four times fought with success a great war to prevent the conquest of Europe by a single Power: the Spain of Philip and the Inquisition, the France of the Grand Monarch and the Jesuits, the France of the Jacobins and Napoleon, and the German military monarchy of our own day (1914–18), have each in turn been foiled." That is to say, England was fighting to defend itself against conquest, and the last three of these occurred during the period under review.

(In an historical survey such as this section must be, I think it is

unscientific to include the present time, so we leave out of account the present war.)

Note.—Wars of defence against an aggressive Power are unavoidable, that is, cannot be charged against the political system.

Cf. America : America has fought no such wars, *i.e.* total national. Even in 1917–18 she did not have her back to the wall.

(This war may be different, and if so, it may—one never knows—bring some changes in the Constitution. An article by an American correspondent in the *Sunday Times* of March 8th, 1942, is interesting in this connection. It says: " Mr. Roosevelt, for one, turns a deaf ear to this outcry. He can easily do so, for, unlike the British Prime Minister, his resignation cannot be forced by parliamentary vote. The President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives are all able to nullify each other's will. This unsatisfactory state of affairs creates a feeling of futility in the case of any direct criticism of the President. Thus simultaneously with the cry for a younger and more vigorous Cabinet, *there is a call for revision introducing more flexibility into the Constitution.*")

(2) *Other foreign wars of minor degree* (*i.e. sub-total*).

In the last three hundred years England has fought scores, not to say hundreds, counting all affrays.

America has had several.

(3) *Piracy, etc.*

(4) *Foreign propaganda, including spies, etc.*

These are taken together because, in the period under review, none have required ' special ' major State measures, that is, have never risen to the level of being major political vicissitudes.

The same applies to America.

(We say no ' special ' occasional measures, because there has been a constant measure against piracy, etc., in the British Navy, of the world police work of which America has in the past availed itself along with other nations.)

Note.—All these are again unavoidable, it being beyond the power of the State to control their incidence; but the fact that they have been kept minor does reflect credit on the alertness and defence measures of the system.

B. Internal Factors

(1) *Forcible attempt to seize government—by an internal group.*

This is a hazard that should be preventable in a soundly organised State. Either it should be alert enough to nip-in-the-bud the attempt of a small number; or, if it is a larger number including a considerable

percentage of the community, it should have been wiser and removed the cause of dissatisfaction before they took to force.

There has been no single attempt to seize the control of government in England during the whole period.

Cf. America : In America there was a forcible dispute as to the propriety of the Federal Government mandate, which grew to become a bloody war lasting several years. The fact that the Civil War occurred and grew to such proportions is no credit to the American system. But this does emerge: the fact that such a terrible vicissitude did not smash that system, that it kept on living (practically unaltered) afterwards, proves a wonderful vitality. In that system must be enshrined a number of the imperishable political verities.

(2) *Religious factors.*

Though a serious cause of disorder before our era opens and for a few years after it, the Toleration Act of 1689 removed finally the major cause of religious faction in England.

Note.—This is an avoidable hazard, and history seems to show that it is avoided by toleration, which the British system constitutionally embodies.

Cf. America : The first amendment of 1791 added religious freedom to the American Constitution.

(3) *Economic factors.*

In our examination above, it was seen that these factors which lead to poverty and want amongst gross sections of the community are very often bound up with political factors. But not always. For instance, a severe drought will cause inevitable hardship amongst the agricultural population, and the incidence of this vicissitude has nothing to do with the Government. Again, coal may come to an end in a great mine, throwing men out of employment; or the market for a great industry may be lost owing to impossible foreign competition; neither of these could the Government have arrested. So we separate the fortuitous from the political, and in this section scrutinise only the fortuitous.

Has England had any fortuitous economic vicissitudes ?

In the last analysis it will be seen that the economic stability of a country depends on its natural resources. England has two main natural resources: its wonderful but, owing to size, restricted agriculture; and its coal. Whilst, therefore, England, and the world, remained rural, it had to face no grave economic vicissitudes. But with the coming of the Industrial Age, about the time America was founded, the avalanche of industrialism into which England entered before all other countries meant that agriculture became inevitably

neglected, and the economic resources of England became in general, apart from coal, artificial. Of course, they were not purely artificial —because the other overseas possessions which she then acquired gave rich reality in oil, cotton, rubber, etc.—but so far as the population in England was concerned they gave the appearance of artificiality in that a group thrown out of employment by one turn of the wheel could not automatically and readily find employment in another.

Cf. America: How different has been the story in America, with its teeming, almost illimitable resources of every type—*in the very country*. Not only could the 'Aladdin's lamp' find immediate and paying living for every one of its own inhabitants no matter how swiftly the wheel turned, up to the beginning of this century, but for scores of years it could find a bountiful living for countless others, as many as cared to come. Just glance at the immigration table again on page 196. And note this from the same author, C. F. Strong: "Up to the close of the nineteenth century, by far the largest number of American immigrants came from the (economically-straitened) British Isles," then Germany and Scandinavia.

This may be definitely said, putting the matter very conservatively: that during this era, and particularly during the last century and a half, England has had a greater share of economic vicissitudes, as distinct from political, than America has had to face.

(4) *Political factors.*

This book is not large enough to include a dissertation on the Industrial Revolution. The facts should be known. If not, they should be studied and grasped by anyone who would dare to talk about politics. Here is the skeleton again.

From the dawn of time until the eighteenth century, all articles for domestic, agricultural, or other purposes were made directly by a man using a manual tool, which itself had been made directly by a man. There was no mass-production, for only so many articles could be made as there were men employed in making them. Furthermore, each man required wages, so that there could be no gross industrial capitalism, which is concentration of capital in the hands of individuals—though fortunes could, of course, always be made from large agricultural holdings, from trading, and from plunder—for there was a limit to the number of men that could be employed, each making single articles. These workmen, too, could not be summarily dismissed, because they were irreplaceable, each one being a specialised craftsman. Since in some crafts high skill could only be attained by a lifetime of training, it was often handed down from father to son. With the coming of the machine, all this was changed. The machine made the article without

the touch of human hand, and it required only a comparatively unskilled—or, at least, easily trained—man to supervise the machine and keep it running. Suppose this machine made as many articles as a hundred men, the owner of the machine, having bought it, would make a profit on all the articles and only pay the wages of one man and ninety-nine men were thrown out of work. But there is no need for the owner to stop at one machine. And, again, later one man can supervise several machines, and be paid higher wages. Then we see mass-production and industrial capitalism. We also see an explanation of the sudden rocketing of the figures of unemployment. We see the meaning of Industrial Problems.

Of course, not all these people were permanently out of employment, because there sprang up collaterally new industries—for instance, the skilled industry of making the machines. And, further, since the articles are now cheaply produced, new untapped foreign markets are found for them (India, China, Africa), and the particular industry can grow, calling back men to unskilled, engine-tending employment, now perhaps in greater numbers than the original. These people can be tempted from the land with slightly higher wages.

If there were only one machine invention, made once, in one industry, it can be seen that in a short time, a few years, a balance would be struck, by taxing the owner and employing the ejected men—those who do not emigrate—in the enlarged industry. But there was not only one invention or one industry. Machines are adapted to every industry; each year since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution has seen new inventions; there are continual increasing improvements; the end is nowhere yet in sight. Progress !

It is clear that each invention and improvement entails a redistribution, a shift, of employed. But this is not all. With less people employed in agriculture, more food and other essential commodities must be imported from abroad, which automatically means a greater price for the commodity, an increase in the cost of living, and an automatic agitation for higher wages.

Thus not only can we truthfully say that the Industrial Revolution has never stood still for the last hundred and fifty years and still goes on, but also that Industrial Problems, which being interpreted mean political vicissitudes due to industrial causes, will unavoidably continue.

This is true, must be true, of every community where the Industrial Age has laid her hand—which means every country on earth, some more than others.

Of none has it been more powerfully true than England.

Other countries watched it grip England like—as it was—an

irresistible driving force. Other countries started, but for the better part of a century they never caught up, and long before that England had become not only the workshop but the banking-house of the world. By then, the turn of this century, some larger countries, Germany and America, were beginning to gain the advantage of their size, but right to the end—the period just before the last war—they never had caught up qualitatively, and England remained, as she had always been from the start, the world's most highly industrialised country. Not only did she blaze the way industrially, however: as an inevitable consequence she blazed the way in Industrial Problems. In Industrial Political Vicissitudes.

Yes, England has had many industrial political vicissitudes, particularly in the last century and a half. As a pioneer, not knowing where each step forward was leading, she has borne the brunt of them, being, as it were, an experimental laboratory for the rest of the world to watch and learn from. For this reason, she had perhaps more of them; but this fact—unless we are to blame England for the industrial stirring of the world—cannot be a reproach to England. Certainly, it cannot be a reproach to her political system.

Indeed, surely the fact that the system has had so many political vicissitudes and has, during that time, retained constantly and steadily its same four-fold form constitutes the opposite of a reproach to the system, but rather a triumph.

. . . . . .

Conclusion on the Test of Time

The British system, the direct evolutionary development of seven hundred years, is seen in its final form through a space of three hundred years to have experienced in good measure, severe in some cases, all the major vicissitudes which are likely to affect a State. This is considered to have been an adequate test of time.

During this period, the political system has stood firm and is still standing firm.

The British system passes the test of Time.

. . . . . .

The Dominions, Colonies, India

This book has become long enough.

Originally it was intended to show, by special reference to each section of it, how the British system embraces the whole Empire. This will not now be done. Only thus, briefly and collectively.

The Dominions

Each one has an interesting history which should be read.

The form of government in each one is *identically* the British system. Four-fold. None has seen fit to alter the system by one iota. Originally they were colonies, as America once was, governed from England. As they grew and became more capable, so they required, *and accepted*, less and less dictation in their own colonial Government; until, in 1931, by the Statute of Westminster, each one became a completely self-contained and sovereign Government. The political system of each still remained the same, four-fold: Crown, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Parliament, Constitution. And the King they all selected was, naturally, the same, the British King, because he was already their King; and he is now hereditary King of England, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa. Naturally, the Cabinets of each are comprised of different men; also the Parliament; and the Constitutions are by now different in the top layers of the latter years, since each Constitution is made up of its living Parliament's laws. But the form of each system is identical. It is the British system. And, in addition to the identity of the Crown, each Constitution has the same fundamentals back in British history, for these fundamentals are the direct, not borrowed but direct, birthright of all.

Here is Trevelyan: " Finally, in 1931, the Statute of Westminster has given legal form to the long-established custom that the Parliament of Great Britain should legislate for the Dominions only at their own request. Laws affecting succession to the Crown can be altered only with the concurrence of each of the Dominions, and the King can take no advice about appointments or other action in the Dominions except from Dominions statesmen. In the post-war world it is no longer Parliament but the Crown that links the Empire, in symbolism, in loyalty, and in law."

To this same system, therefore, but now as regards a widely-flung empire, we can put the tests of emotional appeal, of plausibility, of practicability, and of actual practice, and can give ourselves an answer —I think you will find it a positive answer—but it is too soon, although the thing has been growing in some places for as long as America, to put the test of Time. But it is not too soon to say this:

The political system we have examined exhaustively when applied to a large Anglo-Saxon community living in the British Isles, the same system which, growing and maturing for a thousand years, had remained unchanged and constantly effective for the last three hundred —this same system has proved equally effective as to both workability

in peace and war, and stability, in five other comparatively large and similar communities in far-distant parts of the earth.

. . . . . .

As regards India and the Colonies, this is not the place for a discussion on colonial administration and I do not intend to embark on one.

Our declared object is to find a suitable political formula for a community *such as ourselves*: the native races referred to are not yet, even a perceptible minority of them—though they may one day, with our encouragement and education, more closely approximate to—such as ourselves, so the subject is not expressly germane. Nevertheless this, which the Socialist Mr. Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, stated with regard to British colonial administration on January 10th, 1943, was said with complete truth:

"I would credit us also with laying the foundations of a good system of law and public administration. . . . I would credit us with a humane, decent, fair-minded attitude towards the less-advanced peoples in our charge. In these matters we have set an example which the enlightened world has been glad to follow."

THE SUMMING UP

WITHOUT being consulted, we were born under the British system of government, and when we grew up we found all sorts of self-assured people criticising it and comparing it unfavourably with other systems existing and functioning in other parts of the world. Some said loudly that the Russian system was the last word—" so advanced and rational ! "; some said the German system—" so efficient ! "; some said the American—" so modern and practical ! " Others had theories of their own which they enthusiastically harped on. Obviously they could not all be right. We knew that most of these talkers, being British themselves, were basing their enthusiasms on hearsay only. We decided that, not being less intelligent than most, we owed it, if only to our self-respect, to find out the truth of these matters. Indeed, we sat up sharply and asked ourselves the question : What, after all, is the best form of government ? Is there a ' best ' system for a community such as our own—for we did not want to end up with a good system for primitive savages ? If so, we reckoned that by careful exploration of all pertinent facts we should be able to decide upon it as well as the next man.

Primarily our common sense told us that a system that was to keep a memory-endowed community of human beings orderly for many years—for we would not be satisfied by a momentary method like disciplining them with a machine-gun—must be one that would be broadly consonant with human nature. So it would behove us to take cognisance of human nature, and also of history, which would tell us how human beings and communities had in fact behaved according to scientific record. We know this, that the two endowments which the human faculty of memory gives, and which distinguish men from animals, are reason and sentiment, and these always coexist in every individual ; so we decided that both must be given appropriate consideration in any sensible system.

Two things we accepted : first, *that perfection is unattainable*, so we knew that in our finally-found system we would have to be content with the best possible among imperfects ; and second, *that you can't please everyone*, so that if we did manage to find the best possible system for such a community, it would certainly not please everyone in the community. It possibly would not please us, the discoverers ; but if our reasoning faculties assured us that it was indeed the best discoverable for the community at large, we swore to face the fact and admit it.

So we defined our object. We were searching for a political formula by which a community such as ourselves can lead an orderly life, in self-respect and security, for successive generations.

We surveyed the question of political systems and we found that, innumerable as are the formulas, they all stand along a line at one extreme of which is a pure *autocracy*, at the other a pure *democracy*, and in between an almost infinite variety of combinations of the two, or *mixtures*. A pure autocracy has permanent State officials, totally, from the apex (autocrat) down, all being appointed from the apex; a pure democracy has temporary State officials, totally, from minor officials up, all being appointed from below by recurring vote; a mixture has some permanent (*e.g.* army) and some temporary, and according to the proportion of permanent or temporary so we have an approximation of the system towards the autocratic or democratic form.

Now, history tells us that, as a fact, the life of communities is divided into comparatively long periods of peace interrupted by comparatively short periods of war, isolated States being less frequently interrupted by war than where there is a cluster of different States, as in Europe. Plainly the political desiderata of the two circumstances are different, to wit: in war, maximum State control so that the community can act *as one*; in peace, community contentment. The object of each is, of course, in both cases the same, the *prevention of community disruption*. We saw that autocracy—where obedience can be readily exacted—is the optimum form for war, and democracy—where dissatisfactions can be aired and adjusted—is the optimum form for peace. It seemed therefore that logically the desirable system for a community that hoped for long life would be a mixture, largely democratic, for predominant peace, but which at any time that the trumpet sounds can be easily changed over to the autocratic gear, without essentially mutilating the life-structure of the system.

Russia was the first system we carefully analysed.

This was originally conceived as a pure democracy—a socialistic one called Communism, *i.e.* with State-ownership of goods and industry as opposed to private enterprise, capitalism—with no permanency of any State officials but a constant freely-elected shuttle. It was conceived on the principle that all individuals would naturally, without compulsion or the incentive of reward, work unselfishly for the common good. Being human ourselves, we immediately saw that it was founded on sand. It took for granted a universal willing unselfishness which may be ideal but is not human. We deduced it would not work. We saw in practice that it did not work. Indeed, it was never given a

start. It came into action during a chaotic time of revolution, and then immediately proceeded with a war. Perhaps reluctantly, but none the less factually, it started as an autocracy; and that machinery, an autocracy, with permanently appointed officials from the apex down, it has never discarded. We were consequently not surprised that it did not collapse when confronted with war. (Efficiency, though, is another matter, for a community of a hundred and eighty million, organised for twenty-three years by a 'best' system for all purposes, should surely without aid have stood undinted against a community a half or a third its size.)

So much for the democratic aspect; what of Socialism? From the Communist Manifesto we listed seven specific clauses in which dialectic materialism (Marx's Socialism) was defined: in actual practice of government we found in detail every one of them refuted, though there was a fair degree of State-ownership remaining (as, of course, there is in other countries). In fact we saw that the Russian system, whatever else it might be, was not Communism.

What, then, is the Russian system?

We saw clearly this historical fact: that starting from expressed intentions of strict Communism—a materialistic, international social-democracy—the Russian system has, apparently unwillingly but none the less *progressively*, marched *away from it step by step*.

(Towards what is it marching? might be asked.

It *is* already an autocracy, having abruptly become that, unadmittedly, in the beginning, so it can't be moving towards that; and if the solemn promises implied in Stalin's Constitution mean anything is to move *away* from that. It has shown no signs of idealistically moving back again towards its early aims of materialism, universal socialism, and internationalism—indeed, in response it would seem to undrivable political facts, that is human facts, quite progressively the reverse (this in the last instance, internationalism, being vividly signalised by the official dissolution of the Comintern on May 22nd, 1943)!

Towards what type of government, then, *is* the Russian system moving?

It is not given to humans to peer into the inscrutable future. We can only in our present moment note present appearances and present apparent tendencies: and one of these we found in Russia was a *perhaps reluctant but none the less progressive tendency towards liberalism*. Towards what, then, might this system be marching? It is conceivable that if this observed tendency is allowed by history to continue, if it is not interrupted by revolution or defeat, and par-

ticularly if it is facilitated by the implicitly promised eventual abrogation of the present dictatorship, it might indeed be marching towards such a form of liberalism as that reached in, for instance, Britain or America. Would that be so historically surprising? . . . But this is supposition.)

What is the Russian system now?

We saw that these two facts are indisputable: *de facto* autocracy, and co-existing professions of democratic-socialism. Accordingly only two interpretations could be drawn:

1. It is determined to retain the autocracy permanently—in which case the whole socialist soviet (democratic) profession is a lie; or

2. The democratic-socialist profession is true and the autocracy is intended to be only temporary—in which case the system cannot be regarded as settled but still in the stage of experiment.

Such an uncertain shifting thing we decided was not the stable system for which we were seeking.

Nazism we found was an extreme autocracy. In consequence we reckoned it would be suitable for war, because by its machinery alone it could make the nation act as one. It demanded unquestioning obedience to the autocrat and his permanently-appointed officials, or death. Now, in the enlightened countries of Europe which had been slowly educated (by England) in the dignity of broad human rights there had been no such old-fashioned autocracy for centuries. All such countries had experienced it in their history and all had, where the system had not wisely changed, rebelled. We saw the same thing surviving, or rather regalvanised, in politically-isolated Japan; but there it was not surprising, for that numerous but insular and far-away community had never been politically enlightened. By imperial policy the broad masses had never been educated to contemplate human rights, but, though they had learnt the use of machines, remained superstitious, believing, simple-mindedly, in the divinity of the emperor, and that even the thought of disobedience to him was mortal sin expiable only by suicide; believing they are a supreme race descended from the gods; believing also that death in war is to be earnestly sought because they are thereby translated straight to the Shinto myriad hierarchy of gods.

But how could a similar implicitly obedient autocracy be imposed on an enlighened European State? Thus, by catching the intelligent State at a psychologically receptive phase, a phase of sullen shame after military defeat and economic dissatisfaction unrelieved by the victors. "You were not defeated," they were told. "You are the most glorious race on earth. You are in fact a supreme race. We will

prove it—by conquering ! We can do it if you temporarily give up all personal liberties and unite in military obedience. We will do it ! You agree ? " Thus said the ambitious and clever man, Hitler. He sugared the disciplinary pill for the broad masses by promise of ' wonderful ' Socialism, while in confidence he told the powerful plutocrats of the country, whose financial aid he needed, that of course he never had any intention of giving the stupid broad masses their head. In time, by his campaign, he had enough in Germany agreeing with him to give him a useful party in the democratic Parliament, but the moment this minority party was given power by a lucky turn of the democratic wheel agreement was no longer asked. Extreme autocracy was put into action. That was how it came to happen in an enlightened State.

We saw that, like the man with a machine-gun, extreme autocracy can be imposed temporarily on any community—briefly, until fractions, stirred by human rights, develop enough initiative to rebel. Hitler for his purpose wanted it for more than a few brief months. He wanted it maintained for a few years of war-preparation, then, knowing the patriotic sentiment of the human species, he knew that in war it could be willingly maintained without fear of rebellion. Only in peace (or threatened war-defeat) is there fear of rebellion against autocracy. So what did he do ? We saw that from the moment of his accession he made the emotional outlook of Germany the outlook of war. We saw how he suppressed the enlightened initiative for rebellion by (1) force, (2) crushing of enlightenment. By all means of compulsory education he made the mind of Germany, the plastic and younger elements of it (while he suppressed the unplastic by force), as un-enlightened and superstitious as the Japanese. He made them eagerly and simple-mindedly kiss the rod.

We reckoned that this system would be workable and also stable in a community during an outlook of war—and this is also what we found in practice—but only during an outlook of war ! We reckoned, in view of human nature and history, it would not, and could not, long persist during an outlook of peace. The system would have to be realigned. It would have to be replaced by a different system. Now, Germany will some time be again at peace, either after defeat or after victory, and in either case the system will soon be replaced by another (the concept that after total victory perverted scientific ignorance can be perpetuated throughout the entire world for ever, apart from being from our point of view surely an undesirable result of a political system, is rationally absurd).

In short, we decided that this system, as it stands, would not last

in peace. Now, we in our search were looking for a system that *will last, as it stands, in peace as well as war*, so we logically turned from this explicit war system.

We examined the system of the United States.

Here we found a system that had as its objects our very own. They are sane and reasonable. It aims to give a community an orderly life; to permit individuals the maximum of contentment and self-respect by attaining their reasonable human rights while still maintaining order; and to ensure throughout the preservation or defence of the community.

Not ever expecting perfection, we found that the system to our theoretical satisfaction had provided for, and did in practice give, an all-in-all good realisation of the first two aims. We saw that there were, of course, in a hundred and fifty years of human history—affected latterly by the upheaving Industrial Revolution—a number of lapses from orderliness, some sharp and one grave and prolonged; but taking everything into consideration, and comparing with it the history of many other communities with different systems, it was altogether a very satisfactory record. This system in respect of these two important aims did deliver the goods; and if there had not been another important consideration, to wit, the preservation and defence of the community, we were compelled to admit that this system would have almost sufficiently answered our requirements. But there was, and there is always for any community, the important question of preservation and defence. And here was where we baulked at accepting the American system *in toto* for our own community in the island of England.

We reckoned that a community can preserve itself in the last analysis only by strength. To say anything else about kindly intentions or a sweet diplomatic smile is simply fatuous. Other things being equal, therefore, a large community is in a better case to preserve and defend itself than a small community. But are other things equal? We know from history that many times a small, well-organised community has defeated and disrupted far larger communities that were less well-organised—that were loosely organised. We saw in fact that in a community, in a political system, as in everything else, union is strength. And it did not satisfy us to say, this loosely-jointed community can be united in response to danger, therefore it is potentially strong: we said, it is not as strong as a community of the same size which is already a unity. There is this important question we put: will a loosely-jointed community always be able to transform itself into a temporary practical

unity *in time* to meet a sudden attack of a dangerous neighbour?—for one miscalculation, one only, can be fatal. Obviously, we saw, geography entered into the question.

Here is where we, in our geographical position alongside simmering Europe, looked askance at the American system. For the American system does not make a unity; it does not intend to; it makes a federation of self-governing States that are linked together by a council and some rules and an executive that, in peace-time, governs only a superficial part of their activities—nor is any part of this executive permanent; it is a continual short-term shuffle. The American community, we said, has three times our numbers, it is geographically distant (though getting less) from dangerous neighbours. In practice, perhaps because of these considerations—nay, almost certainly, particularly the obvious second—it has never yet been frontally attacked by a dangerous enemy; and, in consequence, so far this loosely-jointed system with interrupted control has served it well enough—but would it do for us? We live cheek by jowl with fractious Europe, where powerful nations are frequently warring and in arms, we have been vitally attacked in our history not once but many times—and never, until 1940, more vitally than in 1914–18, when the submarine attack nearly killed us. Would it be wise of us to dismember our unity, to snip all the threads of permanent political control, symbolical, sentimental, and practical, that keep us as a community at all times one? Would it be sensible?

That was the question we put to ourselves and we answered soberly, No. We want our orderliness, and we want our liberties; but equally, nay primarily, for without it the first two evaporate, we want our community preservation and defence. The system that we ought to choose is one that will show us in our particular circumstances a sound likelihood, sounder than the American one adduced, of ensuring us at the same time *all three*.

The British system, which is the summation of the political experience of a single community through nine hundred years of history, we found did give us all three.

It is a system that was hammered into its present shape not by political theorists but by the hard facts of community necessities. It was not a philosophical community experimenting with now this, now that, nor a mild one submitting to now this and now that despotism, but a vigorous one that demanded and grasped for itself rights and liberties; that by reason of its vigour and its unifying political system, not by its size, became a great Power in the world, and that for the last

century or so has been the head of the greatest empire the world has ever seen.

We saw that the system came to its fruition and its final form almost three hundred years ago, and that it consists of a permanent hereditary monarch, a changing Prime Minister and Cabinet with a permanent Civil Service, a changing Parliament elected by universal franchise, and a permanent Constitution which is perennially added to by Parliament to meet new conditions. We saw that under and by this precise system the British community grew from the comparative obscurity of the seventeenth century to its present greatness; under and by it it has weathered all the civil and political and military and economic storms of three hundred years, including the gathering and increasing storm of the Industrial Revolution, which wrecked the system of every other considerable community in Europe that was affected by it; under and by it, it, and it alone amongst attacked neighbours, on repeated occasions victoriously resisted the dangerous prolonged assault of a powerful close enemy whose strength was each time universally considered overwhelming. There must be a reason for these facts. We considered that this system exhibited at the very least utility, than which there is, and can be, no higher commendation for a political system. We saw finally that every part of this precise form, each limb and facet, Crown as much as Constitution, Cabinet and permanent Civil Service as much as free Parliament, was an inherent and intrinsic part of the flexible, articulated whole structure; and that no part, not one, could be safely dispensed with because each had been proved, by grim test and experience, of essential value.

It is our community, the British community, which this system has served in this way. The community of ourselves, to suit whom we were concerned to find a political formula of certain definite attributes.

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Thus we draw our final conclusion from the whole investigation.

We have been searching for a political formula by which our intellect is convinced that our own specially situated and great community is most likely to be assured of three simple things: an orderly life, self-respect for its individuals, enduring security.

This is the conclusion—which I soberly believe we have reached without self-deception, having regard only to true facts:

We have found such a formula, but only one, that with practical certainty can in the future assure our community these three things. There may exist other such formulas, but they are not amongst those that we have examined. Only one have we found, and that not ideally

simple, but, like life, somewhat complicated: that formula is the formula of the British system that we now possess and under which we are now living.

Let us with open eyes recognise the important truth of this discovery.

Let us do more; let us without vainglory, but calmly, be justly proud of our good and tested system. Indeed, with this knowledge, let us henceforth defend it against any sudden or essential change that would be brought by inimical, or impulsive, or ignorant people.

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I finish with a statement, which epitomises our own conclusions, by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill (October 9th, 1941):

" Alone among the nations of the world we have found the means to combine Empire and liberty. Alone among the peoples we have reconciled democracy and tradition; for long generations—nay, over several centuries—no mortal clash or religious or political gulf has opened in our midst; alone we have found the way to carry forward the glories of the past through all the storms, domestic and foreign, that have surged about, and thus to bring the labours of our forebears as a splendid inheritance for modern progressive democracy to enjoy."